Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason : Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions by Canale, Fernando Luis
Andrews University 
Digital Commons @ Andrews University 
Dissertations Graduate Research 
1983 
Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason : Time and 
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions 
Fernando Luis Canale 
Andrews University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons, and the Theory and 
Criticism Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Canale, Fernando Luis, "Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason : Time and Timelessness as Primordial 
Presuppositions" (1983). Dissertations. 22. 
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/dissertations/22 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Research at Digital Commons @ 
Andrews University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 




Thank you for your interest in the  
 
Andrews University Digital Library  
of Dissertations and Theses. 
 
 
Please honor the copyright of this document by 
not duplicating or distributing additional copies 
in any form without the author’s express written 
permission. Thanks for your cooperation. 
 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. 
While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce 
this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the 
quality of the material submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to heip clarify markings or 
notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. I f  it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This 
may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages 
to assure complete continuity.
2 . When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an 
indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, 
duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For 
blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. I f  
copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in 
the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, 
a definite method of “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is 
customary to begin filming at the upper left hand comer of a large sheet and to 
continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, 
sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on 
until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic 
means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted 
into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the 
Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best 




300 N. Zeefc Hoad 
Ann Arbor. Ml 48106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8318612
CANALE, FERNANDO LUIS
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON: TIME AND










Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Andrews University 
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON: 
TIME AND TIMELESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS
A Dissertation  
Presented in  Partia l Fu lfillm ent 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor o f Philosophy
by
Fernando Luis Canale 
March 1983
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON: 
TIME AND TIMELESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS
A d issertation  presented 
in partia l fu lf illm e n t o f the requirements 
fo r the degree 
Doctor o f Philosophy
by
Fernando Luis Canale
APPROVAL BY THE COMMITTEE
Raoul Dederen, Chairman 
Professor o f Theology
F ritz  Guy*' P 
of Theology
F. Hasel 
of Old Testament and 
Biblteal ThetSTog
C 2
irhard F. Hasel, Dean 
>DA Theological Seminary
Abraham TeriSnT'Associate 
Professor of Intertestamental 
and Early Christian L iteratures
Avery Dulles, Ordinary 
Professor o f Systematic 
Theology
Catholic University of America
Date Approved 'S f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
Chairman:
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON: 





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH 
Dissertation
Andrews University 
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary
T itle :  TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON: TIME AND TIME­
LESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL PRESUPPOSITIONS
Name of researcher: Fernando Luis Canale
Name and degree of faculty adviser: Raoul Dederen, Ph.D.
Date completed: March 1983
This investigation studies the p o s s ib ility  of developing a 
theological critic ism  of Christian theological reason. The in ves ti­
gation proceeds by developing a phenomenological analysis of three 
major contexts within which reason has been interpreted and u tiliz e d  
by Christian theology fo r the constitution of i ts  exegetical and sys­
tematic formulations: the philosophical, theological, and B ib lica l
contexts.
The philosophical context shows that the structure of reason 
requires the interpretation of Being's dimensionality which deter­
mines its  basic meaning and functioning. Moreover, i t  shows that 
Being's dimensionality has been interpreted in two ways: as time­
less and as temporal.
1
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2The theological context, through the analysis o f reason's 
procedures as a tool fo r the constitution of meaning in  Thomas 
Aquinas's and Rudolf Bultmann's systems, shows that theology has 
depended on philosophical c ritic ism  of reason and its  classical time­
less in te rp re ta tion  of Being's dimensionality. Thomas's system, and 
with him conservative theology, follows the A risto te lian  in te rp re ta ­
tion of reason while Bultmann's system, and with -him lib e ra l  
theology, follows the Kantian in terp retation .
The B ib lica l context, through the analysis of Exodus 3:14, 
the locus classicus fo r the discussion about Being in  S crip ture , 
shows that theological c ritic is m  of theological reason is  possible 
and that B ib lic a l re flec tio n  on Being in terprets  its  dim ensionality  
as temporal.
Moreover, considering the facts that the philosophical con­
text uncovers the hypothetical nature of reason, and that Christian  
theology is rooted in the conceptuality of the B ib lical re fle c tio n  
in which i t  is  grounded, i t  is  suggested th a t critic ism  of theo log i­
cal reason should be developed following the temporal in te rp re ta tio n  
of Being as rooted and developed *n Scriptures.
On th is  basis i t  is  further suggested that such a c ritic is m  
should be able to provide theology with the necessary s ta rtin g  point 
for advancing beyond the alternatives provided by the A ris to te lia n  
and Kantian in terpretations of reason that so fa r have conditioned 
the in terp re ta tion  and actual functioning of reason as a tool for 
the constitution of Christian theological meanings.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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INTRODUCTION
In our ecumenical era which s trives  toward Christian unity 
the existence of theological disagreements challenges the very foun­
dation of Christian theology as in te llec tu a l enterprise. This chal­
lenge reaches reason i t s e l f  which, as a tool fo r the constitution of 
meanings, conditions any theological disagreement or controversy.^
As an in te lle c tu a l enterprise, C hristian theology may be seen 
as theo-logia—that is  a re flec tion  ( lo g ia ) on God ( theos) . I t  is 
the log ia  of theology that makes i t  an in te llec tu a l enterprise. 
Moreover, the logia is  a constitutive element of theology. In other 
words, without logia there is  no theology. Logia as a constitutive  
element o f theology is ,  in  its  broadest sense, what is usually known 
as reason. The involvement of reason in the constitution of Chris­
tian thought and teachings (exegesis, creeds, and dogmatics) was
2
recognized early in the history of the C hristian church. Further­
more, the logia as the locus and ground fo r  the in te lle c tiv e  nature
Whoever is at least a l i t t l e  fa m ilia r  with the wide spectrum 
of current and h is to rica l theological re fle c tio n  needs no further 
evidence regarding the great variety of theological systems which 
often claim opposite ideas regarding the same issue. Examples of 
such disarray and even contradictory positions can be found in the 
second chapter of th is  dissertation where the Thomistic and 
Bultmannian systems are analyzed.
^See for instance Reinhold Seeberg's (History of Doctrines, 
2 vols. [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 197/J) commentary
on Justin Martyr (1 :11 -118), Tertu llian  (1:125, 126), and Clement of 
Alexandria (1:140, 152, 153). Cf. Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma,
7 vols. (New York: Dover, 1961), 2:1-17.
1
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2of Christian theology has provided the basis and viewpoint fo r var­
ious " c r it ic a l"  approaches to d iffe ren t aspects of Christian theo­
logy. In th is context logia appears not only as the essential ele­
ment fo r  the constitution of theological meanings but also as the 
ground from which the Christian theos has been so fa r  c r itic iz e d . 
However, in teresting ly  enough, logia i t s e l f  as ground fo r the c r i t i ­
cism of Christian theology has not as y e t been placed under c r i t i ­
cism.
Subtly but surely logia appears as the cognitive absolute
that conditions and determines the meaning of both theological under­
standing and discourse. Theological tru th , then, can only be per­
ceived, recognized, and accepted w ithin the categories and lim its
allowed by log ia.
Within th is  context i t  should be remembered that reason, as 
tra d it io n a lly  interpreted from a philosophical perspective, has been 
constituted by theology as the c rite rio n  o f "truth" u t il iz e d  fo r self 
critic ism  and the constitution of meanings. In th is sense reason has 
been used not only in natural theology but also in exegesis and 
dogmatics. Truth can be only that which is  allowed by reason and its  
p articu la r categories. I t  is obvious that th is description, as a 
generalization, is not to ta lly  precise, yet i t  points to the basic 
way in which the in terpretation  and function of reason has been
understood by most creative theologians and systems w ithin the Chris­
tian  Catholic-Protestant trad itions.
Yet the current state of d isarray, confusion, and lack of 
unity to which Christian theology has been led by th is  fundamental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3logia suggests the necessity that logia i t s e l f ,  the logia as involved 
in theological thinking and discourse, should be placed under inves­
tig a tio n  and critic ism .
This, precisely, is  the approach to be followed in this  
investigation. The p o s s ib ility  that the logia of theology may be 
c r it ic iz e d  by the theos instead of the theos by the lo g ia  w il l  be 
care fu lly  investigated.
The need of a c ritic ism  of theological reason seems to be 
clear enough. F irs t ,  the already mentioned state of disagreement, 
and often direct contradiction which is  found within the broad realm 
of Christian theology (creeds, exegesis, and dogmatics) seems to sug­
gest, according to Kant's own approach (as he developed his analysis 
of the antinomies of pure reason), that i f  reason's functioning in 
the constitution of theological meanings leads to contradictory  
resu lts , something wrong must be suspected in both the in te rp re ta tio n  
and actual functioning of reason as such contradictory resu lts  are 
reached.
Second, since a critic ism  of reason has not as yet been 
developed in the realm of theology^ i t  seems necessary th a t such an
There are some theological studies that, in  one way or 
another, seem to address themselves to a c r it ic a l approach to reason; 
for instance, Rudolph Gordh ("C ritic ism  of Reason in Contemporary 
Theological Methodology," Ph.D. d issertation . University o f Chicago, 
1941) approaches reason from the viewpoint and concern o f the episte­
mological realm but in the area of methodology which assumes a pre­
vious critic ism  of reason. Within the area of theological methodol­
ogy, Gordh focuses his study mainly on a historical analysis of the 
Protestant reaction at the beginning of the tw entieth  century, 
against the trad itio n a l understanding of reason as represented by 
Emil Brunner, the Lundensian School, and the ir ra t io n a lis t  approach. 
Rousas J . Rushdoony (By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4enterprise should be undertaken especially when i t  is taken into 
account that theology as an in te lle c tiv e  d isc ip line  stands on the 
basis provided by reason's functioning in the constitution o f mean­
ing.
th ird , since theology has been so fa r  developed following
of Cornelius Van T il [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub-
Ii shing Co., I959J, pp. 8 , 9) may be seen as representative of a 
tra d itio n a l Protestant approach according to which reason is  not 
challenged nor c r it ic iz e d  regarding its  functioning or structure, 
but i t  is challenged regarding the autonomy of reason in re lation  
to the in terpretation  o f the origin of theological knowledge, namely 
reve la tio n . In other words, i t  is claimed that there is  nothing 
wrong with the trad itio n a l philosophical in terpretation  of the struc­
ture of reason i f  a p a rtic u la r in terp retation  of the orig in  o f theo­
logical meaning is accepted, namely, revelation and inspiration  as 
presented in the B ib le. Such an approach does not pertain to the 
realm of the critic ism  of reason. Carl Michalson (The Rationality  
of Faith : An H istorical Critique of Theological Reason [New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, I963J) explores, w ithin a Kantian- 
Bultmannian tra d itio n , the p o s s ib ilitie s  that the epistemological 
im plications of philosophical historicism  may provide fo r the 
expression of Protestant theology. Yet, the Kantian-Bultmannian 
pattern of reason is  neither challenged nor under investigation. 
Edward Farley's approach ( Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of
Faith and Reality [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 197bJ) even when
i t  is  considered to be "the most serious study in phenomenology yet 
done by Protestant theology" (Robert Williams, "Ecclesial Man: A
Radical Approach to Theology Through Husserl's Phyenomenology," 
Philosophy Today 19 [  1975]:369), is not a critic ism  of reason's 
structure as tool fo r the constitution o f theological meaning, but 
rather an exploration of the possib ility  th a t a non-transcendentalist 
in te rp re ta tion  of Husserl's phenomenology may be helpful fo r the 
expression of the Protestant understanding of fa ith  as experience, 
s t i l l  w ithin a Kantian-Bultmannian pattern for the structure of 
reason. Hermann Dooyeweerd (A New C ritique of Theoretical Thought, 
4 vols. [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.,
1953-1958]) develops a complex analysis which aims to be the con­
struction and in terpretation  (theory o f knowledge) of reason, in gen­
e ra l, on the basis of a religious Christian starting point within 
the context of a Kantian-Protestant tra d itio n . Yet even th is  long 
and complex study does not address i t s e l f  to the c r i t ic a l  analysis 
of reason's structure, not even w ithin the philosophical realm. The 
c r i t ic a l  work has been done by Kant. Dooyeweerd only builds on the 
basis of his personal understanding o f Kant's c ritic ism . Sydnor L. 
Stealey's approach ("Epistemology, Philosophical and B ib lic a l:  A
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5the basic guidelines provided by various and well developed extra- 
theological theories of knowledge,^ th a t is ,  of various in terpreta­
tions o f the meaning of i ts  logia, i t  seems necessary th a t a c r i t i ­
cism and evaluation of such a procedure and in terpretation  should 
be developed.
And fourth, the fac t that in the very realm of philosophical 
critic ism  the need fo r a new in terp retation  o f reason begins to be 
perceived and discussed seems to suggest th a t also theology needs
Brief Study of the B ib lica l Theory of Knowledge against a Philosophi­
cal Background,” Ph.D. d issertation, Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 1932} may be considered as representative of those which 
attempt to develop a B ib lica l epistemology or in terp re ta tion  of know­
ledge without addressing c r it ic a l ly  the in te rp re ta tio n  of the struc­
ture o f reason. Such approaches ignore the tra d itio n a l in terpreta­
tion of reason that the author himself shares as he develops what 
is claimed to be a "B ib lic a l” epistemology. See also Thomas F. 
Torrance (Theological Science [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1978]) who develops with great s k ill and philosophical carefulness 
an in terpretation  of how trad itional reason is  supposed to work in 
a Protestant s c ie n tific  trad itio n . Yet, a critic ism  of reason's 
structure is not intended nor developed by Torrance. He ju s t follows 
the pattern of receiving philosophical c r itic is m  in order to adapt 
i t  fo r theological purposes. The level o f the hypothetical nature 
of reason and its  also hypothetical in te rp re ta tio n  by philosophical 
trad itio n s  is a matter of either concern or investigation. Cf. 
Donald G. Bloesch, The Ground of Certainty: Toward an Evangelical
Theology of Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19 /1 ); and Hilary
Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1981 ).
In short, as fa r  as I can see, the critic ism  of theological 
reason has not yet been addressed by theologians even as a philoso­
phical enterprise. Theologians seem to consider that the critic ism  
of reason fa lls  out of th e ir  ju risd ic tio n .
*See Frederick Sontag, How Philosophy Shapes Theology: Prob­
lems in the Philosophy o f Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1971);
and chapter 2 below.
2
Giusseppe Savagnone, "La cognoscib ilita  del mondo della  
natura secondo san Tommaso," Aquinas 21 (1978):64. Regarding the 
d iffe re n t ways in which reason and ra t io n a lity  are interpreted within 
the current philosophical scene, see Michael Landmann's commentaries
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6to address i ts e lf  d ire c tly  to the same issue in order to discover and 
determine the way in which its  constitutive log ia  should be 
interpreted and u t il iz e d .
By critic ism  of theological reason I mean two coordinated and 
related senses. F ir s t ,  critic ism  of theological reason means an 
investigation of reason's functioning in  the constitution of meaning 
w ithin the theological realm. So fa r ,  on the contrary, the critic ism  
of reason has been developed within the philosophical realm as an 
extra-theological enterprise. Theologians ju s t receive the 
results  of th is philosophical c ritic ism  of reason (whatever may have 
been chosen) in a ready-to-use package which without fu rther in vesti­
gation or critic ism  is  applied to the theological enterprise. I t  is  
true some theologians, as for instance Thomas and Bultmann, adapt the 
philosophical in terp re ta tion  they choose in order to  f i t  the ir own 
conception of Christian theology. Yet they do not deal d ire c tly  with 
the critic ism  of reason as such but rather accept the critic ism  that 
philosophy hands out to them.
In general terms Catholicism has been aware of reason's foun­
dational role in the constitution o f theological meanings in both 
natural and dogmatic theology. From its  Thomistic tra d itio n , and 
even e a r lie r , Catholicism has developed its  theological reflections  
w ith in  the framework provided by a Christian adaptation of the
("Critiques of Reason from Weber to Bloch," Telos 29 [1976]:187-98) 
on approaches by Max Weber (pp. 187, 188), Theodor Adorno (p. 189), 
Max Horkheimer (pp. 193, 194), Herbert Marcuse (pp. 194, 195), 
JUrgen Habermas (pp. 196, 197), and Ernst Bloch (p . 198). See also 
S artre 's  approach in his Critique de la  raison dia lectique: precede
de Questions de Methode (Paris: Galiimard, 1960).
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7classical P laton ic-A ris to telian  theory of knowledge (which, by the 
way, was epistemology but not yet c ritic ism  of reason, which appears 
la te  in  the history of philosophy). Thus, when c ritic is m  of reason 
appears one wonders i f  i t  could be very relevant to Catholicism since 
i t  has already c a re fu lly  and dogmatically chosen i ts  own interpreta­
tion  o f reason on whose basis the whole of Catholic dogmatics is con­
s titu te d . To c r i t ic iz e  reason may involve changing basic dogmas and 
creeds which Catholicism could not afford without serious danger of a 
loss o f identity .
In Protestantism the endorsement of a p a rtic u la r theory of 
knowledge has been more d i f f ic u lt .  Protestant Orthodoxy followed 
rather closely the Thomistic in terp re ta tion  of reason. Liberal Prot­
estantism has followed in d iffe re n t ways the basic resu lts  of Kant's 
critic ism  of reason. Yet an actual theological (e ith e r  Catholic or 
Protestant) critic ism  of theological reason, as to the investigation  
of reason's structure and functioning in the constitu tion  of theolo­
gical meaning, has not been intended, not even in the most recent 
Protestant epistemological studies.
Protestantism, as i t  addresses i ts e lf  to the epistemological 
enterprise, is not concerned with a critic ism  of reason but rather 
with searching and finding w ithin the philosophical critic ism  of 
reason a model close enough to the dogmatic position the theo­
logian is trying to present, to  be adapted fo r his particu lar 
theological interests and tra d itio n . Yet, what the theologian holds 
as his tra d itio n , usually in Protestantism under the name of “The 
Gospel," is not under c ritic ism  even though reason i t s e l f  is involved
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8in  the constitution of whatever the theologian may be meaning w ith  
his absolute designation of "The Gospel." Thus reason's structure is  
not under investigation in Protestantism.
This leads me to the second sense in which I understand the  
critic is m  of theological reason. A critic ism  of theological reason 
not only includes and means a c ritic ism  of the way reason's structure  
constitutes meaning in  theology, but i t  also means th a t such c r i t i ­
cism is to be developed by theology within its  own realm. I t  means 
to  claim that theology is able to develop a c r itic is m  o f its  use o f 
reason by i ts e lf  outside the tra d itio n a l philosophical realm. This 
idea entails  the necessary independence of theology from philosophy 
th a t should l ie  at the basis of any possible discussion regarding the 
theology-philosophy relationship. Obviously, however, such a study 
could be faced only a fte r th is  dissertation and a great deal of 
fu rth e r study are successfully accomplished.
Due to the epistemological nature of th is  investigation, 
theology is approached as a cognitive enterprise which involves the 
constitution of meanings. Furthermore, within the cognitive realm to  
which theology as an in te lle c tiv e  d isc ip lin e  belongs, i t  is necessary 
to  determine the way in which human reason is to be interpreted  
before the epistemological problem regarding the origin of the 
content of theological statements (re v e la tio n -in s p ira ti on) may be 
properly addressed and interpreted. Consequently, when I say th a t  
theology stands cognitively in reason, I do not mean to deny reve la ­
tio n  its  grounding ro le  in re la tio n  to the content of theological 
meanings; I am only trying to point out the in te lle c tu a l realm to
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9which theology belongs even as i t  pertains to a particu lar revealed 
kind of knowledge. Since reve lation -insp iration  as origin of theo­
log ical meanings assumes, in order to  be at a l l ,  a cognitive realm, 
the realm of reason as a tool for the constitution of meanings (even 
of those originated by what theology ca lls  "reve la tio n -in sp ira tio n "), 
i t  seems apparent th a t a critic ism  o f the realm in which revelation  
is  given should cognitively precede the actual understanding and 
in terp re ta tion  of "revelation-inspiration" i t s e l f .  This dissertation  
addresses i t s e l f  to  th is  previous cognitive investigation.
I f  the need for a critic ism  of theological reason seems to 
be c le a r j  i ts  possib ility  is not. The critic ism  of reason
appeared la te  in the history of philosophy and has been developed
2
w ith in  the philosophical realm ever since. Moreover, since reason
The need comes from both the very nature of theology as 
grounded and constituted by its  lo g ia , and by the fact that theology 
has adopted, along its  h istorica l development, several d iffe re n t  
theories of knowledge without a proper c r it ic a l  procedure. This 
s itu a tio n , in  which d ifferent in terpretations of reason are used 
w ith in  theology, determines the existence of d iffe re n t systems and 
contradictory theological statements.
2
Critic ism  of reason should be distinguished from the 
development of epistemological and ontological theories. Actually  
ontological and epistemological theories appear f i r s t  in the history  
of philosophy, being the actual m aterial that is addressed by the 
c ritic ism  of reason which comes la te  in the history of philosophy. 
Even when ontological and epistemological theories can be traced back 
to the Greek tra d itio n  of philosophy as early as the f i f th  century 
B .C ., i t  is generally accepted that critic ism  of reason began e ith er  
in 1690 with John Locke (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
abridged ed. [Oxford: C1 arendon Press, I928J; or Tn 1781 with
Immanuel Kant ( C ritique  of Pure Reason [London: J. M. Dent and Sons,
1939]). Ever since, criticism  of reason has been developed w ithin  
the realm and w ith the procedures th a t belong to philosophical inves­
tig a tio n s . The critic ism  of reason, therefore, assumes the actual 
pre-existent epistemological in terpretations of reason’ s functioning. 
Consequently, a c ritic ism  of theological reason, i f  the same pattern
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seems to be one, i t  does not seem c lear how a theological critic ism  
of reason could be attempted or established.
Reason, as the human a c t iv ity  fo r the constitution of mean­
ing, is one. There are not two or three d iffe re n t kinds of reasons 
within the same human being. In th is  sense, reason is equal to the 
human capability fo r the constitution of meanings. In th is context 
i t  seems that a c ritic is m  of reason has to deal w ith reason as such 
and not with reason insofar as i t  produces a determinate kind of 
meaning, for instance, theological meanings. I t  is  necessary, then, 
that the poss ib ility  o f a critic ism  of theological reason should be 
established prior to i ts  actual development in re la tio n  to reason’ s 
apparent oneness. This requires an understanding o f reason's struc­
ture and its  actual functioning in  the constitution of meanings which 
is developed when the philosophical context is  analyzed in chapter 
1 below.
So fa r the log ia  of theology has been c r it ic iz e d  from the 
viewpoint of the ontos) (philosophy). Could i t  be c r itic ize d  from 
the viewpoint and realm of the theos (theology) w ithin a Christian  
context? Theologians, in general, have accepted the critic ism  of 
reason to be a philosophical enterprise from whose ideological 
results they can draw but not as a task which theology i ts e lf  should
of appearance is to  be considered, can only appear la te  in the 
history of Christian theology once epistemological theories of what­
ever origin have already been u t il iz e d  in both the in terpretation  
and actual functioning of theological reason. Regarding the actual 
usage of epistemological theories of knowledge in Christian theology, 
see chapter 2 below.
1^ have chosen to use the gen itive ontos instead of the cor­
responding nominative on only because of phonetic reasons.
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face and developJ Consequently, theology so fa r has not even asked
the question about the possib ility  of a critic ism  of theological
reason. In short, c r itic ism  of reason is  a philosophical matter from
whose results theologians may learn but in whose development theo-
2
logians do not share.
In this context where the need fo r a critic ism  of theological 
reason is  apparent but its  poss ib ility  is neither c lear nor has even 
been considered, th is  dissertation proposes to formulate such a ques­
tion about the p o s s ib ility  of a c ritic ism  of theological reason and 
hopes to provide an answer for i t .  Can a c ritic ism  of reason's 
functioning in the constitution of Christian theological meanings 
be developed by theology? Or, on the contrary, should the commonly 
accepted procedure of critic ism  be confirmed and philosophy be 
declared responsible fo r the critic ism  of reason as i t  has been
This is a consequence of the trad itiona l philosophical realm 
in which critic ism  of reason has been so fa r developed. See above, 
p. 3, n. 1. Theologians recognize in general that there is  a c r i t i ­
cal approach to reason, but, at the same time, they dogmatically 
accept that th is c r it ic a l  enterprise pertains only to  philosophy. 
Thus the role of theology regarding the critic ism  of reason is not 
to develop the c r it ic a l  re flection  i ts e l f  but rather consists in 
evaluating the results of the c r it ic a l  philosophical enterprise so 
as to adapt them fo r theological usage. Thus, metatheology is not 
yet, properly speaking, a c r i t ic a l ,  cognitive enterprise.
p
In this context i t  should be noted that the critic ism s of 
reason have been developed by philosophy in re lation  to both philoso­
phy and sciences. Yet, philosophy, as such has not addressed i ts e lf  
to the analysis of reason's theological a c tiv itie s  since theologians 
have read ily  accepted fo r such a task the conclusions and c r ite r ia  
that resu lt from the philosophical critic ism  of reason's a c tiv it ie s  
in philosophy. Regarding the way philosophy c r it ic iz e s  reason's 
functioning in sciences (geometry, Dhysics, bioloqy, and h is tory), 
see, fo r instance, Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philos­
ophy, Science, and History Since Hegel (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1960).
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developed so far? On the other hand, an actual c r itic ism  of theo­
log ica l reason is not intended in th is  study because i t  could be 
seriously considered only a fte r the question of i ts  p o ss ib ility  has 
been both expressed and answered.
In order that th is  issue may be properly addressed i t  is
necessary to focus as precisely as possible on both the f ie ld  of
study and the subject-matter of th is  investigation. The analysis
of the possib ility  of a theological c ritic ism  of theological reason
pertains to the broad f ie ld  of systematic theology. Within the f ie ld
of systematic theology our study belongs to the area o f theological
epistemology or the philosophy of theologyJ In th is  context the
subject-m atter of th is  dissertation pertains s p e c ific a lly  to what
is known in philosophical re flec tion  as theory of knowledge (also
known in some parts of the world as "critic ism " due to Kantian in flu -
2
ence). I t  is w ithin the realm of a theory of theological knowledge 
that the subject-matter of this d issertation is to be found, namely, 
reason as tool and place for the constitution of meanings, particu­
la r ly  Christian theological meanings.^ F in a lly , w ith in  the realm
 ^I t  is within th is  area th a t theological methodologies are 
discussed, c r it ic iz e d , and thus shaped fo r theological re flec tion .
o
As follows from the phenomenological analysis developed in 
chapter 2, below, what I call here theory of theological knowledge 
is ju s t  the theological adaptation of philosophical theories. I t  
does not imply a c r it ic a l  approach to theological reason.
3
I t  should be c lear then th a t the logia under investigation  
is not logic, that is , i t  is not the philosophic d isc ip line  called 
"log ic" which deals with the study o f the formal and empty structure 
of knowledge in i ts  various connections and re la tio n s . The logia 
as here understood is  related to the realm of the theory of knowledge 
which deals with the study of the way reason proceeds in the
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of reason as a tool for the constitution of meaning, th is  investiga­
tion is  focused on the in terpretation  of the dimensionality of 
reason' s s tructure.^
Furthermore, due to the epistemological nature of th is  inves­
tig a tio n , i t  should be c lear that no theo log ica l, exegetical, h istor­
ic a l, hermeneutical, or methodological study as such is  intended. 
Besides, as the investigation of reason in i ts  involvement in and 
re lationship  to both re lig io n  and theology has been very p ro lif ic  
and broad, especially in recent times, i t  should be noted that this  
study is  not going to address related issues such as the truthfulness  
of the Christian systems of beliefs over against every other extant 
or possible system,2 reason in natural theology,3 the faith-reason
constitu tion  of meanings and reasonings with regard to i ts  content. 
I t  could be the case that the c r it ic a l analysis of the logia may sug­
gest some changes in  the way the understanding of the "logic" has 
been so fa r  developed. This, however, cannot even be suggested until 
a fte r the actual c ritic is m  of the theological logia is accomplished. 
Regarding “logic" as philosophical d isc ip lin e  and its  f ie ld  of inves­
tig a tio n , see Clarence I .  Lewis and Cooper H. Langford, Symbolic 
Logic (New York: Dover Publications, n .d .) ,  pp. 3-25.
^Within reason’ s structure the idea of "dimensionality" 
points to  the foundational level in which the rational process of 
constitu tion  of meanings finds its  ground. For an explanation of 
what reason's structure is  and what is  meant by its  dimensionality, 
see. chapter 1 below.
p
See, for instance, Basil M itc h e ll, The Ju s tifica tio n  of
Religious Belief (London: Macmillan Press, 1973); ppT 75-95;
Diogenes Allen, The Reasonableness of Fa ith : A Philosophical Essay
on the Grounds fo r Religious Beliefs (Washington, D .C .: torpis
Books, 1963); and Ninian Smart, Reasons and Faiths: An Investigation
of Religious Discourse, Chris tian  and Non-Christian (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).
3
See for instance, E. L. M il le r ,  God and Reason: A H is to ri­
cal Approach to Philosophical Theology (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1972); James Richmond, Theology and Metaphysics (London: SCM Press,
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re la tionsh ipJ  reason as involved in the phenomenological studies of
2 3re lig io n , reason and re lig ious knowledge and experience, reason and
hermeneutics and exegesis,* reason and rational ju s tif ic a tio n
1970); and John E. Smith, Reason and God: Encounters of Philosophy
with Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, l9 6 l) .
^See, for instance, Robert John Ackermann, B e lie f and Know-  
ledge (Garden C ity , New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972); John Laird,
knowledge, Belief and Opinion (Hamden, Connecticut: Shoestring Press,
1974), pp. 49-/4; George F. Thomas, Philosophical and Religious 
B elie f (New York: Charles Scribner’l  Sons, 19/0), pjT T-8b;
Evangel os P. Pananoutsos, The Foundations o f Knowledge (Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1968), pp. 276-96; Gordon
H. Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation (Philadelphia: Presbyterian 
and Reformed Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 28-110; John A. Hutchinson, 
Faith , Reason, and Existence: An Introduction to Contemporary P h il­
osophy of Religion I New York: Oxford University Press, T95ET;
Germain Gabriel Grisez, Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy o f R e li­
gion (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975); F r i tz  Buri,
TKTnking Faith: Steps on the Hay to a Philosophical Theology
(Phi lade I phi a: Fortress Press, 1968); Brand Blanshard, Reason and
B elie f (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974); D. Bloesch, pp. 176-
Z03; George Galloway, Faith and Reason in Religion (New York: Charles 
Scribner’ s Sons, 19297! and Nels F. Ferre, Faith and Reason (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1946).
P
See, for instance, Thomas J. J . A lt iz e r , Mircea Eliade and 
the D ia lectic  of the Sacred (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963),
pp. 28-31; John Bail l ie ,  The In terpretation of Religion: An In tro­
ductory  Study of Theological Principles (New York: Abingdon Press, 
1928); Douglas A llen , Structure and C re a tiv ity  in Religion: Hermen­
eutics in Mircea E liade 's  Phenomenology and New Directions (The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), pp. 140-72 and 201-46.
3
See, for instance, George I .  Maurodes, B e lie f in God: A
Study in the Epistemology of Religion (New York: Random House, 1970), 
ppl 49-89; Douglas Clyde Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Know- 
ledge (New York: Harper & Bros., c! 1940), pp. 163-364; Frederic
Henry Hedge, Reason in  Religion (Boston: American Unitarian Associa­
tion , n .d .); Nels F. FerreT Faith and Reason (New York: Harper and
Bros., 1946); and John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion (London: Faber
and Faber, 1950), pp. 195-212.
*See, for instance, Charles Monroe Wood, Theory and Religious 
Understanding: A C ritique of the Hermeneutics of Joachim Wach
(Missoula, Montana: American Academy of Religion and Scholars Press,
1975), pp. 113-47.
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1 2 fo r b e lie fs , reason and apologetics, reason and theological method-
3 4 5ology, reason and theological language, and reason and revelation.
From a cognitive perspective the subject-matter of th is  investigation
precedes a l l  these issues and relationships,® and, at the same time,
is foundational to a ll of them because i t  focuses on reason i ts e lf .
Moreover, since th is investigation is not only epistemologi-
cal but also follows a constructive systematic approach, some very
See, fo r instance, Robert M illigan , Reason and Reve1 ation: 
Or the Province of Reason in Matters Pertaining to Divine Revelation 
Defined and Illu s tra te d  (C incinnati: R. w. Carrol & Co., 18/1J.
o
See, for instance, W illis  J . Beecher, Reasonable B ib lica l 
Criticism  (Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times, Co., lB l l );
O liv ie r Rabut, “Recherche theologique et rigueur sc ientifique,"  
Etudes (1975):608-14.
3
WoIfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970); Matthew L. Lamb, History,
Method and Theology: A D ialectical Comparison of Wilhelm D ilth e y ^
Critique of H istorical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-Methodology 
(Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 197b).
A
See, fo r instance, Libuse Lukas M ille r , Knowing, Doing, and 
Surviving: Cognition in Evolution (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1973), ppl 21/-34; Geddes Macgregor, Philosophical Issues in 
Religious Thought (Boston: Houghton M iff lin  Co., 1973), pp. 47-124;
G. G. Grisez, pp. 230-73; Arthur F. Holmes, Faith Seeks Understand­
ing: A Christian Approach to Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1971), pfT 137-162; Landon Oil key, Maker of Heaven and Earth: A
Study of the Christian Doctrine of Creation I Garden C ity , New York: 
Doubleday Co., 1959), pp. 265-98; Ian T. Ramsey, Christian Empiri­
cism, ed. Jerry H. G ill (London: Sheldon Press, 1974), pp. 58-140;
and Douglas A. Fox, Mystery and Meaning: Personal Logic and the
Language of Religion (Phi tadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), pp.
51 -/4 .
5
See, fo r instance, J. R. Illingw orth , Reason and Revelation: 
an Essay in  Christian Apology (London: Macmi11 an Co. ,  1902); an3
Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith
and Knowledge (Phi lade 1 phi a: Westminster Press, c. 1946).
®See N. Smart, pp. 80-92; and Theodor W. Adorno, "Meta­
c ritiq u e  of Epistemology," Telos (1978-1979):82-
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clear lim itations of procedure need to be spelled out at the very 
beginning. In th is  kind of investigation i t  is  impossible to a tta in  
to ta l awareness of the whole o f the philosophical and theological 
systems in th e ir manifold deta ils  that could well be examined and 
analyzed (notably those of Parmenides, P lato , A ris to tle , Kant, 
Jaspers, Heidegger, Thomas, Bultmann, and Moses), or with the c r i t i ­
cal ongoing discussion of them. A h is torica l-th eo lo g ica l follow-up  
of the main systems considered or of the analysis developed fa l ls  
outside the purpose and lim its  of th is  constructive epistemological 
investigation.^ Even within the realm of theological epistemology, 
an actual development of a c ritic ism  of theological reason in the 
sense of providing a theory of theological knowledge or an in terp re­
ta tio n  of theological reason fa l ls  outside the purposes and lim its  of 
th is  investigation, which asks only for the p o s s ib ility  of such an 
enterprise in the theological realm.
Within th is precise and reduced f ie ld  and objective of inves­
tig a tio n , and in the context of the working lim ita tions  above men­
tioned, the analysis of the p o ss ib ility  of a c r itic is m  of theological 
reason requires a careful examination of three basic contexts,
namely, the philosophical, the theological, and the B ib lic a l. The
2
phenomenological analysis of these three contexts is intended to
^Such a h istorica l-theo log ical enterprise is , obviously, 
highly desirable and would be very helpful fo r a better and c learer  
understanding of the current theological and re lig ious approaches 
and usages of reason. However, such an attempt would be rather a 
c r i t ic a l  history of theological epistemology and not an epistemologi­
cal investigation into the structure and p o s s ib ility  of a c ritic is m  
of theological reason.
2
Regarding the way in which the phenomenological approach 
is understood and applied in th is epistemological investigation,
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present a c lear perspective of reason's dimensionality and the way 
in which i t  has been both in terpreted and u t iliz e d  in the constitu ­
tion of meaning in philosophical enterprises (and, of course, in  the 
theological as w e ll) . Such foundational information should provide 
enough evidence fo r reaching some conclusions regarding whether or 
not a c ritic ism  of theological reason is possible and what these con­
clusions would entail for the theological enterprise as a whole. 
At this point i t  should be noted that in order that the p o s s ib ility  
of a c ritic ism  of theological reason may be affirmed i t  is  necessary 
to consider the in terpretation  of Being's dimensionality o.r reason's 
primordial presupposition (tim e, timelessness).
The analysis of the philosophical context should render a 
clear picture of both the subject-m atter of this investigation , 
namely reason’ s structure and its  functioning in the constitution  
of meaning, and the way in which the dimensionality of reason's 
structure has been interpreted throughout the history of philosophy. 
Even w ithin the analysis of th is  philosophical context, i t  w il l  be 
interesting to notice, from a theological perspective, whether or 
not the philosophical in te rp re ta tion  of reason's dimensionality makes 
any roan fo r a theological approach.
The analysis of the theological context should provide a pre­
cise and c lear illu s tra tio n  o f the way in which the structure of 
reason has been interpreted and u tiliz e d  in  the constitution of theo­
logical meanings (exegesis, creeds, and dogmatics) throughout the
c la rific a tio n s  and explanations are presented as needed in the dev- 
lopment of th is  study as i t  reaches crucial points.
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history o f Christian thought. Furthermore, the analyis of th is  con­
text should provide additional evidence regarding the necessity of 
a c ritic is m  of theological reason as expressed above. Yet, since 
Christian theological re flec tions have depended until now on extra- 
theological interpretations of reason, the possib ility  of a critic ism  
of theological reason is  not expected to find its  ground in the 
analysis o f th is  context.
The poss ib ility  of a critic ism  o f theological reason could 
be established i f  a theological re flec tion  on reason's and Being's 
dim ensionality could be e ith e r found or developed. The search for 
such a re fle c tio n  leads th is  investigation to the analysis of the 
th ird  context, namely, the B ib lica l one. The analysis of the B ib li­
cal context w ill  focus on an epistemological analysis of Exod 3:14 
in order to  discover whether or not an orig inal Christian theological 
re flec tio n  on the in terp re ta tion  of the dimensionality of reason's 
structure may be found at the beginning of Christian re flec tio n . 
P articu lar care w ill be taken here in order to discover whether the 
critic ism  o f the logia of theology should be developed from the realm 
and perspective of the theos (theology), o r, on the contrary, should 
be addressed, as so fa r ,  from the realm and viewpoint of the ontos 
(philosophy).
With these prelim inary considerations in mind, i t  is time 
now to s ta r t  th is investigation in search of the p o s s ib ility  of a 
critic ism  of theological reason by addressing the analysis of the 
philosophical context in which the in terpretation  of reason’ s struc­
ture appears.
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CHAPTER I
THE ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REASON
The logos involved in the word and concept of theo-logia  ^
points to the essential cognitive pre-condition of theology. To 
deny th a t logos is co n stitu tive  of the essence of theology implies 
the destruction of th eo -lo g ia . Where there is no logos there is no
For an introductory report about the history of theologia as 
in te lle c tiv e  science—from its  Greek origin to its  Christian  
development—see Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), ppi 23-26. FI Kattenbusch
("Theology as a Science," The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of 
Religious Knowledge, 3rd Photo lithoprinted ed. 1195/J, 11:394) points 
out the Greek origin o f the term and places the f i r s t  Christian usage 
of i t  among the Apologists. Among Greeks the term is used notably by 
A ris to tle , Metaphysics 6 .1 .1 0 , 11 (trans. H. Tredennick, LCL, 1:297); 
cf. ib id . ,  11.7.9. According to W illiam  H. Reade (The Christian  
Challenge to Phiosophy fLondon: S .P .C .K ., 1951], p. 2371 A ris to tle  
made a radical change in  the meaning of theo-logia in that in i t  
logos is  no longer "myth’' or "story" as in €He flia d  but undergoes a 
conversion "into reason."
2
Pre-condition, epistem ologically understood, means that the 
logos realm is required as necessary for theology to ex is t. 
Revelation, which constitutes the o rig in  of Christian Theology, is  
directed to man as a being endowed with reason. Arthur F. Holmes in 
All Truth is God's Truth (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1977),
p. 84, says in theology "we simply cannot avoid reasoning." See also 
L. Harold De Wolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper
and B ro., 1953), ~pi 331 and Luigi Bogliolo, "Theologia Ancilla  
Philosophiae," Aquinas 15 (1972):258. Bogliolo, from a classical 
viewpoint, sees God revealing Himself to human reason. Moreover, from 
a systematic viewpoint i t  should be remembered that logos in its  
structure is  already formed before the theologians go to revelation  
as th e ir  source of meaning. See James L. P ero tti, Heidegger on the 
Divine: The Thinker, the Poet, and God (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 1974), fT 541 rhis position, however, is rejected by 
theological " irra tionalism 1’ which believes that "knowledge is given 
the th inker in 'terms* which cannot be set forth ra tio n a lly , or that
19
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theo-logia. Logos is  the realm of meaningJ which includes
everything that is connected with the constitution of meaning in
2 3general. So fa r  theology has mainly addressed i ts e lf  to the Theos
by means of a logos whose meaning and structure have been studied,
4
developed, and provided by philosophy. Consequently, within
some other way than reasoning is necessary in order th a t the nature 
of the word may be discerned" (George Rudolph Gordh, "Criticism  of 
Reason in Contemporary Theological Methodology" [Ph.D. d issertation , 
University of Chicago, 1941], p. 21). I t  is apparent, however, that 
"irrationalism " does recognize and accept the in te lle c tu a l dimension 
of theology as i t  ta lks about "knowledge," “th in ker,"  and "terms." 
What irrationalism  re jects  is  a particu lar systematic in terp re ta tion  
of the logos dimension of theology and not the logos dimension 
i ts e lf .
L^ogos is  not meant here in its  christo logical sense as in 
John 1:1. Tt~is rather to be understood as Julian Marias (H istory of 
Philosophy [New York: Dover, 1967], p. 75) puts i t :  "The primary
meaning of logos is derived from the verb legein, ‘ to jo in  together' 
or 'gather* and also 'to  say.' Logos ~Ts la y in g , '  that is , a 
'meaningful word."' For a description of the broad meaning of reason 
as logos see Reason and L ife : The Introduction to Philosophy
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 157-158.
2
So logos i s here used as synonymous with "reason" in its broad 
original sense of nous, noein ("to  see," and "apprehension of 
re a lity ." )  (Mariasj Treason and L ife , pp. 164, 165). For an
introductory analysis to the meaning of related concepts—from a 
lin g u is tic  viewpoint-such as "mens," "in te lle c tu s ," and "r a t io ," see 
ib id .,  pp. 166-186. A restric ted  use of the meaning of "reason," 
such as fo r instance the one we find in Immanuel Kant (C ritique of 
Pure Reason [London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1959], pp. 211-13) when he
reters to reason as the connection of judgments provided by the 
categories of the in te lle c t ,  is obviously included in the broad sense 
of logos and ra tio .
3
Theology, understandably, has been so concerned about its  
own subject matter, namely God, that the logos dimension o f theology 
has constantly fa llen  in to  oblivion. Consequently, we see contempo­
rary Metatheology or Fundamental Theology dealing mainly with 
methodological issues. See K. Barth, Evangelical Theology: An
Introduction (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1963), p. 16.
4
Because of many reasons whose analyses f a l l  fa r  beyond the 
lim its of this investigation, theologians have always t a c i t ly  assumed
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theological quarters, c ritic ism  has never reached the realm of logosJ 
namely, the realm of reason.
The purpose of th is  study is  to  evaluate the p o s s ib ility  o f a
2
critic ism  of the logos of theo-logia as i t  has been used by the two 
main h istorica l trad itions  o f theological re flec tio n  (Catholicism and
as a fac t that any c ritic ism  of reason— logos— that theology could 
need should be provided by philosophy. This is not only true in the 
case of Scholasticism which assumed reason's a b il i ty  in  the Greek 
tra d itio n  of epistemology, but i t  is  also true in the case of 
contemporary lib e ra l Protestantism. See, fo r instance, Sydnor L.
Stealey, “Epistemology, Philosophical and B ib lic a l: A B rief Study of
the B ib lica l Theory of Knowledge against a Philosophical Background" 
(Ph.D. d issertation , Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1932), p. 
39; and Schubert Ogden, The Reality  of God and Other Essays (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 68-70; c f . Charles Hartshorne,
"Process Philosophy as a Resource fo r Christian Thought," in
Philosophical Resources fo r Christian Thought, ed. Perry LeFevre 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968), pp. 44-66, and John Macquarrie,
"Existentialism  and Christian Thought," in Philosophical Resources 
fo r Christian Thought, ed. Perry LeFevre (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1968), pp. 123-40.
O^n the contrary, the logos realm in i ts  many ways and 
interpretations has been the main tool fo r the theological c ritic ism
of the idea of God, and, more recently for the theological debate on
Revelation and Insp iration . For a recent study that summarizes the 
current discussion on the problem of the o rig in  of theological 
meaning, see Paul J. Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture: 
Problems and Proposals ( Philadelphial Westminster Press, 1980), pp. 
21-136.--------------------------
2
Criticism  is  to be understood here not only in the general 
sense of a careful investigation of a given subject matter but also in 
the particu lar epistemological sense introduced by Kant, that is , as 
being an investigation of the nature, lim ita tions, and conditions of 
knowledge. In the history of philosophy th is  sense is  obviously a 
recent one. According to Sebastian Samay (Reason Revisited: The
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers [Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971J, pp. x iv -x v i i i ) ,  th is  c r it ic a l  dimension is  essential fo r  
philosophy.
Marvin Farber points out the epistemological predicament of 
reason's c ritic ism  since "in order to investigate cognition, i t  is  
necessary to make use o f knowledge" ("The Ideal of a Presupposition- 
less Philosophy," in Philosophical Essays in  Memory of Edmund 
Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (New York: Greenwood Press, I968J, pp.
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Protestantism) J  Within th is  broad context the purpose o f th is  f i r s t  
chapter is  twofold. F ir s t ,  to explain the subject m atter of the 
investigation, namely, reason as i t  functions in the constitu tion  of 
meaning. Second, to attempt to develop the necessary epistemo­
logical viewpoint that a critic ism  of reason requires.^ In the
53 , 5 4 ). Even though critic ism  of reason is d i f f ic u lt ,  Farber (p. 
54) understands that such a situation “is  unavoidable because of the 
essentia lly  re flex ive  character of philosophical inqu iry ."  Nicolai 
Hartmann in his Grundztige einer Metaphysik der Erkenntis (B erlin : W. 
de Gruyter, 1941), 1.3 4 .c , remarks regarding reason's predicament 
that to use knowledge in order to study its  own conditions is 
something very d i f f ic u l t .  But at the same time he adds th a t such an 
undertaking constitutes the summum of the reflex ive  a ttitu d e .
^They are: the classical tra d itio n  which probably has its
most relevant representative in Thomas Aquinas, and the s c ie n tific  
tra d itio n  in  which Rudolf Bultmann may be considered as a relevant 
representative.
2
At th is  stage i t  may be relevant to point out that the 
viewpoint fo r c ritic ism  th at we have chosen d iffe rs  from the one 
chosen by Kant who, follow ing the Em piric ist-R ationalist controversy 
of his day, chose the perspective of the origin of knowledge fo r its  
c ritic is m . We can see Kant's viewpoint fo r  critic ism  in his Critique  
of Pure Reason (pp. 43-61) as he deals with the metaphysical and 
transcendental expositions of space and time. In contrast, we have 
chosen to develop our critic ism  from the perspective of the 
onto-theo-logical structure of reason. As we are going to see, 
reason's structure was described with c la r ity  for the f i r s t  time in 
Kant's c ritic ism , especially in his Transcendental D ia lec tics .
The Kantian approach to knowledge—the re s u lt of his 
c ritic ism — has been widely accepted and used in post-Kantian 
Protestant libera l theology. Consequently theologians believed that 
i f  they could settle  the issue of the o rig in  of theological meanings, 
the problem of theological meaning as a whole would also be solved as 
a consequence. This Kantian influence may help to explain the 
current in terest and discussion of revelation and insp ira tion  (see 
p. 21, n. 1 above) and the recent development of theological studies ii  
epistemology—Metatheology. Metatheology is conceived to  be, as 
foundational theological re flec tio n , “a philosophical theology in the 
age of analysis" which proceeds mainly by developing "the logical
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chapter I deal with the second objective in terras of the metaphysical1 
dimensionality2 of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason.
analysis of the nature of re lig ious language” (Raeburne Heimbeck, 
Theology and Meaning: A Critiq u e  of Metatheological Scepticism 
LStanford, C aliforn ia: Stanford University Press, 1969J, p. 19).
For a b r ie f  account of modern Metatheological studies see ib id . ,  pp. 
19-21. Epistemological studies in theology are also called  
"Fundamental Theology," whose task 'is  to describe the nature of 
revelation and to demonstrate i ts  de facto existence by pointing to 
the c r i te r ia  of revelation and the signs o f its  c re d ib ili ty ” 
(Heinrich Fries , “Fundamental Theology," Sacramentum Mundi [1968], 
2:369). This kind of study is  called "Formal Theology’* by Emil 
Brunner ( Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and
Knowledge [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946J, pp. 12, 13). ATT 
these studies leave unasked the question about the logos of 
theo-logia, that is , the question about the structure and functioning  
of reason as a tool for theological re flec tion .
*At f i r s t  glance, to claim a "metaphysical dimensionality" as 
the viewpoint fo r a c ritic ism  of reason may seem to be not only 
un justified  but bluntly wrong. A fter a l l ,  was i t  not Kant's main 
thrust th a t metaphysics and ontology should be put aside as reason is 
investigated? Was i t  not Kant's conclusion th a t the c ritiq u e  of 
reason does not grant any ontological or metaphysical knowledge? Is 
i t  not tru e , at least to a certa in  extent, th a t Kant's approach was 
followed by Edmund Husserl who believed, according to Farber (p. 55), 
that "the 'form al' theory of knowledge, which explains this theory of 
theories, is  prior to a ll empirical theories; hence i t  is p rio r to 
a ll explanatory real science, to  physical science and psychology, and 
also to metaphysics"? Moreover, in the nineteenth and twentieth  
centuries Kantian influence has caused a strong anti-metaphysical 
reaction. See Julian Marias, Idea de la  Metafisica, in  Obras 
Comp 1 etas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1962), 67389; ari3 NT
Hartmann, In t .  40. In this context, and at th is  in i t ia l  stage of our 
investigation , we may reply to the above mentioned position by 
pointing out that Christian theology is essentia lly  linked to 
tra d itio n a l metaphysics (P e ro tti, p. 64) and that we cannot, as 
theologians, include theology in the contemporary re jection  of 
metaphysics as Heidegger does in his "overcoming" of both metaphysics 
and theology. Additionally, as Stanislas Breton ("Crise de la  raison 
aujourd'hui," Revue de theologie et de philosophie 22 [1972]:146, 
151, 152) points out, the current cris is  of philosophical reason is 
essen tia lly  connected to the c r is is  in the understanding of the 
essence of metaphysics. So, a critic ism  of reason neither in the 
philosophical nor in the theological realm can avoid the metaphysical 
dimension.
2
The term "dimensionality" is not used here in i ts  common 
meaning as related to breadth, length, and thickness. I use the term
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In order to provide epistemological room for a critic ism  of
theological reason I show f i r s t  the independence of, and, at the same
time, the essential relationship th a t exists between, reason as such^
2
and the d ifferen t interpretations of i t .  I also attempt to show
that reason's structure may be understood and interpreted in two
3d iffe re n t dimensionalities which render two widely d iffe re n t kinds
"dimensionality" to point out the realm of inquiry in  which the 
primordial presupposition of Being and reason moves and receives its  
meaning. This "dimensionality" pertains to the structure of reason 
as i ts  basic and a ll-pervas ive  nature which requires to be 
in terp reted . In other words, "dimensionality" may be seen as the 
ground of Being previous to an in terp re tation . Both, “ground of 
Being," and "primordial presupposition," already include the in te r­
p re ta tive  factor. "Dimensionality" is  the realm o f Heideggerian 
"No-thing" non-entity, that pervades the whole o f re a lity  and 
meaning. Dimensionality then requires in terpretation , i t  does not 
provide i t .  Cf. Paul T i l l ic h 's  somewhat d ifferent usage o f the term 
"dimension" (Systematic Theology, 3 vols. [Chicago: University of
^That is to say, reason as actual, concrete, human realm of 
meaning, over against the interpretations that philosophy and science 
may o ffe r  of such a basic cognitive a c t iv ity .
2
In philosophy, science, and theology, reason, as a c tiv ity  
responsible for the constitution of meaning, has been confused with 
the P latonic in terpretation  of i t .  Philosophers and theologians seem 
to fo rget that the foundational epistemological re flec tio n  that any
science or methodology needs to  assume is called "Theory of
Knowledge." The very name suggests divergence and hypothetical 
resu lts . Usually, however, these results have been considered as 
" fa c ts ."  For a b r ie f technical introduction to the understanding of 
the main Theories of Knowledge, see N. Hartmann, 2.11-22; and Thomas 
W hittaker, Reason: a Philosophical Essay with H istorica l I l lu s tra -
tions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1966). For a theological
discussion of Theories o f Knowledge, see S. Stealey, pp. 18-105.
■*1 do not know any philosopher who expresses the p o ss ib ility  
of two dimensionalities of reason. I w il l  try  to show, however, that 
modern epistemological critic ism  points in that d irection  and to 
suggest the context in  which the "choice" at the level of the
dimensionality of reason may be seen. Since reason cannot function 
in both dimensionalities at the same time, the philosophical search 
fo r tru th  has so fa r  avoided th is  foundational and primordial choice
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of logosJ  In order to accomplish these objectives I undertake a
2
phenomenological analysis o f the act of knowing and analyze the 
actual systems of thought^ of the most important thinkers in  the
because i t  w il l  only worsen the already d i f f ic u l t  problem posited by 
conceptual re la tiv ism —the idea that meaning is re la tiv e  to the 
system and presuppositions assumed.
^As developed in the second part of th is  chapter, these two 
foundational kinds of logos are the classical or timeless and the 
tem poral-historical reason. Me are pointing to a foundational 
d iffe re n tia tio n  which goes fa r  beyond to what Derek A. K e lly  ca lls  
"varie ties  of philosophical reason." See his a r t ic le  "V arie ties  of 
Philosophical Reason," Philosophical Studies (Ire land) 24 (1976):28- 
32. What K elly  ca lls  "varie ties  of philosophical reason" is  ju s t a 
h istorica l synthesis of the main currents in the theory of knowledge 
which are considered to be main “types" of reason, namely Perfection­
ism (P la to ), Contextualism (Kant), Completionism (A r is to t le ) ,  and 
Adventurism (H erac litu s ). Temporality and timelessness as dimension­
a l it ie s  of reason are to be regarded as the ground and condition of 
theories of knowledge or "typologies" such as K e lly ’ s.
Farber describes the phenomenological procedure in  the 
investigation of the act of knowledge as "the intentional analysis of 
the cognitive process" (p . 62). Then he evaluates i t  by saying that 
"when res tric ted  to cognition and its  correlates as such, [ i t ]  may
well be the most c r i t ic a l  possible beginning fo r philosophy."
A dd itionally , Farber (p . 58) e x p lic itly  connects the phenomenological
analysis to  the "structure of reason" in  the following way: "the
phenomenological method is  not only a possible method fo r the theory 
of knowledge, but i t  is  one which necessarily must be developed and 
carried through consciously for the understanding of the nature and 
structure o f knowledge." See also R. Vancourt, foreword to  Les 
principes d'une metaphysique de la connaissance by Nicolai Hartmann 
(Paris: Aubier, 1945), p. PT We are not actually planning to
develop a phenomenological analysis beginning de novo. The
lim ita tions  of our investigation prevent me from doing so. 
A dditionally , the fac t tha t there is already developed an analysis of 
i t ,  and tha t as Farber says (p. 58), the phenomenological analysis 
has been used in p a rtia l form throughout the history of philosophy, 
encourages me to use these technical analyses and insights in  the 
investigation here.
^The analysis of reason beginning from the meaning found in 
an actual system of thought was successfully used by Kant. His 
starting  point is  what he ca lls  "the fac t of pure reason" ( Critique  
of Pure Reason, pp. 35-37 ). This procedure has already been used in 
theological epistemology, even though in a somewhat d iffe re n t subject
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history of the critic ism  and in te rp re ta tion  of reason. As I use the  
phenomenological approach I am aware o f the major c ritic ism * that has
been formulated against i t ,  namely, that i t  necessarily works in the
2realm of transcendental idealism. This critic ism , however, fa ils  to
3
see that phenomenology may be used outside of the id e a lis t ic  fence.
m atter, namely methodology. See P ierre  Gisel, V e rite  et histoire:- 
La theologie dans l a modernite: Ernst K'asemann (Paris: Editions
Beauchesne, 1977), p. 648.
*As a "minor" objection i t  could be argued th a t such a method 
is  too recent to be trusted. A fte r a l l ,  N. Hartman (1 .4 .b .) ,  early  
in  the twentieth century, recognized that he was breaking new ground 
w ith his phenomenological analysis o f knowledge in  a systematic way 
and foresaw that such a procedure would become a science by i t s e l f .  
Hartmann's statement may have some tru th  in i t ,  but in  general i t  is  
an overstatement. Reinhardt Grossmann (The Structure of Mind 
[Milwaukee: The University o f Wisconsin Press, 1965J, pp. 3-591
traces back the history of the phenomenological analysis of the 
structure of the mind to Brentano's idealism. A d d itiona lly , M. Farber 
affirm s that phenomenology "has been ta c it ly  assumed and used in part 
in  the past" (p. 58).
2
Hilary Putnam (Reason Truth and History [London: Cambridge
University Press, 1981], pp. 211} claims th a t phenomenological 
investigation is "fundamentally misguided." His c r itic is m , however, 
is  mainly due to the remaining idealism that he is  able to see in 
phenomenology as stemming from Edmund Husserl's procedure which 
included as an essential feature a conscious detachment from the 
ontological realm. Commenting on Husserl's f i r s t  Cartesian Medica-  
t io n , Quentin Lauer (Phenomenology: Its  Genesis and Prospect [New
York: Harper and Row, I965J, p. 134) explains how fo r  transcendental
idealism the "world" is  given in  the "I am" of Cartesian conscious­
ness. Farber synthesizes the idealism of Husserl's approach to  
phenomenology by saying that the c la r if ic a tio n  of what knowledge is  
"occurs within the framework o f a phenomenology of knowledge which is  
concerned with the essential s tructure of the pure experiences and 
th e ir  meanings" (p. 55 ). At th is  point, however, we should remember 
th a t the late Husserl seems to fo rg e t th is  phenomenological reduction 
and points to the ontological foundation of meaning.
^R. Vancourt (p . 11) points out that N. Hartmann uses the 
phenomenological method but a t the same time re jects  Husserl's 
transcendental reduction. The same is  true for Heidegger, Being and 
Time, In t . 2.7; Jean-Paul Sartre , Being and Nothingness: An Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956),
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I t  is th is  la s t way, which is  open to the ontological role of re a lity ,
that I understand and use the phenomenological procedure^ in  th is
attempt to id e n tify  the nature and structure or the subject m atter
2
of this study, namely, reason— knowledge, logos.
An Introductory Description of the Onto-theo-logical 
Structure of Reason
To begin an analysis of the structure of knowledge is  to
leave the naive realm in which knowledge is just a "fact" among
3 4others, even an unconscious one.
pp. x lv i i ,  x l v i i i ;  and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Per­
ception (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1962), see Preface.
W his approach is the best way to accomplish the foundational 
task of getting acquainted with the subject matter of th is  study. 
"Before we can make any re fle c tio n  on an object we must f i r s t  know 
the object. The phenomenologists are rig h t when they in s is t that 
the f i r s t  step in philosophy is  an analysis o f the phenomenon, which 
means an accurate description of the thing as that thing swims in to  
our awareness. This must be met face to face before anything else 
can be done. This is no place to give d efin itio n s , because we have 
no right to  define until the phenomenon has been completely surveyed. 
To begin w ith defin ition  is  to  expose the whole work to fru s tra tio n  
or f u t i l i t y "  (Gustave Weigel and Arthur G. Madden, Knowledge: Its  
Values and Limits [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961J,
p. 13).
2
My description of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason 
focuses on i ts  main d is tin c tive  features which are d irectly  re la ted  
to the c ritic is m  of theological reason pursued in the next two chap­
ters. For a complete and detailed  analysis of the phenomenon of 
knowledge the best available work is s t i l l  N. Hartmann's 6rundzuge 
einer Metaphysik der Erkenntis; see especial ly  1 .5 . In the same t r a ­
dition is  Johannes Hessen's Erkenntnistheorie (Berlin: Ferd Dummlers, 
1926). In a d iffe ren t tra d itio n  and with a less technical exposition  
is G. Weigel (pp. 29-31). A critic ism  of these phenomenological 
expositions is  not intended here because of the thematic approach 
of this investigation .
3
Many a theological re flec tio n  has been developed on th is  
naive ground.
4
That is  to say, naive understanding is  not even conscious of 
the existence of such a thing as "an act of knowledge." The naive
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Nicolai Hartmann points to the basic nature of knowledge, 
which is at the same time a structure, by saying that in  every 
knowledge a "knower" and “known," a subject and an object, meet face 
to face. The relationship th a t exists between them is in  i ts e lf  
knowledge.1 In d iffe re n t ways, and from d iffe ren t philosophical 
tra d itio n s , th is  foundational structure of knowledge, namely the 
subject-object relationship, is  recognized. This is  the founda­
tional expression of reason's structure because any meaning is 
possible only insofar as i t  springs from and stands on this  
relationship . This re la tiona l structure is  an a priori condition for
knower is  only conscious of the "known object" as a material content 
of his awareness. See N. Hartmann, 1 .5 .b . l .  This may suggest the 
d iff ic u lt ie s  that l ie  ahead. I t  may require extra concentration 
to follow  a summary description of an act whose existence has been 
previously unrecognized.
1N. Hartmann, 1 .5 .a . l ;  c f. 5 .1 .1 .a. Here care must be taken 
not to confuse subject and object with the medieval understanding of 
them ( obiectum, subject urn— hypokeimenon) or with Kant's Gegenstand 
(that which exists as standing-over-against). See Heidegger, The 
Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, edited with
commentaries 5y James G. Hart and John CT Mara I do (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1976}, p. 26. These philosophical usages 
and the common usages as well already include ontological connota­
tions which a t th is foundational stage of the phenomenological
analysis have not appeared y e t. The ontological dimension appears 
la te r  but only in a structural re la tio n  to the subject-object 
relationship in its  cognitive function.
2
References to i t  are not always d irec t ones nor are they 
expressed in an epistemological context. They are c lear enough, 
however, as to be understood as pointing to the foundational
subject-object re lationship. The following references are examples. 
Spanish philosophers of v ita l  reason point to  th is  relationship from
an ontological perspective through the famous sentence by Ortegay 
Gasset, " I am I and my circumstance" (Yo soy yo y mi cirscunstancia), 
quoted and explicated by his most b r i l l ia n t  disciple Julian Marias 
( Idea de la  Metafisica, pp. 397, 399). From a sc ien tific  viewpoint, 
Putnam (p. 54) points out th a t there is no input that is  not in "some 
extent shaped by our concepts." From a M arxist perspective Theodor
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any theory that t r ie s  to in te rp re t the d iffe re n t roles o f i t s  two 
poles, namely, subject and object. I f  one pole is  absent there is  no 
knowledge, no meaning, no logos J  This re lationship  is  the center 
from which any meaning is constituted, from which logos opens i t s e l f  
up to its  frameworks and dimensionality.
What is the role that each p o le -su b jec t and ob ject— is  
supposed to play w ithin the foundational expression of reason's
W. Adorno says, c r it ic iz in g  empiricism and rationalism , th a t " s p ir it  
can as l i t t l e  be divorced from the given . . .  as the la t te r  can from 
i t .  Neither is  something f i r s t .  The fact that both are essen tia lly  
mediated by one another makes both equally u n fit  to be o rig ina l 
principles" ("M etacritique of Epistemology," Telos [1978, 7 9 ]:92 ). 
Jaspers, Philosophical Faith , understands this structure of knowledge 
fo r he states th a t "consciousness is the basic phenomenon o f the 
s p lit  into subject and object," and that "whatever we speak o f has 
come into the dichotomy as we speak of it"  (p. 6 1 ). I t  is  c le a r that 
Jaspers introduces here an ontological idea by which he sees the 
subject-object re lationship  as s p lit  in its  center by a dichotomy. 
He considers i t  to be reason's responsibility  through i ts  mode of 
"encompassing" to  bridge such a s p lit  and dichotomy in order to bring 
f in a l unity. M arjorie  Grene, commenting on Merleau-Ponty's approach 
to reason, says that "neither is  pure subject, neither is  pure 
object: i t  is those very categories that have so misled us and that
Merleau-Ponty is  attempting to  transcend" ("Merleau-Ponty and the 
Renewal of Ontology," Review of Metaphysics 29 [1976]:619). Then she 
goes on characterizing Efie subject-object re lationsh ip  as the 
"in-between." For an approach from a pragmatic viewpoint, see Sandra 
B. Rosenthal, "C. I .  Lewis and the Pragmatic Rejection of Phenomenal­
ism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1980):209.
1 I t  pertains to the structure of knowledge, according to the 
phenomenological analysis, that the subject-object re lationsh ip  is a 
"correlation" in  which its  poles "condition each other" (N. Hartmann,
1 .5 .a .2). Such a relationship takes place psychologically in 
consciousness and epistemologically in the "image" of the object in 
the subject (N. Hartmann, 1 .5 .b .6 ) . So knowledge is  the re s u lt of 
the relationship i t s e l f  with the inputs th a t come from both its  
poles, namely, subject and object. This suggests th a t the 
subject-object re lationship is  not only determined by the object but 
also by the subject ( ib id . ,  1 .3 3 .a ).
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structure?^ The ob ject's  role is basically  the communication of the
properties of the object into the subject. The function o f the
object is  to be the determinative element; the subject is  the
2
determined element. On the other hand, the cognitive subject, which 
when considered from the object's viewpoint appears to be essentia lly  
receptive, is also, when seen from the subject's perspective, called  
to play a crea tive  function in the re la tio n a l structure of
4
knowledge. The creative  ac tiv ity  o f the cognitive subject thus
At th is  stage i t  should be easier to understand why i t  is  
necessary to ta lk  about "the structure of reason." I t  is  because the 
most fundamental way in which knowledge—Jogos— is  given is  not 
simple but composite. I t  is not s ta tic  but dynamic. I t  is not a 
tangib le  re a lity  which could be reduced to a d e fin ite  fac t or 
meaning, but the very composite and dynamic source of meaning in  
action. The complexity of th is structure w il l  be apparent as I 
continue with its  analysis.
N. Hartmann, 1 . 5 . C . 1  and 2. This may give the impression 
th a t we are facing realism. This seems in fa c t to  be Hartmann's 
viewpoint as he stresses the object's role more than the subject's. 
However, as he develops his phenomenological analysis, a lim it is  set 
to the object's determinative powers in that the object does not 
determine the subject as such, not even in i ts  purely cognitive 
dimension, but i t  only determines the image o f the object in the 
subject ( ib id . ,  1 . 5 . c .4 ) . In more precise terms one may say th a t 
what the object determines in the cognitive relationship which 
knowledge is , are the properties of the object th a t partic ipate in 
the constitution o f any given act of knowledge. This is always the 
case in independence of the kind of object involved, that is , in 
independence of any ontological in terp re tation .
^N.  Hartmann, I . 5 . C . 6 .  Even though a t f i r s t  glance the 
creative  contribution of the cognitive subject may appear to be 
in s ig n ific a n t and easy to handle, further analysis shows i ts  
foundational importance and its  complexity. The recep tiv ity  of the 
subject is  foundational. I t  points to the subject's cognitive  
c a p a b ility  that makes knowledge possible. Without recep tiv ity  there  
would be no knowledge. Throughout the h istory o f philosophy the  
concepts of "potency" and "nothingness" have been used to re fe r to  
the subject's re c e p tiv ity .
^This means that the subject, as knower, brings to the  
re lationsh ip  i ts  own inputs which shape both the form and the content
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affects  the relation of knowledge i t s e l f  (as does the object); that 
is to  say, i t  reaches forth  and constitutes the image of the object, 
not the object its e lf .^  Hartmann characterizes the foundational
input o f the subject in any knowledge as "the spontaneity of the
2
subject," which appears mainly as the image is seen as an
in te rp re tive  endeavor to grasp the o b jec t.3 This spontaneity
4
includes a ll  the background that the subject brings to the re la tio n .
The structure of reason is  to be found in the actual
of the meaning that is  constituted. Thus i t  contributes as much to 
the act o f knowing as the object does ( ib id . ) .
^Ibid. This means that consciousness, namely subject as 
knower, participates crea tive ly  in the formation of the image, that 
is words of the actual meaning that springs from the relationship  
i t s e l f .
2Ib id .
3
Ib id .,  i .5 .c .7 .  This points to  the fac t that in a ll 
knowledge an in terp re tative  dimension is  included. This in terp re ta­
t iv e  dimension is provided by the subject as one of the involved 
poles o f the relationship that knowledge is .  Holmes points to this  
essential pole of knowledge when he says that "our reasoning 
in te rp re ts  what is given (p. 100). John Kekes ("Feeling and
Imagination in Metaphysics," Id e a lis t ic  Studies 7 [1977]:76-93), even 
though not applying i t  to the structure of reason, shows that feeling  
and imagination are present in the construction of metaphysical 
theories . Since he affirm s that imagination and feeling have a 
crucial role "within the bounds of reason," one can see in his study 
at leas t an indirect reference to the cognitive "spontaneity of the 
subject." At the other end of the cognitive enterprise—the origin  
of knowledge—the spontaneity of the subject is seen by Putnam who 
affirm s that “even our description o f sensation . . .  is heavily 
affected . . .  by a host of conceptual choices" (p. 54). Thus, we 
can see that at least imagination, fe e lin g , in terp re ta tion , and 
conceptual choices are involved and working in what we ca ll the 
"spontaneity of the subject" in the subjective pole of the 
re lationsh ip  of knowledge.
^The idea of "background" includes the whole of the subject's 
experiences and knowledge which, are added to the already mentioned 
imagination, feeling , e tc .,  to in tegrate  the input the cognitive
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relationship o f the two poles. Poles become poles only in th e ir
re la tio n s h ip .1 These poles, in th e ir structural re la tionsh ip ,
constitute equiprim ordially the whole of the meaning of any possible  
2
knowledge.
As the basic phenomenon of the structure of reason, the 
subject-object relationship appears as i t  functions in its  natural 
realm, namely the cognitive one. I apply the term "epistemological 
framework1'4 to the cognitive realm of the structure of reason.5 Even
subject brings to the relationship o f knowledge. The spontaneity of 
the subject, as the in terp re ta tive  pole, must be present fo r  the 
constitution o f knowledge.
I t  has been the task of the theory of knowledge to understand 
and in terpret th is  relationship. Several in terpretations have been 
suggested, from the minimization of the subject's creative ro le , as 
in early  Greek philosophy, to  the maximization of i t  as, fo r  
instance, in George Berkel^'s proposal that "to be is to  be 
perceived" (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 
[La Salle , I l l in o is :  Open Court Publishing Co., 1946J, p. 32).
Hartmann, 1 .5 .a .2. As the analysis shows la te r, however,
subject and object do not exhaust themselves in th e ir  actual 
relationship ( ib id . ,  1 .5 .e .6 ).
2
Knowledge and language belong together. In other words, one 
is never without the other. One is  never the foundation o f the 
other. One is  never prior to the other. One is  never condition fo r  
the other to be or to enter in to  the re lationship . See p. 21, n. 1 ; 
and also Putnam, pp. x, x i. "The mind and the word jo in t ly  make up 
the world" ( ib i d . ).
3
Hartmann, 1 .5 .e .
4
"Framework" is used here in its  sense of "frame" w ith in  
which the subject-object relationship works and to which i t  is 
essentia lly  linked.
5
The "frameworks" of reason— both the epistemological and the 
ontological—are not to be considered as being "external" to  the 
structure of reason but rather as pertaining essen tia lly  to i t .  As a 
matter of fa c t, the inclusion of the "frameworks" completes the 
phenomenological analysis of the structure of reason at i ts  
foundational le v e l.
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when both subject and object are included w ith in  the epistemological
1 2 framework, i t  obviously leans toward the subject’ s side.
A fu rther step in the phenomenological analysis of knowledge
3
shows, as lim itin g  and in a certain way embracing the epistemologi­
cal framework, a complementary ontological framework.4 Now the 
subject-object re lationsh ip  o f the structure o f knowledge can be seen 
as transcending the epistemological framework into what encompasses i t ,
5
namely the ontological realm. The phenomenological analysis points 
to the ontological framework prior to and constitu tive of the
This is  apparent when Hartmann (1 .5 .e . l  and 6) continues his 
epistemological investigation  by disclosing the gnosiological being- 
in - i ts e lf  fo r both the subject and the object.
2Ib id .,  1 .5 .e .5 . The phenomenological analysis reveals that 
the main feature of the object is its  " tran s -o b je c tiv ity ,"  that is , 
in its  transcendence— independence—from the subject ( ib id . ,
1 .5 .e . l ) .  On the other hand, the main feature of the subject lie s  in 
its  "poten tia lity" ( ib id . ,  1 .5 .e .7 ). See p. 30, n. 3 above. On this  
basis we see the epistemological framework mainly centered in the 
subject's cognitive a c t iv ity . Furthermore, the gnoseological 
"transobjectivity" of the object points to the ontological framework 
of the structure of reason.
3Ib id . , 1 .5 . f .
4Ib id . ,  1 .5 . i .
5The idea o f "framework" could also be expressed as "order" 
or "level." Hartmann ( ib id . ,  1.5.1) only provides in i t ia l  insights 
for an analysis of the ontological framework in  its  re la tio n  to the 
epistemological. One should be careful in  considering Hartmann's 
phenomenological analysis because at th is  point he introduces 
elements of classical ontology in its  post-Kantian tra d it io n , as for 
instance, when he affirm s that the ontological order has to be 
understood as " tra n s in te llig ib le ,"  namely, as that what cannot be 
known ( ib id .;  1 .5 . i .8  and 11). In short, he subtly abandons the 
phenomenological analysis to work from the viewpoint of a particu lar  
ontological theory, while at the same time s t i l l  claiming that his 
analysis is s t r ic t ly  phenomenological. At th is  stage of Hartmann’ s 
analysis, phenomenon and theory are mixed and confused.
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structure of knowledge from the object's side.^ Consequently one may
2
speak about the ontological framework o f the structure o f knowledge
3
as leaning toward the object and pertaining mainly to  i t .  As the 
subject-object relationship is  a structural one, so the ontological 
and epistemological frameworks also stand in  a structural re la tio n ­
ship with each other and with the foundational subject-object
relationship. Because of the importance o f these two frameworks in
4
the structure of reason I deal with them separately.
The Ontological Framework: "Ontos"
The phenomenological analysis of knowledge points to an 
encompassing ontological framework^ as a constituent of the structure
1 Ib id . , 1 .5 .f .3  and 1 .5 . i .4 .
2
The ontological framework which proceeds mainly from the 
object pertains to and is  constitutive of the structure o f reason.
^At this point, Hartmann's analysis f a i ls .  I ts  fa ilu re  lies  
in his diminishing the subject's role in the ontological framework. 
I t  is  not the case th a t only the object is  encompassed by the 
ontological framework. The subject is  also included. According to 
R. Vancourt, Hartmann recognizes that “subject and object pertain to 
Being" (p. 20). However, in his analysis Hartmann does not explain 
the subject's role in the ontological order. In the analysis of the 
ontological order the subject seems to disappear. This oblivion of 
the subject prevents Hartmann from arriv ing  at the dimensionality of 
ontology.
4
I have chosen, however, to analyze them in the inverse order 
from Hartmann's. The reason for th is change is that i t  f i t s  better 
the purposes of my c ritic is m  of theological reason and contributes to 
its  c la r ity .
5
Vancourt says that “ the phenomenological description of 
knowledge shows c lea rly  th a t knowledge is  a grasping o f Being" (p. 
20). A dditionally, the grasping of being i t s e l f —the epistemological 
framework—stands i t s e l f  on Being, “subject and object are o f Being" 
( ib id . ) .
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of reasonJ The ontological framework stands on the fac t that
p 3
"thinking" and "Being" belong together. I t  is important to notice
that the framework of reason I  am analyzing is on to -log ica l, that is ,
4
i t  is a matter of knowledge— "lo g ica l"— about Being— “onto."
This means that we are s t i l l  ta lk ing  at the structural level 
revealed by the phenomenological analysis. This level is  previous 
to conditioning, and co n stitu tive  o f any possible ontological theory. 
Theorizing works on the basis of reason's structure.
^The term "Being" with upper case "B" re fers  to the 
foundational realm of the "ground of Being." Being with lower case 
"b" refers to en tities  both in general and as concrete individual 
r e a lit ie s .
3
Heidegger explains that "as the situation has been presented, 
noein—translated fo r short as thinking—-is thinking only to the 
extent to which i t  remains dependent and focused on the e in a i, Being.
Noein is  not "thinking" simply by v irtue of occurring as a
non-material a c tiv ity  o f soul and s p ir it .  Noein qua Noein belongs 
together with e inai, and thus belongs to einai i ts e lf "  (What Is 
Called Thinking- DIew York: Harper and Rowj HJ58], p. 240H This
idea was expressed o r ig in a lly  by Parmenides who said th a t " i t  is the 
same thing to think and to  be" (The Way to Truth, frag . 3 [trans . K. 
Freeman, Ancilla  to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete
Translation of the Fragments in D iels, 'Fragmente der VorsokratikeF  
42J1. John Burnet translates i t  in a d iffe ren t way: “For i t  is the
same thing that can be thought and that can be" ( Early Greek 
Philosophy [London: Adam and Charles Black, 1948], p. 173). CFT
Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, 4
vols. (London: John Murray, 1901-1905), 1:179; and Heidegger, Early
Greek Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 95. Q. Lauer
adds, “Thus in one and the same act [man's existence] what has been 
called subject and what has been called object are united in being"
(p. 171). Cf. William E. Reiser, "An Essay on the Development of
Dogma in an Heideggerian Context: A Non-theological Explanation of
Theological Heresy," The Thomist 39 (1975):479. Reiser applies to 
dogmatic discussion the princip le that "Being and tru th  'are ' 
equiprimordially" ( ib id . ) .
4
Hartmann (1 .40) points out that knowledge is th a t point in 
Being in which being i t s e l f  re flec ts  on i ts e lf  and gives b irth  to a 
sphere of representations. That "sphere of representations" 
obviously is  what we c a ll ontology. This is a typical expression of 
Hartmann. In i t ,  i t  appears that thinking is  so encompassed by Being 
that i t  is only an a c t iv ity  and re flec tio n  of Being. Hence the
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Reason's structure, then, implies and includes ontology^ as an 
understanding of Being. Ontology is  thus unavoidable in an analysis
p
and critic ism  of reason. More than that, ontology is  the center o f 
3
gravity of reason. Consequently the perspective fo r  a c ritic ism  of 
reason switches from an "epistemological" approach to an ontological 
one.4 The phenomenological analysis of the structure of reason,
spontaneity of the subject which, according to the foundational 
re la tion  of knowledge, is essential and constitu tive fo r any know­
ledge, is  just overlooked and kind of "lost into Being." This proce­
dure cannot be followed because i t  does violence to the structure  
of reason. See above, p. 33, n. 5.
^See R. Vancourt, p. 21.
o
Hartmann ( In t ,  42) affirm s that metaphysical—ontological — 
framework is unavoidable for any theory. Such framework fo r meaning 
appears even when theoretical thought works in unawareness of i t  or 
is  try ing to avoid i t  ( ib id . ,  In t . ,  32). Hartman c r it ic iz e s  Kant's 
position by denying "gnosiology," that is theory of knowledge—which 
works, according to Kant, in independence from the ontological 
framework, the cap ab ility  of deciding by i ts e lf  the meaning o f the 
essential metaphysical questions.
3
According to the phenomenological description of knowledge 
the center of g ravity  of reason does not l ie  between subject and 
object, nor beyond the subject but beyond the object, in  the 
transobjective (Hartmann, 1 .5 . i .4 ) .  The idea is fu rth e r expanded in  
order to include the ontological realm i ts e lf  ( ib id . ,  l . S . i . i i ) .
4
I t  represents, then, a return to classicism in a post- 
Kantian fashion, which denies the center of g ravity  of Kant's 
c ritic ism , that is , the p r io r ity  of the epistemological framework. 
So, fo r Hartmann, ontology is the primary foundational re flec tion  on 
which knowledge is  to be understood ( ib id . ,  In t . ,  3 9 ). We agree th a t 
the center of reason— and thus of meaning as a whole—is , in the 
f in a l analysis, to be referred to Being as its  ground fo r  
in te l l ig ib i l i t y .  However, though critic ism  has to grasp foundational 
guidelines from the ontological framework, i t  cannot do without 
considering at the same time the primordial presupposition. In the 
overlooking of one o f these two foundational frameworks of reason, 
Kant's and Hartmann’s critic ism s are to be found fa u lty . Perhaps the 
in terrelationsh ip  th a t exists between both frameworks is adequately 
expressed by Hartmann ( In t . ,  42) as he remarks that theory of 
knowledge supposes metaphysics as metaphysics supposes theory o f
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then, points to the ontological realm—understanding o f Being—  ^ as
being a constitu tive part of reason's structure, which is  called to
2
play a decisive ro le in  the realm of meaning. There is  no meaning 
without an ontological framework. Every meaning, as i t  is  
constituted, stands in  reference to the ontological framework.^
"Onto” is included in  the name of reason's structure (the "Onto- 
theo-logical structure o f reason") because i t  is  the phenomenological
knowledge; they condition each other. He, however, does not see th is  
relationship as applying to the structure of reason. The re la tion ­
ship is technically  seen only at the level of theories both of 
knowledge and of being. The phenomenological analysis of the 
structure of reason, however, shows that the in terrelationship  
between theories is grounded in a deeper level in  the foundational 
in terrelationship  of reason's structure.
Whe understanding of Being includes in i ts e l f  the epistemo- 
logical framework. In other words, even though Being, as grasped in 
ontology, is  foundational fo r a c ritic ism  of reason, i t  is  not an 
absolute tribunal which could render a f in a l ,  unchallengable, unified  
version of the meaning of either being i ts e l f  or reason. On the 
contrary, as i t  is  essentially  linked to the epistemological 
framework, i ts  in terpretations, a ll  of them, are provided through the 
"spontaneity of the subject." Otherwise they would not be cognitive. 
Hence the in te rp re ta tive , hypothetical nature of reason cannot 
render a f in a l understanding of being by i ts e lf .
2
That is , the Kantian way according to which ontology and 
metaphysics are to be le f t  out of the analysis of reason is not 
granted by a careful analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge. 
Moreover, a careful analysis of Kant’ s c ritic ism  reveals that in 
spite of his claims o f working in to ta l independence from the 
ontological realm, he was in fact relying on concepts and ideas whose 
content was grounded on classical ontological re flec tio n s .
3
This ontological fact is  usually unconscious. However, a 
technical epistemological analysis reveals, sooner or la te r, the
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center from which, in the fin a l analysis, a l l  other meaning flow sJ
The Epistemo!ogical 
Framework: “Logos*
The phenomenological analysis points also to an epistemologi-
2
cal framework as a constitutive part of the structure of reason. 
This framework springs from and stands on the subject's side of the 
subject-object relationship."* This framework makes understanding and 
meaning possible. Consequently any possible meaning is  grounded and 
happens in i t . ^  The epistemological framework is  a necessary
ontological basis of any given knowledge. Highly sophisticated and 
precise ideologies such as philosophy and theology cannot longer dare 
to work on an im p lic it unconscious ontological re feren t. A founda­
tional task o f reason's c ritic ism  lies  in the c la r if ic a t io n  of th is  
framework fo r meaning.
*About the gnosiological p r io r ity  o f the ontological frame­
work in the realm of reason, see p. 36, n. 3. A dditionally , the name 
that we have chosen in order to id e n tify  reason's particu la r  
structure through its  main nature and frameworks points to a inner 
dynamic that ex ists  within the structure o f knowledge i t s e l f ,  at 
least from an epistemological perspective.
2
Weigel puts i t  in  the following way: "All that the
phenomenon says is  that we have achieved as a content of conscious­
ness a perception of an existing other, rendered meaningful by 
categories or concepts. On the examination o f the phenomenon of th is  
kind of knowledge we simply can state no more" (p . 17). What we ca ll 
"epistemological framework of reason's structure" corresponds to what 
Weigel ca lls  "categories or concepts."
3
In other words, i t  is immanent to the subject as knower. So 
i t  does not form part of the known object, ye t i t  ce rta in ly  forms 
part of the knowledge we have of any known object (N. Hartmann, 34 
c ). Karl Jaspers in  his Reason and Anti-Reason in  Our Time ([Hamden, 
Connecticut: Archor Books, 1971J ), p. 68) re fe rs  to the "place" in
which the epistemological framework works as a "mental space" which 
is provided by reason. So, the epistemological framework is  that 
which the cognitive subject brings and introduces to the relationship  
of knowledge as i t  constitutes i t .
4
As we w il l  see, th is  does not mean the denial of the 
ontological frameworks as a foundational part of the process of
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condition for meaning in  the sense th a t its  nature and contents are 
prio r to any given subject-object relationship J  This a p r io r i 
conditionality of the epistemological framework is  expressed, 
however, in categories whose p a rtic u la r meanings come from the
meaning. Solipcism results as a p articu la r expression within the 
classical trad ition  of theory of knowledge but i t  has no place in the 
understanding of the structure of reason and its  frameworks. What is  
brought into the relationship of knowledge by the cognitive subject 
is called , in its  most general and broad sense, "categories." Kant 
points out that categories are "the natural property" of the 
understanding (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 373). "Categories are 
those concepts by means of which r e a l i ty  has to be understood i f  i t  
is to  be understood at a l l ,  those concepts, that is , which provide 
the indispensable framework w ithin which to understand the world of 
our empirical experience" (Colin Gunton, "The Knowledge of God 
According to Two Process Theologians: A Twentieth-Century Gnosti­
cism," Religious Studies 11 [1975 ]:94 ). Alfred N. Whitehead notes 
that "The novel observation which comes by chance is  a rare accident, 
and is  usually wasted. For i f  there be no scheme to f i t  in to , i ts  
significance is lost" (The Function o f Reason [Boston: Beacon Press,
1958], p. 73). For additional commentary on the function th a t 
categories play in constituting meaning see Putnam, p. 202.
^Hartmann (34. c) points out the ro le  that cognitive  
categories play as conditions of knowledge. This a p rio ri character 
of the epistemological framework must not be understood in the 
Kantian formal sense o f absence o f sensible experience from th e ir  
content. A p rio ri, as cognitive condition ,is  rather to be understood 
as "anticipation”; see Raymond F. Piper and Paul W. Ward, The Fields  
and Methods of Knowledge: A Textbook in Orientation and Logic (New
York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1936), p. 172. E. Husserl describes the
constitutive aspect of the a p r io r i epistemological framework by 
saying that we should imagine a consciousness prior to a l l  experience 
which may very well have the same sensations as we have "but i t  w il l  
in tu it  no things, and no events pertaining to things, i t  w il l  
perceive no trees and no houses, no f l ig h t  of birds nor any barking 
dogs. One is at once tempted to express the situation by saying th a t  
i ts  sensations mean nothing to such a consciousness, that they do not 
count as signs of the properties of an object, that th e ir  combination 
does not count as a sign of the object its e lf"  ( Logical Investiga-  
tions, 2 vols. [New York: Humanities Press, 1970J, pT 309.
Categories have been understood as form al, as in Kant, or as empirical 
as in Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certa inty [New York: Harper and Row,
1969], 167) who points out that some particu lar propositions can be 
turned into "norms of description." This would constitu te  what Piper 
ca lls  a "deposit" or "residuum" in  terms of which "more and more
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ontological framework.1 In other words, the epistemological 
framework is  incorporated2 as part of the cognitive framework—that 
is ,  the conceptual categories—within the subject from whom any given 
meaning springs. I t  can be seen, then, th a t at the core of the 
epistemological framework and of the categories provided by i t ,  the 
spontaneity of the subject is  present as i t  provides the in terpreta­
tion  of Being, the ontological framework which at the same time 
provides the basis fo r the categories (the epistemological framework)
successful anticipations are possible" (p. 171). The a p rio ri nature 
of the epistemological framework does not mean that we can know 
categories through a non-sensible knowledge or experience previous to 
sensible experiences. I t  rather means th a t some aspects of the 
cognitive object-to-be-known are already present in the cognitive 
subject constituting i ts  a prio ri epistemological framework; c f .  N. 
Hartmann, 34 .c. I t  may correspond to what Husserl calls "appresenta- 
tion" which is a kind of " f i l l in g - in "  in the actual cognitive 
a c t iv ity . This is what is  not present—from the object's side—but 
is  brought in—from the subject's side— as the a prio ri—residuum- 
provided by the epistemological framework. For an introductory study 
on Husserl's idea of "appresentation," see Edward Farley, Ecclesial 
Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality  (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 19 /5), p. 1987
^ e  see, then, how ontology determines the epistemological 
framework. See, for instance, Giuseppe Savagnone, “La cognoscibilita
del mondo della  natura secondo San Tomaso," Aquinas 21 (1978):84;
Octavio N. Derisi, "El Fundamento de la  Metafisica Tomista," 
Sapientia 35 (1980): 10; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolgiae, 60 vo ls ., 
English trans. Michael Cardinal Browne and Aniceto Fernandez (New 
York: B lackfriars, 1964-75):1 .2 .3  (hereafter cited as S T ) ;  idem,
Summa Contra Gentiles7~5 vols. trans. with an introduction and notes 
Vernon J. Bourke (Garden C ity , New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956):1.13
(hereafte r cited as SC6) . This seems to be in contradiction to 
Kant's approach according to whom the analysis of knowledge is
propaedeutic fo r any fu ture metaphysics. Later in th is chapter we 
see, however, that Kant's theory of knowledge presupposes a very 
p a rtic u la r kind of ontology. See below, p. 9 9 , n. 1.. Thus
Kant's actual practice, i f  not its  theory, follows the pattern 
established by the structure of reason.
2
See Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 167.
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by which meaning is  both constituted and recognized.^ Because of
2
the ir ontological orig in , cognitive categories are in fact the 
leading element in the developing of meaning and understanding in any 
given s c ie n tific  enterprise.
N. Hartmann (3 6 .a) points out the hypothetical nature of the 
cognitive categories. Alfred N. Whitehead sees how "the development 
abstract theory precedes the understanding of fact" (The Function of 
Reason, p. 73). Putnam (p. 202) says that our "value system" works 
in shaping the categories. At th is  point i t  should be remembered 
that both essentialism and existentia lism  should be avoided because 
they provide with un ila te ra l emphasis what should be considered as a 
whole. Essentialism understands knowledge from the subject's side, 
from the side of essences and concepts, forgetting  th e ir  ontological 
roots. Existentialism  emphasizes concrete r e a l ity ,  the ontological 
framework, forgetting the constitu tive ro le of the epistemological 
framework. As we shall see la te r, th is  does not apply to a ll
existentialism s. For a commentary on these two ways of understanding 
knowledge and meaning, from a Thomistic context, see Orlando 
Pasquale, "Verso un Tomismo Esistenzia le ," Aquinas 14 (1971):381-88.
2
The in terpretation  of cognitive categories— epistemological 
framework— is at least as old as Parmenides who, according to K. 
Jaspers (The Great Philosophers: The Original Thinkers [New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 1966J, p. 27), was obliged to think 
of the signs of Being "in forms that were la te r  termed categories." 
However, the f i r s t  tab le  of categories was offered by A risto tle i who 
saw “in categories not only logical but also ontological elements, 
( ib id .) .  Being i t s e l f  may be divided in  much the same fashion as his 
table of categories divides thought fo r logic . A r is to tle 's  categories 
are forms of being (Metaphysics, 5.7 [trans . Hugh Tredennick, LCL, 
237-39]), which follow  the way o f essence ( ib id . ,  7 .12-14). For 
further commentary on A ris to tle 's  categories and th e ir  place in his 
epistemology see Julian Marias, H istory of Philosophy, pp. 67, 68; 
and Johannes Hirschberger, The History of Philosophy, 2 vols.
(Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), 1:142-43.
Categories have been connected to the problem of the universals; see 
Weigel, pp. 19, 20. Kant understood categories to be a priori and 
independent from experience as the condition fo r any possible 
experience at a l l .  He changed the ground fo r categories from the 
ontological A ris to te lian  foundation to its  own epistemologic tran­
scendental foundation. For an introduction to the Kantian idea of 
categories, see M. Meyer, "Le Paradoxe de L ' object chez Kant,"
Kantstudien 68 (1977):292. Some have understood categories to be
timeless, as fo r instance Hartmann, 34 .d; and A. N. Whitehead, The 
Function of Reason, p. 75. Others have understood categories to be 
In  Uie temporaI realm of experience; see fo r  instance, Herman
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One of the most characteristic and widely-recognized features 
of the epistemological framework which has received d iffe ren t  
in terpretations throughout the history o f philosophy is the idea of 
“object" and “o b jec tiv ity ,"  which in some ways seems to touch the 
center o f ra tio n a lity .^  In its  technical cognitive meaning as an 
a priori condition of knowledge the idea o f “ob jectiv ity" is  grounded
Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 6 vols. 
(Philadelphia* Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953-1958), 
1:41. Dooyeweerd sees categories as naive temporal experience 
"ordered according to types" ( ib id . ) .  Rosenthal (pp .t 206, 8, 10) 
speaks o f categories in a biological behavioral sense; Wittgenstein 
considers that "knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (On 
C ertainty, 378).
V o r  instance, Roger Trigg claims that without a clear 
concept of o b jectiv ity  "reason becomes impotent" (Reason and 
Commitment [London: Cambridge University Press, 1973], p. 168).
Orlando Pasquale ("L'esperienza In te lle t t iv a  tomista," 
Aquinas 18 [1974]:226) points out how the concept of object and 
o b je c tiv ity  according to Thomas Aquinas has its  ground in the realism  
of Aquinas which has its  center and foundation in  the esse. Kant 
does not modify the basic meaning of o b je c tiv ity  and object that was 
produced by Aquinas' realism, but he ra th er gives a new philosophical 
in terp re ta tion  of i ts  ground. Kant's transcendentalism is  apparent 
when he declares in  Critique of Pure Reason that "Transcendental 
analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can 
contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori conceptions which 
represent objects antecedently to a ll  experience, or ra th er, indicate  
the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical 
cognition of objects" (p. 223). For a c ritic ism  of Kant's idea of 
o b je c tiv ity  and its  re lation  to the epistemological framework, see M. 
Meyer, pp. 290-304. Thus, beyond the r e a lis t  and transcendentalist 
in te rp re ta tion  of the ontological (or epistemological in the case of 
Kant) foundation fo r the idea of o b je c tiv ity , the content of i t  is  
basica lly  not changed. See p. 40 , n. 1 above. In the context of th is  
t ra d it io n , subjectivism and re la tiv ism  are considered a denial of 
reason; see Putnam, p. 123 and Trigg , pp. 150 and 168. As the 
s c ie n tif ic  enterprise turned into the realm of natural sciences a fte r  
the em piric ist and p o s itiv is t trad itio n s  in philosophy, the idea of 
o b je c tiv ity  originated the ideal of "exactness." Yet, according to  
W ittgenstein's critic ism  "not a single ideal of exactness has been 
la id  down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under 
th is head" (Philosophical Investigations [Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
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on the ontological framework. That is. the idea of "objectiv ity"
conditions and is constitutive of the meaning of any possible 
knowledge, since knowledge, in order to be knowledge, needs an 
object. Thus the epistemological framework, as the “logos" o f the 
Onto-theo-logical structure of reason, is to be thought of as being 
"a p r io r i . " 1
1958], pp. 87, 88) .  For further commentary on W ittgenstein's
critic ism  of the s c ie n tific  ideal of "exactness," see W. T. Jones, A 
History o f Western Philosophy, 5 vols. 2nd ed. revised (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969, 1970), 5:380, 381. Such c ritic ism  
suggests a new concept and understanding o f o b jectiv ity  i t s e l f .  
Trigg expresses Wittgenstein's new approach, y e t in a negative way by 
saying th a t fo r  him "ob jectiv ity  is  in princip le  impossible" (p. 97). 
However, even though Wittgenstein departs from the tra d itio n a l 
understanding o f o b jectiv ity  and exactness, according to Charles H. 
Cox ("W ittgenstein 's Concept of Language and Its  Implications for 
Metaphysics and Theology," Religious Humanism 9 [1975]:80), he points 
to o b je c tiv ity  under the form of "language as objective consciousness 
of human race." Lauer (pp. 127, 128) perceives that there is  also a 
kind of departure from the tra d itio n a l understanding of o b jec tiv ity  
in the thinking of E. Husserl. His is a kind o f o b jec tiv ity  that 
begins to grasp the essence, the 'sense' (Sinn) of the phenomenon. 
He believes th a t "what Husserl wants is not logical necessity as in 
logic but ra ther formal and material necessity." Lauer, however, is 
of the opinion that Husserl has fa iled  to provide c la r if ic a tio n  for 
what he understands by "necessity," so th is  makes i t  "somewhat 
doubtful th a t the whole theory is genuinely rational" (p. 128). 
Lauer's c ritic is m  of Husserl's approach to o b jec tiv ity  shows how 
closely the idea of o b je c tiv ity , which is  provided through the 
epistemological framework, is  connected to ra tio n a lity  i t s e l f .  
F in a lly , our incursion into the problematic o f interpreting the idea 
of "o b jec tiv ity"  as a p rio ri condition for knowledge, important as i t  
may be, is  ju s t  an example of the Logos, as epistemological framework 
of the Onto-theo-logical structure of reason. The epistemological 
framework includes every possible category, in  the broadest sense of 
the word, th a t may be required fo r the constitution of meaning.
^ h is  means a p rio ri of any actual subject-object re la tio n ­
ship. A p r io r i ,  then, has not the Kantian classical meaning of 
"previous to sensible experience."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
The System: "Theos“
The ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's 
structure in th e ir  relationship provide the basis fo r  the unity and 
coherence of the cognitive enterprise as a whole. That coherence and 
unity of meaning is  what is known as a “system" o f meanings or sig­
n ifications. In other words, there is  no isolated meaningj there 
are only in te rre la ted  meanings; fo r  meaning is constituted and exists 
in a system. Meaning exists only in the subject-object relationship  
in the context of both ontological and epistemological frameworks 
which provide the ground fo r a coherent network of meaning that
enables meaning to flow  harmoniously among the parts of the whole and
2
between each part and the whole.
Even though the systematic nature of reason finds i ts  ground
3
from the side of the ontological framework, i ts  form and functioning
^Putnam (p. 52) notes th a t "objects" do not ex is t independen­
t ly  from conceptual schematization.
2
l .  H. De Wolf points to the systematic nature of reason's
structure when he says that the examination of an idea or object in
the widest possible context of thought and experience "seems the most 
adequate rational instrument fo r discerning truth" ( A Theology of the 
Living Church, pp. 28, 29). I t  seems proper to remark that what Ue 
Wolf ca lIs  "thought and experience" points to the ontological 
structure of reason. I f  the systematic coherence and unity of mean­
ing is not achieved, there is no real meaning or knowledge. Jaspers, 
in Reason and Anti-Reason, says th a t reason brings about the unity of 
a ll re a lity  as i t  w ills  the one, which is  a ir *  (p . 39). Such unity 
comes from "Being i t s e l f ,  the real unity" (p. 40 ). So that reason is 
"what unlocks the heart of everything" (p. 42).
3
N. Hartmann indicates in his phenomenological approach to
reason that reason’ s system comes from the "natural" structures of
re a lity  of Being ( I n t . ,  46, 47 ). So reason's system must not be 
b u ilt up but should rather be discovered. The a r t  of ontology con­
sists in le ttin g  the problems speak by themselves in  order that they 
may reveal th e ir  own natural s tructure. At th is  point Hartmann is
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are determined from the side of the epistemological framework. 1 I t  
is  the “form" and "functioning" o f reason that pertain to the e p is te ­
mological framework which provides, through the categories, the un ity
2
and coherence th a t belong properly to  thinking as thinking.
referring to the source for the actual contents fo r reason's system 
as based on the ontological framework. The system its e lf  pertains  
to and exists in the epistemological framework.
^The systematic nature of reason's structure as moving w ith in  
the epistemological framework has been expressed with p a rtic u la r  
c la r ity  by Kant: " I t  is obvious that there exists among the tran s ­
cendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, 
by means of them, collects a l l  i ts  cognitions into one system" 
(Critique of Pure Reason, p. 231); and: “A ll th a t we can be c e rta in
ot from the above considerations is  that th is  systematic un ity  is  
a logical p rin c ip le , whose aim is  to  assist the understanding, where 
i t  cannot of i t s e l f  attain to ru les, by means of ideas, to  bring  
a ll these various rules under one princip le , and thus to ensure the 
most complete consistency and connection th a t can be atta ined"  
( ib id .,  376). Thus, b rie fly , fo r  Kant reason is  what we c a ll the 
"systematic nature of reason's structure." Kant says that reason 
"merely arranges" what i t  receives from the understanding and "gives 
to them that unity which they are capable o f possessing when the 
sphere of th e ir  application has been extended as widely as possible" 
( ib id .,  p. 373). Then, fo r Kant, in a res tric ted  sense at le a s t, 
“reason" is  to be seen as working in this "arranging" and "connect­
ing" a c tiv ity  which he discusses and develops in  his Transcendental 
Dialectics. We, on the other side, take reason in its  wider sense 
which includes the whole of the processes and involved structure  
through which meaning is constituted. Karl Jaspers, commenting on 
Kant's understanding of the systematic function of reason th a t the 
transcendental ideas provide, explains that "ideas are perspectives 
that we apply to experience" (The Great Philosophers: The Founda-
tions [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 196ZJ, pp. 283,
284). Psychologically, "they are hidden forces in s c ie n t if ic  
inquiry. Unconsciously every individual is guided by them and eva l­
uates . . . the importance or unimportance o f a s c ie n tific  work
according to the ideas whose presence he fee ls  in i t"  ( ib id . ) .  And,
objectively, they are "consonant with nature. . . . Here we must
assume the systematic unity of nature to be objectively va lid  and 
necessary" ( ib id . ) .  Kant himself ( Critique o f Pure Reason, p. 384) 
explains the "heuristic" function of the transcendental ideas in  
reason.
o
The close connection th a t exists between categories and 
the systematic nature of reason's structure is  also developed by
Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 373).
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At th is  point a foundational d istinction must be made between 
system as a formal structure o f reason's procedure in  reaching mean­
ing and the actual system or systems of meaning  ^ which are b u ilt  
in and by the systematic nature o f reason's structure. The d istinc­
tion , however, is  not real but pertains to the structura l analysis 
of reason I am developing. In other words, the structure of reason 
is never given by i t s e l f  alone— as i f  one could find  reason's syste­
matic “functioning" detached from a l l  systematic “content"--but i t  
is  only co-given in  any actual system of meaning. The phenomenologi­
cal analysis leads behind the actual content of meaning to the cogni­
t iv e  dynamics which is responsible fo r the constitution of meaning 
as meaning.^
L. Wittgenstein refers to system in its  actual concrete 
sign ifications remarking that "when we f ir s t  begin to believe any­
thing, what we believe is  not a single proposition, i t  is a whole 
system of propositions (Light dawns gradually over the whole)" (On 
C ertainty, 141). He deals with systems from a more epistemologicaT 
perspective, as he says that “i t  is  not single axioms th a t s trike  me 
as obvious, i t  is  a system in which consequences and premises give 
one another mutual support" ( ib id . ,  142). Thus, we can speak of 
systems of actual s ig n ifica tio n s . About the p lu ra lity  of systems of 
meanings, see J. Marias, History o f Philosophy, pp. 5 , 6 ; c . f .  Trigg, 
pp. 99. Regarding the experience of changing systems of thought, 
see Brian Knowles, "Journey in to  Reason," Religious Humanism 14 
(1980):120.
O
Even though there is  a difference between the actual system 
of meanings and the structure o f reason through which and in which 
meaning is  constituted, the structure of reason and i ts  systematic 
nature should not be thought of as being "formal" in the sense of 
being an enqjty “abstraction." The structure of reason is  the actual 
dynamics that any meaning follows as i t  is constituted. In th is  
sense, i t  is  the basic description of reason's functioning as i t  
constitutes meanings. The existence of actual meanings and system at 
the level of epistemological and ontological frameworks, is , however, 
also part of reason’ s structure . What fa lls  out of reason's 
structure is  only the actual s ign ifications; fo r instance, the mean­
ing of " tree ,"  "man," "the sky is  blue," etc. The structure of the
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I t  pertains to reason's systematic nature that meaning should 
flow from the whole to the part rather than from the part to the 
wholeJ The understanding or in terp retation  o f re a lity  as a whole 
provides reason with the context or background needed fo r the consti­
tution of meaning as a system. The understanding of the whole has
reason is  reached by analyzing the procedures followed by the human 
mind as i t  functions in constituting and discovering meanings. Then, 
the d is tin c tio n  between reason's structure and the actual content 
produced by i t  is not to  be conceived as the difference that exists 
between what is  ''formal" and that which is  "m aterial," or between 
"abstract" and "concrete," but rather between a function and its  
result.
H h is  flow of meaning does not mean that the part does not 
provide at the same time a flow of meaning coming from i t s e l f .  How­
ever, the. meaning of the whole is not determined by the meaning of 
any single part nor by the addition o f a l l  parts. The whole has 
a meaning o f  i ts  own as whole and every part finds its  own particular 
meaning in  re lation  to the meaning of the whole as i ts  cognitive- 
necessary background (ontological framework). Wittgenstein says 
that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only w ithin th is  
system has a particular b it  the value we give it"  ( On Certainty, 
410). John C. Hoffman in "On Theology's Cognitive Claims: A. J.
Ayer Revisited" ( Studies in  Re 1 igion 6 .2  [1976, 77]:125), points 
out that the very facts th a t our p o s it iv is t ic  and s c ie n tif ic  age 
considers the basis fo r science and knowledge have th e ir  meaning 
in a given system; see A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p. 
80. Donald S. Lee ("Contexts," Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 
[1977]:151, 57, 58) provides an analysis of the flow of meaning from 
the whole to the part from the perspective o f an analysis of con­
texts. He offers an analysis of the factors involved in contexts 
and then comments on the ro le  contexts play in  the constitution of 
meanings. He remarks that he does not deny "that meanings are deter­
minate, bu t,"  he asserts, "the determination in  the end is  re la tive  
to a context. The context is  usually 'understood,' i . e . ,  im p lic itly  
agreed upon by those who are grasping or attempting to grasp the 
meanings intended. Persons without some context in common cannot 
communicate successfully. . . . A ll meaning, in the end, is  context 
bound, and contexts themselves are re la t iv e  to fu rther contextual 
considerations" ( ib id .,  p. 158). Cf. Daniel Lerner, e d ., Parts and 
wholes (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 157-62.
Wittgenstein describes properly the ro le  o f the systematic nature 
of reason by saying that "the system is  not so much the point of 
departure, as the element in  which arguments have th e ir  l ife "  (On 
Certainty, 105). So inextricab ly  united is  the system to meaning
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been tra d itio n a lly  the task of metaphysicsJ but i t  has also been
designated by other terms such a "world-view" or “Weltanschauung" 
2
and "cosmology." I t  is within the metaphysical realm that reason
finds the end to  its  search fo r  un ity  of meaning and so fo r the
grounding of its  systematic nature. This ground is  provided by the
3
idea of God, namely, the theos of reason's structure.
of parts that to change systems e n ta ils  a change o f meaning fo r  the  
same involved part; c f .  Hoffman, p. 125.
^Aristotle talks about metaphysics as the understanding o f 
the whole as he states that philosophia prima “is  not the same as 
any of the so-called particular sciences, For none of the others 
contemplates Being generally qua Being" (Metaphysics, 4 .1 ). Marias 
explains that "A ris to tle  defines ' f i r s t  phi Iosophy‘ as the science 
that considers the e n tity  as such in  an universal manner; th a t is  
the to ta li ty  of things fo r what they are" (Hi story of Phi 1 osophy, 
p. 64 ). Thus, in  ontology we are entering into the realm that lies  
beyond the physical world, at le a s t according to tra d itio n . See 
Boethius, De T r in ita te  2 (trans. H. F . Stewart and E. K. Rand, LCL, 9).
2
Whitehead says that the aim of speculative reason is  to  
build  a cosmology which would provide a hierarchy of meaning th a t  
would help to find  the most general in te rp re ta tive  system for exper­
ience: "Cosmology, since i t  is the outcome of the highest generality
of speculation, is  the c r it ic  of a l l  speculation in fe rio r  to i t s e l f  
in generality" (The Function of Reason, pp. 84, 8 5 ). Wittgenstein  
(On Certainty, 95) ca lls  i t  "w orld-p icture." Francis L. S trickland, 
(Foundations of Christian B elief: Studies in the Philosophy of R e li­
gion LNew York: Abingdon Press, 1915J, p. 46) c learly  describes
the ro le  that the Weltanschauung plays in the dynamic of meaning, 
from the perspective of the whole or generality , as "background" 
o r, as Wittgenstein puts i t ,  as the "element" fo r  the systematic 
nature of reason. See p. 41, n. 1 above.
3
Kant (C ritique  of Pure Reason, p. 233) c a lls  i t  the “Ideal 
of pure reason?1 He summarizes his position concluding that "from 
the to ta li ty  of the conditions o f thinking objects in general, in 
so fa r  as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity of a l l  
conditions of the p o ss ib ility  of things in general; that is , from 
things which I do not know in th e ir  mere transcendental conception, 
and o f whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception what­
ever. This d ia le c tic a l argument I  shall ca ll the Ideal o f pure 
reason." Of course, th is  "Ideal" was already at work when philoso­
phia prima was born in  A ris to tle 's  w ritings . A r is to tle  (Metaphysics,
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At this point in our analysis reason’ s structure appears 
in i ts  systematic nature as on to-theo-log icalJ  In other words, 
reason’ s structure as onto-theo-logical finds the ultim ate ground 
for i ts  coherence and system in the idea o f God—theos. I t  expresses 
its  systematic nature through the coherent in te rre la tio n  of the epis­
tem ological—Jocjos— and ontological—ontos—frameworks. And i t  finds
6 . 1 . 10, 11) includes theology as a foundational part of metaphysical 
hierarchy— as a matter o f fac t as the ultim ate ground and te l os of 
metaphysics. Metaphysics, philosophia prima, has a theological 
foundation; c f. Joseph Owen I^ The Doctrine of Being in the 
A ris to te lia n  'Metaphysics’ : a Study in  the Greek background oF3
Medieval Thought, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical In s titu te  of 
Medieval Studies, 1963), p. 457. Even within the s c ie n tific  trad­
itio n  theos seems to be at the very foundation of ra t io n a lity . See, 
for instance, Albert E instein, The World As I See I t  (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949), "pi 29T Martin Heidegger ( ’’The
Onto-theo-1ogical Constitution of Metaphysics," in  Identity  and D if-  
ference, ed. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper and Row, 1969J, pp.
explains how in tra d itio n a l philosophy, ontology and hence 
reason's systematic structure finds i ts  ground in God. He also 
explains that "metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the 
ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is in d iffe re n tly  
valid  everywhere, and also in the unity of the a ll  that accounts 
fo r the ground, that is , o f the A ll-H ighest. The Being of beings is 
thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground. Therefore a ll 
metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds, what 
gives account of the ground, what is  called to account by the ground, 
and f in a l ly  what c a lls  the ground to account" ( ib id .,  p. 58). Theos 
is s t i l l  considered as foundational fo r  ra tio n a lity  in post-Kantian 
approaches; see Charles H. Cox, p. 82; and Theodor Adorno, pp. 80, 
82. I t  is  clear, then, that we use theos only in i ts  epistemological 
sense o f that p rinc ip le  of in te l l ig ib i l  i ty  and that any other 
th e is tic  or atheistic  connotations are not relevant to our analysis.
^Heidegger in "Onto-theo-logical Constitution" (pp. 54, 60) 
defines metaphysics as being onto-theo-1og ica l. In the same pages he 
explains the Greek foundation of the onto-theo-logical nature of 
metaphysics. As is  c lear from the preface of Being and Time, 
Heidegger's main concern is  ontological, namely! the grasping 
of the meaning of the ground o f Being. I t  is in th is lig h t that he 
deals w ith  the onto-theo-logical structure. On the other hand, our 
main concern in dealing with the very same structure is  episte­
m ological. Since both approaches are provided from one o f reason's 
frameworks—Heidegger ontological framework, and our study epistemo­
logical framework— they are not contradictory but complementary. I t
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i ts e l f  b u ilt  in  (fo r any possible constitution of meaning at any 
le v e l, pole, framework or dimensionality) the foundational subject-  
object re lationsh ip .
As the critic ism  of reason has been the resu lt of a h is to r i­
cal process led by tra d it io n J  the search fo r the ground of meaning 
and system has not dared to go beyond the ground set by tra d it io n ,  
namely the theos. This s itu a tio n , however, has changed since 
Heidegger's remarks about the need to overcome metaphysics.^ To 
put i t  b r ie f ly ,  the theos cannot constitute the fin a l state in  a
should be noticed also that the coherentist versus foundationalist 
models fo r grounding meaning controversy seem to be overcome since 
coherence and ungrounded ultim ate propositions stand together in 
the dynamic onto-theo-logical structure of reason. For an introduc­
tion  to the foundational is t  model of knowledge, see C. I .  Lewis, 
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La S a lle , I l l in o is :  Open
Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 333. For an introduction to the 
coherentist model, see Roger Shiner, "Wittgenstein and the Founda­
tions of Knowledge," Proceedings of the A ris to te lian  Society 78 
(1977, 78), pp. 104, 105:
^About the way in which tra d itio n  leads the in terp retation  
of the foundational structure of meaning and reason, see Wittgenstein, 
On C erta in ty , 95. Wittgenstein explains that " I did not get my p ic- 
ture of the world by satisfying myself of i ts  correctness; nor do 
I have i t  because I am satis fied  o f i ts  correctness. No: i t  is
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true  
and false" ( ib id . ) .  See also Putnam, p. 216.
2
Such structure comes from Greek heritage and is epistemolo- 
g ic a lly  developed by Kant. Precisely here lie s  the lim ita tio n  of 
Kant's c ritic ism  of reason. Kant develops and c r i t ic a l ly  analyzes 
reason and i ts  structure, yet he does not extend his c ritic ism  to 
the foundational ground fo r meaning that lie s  beyond the theos and 
the ontos themselves. In th is  aspect Heidegger's analysis represents 
a step forward.
^Heidegger, "Onto-theo-logical Constitution," p. 72. See 
p. 106, nn. 2, 3; and p. 107, nn. 1, 2 below.
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search fo r the ultim ate ground o f meaning, since theos in the very 
same onto-theo-logical structure o f reason conceals a theo-log ia , 
namely an understanding or in terp re ta tion  of the theos. Addition­
a lly , i t  should be remembered th a t the theos is  the ultim ate express­
ion of the ontos which also e n ta ils  an onto-logyJ I t  is apparent, 
then, that what goes beyond both theos and ontos in  the onto-theo- 
logical structure of reason is  logos i ts e lf ,  which is  the subject 
matter of th is  investigation. I t  is  necessary, then, to take a 
further step and go beyond the ontos and the theos into the realm 
of the ultim ate cognitive reference from which the meanings of the
parts of the whole—that is ,  o f ontos, theos, and logos—equiprimor-
2
d ia lly  orig inated . This is the realm of foundational ontology.
H h at is ,  an understanding or interpretation of the "ontos."  
See p. 17 n. 4, above.
2
Heidegger expresses the 1ogos' cognitive precedence in the 
onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics in the following way: 
"But -logy hides more than ju s t the logical in the sense of what 
is consistent and generally in the nature of a statement, what struc­
tures, moves, secures, and communicates a ll  s c ie n tif ic  knowledge. 
In each case, the Logia is  the to ta lity  of a nexus of grounds 
accounted fo r , w ithin which nexus the objects of the sciences are 
represented in  respect of th e ir  ground, that is ,  are conceived. 
Ontology, however, and theology are 'Logies* inasmuch as they provide 
the ground o f beings as such and account for them w ithin the whole. 
They account fo r Being as the ground of beings. They account to  
the Logos, and are in an essential sense in accord with the Logos, 
that is they are the logic of the Logos. Thus they are more pre­
cisely called onto-logic and theo-log ic . More rigorously and c le a rly  
thought out, metaphysics is : onto-theo-logical" ("Onto-theo-logical
Constitution," pp. 58, 59).
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The Hypothetical Character 
of Reason's Structure:
Presuppositions
The onto-theo-logical structure o f reason points beyond the 
theos to the logos involved in its  understanding. At th is  point 
we leave the analysis o f the structure o f reason as centered in its
functioning^ and have to deal with the minimum basic ontological
2 3contents that reason's structure needs in  order to function a t a l l .
Nonetheless, even a t th is  turning point from structure--as
functioning--to content— as shaping the meaning of the structure—
there s t i l l  are some structural aspects that need c la r if ic a t io n .
That is  why I analyze the actual minimum ontological content needed
for reason to function in the second part o f th is  chapter. I want
now to deal with the structural aspects involved.
As knowledge stands on the foundational subject-object
re lationship , that which is brought to  the actual re lationsh ip  by
^ e e  p. 46, n. 2, above.
2
At this po in t, as the structure of reason requires an 
ontological—theological—content, Logos, functioning w ith in  the 
subject-object re lationsh ip , has as subject matter the understanding 
of Being which is previous to any ontological re fle c tio n . This 
understanding w ill ground, at the same tim e, the onto and the logos 
fo r the in terpretation of both metaphysics and reason. Hence, this 
understanding is foundational for both epistemological and ontologi­
cal frameworks. I t  is  at th is foundational level of reason's struc­
ture which we ca ll “dimensionality of reason's structure' that the 
c ritic is m  of reason should be addressed and grounded.
\ e  here speak of "content" only in  so fa r as needed to 
develop the basic in te rp re ta tion  of the ontological and epistemologi­
cal frameworks. Such content is previous—a prio ri—to the actual 
system of meanings.
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both the subject and the object can be said to be a p r io r iJ  and
to  be the condition of the re lationship and, consequently of
meaning i t s e l f .  From the subject's side the a p rio ri feature o f
reason's structure appears as what the cognitive subject needs to
presuppose or assume in order th a t a relationship--knowledge,
2
meaning—may be produced or constituted. Kant b r ie f ly  expresses
th is  aspect of reason's structure by saying that reason has the
"princ ip le  of presupposing the unconditioned fo r every conditioned 
3
th in g ."  This is  reason's search fo r  unity in order to provide an
I t  is in  th is  sense that a p rio ri is to  be understood as 
being a feature in the structure of reason. Kant's idea of a p rio ri 
as being previous to sensible experience is to be considered as his 
own p articu la r interpretation of what the subject brings to the re la ­
tio n  of knowledge; in other words, i t s  own in terpretation  of what 
the a p rio ri of reason's structure means. Kant's explanation of
the a prio ri o f reason, leaving aside its  transcendentalism and
idealism , is very useful and even foundational from the perspective 
of the epistemological framework fo r  understanding conditionality  
as part of reason's structure. As we deal with reason, the analysis 
of what the object brings to the re la tion  of knowledge is  not
addressed. Such is  the task fo r the so-called regional ontologies. 
A critic ism  of reason must concentrate i ts e l f  on the side of the 
subject who performs the cognitive act. And so, the a priori condi­
tions appear from the subject side as part of the epistemological 
framework of reason's structure.
2
This has its  foundation in the phenomenological descrip­
tio n  of knowledge as a relationship. I f  nothing is  brought to i t  
by the subject there is  no knowledge. See p. 27, n. 3 above.
3
C ritique of Practical Reason (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1956), p. T . I t  is clear that Kant has given a much longer 
and detailed exposition of the a p rio ri con d itio na lity  of reason 
which includes what he calls Transcendental Aesthetic (forms of sen­
s i t i v i t y ,  space, and time) and Transcendental Analytic (forms of 
the understanding, categories). Because of our structural analysis, 
however, the a p rio ri of reason, which Kant develops in his Trans­
cendental D ia lec tics , presents the basis fo r an understanding of 
reason's hypothetical functioning.
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ultim ate ground fo r its  own system J  This unity, according to  Kant,
is  to  be found and grounded in  the transcendental ideas from which,
a f te r  they are found by reason, meaning flows to the conditioned
2
and to the whole system of reason. The rational knowledge that 
resu lts  from the application o f the “heuristic  principles" of
3
reason to particu la r cases reveals the "hypothetical" character
4
of reason's functioning. According to Kant, these princip les are
The search fo r the unconditioned which conditions the whole 
of knowledge is  grounded in the functioning of reason, hence i t  per­
ta in s  to its  structure. Kant explains this aspect in d e ta il and 
remarks that the search for the a priori is developed from the side 
of the conditions (cognitive conditions, hence pertaining to the 
epistemological framework) and not from the side o f the conditioned 
"fo r the p o s s ib ility  o f the conditioned presupposes the to ta l i ty  
of i ts  conditions, but not o f i ts  consequences.“ " I t  is  easy to
perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute to ta l i ty  
of the synthesis on the side o f the conditions, and that i t  does 
not concern i ts e lf  with the absolute completeness on the part of 
the conditioned" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 231). The search ends 
as i t  reaches the absolute unconditionality, the idea of God, the 
theos of reason's structure. See ib id . ,  p. 223.
2Ib id .,  p. 384.
"W transcendental ideas in which u ltim ate unity is 
expressed and conferred by the "ideal of pure reason," namely, the 
idea of God.
^"The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid o f ideas 
employed as problematic conceptions is properly not constitu tive. 
That is to say, i f  we consider the subject s t r ic t ly ,  the tru th  of 
the ru le , which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow  
from the use that is made of i t  by reason" ( ib id . ,  p. 375). I t  is 
to be noticed that fo r Kant the hypothetical character o f reason 
does not apply to the forms o f sensib ility  and to  the categories 
as the form of the understanding. Such function of reason, according 
to Kant, is not hypothetical but necessary, and the very foundation 
of science. See ib id . ,  p. 373. Yet, even in Kant, there is  a way 
in which the meaning that flows from the heu ris tic  principles of 
reason penetrates the whole o f knowledge, otherwise, there would 
be no unity or system, which is  the task reason is  supposed to 
achieve. Kant te l ls  us e x p lic it ly  that we have "to expect that the 
form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical un ity of in tu itio n s ,
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complemented by the postulates of practical reason which "are not 
theoretica l dogmas but presuppositions of necessarily practical
import. " 1 Such presuppositions, l ik e  th e ir  correlates the “ideas,"
2
are not "knowledge" but they are the necessary condition of a ll
3
knowledge, both theoretica l and p ra c tic a l. This feature of reason's
following the rule o f. the categories, w ill contain the orig in  of 
p a rtic u la r a prio ri conceptions, which we may ca ll pure conceptions 
of reason or transcendental ideas, and which w ill determine the use 
of the understanding in  the to ta li ty  of experience according to prin ­
ciples" (p. 223). Following th is  structural lin e  presented by Kant, 
we see the hypothetical character of reason as permeating the whole 
of reason's a c tiv it ie s ; c f .  p. 217.
C r it iq u e  of Practical Reason, p. 132. Kant immediately 
adds th a t “while they do not extend speculative knowledge, they give 
objective re a lity  to  the ideas of speculative reason in general (by 
means o f th e ir re la tio n  to the p ractica l sphere), and they ju s t ify  
i t  in  holding to concepts even the poss ib ility  of which i t  could 
not otherwise venture to a ffirm ."
2
They are not "knowledge" because Kant has already defined 
the lim its  of every possible knowledge as provided by in tu it io n . 
I f  there is  no in tu it io n , according to Kant's theory you have a know­
ledge which is not "knowledge" but which nonetheless plays the ro le  
of u ltim ate foundation fo r meaning and knowledge. W ittgenstein, 
among others, follows Kant's pattern (On Certainty, 86 , 116), even 
though w ithin a d iffe re n t epistemological theory. For him, the 
“ground flo o r propositions" are not known because fo r "knowledge" 
to be— according to his theory—we must be able to v e r ify  i t ;  c f. 
Shawn J. Mintek, "R ationality  and Absolute Presuppositions" (Ph.D. 
d isserta tion , University of Washington, 1977), p. 48; and C. G. 
Luckhardt, "Beyond Knowledge: Paradigms in W ittgenstein's Later
Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1978):252. 
For W ittgenstein, “not to know 'background propositions'" or "abso­
lute presuppositions" does not mean to "ignore" them or th a t they l ie  
in the realm of unconsciousness. I t  rather seems to mean that they 
l ie  in a d iffe ren t realm of knowledge, the realm of the grounding 
of meaning. On the contrary, A r is to tle  (Analytica Posteriora 1 .2 ,
3 [tra n s . G .. R. G. Mure, The Work o f "Aristotle translated into  
English, 1:71 -73a ] )  and Plato ( Republic /.13  Ltrans. Paul Shorey, 
LCL, ? :203 ]), believe th a t the f i r s t  ground fo r knowledge must be 
reached by knowledge, otherwise, there would be no real s c ie n tific  
knowledge at a l l .
\ a n t  in C ritique  of Practical Reason (pp. 140, 141) explains 
the re lationship that exists between Practical and Pure reason
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structure, pointed out by Kant, extends the hypothetical character 
of reason to the whole of reason's system, whose ultim ate meaning 
is not grounded in knowledge but in a "postulate," a "presupposi­
tio n ,"  or as some thinkers l ik e  to ca ll i t ,  " fa ith .
Even though the idea of presupposition i ts e lf  has a somewhat
2
broad and ambiguous meaning, I use i t  here in its  a p r io r i sense
regarding the "ideas" and "postulates." At th is point, i t  seems 
clear that such “ideas" and "postulates" are at least a certa in  kind 
of knowledge. What Kant denies is  the u ltrasensorial, supernatural 
origin of knowledge, not i ts  theoretical position in the whole of 
reason's structure. Reason s t i l l  needs a transcendental f i r s t  
being— as in A ristotle  and Thomas Aquinas— in  order to provide the 
ultim ate ground for meaning and system fo r  the whole of reason's 
a c tiv it ie s . What the postulates of practica l reason do is tc  provide 
the "object" that corresponds to the "ideas" of pure reason. That 
is to say, they do not provide the meaning fo r the ideas. On the 
contrary, the meaning is  provided by pure reason. We should remem­
ber at th is  point that fo r Kant existence does not add anything to 
the essence. See his famous critic ism  o f the Ontological Argument 
of Anselm in which Kant uses the example of the 100 ta le rs  in 
Critique o f Pure Reason, p. 350. The foundation for the transcenden­
ta l ideas oT reason is  provided, then, not through knowledge but 
through moral experience and fa ith , while the meaning fo r them is 
s t i l l  provided by pure reason as i t  received i t  from Greek platonic  
tra d itio n . Kant suggests th a t th is  knowledge—that of the ideas— 
should not be used in a positive but ra ther in a negative way that 
would discourage an extrasensorial o rig in  fo r the ideas. In this  
way Kant's system reaches i ts  perfect coherence.
^Jaspers, conmienting on Kant in The Foundations, says that 
"without pure rational fa ith ,  the use of reason becomes e ith e r  the 
pretension to universal knowledge (Pansophy) or misology, the 
suicide o f reason" (p. 312). This Kantian description o f reason’ s 
structure is the basis fo r Dooyeweerd's critic ism  of reason 
(1:13-113).
2
Farber gives an idea regarding the meaning of the term- "pre­
supposition": " l i te r a lly  i t  means 'posited as holding or as existing
in advance.' Because of i ts  many uses, the term must be interpreted  
in a twofold manner, having regard to existence as well as to 
thought. In broadest meaning i t  refers to  any kind of supposition 
or assumption, such as a m aterial or ideal domain, a realm of e x is t­
ence, a process of experience, or a system of knowledge. I t  may 
be also taken to re fe r to formal p rinc ip les , either in the sense
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of a condition of knowledge. In th is  usage the meaning of "presuppo­
s ition" is  s t i l l  very broad, but i t  is no longer ambiguous since 
we are now applying i t  to a very concrete realm— namely, the realm 
of the cognitive a c tiv ity  of the subject-object re lationsh ip— and 
within i t ,  more precisely, to what the subject brings to th is  re la ­
tion from the side of the epistemological framework.
The hypothetical character of reason's structure is  present 
in the a priori conditions or presuppositions i t  requires fo r the
constitution of knowledge.^ I t  is  possible to see, then, how the
2
hypothetical character pertains to the whole of reason's structure.
At this point Husserl's idea of a presuppositionless
3
philosophy seems to contradict the idea of an a p r io r i realm o f
of a rb itra ry  assumptions or of necessary logical princip les" (pp. 45, 
46). Then, he proceeds to divide and analyze presuppositions into four 
basic types, namely, m ateria l, cognitive, of special systems, and 
princip les of logic. Presuppositions have been studied in d iffe re n t  
areas: for instance, in semantics, see Deirde Wilson, Pre­
suppositions and Non-truth-conditional Semantics (London: Academic
Press, 1975); and in lin g u is tic  analysis, see Laurie Hoi lings, "Pre­
suppositions and Theories of Meaning," Mind 89 (1980 ):274-81. This
kind of analysis fa l ls  beyond the lim its  of our investigation .
^"Every knowledge has presuppositions, and what matters is  
what should we do with them, in other words, what ro le  are they  
supposed to play in knowledge" (Marias, Idea de la  M etafisica, p. 
398). "Assumptions must be made in a l l  reasoning, including reasoning 
in logic its e lf"  (Farber, p. 51). De Wolf adds: "Besides needing 
data of experience, reason also depends upon certa in  assumptions or 
postulates which no appeal to the data can establish and which reason 
cannot prove without assuming them while proof is attempted" (p. 30 ).
2
As presuppositions are embedded in reason's structure, d i f ­
ferent presuppositions render d iffe ren t systems of meaning; see 
Farber, pp. 44, 45; and Dooyeweerd, 1:36, 37. Jaspers, commenting on 
Kant in  The Foundations (p. 311), stresses the way in  which the realm  
of a p rio ri presuppositions pertains to the structure of reason.
Edmund Husserl puts i t  in the following way: "There lie s
embedded in its  meaning as philosophy a radicalism  in the m atter
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cognitive conditions fo r meaning. However, a careful study o f th is  
idea reveals that i t  refers rather to a procedure or methodology 
through which the a p rio ri realm of presuppositions may be reached.*
of foundations, an absolute freedom from a ll presuppositions, a 
securing fo r  i ts e l f  an absolute basis: the to ta li ty  of presupposi­
tions that can be 'takeri fo r granted'" ( Ideas: General Introduction
to Pure Phenomenology [London: George Allen and UnwinJ, 13€»/» p. 28).
farber Lpp. 44-60 passim) remarks that th is  idea was prominent in  
Husserl and his successors— Schuppe and Rehmke, fo r instance. I t  
supposes that "nothing is  assumed, and as a beginning there is  only 
the s e lf-v a lid a tin g  cognitive experience its e lf"  (p. 62). The world 
is surely "pre-given," but th is  touches the ontological a p r io r i 
and not the epistemological one we are interested in . See p . '52, 
n. 3 above.
V a rb e r ’ s analysis (pp. 44-64 passim), however, goes fu rth e r  
and sees th a t “in fac t, the princip le  of presuppositionlessness has 
been called the greatest of presuppositions" (p. 44). I t  seems that 
Husserl, in fostering such an id e a l, was thinking not along the lines  
of reason's structure as we do, but rather along the lines o f  what 
Putnam (p. 110) calls  " c r ite r ia l  conception." That is , the existence  
of a p r io r i in s titu tio n a lized  norms defining what is and is  not 
ra tio n a lly  acceptable. In short, he was rejecting dogmatism in 
philosophical analysis as hindering the progress of i t .  Farber's  
analysis seems to confirm our evaluation as he sees Husserl re fe rr in g  
especially to  "metaphysical or ex istentia l assumptions" (Farber, 
p. 64). The ideal of a presuppositionless philosophy can be seen 
as the te s t fo r a tru ly  c r i t ic a l  philosophy (p . 54 ). This idea seems 
to reach i ts  methodological expression through the epoche (p . 55). 
However, a fte r  dogmatic assumptions are la id  asi3e EErough the 
epoche (th a t is to say, presuppositions in the sense of prejudices: 
see Rudolf Bultmann's "Is Exegesis without presuppositions possi­
ble?" in Existence and Fa ith , ed. Schubert M. Ogden [New York: L iv­
ing Age Books, 1960J, pp. 290, 291), the ideal of sc ien tific  p h ilo ­
sophy "properly means the e x p lic it  examination and con stitu tive  
analysis of a l l  elements of the structure of knowledge and re a lity "  
(Farber, p. 64 ). In th is  la s t sense, the sense pointing to reason’ s 
structure, a presuppositionless inquiry is  unattainable; c t . M intek, 
p. 36. Farber, on the other hand, te lls  us that "the phenomenologi­
cal reduction makes possible the fin a l elucidation of a ll elements 
of knowledge and experience by enabling us to get back of and to 
the bottom of a l l  presuppositions" (p. 62). And so he sees that 
in Husserl "the radical re fle c tio n  which is required examines syste­
m atically  the ultimate thinkable presuppositions of knowledge" 
(pp. 59, 6 0 ). R. G. Collingwood expresses b luntly  the need o f pre­
suppositions fo r the s c ie n tif ic  inquiry: "Metaphysics, therefore ,
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Presuppositions are o f two kinds, re la tive  and absolute.^ 
As the u ltim ate meaning of any re la tiv e  presupposition is  conditioned 
by the absolute one to which i t  is  essen tia lly  ordered, we need to 
consider here only the realm of absolute presuppositions. A phenom­
enological analysis of the dynamics o f meaning reveals that absolute
either has presuppositions or is  no science" ( Essay on Metaphysics 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940], p. 63 ).
Whe re la tive  ones, in th e ir  meaning, are sub-ordinated to 
the absolute ones. Three major philosophers have developed e x p lic it  
studies on presuppositions, namely Collingwood, Husserl, and 
W ittgenstein. Lionel Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Meta-  
physics: A Study in the Philosophy of the Mind (Canada: University
of Toronto Press, I9?0), p. 218, points out that Collingwood recog­
nizes two kinds of presuppositions, those w ithin the body of science 
which can be verified , and those that pertain not to th a t body and 
which are, therefore, not v e r ifia b le . “These are the conditions 
sine quae non of the science in question" ( ib id . ) .  Farber says that 
Tor Husserl there are also two kinds of presuppositions, namely, 
the ordinary ones and th a t which is presupposed im p lic it ly  in a ll 
presupposing and in a l l  questioning. This las t was held to exist 
necessarily, and to continue to ex is t, and was not acknowledged to 
be an assumption. " I t  was regarded rather as the f i r s t  thing to 
be fre e ly  and expressly posited, and th a t with a self-evidence which 
precedes a l l  conceivable instances of self-evidence, and is  contained 
im p lic it ly  in  them a ll"  (p . 60 ). W. D. Hudson ("Language-Games and 
Presuppositions," Phi 1osophy 53 [1978]:96) says that fo r Wittgenstein 
there are also two kinds of presuppositions. One of them is  called 
by him "hypotheses"; see On Certainty, 153, 163, 337, 110, where 
we are to ld  that they can be true or fa ls e , be tested, be doubted, 
and that they need ground. The second kind is  called "fundamental 
presuppositions"; see ib id . ,  403, 119, 311, 512, 12, 626, 616, 19, 
where we are told that they are the foundation of our language-games, 
they cannot be tested, they cannot be doubted, and that they cannot 
change. I t  should be noticed that the analysis of the phenomenon 
of knowledge and the structure of reason do not render the existence 
or necessity of thinking in terms of only one absolute presupposi­
tio n , but rather speaks o f presuppositions in general implying the 
p lu ra lity  o f them. Mintek (p. 75) explains how, according to 
Collingwood, many presuppositions are involved in each particu lar  
meaning; c f .  Collingwood Essay on Metaphysics, p. 25. For examples 
of absolute presuppositions, see ib id . ,  pp. 49, 50; c f. Mintek, pp. 
71, 72. As can be appreciated from these examples, they do not reach 
e x p lic it ly  but or.Iy im p lic it ly  the ultim ate realm of the theos.
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presuppositions constitute part o f the structure of reasonJ The
ro le  o f presuppositions within the structure of reason is , in a way,
2
analogous to the theos of i t ,  although in the deepest grounding 
of meaning the search fo r the u ltim ate  presupposition has to go even 
beyond theos and ontos. ^  Absolute presuppositions are the
Wittgenstein develops a c ritic is m  of knowledge from a 
l in g u is tic  viewpoint in which we are able to see presuppositions 
working as part of the structure o f reason, since language is  the 
expression of the act by which reason constitutes meaning. ( I  cannot 
analyze here the way in which language is  also present as part o f 
the a p rio ri of reason as i t  constitutes and communicates the  
concrete content of the presuppositions reason needs fo r working.) 
See Hudson, pp. 94-99. On the other hand, i t  must be remembered 
th a t W ittgenstein's analysis, as i t  has been shown by Nicholas F. 
Gier (Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study o f the
Later W ittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty LAlbany: 
State University of New York Press, 1981J, pp. 46, 4 / J is , in  the  
f in a l analysis, also a phenomenological one. Wittgenstein sees in  
his analysis that the rock bottom o f his convictions "are carried  
by the whole house" (On Certainty, 142). Consequently, Hudson points 
out that "Wittgenstein speaks o f fundamental propositions a number 
of times as im p lic it within our experience and suggests th a t we 
exp licate  them subsequently through re flec tio n  upon i t "  (p . 95 ). 
Cf. On Certainty, 95, 152. So presuppositions are im p lic it in every 
knowledge even though the knower may not have an e x p lic it  conscious­
ness o f i t .  What is  not e x p lic it  a t f i r s t  glance, though, is made 
e x p lic it  through the phenomenological analysis.
2
They are analogous to the theos, according to W ittgenstein, 
because the "systems" of meaning th a t he analyzes are mostly those 
of the common l i f e  realm, and so they can be expressed, at leas t  
in a lin g u is tic  context, as propositions that are other than God 
or the idea of God. By analogy, then, that presupposition plays 
the ro le of theos in reason’ s structure. A deeper analysis, however, 
asks fo r the meaning of this presupposition and its  constitu tion , 
the thing which is  not always pursued by Wittgenstein, but which 
is obviously hinted as he sees a l l  systems of thought springing from 
the Lebenswelt. Or, as he expresses in his w ritings, the bottom 
lin e  from which every absolute presupposition would spring is  our 
action; see On Certainty, 204, 46, 135, 287, 559, 359; c f. Hudson, 
p. 99.
^See p. 51, n. 2 above.
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"groundfloor" or “source" of meaning fo r the whole rational system J
and as such they stand beyond doubt, c ritic ism , v e r ific a tio n , and
2
in th is  sense are neither “true" nor "fa lse ." I f  tru th  and meaning
have th e ir  ultim ate ground in the a p rio ri realm o f presuppositions,
a c ritic ism  of reason and its  structure should begin by being con-
3
scious of th is  realm and the content of i ts  presuppositions.
According to Mintek “some beliefs are 'ground-floor* and 
cannot be questioned, given up, or modified ra t io n a lly , because they 
serve as paradigms and standards of ra tio n a lity . TEey serve as the 
framework of a belief-system and determine the sorts of inquiry and 
questioning that one can leg itim ate ly  and in te l l ig ib ly  carry out. 
Even though they are not ju s t if ie d  or known, nothing is  more certa in  
than these rock bottom beliefs according to Wittgenstein" (p. 57). 
Yet, philosophers in general, even those such as Husserl, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Collingwood, etc. . . . who 
are involved in the study and c ritic ism  of reason, seem to forget 
the hypothetical nature of reason in  i ts  absolute foundation, namely, 
in the realm of absolute presuppositions. To accept i t  would imply 
that certainty would be challenged, at least the tra d itio n a l under­
standing of i t .  A new understanding should be worked out. This 
is not done, not even by W ittgenstein who accepts the tra d itio n a l 
Platonic meaning fo r  certainty as foundational.
2
According to Wittgenstein (On C erta inty, 115), absolute 
certa in ty  of ultim ate presuppositions is tHe Basis for doubting 
i t s e l f .  Collingwood explains the unques .io n a b ility  of absolute pre­
suppositions in his Essay on Metaphysics, chapter 4; c f. Mintek,
pp. 82, 83, 61, 62; and Adorno, p. 83. Rintek (pp. 57, 82-84, 92)
c r it ic iz e s  Collingwood's and W ittgenstein's understanding of absolute 
presuppositions. C ritic a l ra t io n a lity ,  as Mintek sees i t ,  must avoid 
such dogmatism which destroys ra tio n a lity  i t s e l f .  According to 
Mintek, ra t io n a lity  must be open to critic ism  and v e rifica tio n  at
the level of its  ultimate presuppositions. Yet, Mintek is not con­
s is ten t with himself when he affirm s that "beliefs and b e lie f systems 
can be rational in spite of the fac t that some beliefs must be
ungrounded" (p. 105). The problem with Mintek's critic ism  is that 
he does not distinguish between absolute presuppositions as part 
of reason's structure and the concrete actual meaning of absolute 
presuppositions which stands in  need of c r itic is m . Additionally, 
he also disregards the hypothetical nature o f reason which c a lls  
fo r more than one understanding fo r  any presupposition, whether re la ­
t iv e  or absolute.
\u ckh ard t (pp. 250-52) t e l ls  how the grounds of knowledge 
must be known according to A r is to tle , and how they are not supposed
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However, the analysis is not to be developed at the concrete level 
of the content of the many rational systems^ but at the structural 
level in  which the very epistemological framework of reason is  shaped 
and developed in order to be used afterwards as the basic tool of 
systematic structural reason which any knowledge is  supposed to have 
and follow  in order to have a system of meaning at a l l .  In such 
an enterprise the basic d if f ic u lty  to be met lie s  in the p o s s ib ility
to be known according to W ittgenstein. Yet, in close examination 
these two theories are not so fa r  apart from each other. Collingwood
(Faith and Reason: __ Essays in Phi 1 osophy o f Religion [Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1968J, p. 108) explains that fo r A risto tle  we do 
not have proof of them but that they are not matters of fa ith  e ith e r .  
They are evident in themselves. On the other hand, fo r W ittgenstein, 
to know is  to v e rify , at least in some sense. However, these abso­
lute presuppositions cannot be checked out, e ith er by experience 
or by argumentation; see Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 
123, 194, 173; c f . Mintek, pp. 67, 74. Then, i t  seems c lear why 
they are not "knowledge" in W ittgenstein’ s theory. However, they 
are knowledge in the sense that they have a meaning of th e ir  own 
that can be expressed in propositions. Hence they have the founda­
tional meaning fo r the en tire  structure o f reason; c f. Farber, pp. 
59-62 passim; p. 55, n. 2 above; Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, 
p. 43.
^This is , fo r instance, the kind of critic ism  th a t 
W ittgenstein's and Collingwood's analyses represent; see Mintek, 
pp. 71-87 passim. Collingwood ( Essay on Metaphysics, p. 48) 
expresses his h is to r ic is t c ritic ism  o? absolute presuppositions. 
He fu rther develops its  position; see pp. 72, 73, 254. Collingwood 
believes that absolute presuppositions may be compared to others, 
may be h is to ric a lly  investigated in th e ir  process of change, yet 
they must be accepted by fa ith .  I agree th a t h istory plays a founda­
tional ro le in the transmission of absolute presuppositions from one 
h is to rica l s ituation to another, yet disagree with the h is to r ic is t  
reduction of metaphysics and the meaning o f absolute presuppositions 
by the h is torica l conditioned situation  in which men live  and th in k . 
This position is  unaware of the epistemological framework and o f 
the h is to rica l logos. I t  ju s t c r it ic iz e s  trad itio n a l trends but 
does not provide a new in terpretation  fo r reason's structure to  
function.
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of determining the content of the ultim ate presuppositionJ
As we look fo r the ultim ate presupposition in the structure  
of reason we have to reca ll that its  epistemological framework pre- 
supposes as i ts  foundation the ontological framework. The theos
The basic d if f ic u lty  we find in Wittgenstein's and 
Collingwood's approaches lie s  in the tension they posit between the 
theos o f reason's structure—which represents the trad itiona l concept 
and dimension of the ONE— and the affirm ation of a p lu ra lity  of u l t i ­
mate p rinc ip les . The problem lie s  in the fac t that neither of them 
pursue his analysis u n til i ts  f in a l consequences, in to  the realm 
and dimension of the ONE. This is  the step I try  to take. See 
pp. 48, n. 3; and 59, n. 1 above.
2
See p. 40, n. 1 and p. 41, n. 1 above. R. Vancourt (p. 22) 
speaks of "mutual conditionality" which considers the critique of 
knowledge to be the necessary introduction fo r metaphysics; and, 
at the same time, considers metaphysics to be the indispensable pre­
supposition of every theory of knowledge. Hartmann ( In t . ,  42) con­
siders metaphysics to be the indispensable presupposition of every 
theory of knowledge following the trad itio n a l idea of philosophia 
prima. Heidegger remarks that "the question of Being aims therefore  
at ascertaining the a p rio ri conditions not only fo r the possib ility  
of the sciences which examine e n titie s  as e n titie s  of such and such 
type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of 
Being, but also fo r the p o s s ib ility  of those ontologies themselves 
which are p rio r to the ontical sciences and which provide their foun­
dations" (Being and Time, In t . ,  3 ) . Heidegger stresses the point 
that "orig ina l ontological concepts must . . .  be obtained p rio r  
to any s c ie n tif ic  d e fin itio n  of 'basic concepts'" ( The Essence of 
Reasons [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969J, p. 2b).
T. Langan affirm s that "these notions about the ultim ate constitution  
of Being and about the nature of the founding en tity  influence the 
c r it ic a l  a ttitu d e  o f the th inker as he plays o ff the d iffe ren t 
sources of evidence one against the other. At work whether he sees 
i t  c le a rly  or not is a conception of tru th  and a notion of what Being 
is bas ica lly  like  that guides his judgment as to what w il l  be 
accepted as evidence and what w il l  not, what w ill be evaluated and 
what devaluated" ("H is to r ic ity  and Metaphysics," American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 48 [1974 ]:5 ). Not only epistemology is  
seen as conditioned By” ontology but also logic i t s e l f .  Farber 
remarks: " I t  is becoming increasingly c lear that logic requires
the preparatory analysis of meaning and the concept of re a lity "  
(p. 52). See also Jaques M arita in , The Range of Reason (London: 
Geoffrey Bless, 1953), p. 6 ; Putnam, pi 215; Andres Ortis-Oses, 
“Communicacion e Interpretacion: C ritic a  de la Razon Hermeneutica," 
Pensamiento 30 (1974):420.
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of reason's structure also presupposes the ontological framework.^ 
Thus, in the onto-theo-logical structure of reason the logos is  in
a sense subordinated to the theos, and the theos is  subordinated
2
to the ontos. In short, the flow of meaning in  the structure of 
reason goes from the ontos through the theos to the logos.^ I t  would 
seem, however, that the hypothetical nature of reason remains at
Martin Heidegger says: “Only from the tru th  of Being can
the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the 
holy can the essence o f the d iv in ity  be thought. Only in the lig h t  
of the essence of d iv in ity  can i t  be thought and said what the word 
'God' is  to signify" ("L ette r on Humanism," in Philosophy in  the 
Twentieth Century: An Anthology, eds. W. Barret and H. D. Aiken,
4 vols. I  New York: Random House, 1962], 3:294). He further adds:
"All theological concepts necessarily contain th a t understanding 
of Being which is constitu tive of human Dasein, insofar as i t  exists  
at a l l"  ("Phenomenology and Theology" in The Piety of Thinking, eds. 
J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo [Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1976], p. 18). Cf. Nicholas A. Patricca, "Martin Heidegger's Under­
standing of Theology," Listening 10 (1975):60, 61. Rousas J. 
Rushdoony points out tfiaE in  theology the philosophical bias 
"re-orders th e ir whole judgment and determines what shall be and
what shall not be a fact" (By What Standard? An Analysis of the 
Philosophy of Cornelius Van ITT LPhiladelphia: Pennsylvania: THe
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1959], p. 13). John 
Macquarrie explains that "every inquiry has its  presuppositions, 
and th at is  true of theological inquiry as of any other. These pre­
suppositions delim it the f ie ld  of the inquiry, determine its  basic 
concepts, and give i t  d irec tion . In some way they already determine 
the resu lt of the inquiry—not the content o f the resu lt, but the 
kind of resu lt that w il l  be obtained. These presuppositions are 
ontological, that is  to  say, they consist in a prelim inary under­
standing of the being o f the e n titie s  into which the enquiry is being 
made" (An E x is te n tia lis t Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and
Bultmann [liew Yorlc: Macmillan, 15155J, pp. 6 , I ) .
^See p. 48, n. 3; p. 51, n. 2; and p. 52, n. 2 above. Thus,
the onto-theo-logical order expresses the flow of meaning.
^This flow is  to be seen as complementary to the flow from 
the whole to the part; see p .41, n . l  above. Ontos and theos provide 
the ground and framework fo r the understanding o f the whole which 
is afterward kept as categories in the epistemological framework. 
I t  should be remembered that Logos is equiprimordial to ontos and 
theos as logos is  present providing tfie understanding of both ontos 
and logos.
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the theos level^ and does not reach the ontos level (a t  least not
the level of foundational ontology). Thus the ontos level would
appear to be the non-hypothetical ground fo r  the hypothetical charac-
2
te r o f the structure o f reason. Our analysis, however, gets more 
complex, and at the same time opens i t s e l f  up,when i t  is  realized  
that since ontology already includes a logos, which renders a meaning 
that may be expressed in a propositional way, foundational ontology 
must also function w ithin the structure o f reason at the level of 
the subject-object relationship . This requires that the spontaneity 
of the subject^ should be present in the ontological realm. Conse­
quently the ontological realm i ts e lf ,  inasmuch as a logos (and hence 
a cognitive subject with i ts  necessary spontaneity) is  involved,
is to be considered as pertaining to the hypothetical character of 
4
reason's structure.
^See p. 54, nn. 3 and 4 above.
2
This is the case when the metaphysical and ontological 
realms are seen as the realm of absolute presuppositions. The abso­
lute presupposition is then to be understood as an ontological one 
and so ontology i ts e lf  has to follow the ungrounded—presupposition- 
less— nature of absolute presuppositions; see Hoffman, p. 121; and 
Mintek, p. 82. There are also those who accept the hypothetical 
nature o f reason in metaphysics but only in re la tion  to i ts  unavoid­
able, various, and contradictory theories. See, fo r instance, N. 
Hartmann, In t . ,  36, a, and 41; cf. Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith ,
pp. 200, 201.
See p. 31, n. 2 above.
^This fact is  being increasingly recognized by contemporary 
philosophers. For instance, J. Marias ( Idea de la  M etafisica, 
pp. 26, 393, 394) says that “adamism" is  impossible, th a t is  to say, 
a presuppositionless metaphysics is  impossible; moreover, "Being 
is an in terpretation of re a lity ."  Alan Richardson says that " i t  
is becoming clearer nowadays tha t, without the instruction  of a 
'fa ith -p r in c ip le , ' no metaphysical system and no Weltanschauung can
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We can see now that reason functions, in  a ll the leve ls  of 
i ts  structure, in a hypothetical way. A dditionally , since the hypo­
thetical character o f reason is  provided by i ts  a p rio ri realm of 
presuppositions, a critic ism  of reason has to begin not w ith a 
detailed analysis of the structure i ts e lf  but rather with a consider­
ation of the actual minimum meaning that the structure o f reason 
requires fo r developing the content of the a p rio ri presuppositions 
i t  needs to constitute p a rtic u la r meanings arising in a subject- 
object relationship.
Thus i t  can be seen, through the phenomenological analysis, 
that the structure o f reason is  discovered from its  actual function­
ing and, at the same time, th a t an awareness of the main features  
of this structure allows us to proceed fu rth e r in  the actual c r i t i ­
cism of reason.
The Dimensionality o f Reason's 
Structure: The Primordial
Presupposition
At th is  point, the aim of our analysis is  to disclose the 
epistemological realm in Which the source o f meaning fo r  both
be constructed" ("Faith and Presuppositions," in Faith Reason, and 
the Gospels: A Selection o f Modern Thought on Faith and the Gospels,
ed. J. Heaney (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, I963J, p. 69 ).
Cf. David M. Armstrong, B e lie f , Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pressi 1973), pp. 77-110. ICekes (pp. 76, 91) 
sees feeling  and imagination present in the dynamics of developing 
metaphysical theories. Choice is  involved even in presuppositions 
and paradigms; see Trigg, p. 107. W. B. G a llie  ( Philosophy and the 
Historical Understanding [New York: Schocken Books, 1968J, p. lb /)
points out that metaphysics is  constituted by "essentially contested 
concepts." Disagreement arises in  metaphysics because men emphasize 
d ifferen t aspects o f the same complex r e a l it ie s .  Such then is  only 
natural since metaphysics attempts to grasp the nature o f the u l t i ­
mate.
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ontological and epistemological frameworks, and from them as a p rio ri 
conditions of knowledge fo r any given system of meaning in its
a c tu a lity , is given. We c a ll th is  epistemological realm the primor-
1 2 dial presupposition o f reason or its  “dimensionality." This is
the realm in which Being, the “ultimate" presupposition of every
3
meaning, has its  own basic meaning which is present in every
"Primordial presupposition" expresses in a nutshell the
idea of ultimate source in the sense o f "grounding realm." 
M. Heidegger, in An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1959), pp. 3, 6 , speaks about the ultim ate ground 
from the perspective and concern o f ontology. He believes that "the 
ground [o f  metaphysics] in  question must account fo r the being of 
the essent as such. This question 'why* does not move on the same 
level as the essent i t s e l f .  This 'why' does not move on any one 
plane but penetrates to the 'underlying' C tu-grunde' liegend) realms 
and indeed to the very la s t of them, to the lim it;  turning away from 
the surface, from a ll shallowness, i t  strives toward the depths; 
th is broadest of a l l  questions is also the deepest." He ca lls  th is
ontological search the opening of the "Ur-sgrung" that is  the o r ig i­
nal source or o rig in . Our search, even though involved in  the onto­
logical realm, approaches i t  from the epistemological perspective 
of the ontological framework, and so i t  entails  other concerns than 
Heidegger's ontological ones. Primordial presupposition leads then 
to the ultim ate ground o f meaning, to  the primordial source of mean­
ing. The analysis at th is  level provides the necessary viewpoint 
fo r developing our c ritic is m  of theological reason.
o
Heidegger speaks of i t  as a realm always present and which 
he ca lls  the "area of th inking 's abode" ("The Onto-theo-logical Con­
s titu tio n ,"  p. 50 ), and "the way in which logos essen tia lly  occurs" 
(Early Greek Thinking [New York: Harper & Row, 1975], p. 70).
P e ro tti, commenting on Heidegger's ontological purpose, says: "He
is attempting to establish an ontological dimensions which would 
be the ground fo r the ontic" (p. 19). Cf. Collingwood, Essay on
Metaphysics, p. 30; and Mintek, p. 77.
3
The grasp of the meaning of Being is  d i f f ic u l t  because i t  
implies grasping the whole (Jaspers, The Foundations, p. 290) and 
because i t  is seen sometimes as a search into an insight fo r under­
standing re a lity  (Hoffman, pp. 124, 125). Yet an additional problem 
arises: i f  we have to grasp the meaning of Being, and Being is  to
be seen as the whole of r e a l ity ,  what can be presupposed that is
not already to be considered as a part of the whole? Jaspers says 
that we cannot reach i t  "by our knowledge of something, but solely
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
meaningJ furnishing the ground fo r meaning, coherence, and unity
for the whole o f reason's structure. In understanding th is  realm,
2
Heidegger's reflections are p articu la rly  he lp fu l.
The analysis of the meaning of Being shows that i t  functions 
as an a p rio ri presupposition fo r understanding the meaning of 
entities .^  In th is  context, the analysis of the meaning of Being
by the course we take w ithin i t  [the w orld], by the experience of 
the ideas in systematic knowledge, by the play of a ll our cognitive 
faculties in  the in tu itio n  of the b ea u tifu l, and t ru ly  and deci­
sively, through our freedom in ethical action" (p. 290). This, how­
ever, besides following the Kantian pattern, is  not helpfu l because 
i t  tries  to search fo r the ultimate meaning in  some part o f the whole 
namely, ethics or esthetics. Dorothy M. Emmet is  not help fu l either 
when she suggests that such foundational meaning is  obtained through 
“a peculiarly vivid  kind of awareness and responsiveness to  re a lity  
beyond ourselves" (The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking [London: 
Macmillan, 1961], pp. 61, 65). This last approach is  not useful 
because i t  is too broad, and in its  broadness i t  does not provide 
any clue as to the actual meaning fo r the primordial presupposition. 
Moreover, i t  seems to suggest a sort o f individual illum ination  or 
revelation. Cf. W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London: Hutchinson Uni­
versity Library, 1963), p. 81.
^Jaspers ( Philosophical Faith, p. 198) speaks about these 
basic presuppositions as providing the guidance that our vision needs 
to see the onta. That is  why the basic meaning of Being is  present 
in each being or en tity  providing the ground fo r its  meaning. Conse­
quently, Jaspers says that “the most abstract question about being 
becomes the most powerful" (The Original Thinkers, p. 32).
2
Heidegger in the preface to Being and Time gears i ts  whole 
enterprise into the task of understanding the meaning o f Being: “So
i t  is f it t in g  that we should raise anew the question of the meaning 
of Being." Cf. 2 .6 .83 . We should bear in mind that in  the meaning 
of Being both epistemological and ontological frameworks find  their 
source. Being and logos are equiprim ordial. No one is  previous 
to the other.
3
Heidegger, in  Being and Time, says th a t “th is  'presupposing' 
of Being has rather the character of taking a look at i t  beforehand, 
so that in the lig h t of i t  the e n titie s  presented to us get provi­
sionally articu lated  in the Being. This guiding a c t iv ity  of taking 
a look at Being arises from the average understanding o f Being in 
which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential
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leads us beyond metaphysics to its  ground J  That is  to say, we have 
to go beyond the level of beings as e n titie s , which are dea lt w ith  
by metaphysics, to the level of Being as Nothing, which is  the ground
constitution of Dasein i ts e lf .  Such 'presupposing' has nothing to do 
with laying down an action  from which a sequence o f propositions is 
deductively derived" ( In t . ,  1 .2 ). I t  is  in th is  la s t sense of a pre­
supposition as an axiom that grounds deduction th a t Heidegger denies 
his search is a search to discover "a hitherto overlooked presupposi­
tion of philosophy, and thereby to show that philosophy does not yet 
stand on an unshakable foundation and therefore cannot yet be the  
absolute science” ( “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” in 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology, ed. S. W. Barret 
and H. D. Aiken, 4 vo ls . LNew York: Random House, 1962], 3 :209 ). I t
should be remarked here that according to Heidegger there is  a 
foundational d ifference between beings (e n tit ie s ) and the ground of 
Being (Being i t s e l f ) ;  see Heidegger, "The Princip le  of Id e n tity ,"  in
Id e n tity  and D ifference, ed. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), p. 51. However, he is looking fo r the ground of Being which 
is the source of a l l  presupposition.
^Heidegger comments: "Metaphysics, insofar as i t  always
represents only beings as beings, does not reca ll Being i t s e l f .  
Philosophy does not concentrate on its  ground. I t  always leaves 
i ts  ground— leaves i t  by means of metaphysics. And yet i t  never 
escapes its  ground. Insofar as a thinker sets out to experience 
the ground of metaphysics, insofar as he attempts to recall the tru th  
of Being i ts e lf  instead of merely representing beings as beings, 
his thinking has in  a sense le f t  metaphysics. From the point of 
view o f metaphysics, such thinking goes back in to  the ground o f meta­
physics. . . . Metaphysics remains the basis of philosophy. The
basis of thinking, however, i t  does not reach. When we th ink of
the tru th  of Being, metaphysics is  overcome" ("The Way Back," p. 
208). The ground fo r the meaning of Being stands upon the d ifference  
that exists between Being and beings; see "The Onto-theo-logical 
Constitution," p. 51. According to Heidegger, philosophical t r a d i­
tions have forgotten the realm of the ground o f Being and so the 
tru th  of Being "has remained concealed from metaphysics during i ts  
long history from Anaximander to Nietzsche" ("The Way Back, p. 210). 
Besides, the going back to the forgotten ground o f metaphysics may 
bring about a "transformation o f metaphysics" (pp. 209-13 passim). 
This "transformation" or "restoration" of metaphysics was already  
pointed at in Being and Time, In t .  2 .7 , as "destruction." Later, 
in The Question of Being (fliw York: Twayne, 1958), p. 91, Heidegger
ca11s i t  “overcoming“ ( Oberwindung); c f. P e ro tti, pp. 57-59.
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1 2 for both Being and meaning. Nothing as no-thing is  the realm of
meaning which we call primordial presupposition or, more precisely, 
3
dimensionality. That dimensionality is the realm of no-thing as
In “The Way Back" (pp. 216-18), Heidegger shows how the 
thinking fo r  the ground o f Being moves to the Nothing and then i t  
tr ie s  to  think the nature of metaphysics. Heidegger suggests 
(p. 218) th a t Leibniz's famous question "Pourquoi i l  y  a plutot 
quelque chose que rien?" should be understood not regarding meta­
physics. In  other words the question should be thought o f as regard­
ing the ground of Being, hence, as not looking fo r the ground in an 
e n tity . The question would be locking rather fo r the ground of a ll 
e n titie s . Thus, the question should be, “How did i t  come about that 
beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every ' is '  while 
that which is not a being is  understood as Nothing, though i t  is 
Being i t s e l f ,  and remains forgotten?" ( ib id . ) .  Breton considers 
that in searching for its  ground "la metaphysique se depasse d 'e l le -  
meme vers quelque chose dont e lle  ne nous d it  rien" (p . 149). 
Vincent Vycinas, ( Earth and Gods: an Introduction to the Philosophy
of Martin Heidegger LThe Hague: Martinus N ijh o ff, 1961J, pp. 319,
320) expresses the search into the ground of metaphysics as 
Heidegger's search for the presuppositions o f metaphysics.
2
Heidegger explains his position by saying th a t "Nothing 
is neither an object nor anything that ' is '  a t a l l .  Nothing occurs 
neither by i t s e l f  nor 'apart from' w hat-is, as a sort o f adjunct. 
Nothing is  that which makes the revelation of what-is as such 
possible fo r  our human existence. Nothing not merely provides the 
conceptual opposite of w hat-is but also an original part o f essence 
(Wesen). I t  is  in the Being (Sein) of what-is that the n ih ila tio n  
of Nothing ( das Nichten des Nichts) occurs" ("What Is Metaphysics," 
in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock [Chicago: Henry Regnery,
194977 pi 340). In' Being and Time ( In t .  1 .2 ) , he says th a t "the 
Being o f e n t it ie s  'is ' not i t s e l f  an e n t i ty .” Cf. idem, The Question 
of Being, p. 97. Perotti explains th is rather d if f ic u lt  Heideggerian 
concept saying that "the 'nothing' here is  f i r s t  intended in the 
sense o f th a t which is other than beings, that which is not a being" 
(pp. 19, 2 0 ). Cf. Jaspers, Reason and Anti-Reason, p. 54.
^We here make a d is tinc tion  that appears only im p lic it ly  
in Heidegger. The "nothing" of Heidegger includes two d iffe ren t 
elements. F irs t , the realm of the inquiry or re fle c tio n , which we 
have already pointed out; and the actual understanding o f such a 
realm. By the use of the term "dimensionality" we mean the realm 
of inqu iry  in which the primordial presupposition o f Being and 
reason moves and receives i ts  meaning. By the use o f the term 
primordial presupposition, we mean the actual in terp retation  of the 
dimensionality of reason and Being.
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non-entity en ta ils  that the primordial presupposition does not simply 
appear but rather co-appears with every e n tity  J  So, even though 
the primordial presupposition is  not "knowledge" in the usual sense 
(that is  to say, knowledge in  the realm of e n t i t ie s ) ,  i t  is  nonethe­
less "knowledge" insofar as there is a subject-object re lationship
2
that always appears with i t .  And, since the ground of Being as
Perhaps the shorter way of expressing the foundational way 
in which dimensionality—grcund-cf Being and Reason— is to be under­
stood is given by Heidegger himself in "What Is Metaphysics?" when 
he affirms th a t "nothing occurs neither by i t s e l f  nor 'apart from' 
what-is, as a sort of adjunct" (p. 340). See p. 52 , n. 2 above. 
In Being and Time Heidegger explains that " i t  is  something th a t prox- 
imaI ly and fo r  the most part does not show i t s e l f  at a l l :  i t  is
something th a t lies hidden, in contrast to th a t which proximally
and for the most part does show i ts e lf ,  and i t  belongs to i t  so
essentially as to constitute its  meaning and its  ground" ( In t . ,  
2 .7 .c). That is  why he believes that "Phenomenology is  our way of 
access to what is  to be the theme of ontology. . . .  Only as Phenom­
enology is  ontology possible" ( ib id . ) .  A quick glance at the whole 
section shows that Heidegger's Phenomenology has rejected Husserl's 
transcendental idealism. In i t  Heidegger explains how the ground
of Being, the dimensionality of Being and reason, is "co-given" or
"co-appears” with every e n tity , not as an e n tity  but as th e ir  ground 
and always present source of meaning, coherence, and un ity . More­
over, i t  is known that Heidegger considers Dasein as the place in 
which the "co-appearance" of Being can be b e tte r and more c learly  
grasped; see Being and Time, In t . 2.5; and "What Is Metaphysics?" 
pp. 347, 348.
2
Heidegger expresses the core of the d if f ic u lty  by saying 
that "th inking, which is essentia lly  always thinking about something, 
would, in thinking of Nothing, be forced to act against its  own 
nature" ("What is  Metaphysics?" p. 330). This la s t statement about 
the "nature" of thinking must not be interpreted as meaning that 
beyond representational knowledge there is no knowledge, but rather 
pointing beyond representational knowledge to a d iffe re n t kind of 
knowledge. See "The Way Back" pp. 211, 217 where Heidegger remarks 
that "the thinking which is  posited by beings as such, and therefore  
representational and illum inating in that way, must be supplanted 
by a d iffe re n t kind of thinking which is brought to pass by Being 
i ts e lf  and, therefore, responsive to Being" (p . 211). He also speaks 
of a tra n s itio n  from representational thinking to "thinking that 
recalls" (p . 217). An additional d if f ic u lty  lie s  in the fa c t that 
as we try  to express th is d iffe re n t kind of knowledge we are bound 
to the language of tra d itio n ; see Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical
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primordial presupposition can only be reached in the realm of know­
ledge, i t  cannot happen in disregard of the hypothetical character
of reason's structure e ith e rJ  In other words, reason needs to have
2
an a p r io r i understanding of the ground o f Being and meaning in 
order to be able to grasp the meaning o f beings as e n tit ie s . This
Constitution," p. 50. Obviously, however, even when we are bound 
to use the language of tra d itio n  we are also bound to provide a new 
meaning fo r  i t  in order to express the new kind of knowledge.
^J. Maritain may be considered as representative of classical 
philosophy which does not accept the hypothetical nature of reason 
at i ts  foundational leve l. In The Range of Reason, M aritain says 
that "in i t s  rational development as in i ts  primal in tu ition s  meta­
physics is  purely objective" (p. 28). Heidegger may be considered 
as representative of the "new way of ontology and th inking ." He 
says in "The Way Back" that the "new kind o f thinking is  brought 
to pass by Being i ts e lf  and, therefore, responsive to Being" (p. 
211). So we ju s t grasp the meaning of Being which is  given— as i t  
is —by Being i ts e lf .  The spontaneity of the subject is  in other 
places recognized by Heidegger (fo r instance, Being and Time, pro­
logue, and In t . ,  2.6) but is  not considered actually when Heidegger 
speaks of the meaning of the ground of Being. This s ituation  may 
be understood i f  we rea lize  that to recognize the hypothetical 
character o f reason at the level of the ground of Being—primordial 
presupposition—would en ta il extending the hypothetical character 
to every meaning and to tru th  i ts e lf .  As Heidegger sees i t  c learly  
(Being and Time, In t . ,  7 .c ) ,  beyond the ground of Being stands 
neither e n t it ie s  nor Nothing. Hence, reason would have no reference 
to decide between alternatives should they be recognized at this  
foundational level. The unab ility—im possibility?—fo r providing 
a ra tion al answer to th is  foundational choice should be considered 
the main reason for Heidegger's in terp retation  of tra d itio n a l think­
ing as not in opposition but in complementation to his own "destroy­
ing and "overcoming" of i t .
I t  should be clear that I use the term "ground of Being" 
in a d iffe re n t way than the one Paul T i l l ic h  does in his theology. 
In his Systematic Theology T ill ic h  makes c le a r that "the ground of 
Being" is  God (1:156), interpreted a fte r i t  has been understood that 
God is not an entity (1; 237; c f . 1:235). God as "creative ground 
of Being" keeps the tra d itio n a l ideas of causality and substance 
as i t  transcends them by applying them to the re a lity  of God as a 
non-entity (1:274). As T i ll ic h  does th is  in terp retation  o f God as 
the "creative  ground of Being." the meaning o f the primordial presup­
position has been accepted in the Parmenidean trad ition  of timeless­
ness (1 :188 , 189). We see, then, that in T i l l ic h ,  "the ground of
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a p rio ri is  a foundational grasp o f reason's dimensionality, namely 
a primordial presupposition, which is  the minimum knowledge that 
reason needs as i t  ( f i r s t )  develops an interpretation of the ontolog­
ical framework—e .g ., tra d itio n a l metaphysics—and then (second)
on th is  basis, proceeds to develop the epistemological framework— its  
procedures, functions, and categories—which were born as they were 
already used in the in te rp re ta tio n  o f the ontological frameworkJ
Moreover, the foundational subject-object re lationship  is
2
involved in  the in te rp re ta tio n  of the primordial presupposition 
that leads beyond the structure of reason to its  f i r s t  basic content
which determines the form and meaning that the structure i ts e lf
assumes in its  actual functioning. Consequently, the spontaneity 
of the subject is to be seen as active in the constitution of the 
primordial presupposition.^
Being" designates onto log ically  the d ivine being. The realm of Being 
as No-thing, prior to any in te rp re ta tion  of i t  either as timelessness 
or tem porality (dim ensionality), is  not included in T i l l ic h 's  idea 
of “the ground of Being."
^We do not need to get involved in the obvious complexity 
of th is  subject. We should bear in mind, however, that the 
epistemological framework re la tes  to an ontological structure—or the 
tra d itio n a l metaphysics th a t deals with beings as beings— and so
i t  is not the case th a t we should have f i r s t  an epistemological
framework and then an ontological one. Yet in the actual h istorica l 
development of ideas, both frameworks are thought of together. The 
epistemological analysis, however, shows a cognitive precedence of 
the ontological framework in  that i t  provides the ground fo r the 
developing o f the epistemological framework.
See p. 52, n. 2 above. Object here does not mean "object"— 
neither in its  Kantian sense nor in any way that re lates i t  with
ontological en tities . Object here expresses xhe necessary ro le  that
the structure of knowledge requires fo r the constitution of any mean­
ing whatsoever.
3
At th is point we part company with the m ajority of philo­
sophers. See p. 72, n. 1 above.
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In th is  context reason can be expected to have than one 
possible primordial presupposition. So fa r  there are two basic 
understandings of reason's dimensionality. That is  to say, reason 
has developed its  own actual structure—with emphasis on the e p is te -  
mological structure--on the basis of two widely d iffe re n t primordial 
presuppositions, namely timelessness and tem porality . 1 In the second 
part of th is  chapter, which deals with the structure of reason from 
the viewpoint of the minimum content its  dimensionality needs to  
be in terpreted , I  w ill analyze these two primordial presuppositions 
as they have been understood and developed in the history of phi­
losophy. In p articu la r, I am interested in the ways in which they
have influenced the actual form and meaning of two d iffe ren t in te r -
?
pretations o f the functioning and structure of reason.
Dimensionality o f the Onto-Theo-Logical 
Structure of Reason
The phenomenological analysis of reason's structure must
now be focused on the actual interpretations that th is  structure
We cannot see any p a rtic u la r reason why there should be 
only two. Perhaps, from an epistemological viewpoint, i t - i s  possible 
to grasp more than two primordial presuppositions. This is i r r e le ­
vant, however, fo r our c r itic ism  of theological reason, since in 
the theological realm timelessness and tem porality are enough 
to sa tis fy  the needs of both c ritic is m  and constitution of meanings.
2
As primordial presupposition is , in its  basic meaning, the 
ground fo r the meaning of the whole, i t  necessarily determines and 
constitutes both the ontological and epistemological frameworks. 
Yet, i f  the basic foundational in terpretation  fo r each framework 
is worked out from assuming a d iffe ren t primordial presupposition, 
the tra d itio n a l ground fo r un ity  and coherence, the One, would have 
been destroyed by changing i t  in to  "two.” In th is  case the u ltim ate  
ground fo r coherence and system would be inexisten t, and so coher­
ence, system, and truth would no longer ex is t. We should re c a ll ,
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has received throughout the history of philosophy. Because a
complete and detailed analysis f a l ls  out of the lim its  of our
epistemological constructive investigation ,’^  I deal only with those
thinkers who because o f the nature and relevance of th e ir  suggestions
are indispensable fo r  an understanding of the dimensionality of
reason in  its  timeless and temporal interpretations. For the sake
2
of c la r ity  I follow a h is to rica l order, and deal f i r s t  with time­
lessness and then with tem porality. In  each case I have selected 
a philosopher who is  generally recognized as providing the founda­
tional insight into the nature of Being (or its  primordial presuppo- 
s it io n ) .  Then I  show, in an abridged way of course, how the
however, that the structure  of reason i t s e l f  qua functioning is not 
modified by the p a rtic u la r  content chosen in the primordial 
presupposition.
detailed analysis would belong in an h is to rica l analysis. 
Such an analysis would be very enlightening as a complement to the 
present systematic ana lys is . On the other hand, we agree with Jose 
Ortega y Gasset who believes that only a few thinkers have dealt with 
Being and that fo r th is  reason i t  is  wise not to m ultip ly the analy­
sis " f i l l in g  philosophy with brown cats" (no vale la pena llenar la  
f i lo s o f ia  de gatos pardos) (La idea de Principio en Leibniz y la  
Evolucion de la Teoria Deductiva in Obras Comp Ietas LMadrid: Revista
de O c c id e n t s  196T-19693,'BT<T/IJ. --------------- ---------
2
The h is to rica l order is useful for our c ritic is m , not 
because we agree w ith historicism , as, fo r instance, Collingwood 
in An Essay on Metaphysics (pp. 47-50), but rather because the actual 
shaping of reason has been achieved throughout a long period of time 
in which several contributions, additions, and modifications have 
been introduced by germinal thinkers. The c r it ic  of reason in theol­
ogy must be aware not only of the structure o f reason— as 
functioning—but also o f i ts  origin and development throughout the 
history of philosophy. In the tim eless primordial presupposition 
I fo llow  the chronological order w ith no modification. In the case 
of the temporal h is to r ic a l primordial presupposition I modify the 
chronological order in  order to maintain the systematic order of 
our investigation.
3
We have selected Parmenides fo r the timeless primordial 
presupposition and Heidegger fo r the temporal. The analysis
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ontological and epistemological frameworks have been shaped and 
interpreted according to the prim ordial presupposition.
Classical Dimensionality: Timelessness 
Primordial Presupposition: Parmenides
Parmenides^ not only seems to have been the f i r s t  philosopher
to give expression to the foundational re lationship  that exists
2
between epistemological and ontological frameworks but he also seems 
to have been the f i r s t  to go beyond the arche of the e a r lie s t
3
philosophers, that is , to en ter into the realm of the nature of
reveals that they provide philosophy with the most e x p lic it and 
in flu e n tia l expression of each primordial presupposition.
^See W. C. K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 4 vo ls . 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196Z-19/5), Z :l-80  fo r  an
introduction to Parmenides' biographical data and to  his philosophy 
as a whole. Parmenides was born c. 515 B.C. He was probably a 
younger contemporary of Heraclitus and an older contemporary of Zeno 
and Socrates.
2
Parmenides, frag. 3. Theodor Gomperz explains the meaning 
of Parmenides' frag . 3: "For i t  is  the same th ing to think and to 
b e .” By saying that, "they mean nothing more than that the genuine 
thing that is  is  the only object of thought, and that thinking can 
never be diverted to the thing th a t-is -n o t” ( A History of Ancient 
Philosophy, 4 vols. [London: John Murray, 1901-I905J, 1 :1 /9 ). The
"understanding in  depth" of what Parmenides meant is ,  however, s t i l l  
a cause of controversies; see, fo r instance, Francis McDonald 
Conford, Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' "Way of Truth1' and
P lato 's  “Parmenides", trans. w ith an introduction and running com­
mentary (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 80; and
Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, pp. 74, 84, 86 .
3
Jaspers states: “Parmenides wished by thought to gain a 
foothold beyond the origin o f the world, which, under the name of 
arche (o rig in , p rincip le), had already been conceived in a number 
of ways. However, his thought was interpreted as a new approach 
to th is  very same arche" (The O riginal Thinkers, p. 3 l ) .  Yet, since 
the idea of arche had a temporal sense in the f i r s t  philosophers 
(D ietrich  M uller, "Beginning, O rig in , Rule, Ruler, O rig inator,"  
NIDNTT, 1:164), i t  seems th a t Parmenides did not give a new in te r ­
pretation to the very same idea o f arche but th a t he rather replaced
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BeingJ the realm o f reason's dimensionality or primordial presup-
2
positions in order to  provide the f i r s t  interpretation o f i t .
i t  by the expression, at the same time, of both the dimension o f  
reason and its  timeless primordial presupposition which afterwards 
becomes classical fo r  both philosophy and theology. As Parmenides 
moves in the cognitive realm i t  is  c lear that i t  is  d iffe re n t from 
the cosmological arche o f the f i r s t  philosophers.
^Regarding the realm of dimensionality in  Parmenides' 
thought, Jaspers remarks in The Original Thinkers th a t “measured 
by the logical richness of the d iffe ren tia ted  categories or the per­
ceptual richness of the world, Parmenides' being is  so poor th a t  
i t  vanishes. For his boldly transcending thinking of th is  being 
is directed toward an imageless pre-categorial, or trans-categoria l 
realm, yet transcendence in Parmenides is not somewhere else, i t  
is wholly present. But th is  presence does not l ie  in the plenitude  
of the sensuous, temporal world" (pp. 27, 28). P ero tti points out 
the fac t that Parmenides and Heraclitus, whom Heidegger ca lled  
“greater" philosophers ( What Is Philosophy [New York: Twayne, 1958],
p. 53 ), "did not seek to answer the tf~  to on, and thus they were 
not ontological; they did not a ffirm  a f i r s t  d ivine ground fo r a l l  
beings and thus were not theological; f in a lly  since they were poets 
and mythologists, they were neither logicians nor did they th ink  
representationally" (p . 68) .  Jose Lorite  ( “Preliminares al Estudio 
C ie n tific o  de la Suma Teologica," Pensamiento 30 [1974]:295-97) notes 
the well-known fac t that Parmenides' and Heraclitus' thoughts are 
opposite. Nonetheless, we are not going to analyze H eraclitus ' views 
since he was not followed as understanding of being u n til la te  in  
the history of philosophy. Since we are following a somehow h is to r i­
cal analysis of the primordial presupposition o f reason, we deal 
with the opposite to Parmenides' in terpretation in  Heidegger's la te  
development of i t .  Yet, we should bear in mind th a t the d u a lity  
of in terpretation  in  the realm of dimensionality may be traced back 
in Western philosophy as early as 500 B.C.
2
This is the realm which Heidegger ca lls  "No-thing" (see 
p. 52, n. 1 above). Gomperz expresses the idea that Parmenides, 
a fte r  having assayed "a f lig h t  on the wings of Icarus above the  
region of experience into the ethereal domains of pure being, . . . 
sank, and fe l l  to the fa m ilia r plains of corporeal existence” 
(1 :170). This in terpretation  is  unaware that Parmenides is  working 
in the realm of reason's dimensionality. Consequently, Gomperz sees 
Parmenides working with e n titie s ; fo r  instance, when Parmenides 
ta lks  of Being as "the mass of a well-rounded sphere" (fra g s ., 7, 
8 ) .  However, already A risto tle  sees that "the contention that a l l  
existence is one and r ig id ly  unchanging . . . does not re a lly  concern 
the student of nature" (Physics 1.185a [trans. Ph. H. Wicksteed and 
F. M. Cornford, LCL, 1 : l4 , T5 ) . Cornford (p. 45) remarks th a t
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Even though Parmenides did not speak e x p lic it ly  about the 
ground o f Being or about timelessness, he makes i t  apparent that 
his "way of truth" was grounded in the meaning of Being and that 
his understanding of Being was grounded in  timelessness J  Parmenides 
was aware that the knowledge of Truth requires a foundational 
decision, a decision th a t he, consequently, made at the very
Parmenides' Being is the object of thought but not of sense percep­
tion; and M. L. West thinks that Parmenides' Being "is  not derived 
from cold deduction but from a direct perception, a mystical experi­
ence" ( Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient [Oxford: Clarendon,
1971], p. 222). Etienne Gi Ison, L‘£tre et 1 'Essence, 2nd. ed. (Paris: 
L ib ra irie  Philosophique J. V rin , 197Z), p. Zb, believes th a t to  speak 
of "abstraction" in Parmenides' understanding of Being is  an 
anachronism. At the same time Gilson considers Parmenides as the 
founder of ontology ( ib id . ) .  Cornford (p. 29) sees that Parmenides' 
thought is not a mere abstraction as fa r  as i t  speaks of re a lity  
or ousia. Kathleen Freeman argues regarding Parmenides* extra- 
logical meaning concerning Being because back in Parmenides' time 
thinkers "would not have found his results absurd i f  he had kept 
them to the realm of log ic and had not insisted that they must be 
accepted against a ll the evidence of the senses" (The Pre-Socratic  
Philosophers: A Companion to Diels, "Fragmente der Vorsokratikerir
LOxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959], p. 145). Obviously, beyond argu-
ments on minute d e ta ils , Parmenides' thought on Being is  recognized 
as dealing with the foundational understanding of Being, the under­
standing of the ground o f Being. Jaspers explains the dim ensionality  
of Parmenides' thinking on Being by stating that " i t  is  a thinking  
action which was possible in the naivete (not primitivism) o f cre­
ative beginning, i t  is s t i l l  possible, though we cannot recapture 
the old candor. Logic and being merged, and both were unfolded in 
thought. Logic was not ye t empty because i t  was not ye t intended 
as logic. Accordingly, the vision is not a metaphor, but a necessary 
part of the thought. . . . The Inexplicable is explained; the form 
is that of prophetic vision" (The Original Thinkers, p. 26, 27). 
Cf. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 98.
Hhe meaning of timelessness cannot be understood in a single 
concept or proposition. That is  why Parmenides uses several semata 
in order to convey the basic meaning of Being’s dim ensionality. 
Timelessness is expressed by the overall meaning presented by the 
semata. In short, timelessness appears couched in Being. That 
being-couched-in-Being of timelessness is  what we ca ll the "co­
appearance" of the dimensionality of reason, see p. 72, n. 1 above.
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beginning of his poemJ He described the ground of Being—prim ordial
2
presupposition—which he called  "the way" by means o f several 
"signs" (semata): the “not coming-into-being" ( aYewnxov ),
Parmenides expresses his decision in the following sentence: 
"Thou shalt inquire into everything: both the motionless [irp e iie c  ]
unmoved heart [ htoo ] o f well-rounded tru th , and ajso the opinions 
of mortals, in which there is  no true r e l ia b i l i t y  [* ia x ic  aXn«nc ] “ 
fra g . 1 ). Here we can see th a t a foundational choice has been made. 
No reason is  given for i t .  Obviously i t  points to the hypothetical 
character of reason's structure. Parmenides expresses th is  hypothet­
ica l character of "Truth"— reason— by remarking that in  the way 
of doxa there is  no "love r e l ia b il i ty "  or "true fa i th .” See the 
trans la tion  by Burnet (p. 172). Parmenides connects "The Hay of 
Truth" to Being: "The ways o f inquiry which alone are to be thought:
the one that IT IS [coxtv ] ,  and i t  is not possible for IT  NOT TO 
BE [jin t iv a i  ] ,  is the way o f c re d ib ility , [  xeieouc ] fo r  i t  fo l ­
lows tru th  [ 5AXn®etn tap ownSeT]" (frag . 2 ) .  [weieoGc ]  can 
also be understood as "persuasion." See Burnet, p. 173; and 
"nctew," A 6reek-English Lexicon (1968), pp. 1353, 54. I f  *eieou<, 
is  translated as “persuasion'1 The Way would be of persuasion, which 
could point to the fact of an already-taken choice, or to  the cer­
ta in ty  that i t  provides to the one who is searching in the way of 
tru th .
2
"There is only one other description of the way remaining, 
(namely) that (What Is) Is . To th is  way there are very many sign­
posts [ o n p a x a ] :  that Being has no coming-into-being and no des­
tru c tio n , fo r i t  is  whole of limb, without motion, and w ithout end. 
And i t  never Was, nor W ill Be, because i t  Is now, a Whole a l l  
together, One, continuous; fo r what creation of i t  w ill you look 
for? How, whence (could i t  have) sprung?" (Parmenides, fra g s . 7, 
8 ).
3
With th is word the via negativa begins. Its  s tarting  point 
is  the world of sensory perception. UrTthis, Parmenides says: "You
must debar your thought from th is  way of search, nor le t  ordinary  
experience in i ts  variety force you along th is  way" (frags . 7 , 8 ) .  
In other words. Being and i ts  meaning are to be reached as we get 
r id  of the Lebenswelt by denying that which pertains to the senses. 
Here &txmhxov denies that Being—re a lity — has any origin or cause. 
Being stands beyond causality and development. Becoming is  not part 
of Being, since becoming is  part of the world of doxa. C f. F e lix  
Cl eve, The Giants of Pre-sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt
to Reconstruct th e ir rhoughts, 2 vols. (the Hague: Martinus
N ijh O ff, 1965), 2:530, 531.
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1 # p
“in d e s tru c tib ility "  ( a v w X c s p o v ) ,  "completeness" ( ooX oyeXe's,) ,
3 4“motionlessness" (iie fvnxov), and "endlessness" ( SxeXeoxov ) .
This completes the o-revnxov idea. Being has no cause. 
Hence i t  has no development. Then i t  has no perishing nor fading 
away.
o
I think that Burnet (p. 174) renders a better translation  
of Parmenides ouXojieXcc . He trans la tes  ouxoyexec “complete,"
instead o f "whole of limb." We fin d  here also a negative meaning
in that wholeness is  reached by the denial of parts. The negative
meaning reappears la te r  when Parmenides (frags. 7, 8 ) affirms that
Being is  "an in v io la te  whole" [»ov SouXov ] .  For a commentary 
regarding the re la tio n  extant between ouXoycXcc and yovoxevec , 
see Burnet, p. 174, n. 4.
3
This leads nearer to the foundation of Parmenides' under­
standing of Being. Due to its  relevance i t  was already mentioned
in frag . 1 as being the "heart of well-rounded Truth." In frag. 
1, Parmenides uses the word axpcycc. Here, as he develops the 
semata he uses K ivnxov , which becomes the classical word for  
changelessness. According to W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, 1:381, 82, before Parmenides ctveaic had only the popu­
lar sense of local motion or disturbance. The negation of local 
motion would have been the meaning the word has in Xenophanes, frag . 
26 (trans . K. Freeman, Ancilla to  the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 
23). However, in Parmenides, according to Guthrie, okivdtov means 
"complete immobility of the rea l, the im possibility  o f k iv  in
any sense of the word" (2 :36). This absolute negation, obviously, 
already includes time, since time is  what always co-appears when 
something is moving in any way, as A r is to tle  points out la te r in 
On the Heavens 279, a .15 (trans. W. K. C. Guthrie, LCL, 90, 91) and
Metaphysics, 12.1.5, that time is the measure of motion. The absence
of motion, then, en ta ils  the absence o f time and vice versa. Being,
then, belongs to that region beyond time, namely, timelessness. 
However, as the idea of timelessness stands by negating time, and, 
since the idea of time is not c lea r fo r  Parmenides or Greek 
philosophy—which understands i t  only in  re la tio n  to movement— the 
idea o f timelessness in its  positive content is  to be grasped in 
re la tion  to the meaning of the semata as a whole.
^Is Parmenides denying the idea of achievement and, hence, 
of progress in Being, or is he speaking about the ^everlasting dura­
tion o f something tha t is  present? The word " axeXeoxov " seems 
to f i t  both meanings; see Gerhard D e llin g , "Telos," TDNT, 8:49-87. 
Its  meaning in th is  tex t must be decided by the context provided 
by the nature of Being whose simata Parmenides is developing. So 
i t  must be related to  the previous oictvnxov. At th is  point we 
should disregard Freeman's tra n s la tio n  which disconnects
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F in a lly , reaching the very core of th is  v ia  negativa1 Parmenides 
expressed the timelessness of "the way o f tru th" by saying that “i t
never Was nor W ill Be, because i t  Is now" (o i«e  wot* fiv oSa* eoxai
cwci Vo t iv ) . I t  seems c lear, however, that the resu lt of th is
via negativa was not something negative i t s e l f  and therefore meaning­
less or with no content a t a l l ;  on the contrary, i t  was a basic
foundational, positive meaning that provided the ground fo r meaning
ixeXcoxov from what follows and follow C. J . De Vogel's rendering 
of the Greek original (Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts,
2 v o ls ., 3rd. ed% [Leiden^ E. J. B r i l l ,  1S63J, 1:38) which connects 
axeXeaxov with ovSe wot* nv ouS* eaxai, cwet vv>v eoxiv th a t follows. 
Thus, here ixcXeoxov denies that Being is  a goal to be achieved, 
hence, i t  denies any inner development in Being.
^As can be eas ily  observed, Parmenides reaches the core of 
Being's dimensionality by denying what is  given to him through sen­
sory perception. We can see here the cradle of the theological via 
negativa followed in the pursuing the knowledge of God, and of the 
Platonic chorismos, which expresses i t  in the gap which separates 
the two worlds -sensible and in te ll ig ib le . M. Heidegger, Introduc­
tion to Metaphysics, p. 106, uses chdrismos in  th is sense.
p
Here duration is  denied as pertaining to Being, and so time­
lessness reaches its  deepest expression. I f  Being should be under­
stood as endless duration in time, i t  c e rta in ly  should have had a 
past (unchangeable as i t  may be}, and surely i t  should have a future, 
because duration flows in time. Yet, Parmenides' Being has neither 
past nor fu ture . So the “now" does not point to the present or tem­
p o ra lity , rather i t  points to the "instant" which is beyond the flux  
of tim e, and so beyond time as dimensionality of Being. Timeless­
ness, then, is understood by Parmenides as Being's dimensionality. 
For those who may s t i l l  think—following Heidegger—th at the "now" 
as "instant" gives access to the present and so is grounded in time, 
at least in  one of i ts  ecstasies, we have to point out th a t we have 
access to the present through appearances, and that what appears 
is given to us through sensory perception, the way which is  expressly 
rejected by Parmenides as pertaining to the truth of Being. See 
frags. 1, / ,  8 ; c f. Cleve, 2:538. I t  seems to be the case that 
Parmenides is  not only denying (forgetting  in  Heidegger's expression) 
the movement of flux (change) im p lic it in time and making Being some­
thing "s ta tic"  (beyond any flu x ) in time but also is denying dura­
tio n , since duration needs, in  order to  be, both past and future
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
and unity to the whole of reason's systemJ And the basic idea
Parmenides was expressing through his v ia  negativa was his primordial
2
presupposition for the dimensionality o f Being, namely timelessness.
and Being has neither one. Therefore, the vGv Voxiv stands outside 
both, the flux  as measure of essential change and, also outside of 
the very dimension of duration, outside time as the realm of appear­
ances. Thus, the vuv canw is expressing timelessness and not 
in d e fin ite  duration in time of what is  beyond essential change. 
What is  beyond essential change is , then, completely beyond time. 
The vGv coxiv expresses what lie s  beyond tim e, namely, timelessness. 
The o rig in  of the idea o f timelessness seems to have been very early  
in the realm of heathen re lig ions. See Cornford, P lato and 
Parmenides, pp. 28 , 29. Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 530 B.C.) seems 
to be an early antecedent fo r some of Parmenides' ideas (see frags. 
23-26). A fter Parmenides, Melissus o f Samos (c. 440 B.C.) seems 
to deal w ith timelessness, yet he reaches only the idea o f in f in i te  
duration, fo r he says in  frag . 1 of his Poem (trans. K. Freeman, 
A ncilla  to  Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 48) that "that which was, was 
always an3 a I ways wi 11 be.'* I f  seems th a t he misses the deeper 
thought o f his predecessor. Yet, he follow s Parmenides in re jecting  
sensory perception as belonging to Being. See frag. 8 :2 , 3, 5 where 
the discontinuity of Being from sensory perception is  apparent. 
We see, then, that Parmenides' thought on the ground of Being stands 
alone as the beginning o f Greek tra d itio n a l philosophy.
H h is  is apparent when Parmenides, in his treatment o f the 
signs o f Being, changes from the via negativa into positive s tate­
ments on Being. See, fo r instance! fra g s . 7, 8 where Parmenides 
says th a t Being is "a Whole a ll  together" [ oiioG iav ] ,  "One"
[ cv ], and "continuous" [Cwvextc ] .  These and other expressions
have to  be understood, however, on the basis of the via negativa, 
namely on timelessness. In short, th is  "positive" way of ta lk ing
about Being is  not l i t e r a l  but rather "analogical."
2
Freeman in The Pre-Socratic Philosophers comments: "There­
fore Becoming and Destruction land w ith them time i ts e lf )  are done 
away w ith  ('quenched')" (p. 147). Gomperz adds: "Nay, one of
Parmenides' expressions even seems to cast doubt on the passage of 
time i t s e l f ;  and, seeing that nothing happened in time, that re a lity  
was denied to each and every temporal process, there was actually  
nothing le f t  for the time-conception to denote" (1:172). Bertrand 
Russell w rites: "The doctrine of the perpetual flux as taught by
Heraclitus is painful, and science, as we have seen, can do nothing 
to re fu te  i t .  One of the main ambitions of Philosophers has been 
to revive hopes that science seemed to  have k ille d . Philosophers, 
accordingly, have sought, with great persistence, fo r something not 
subject to  the empire of time. This search begins with Parmenides”
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From th is  viewpoint, time— temporal re a lity —was understood and
appraised in an in i t ia l  negative wayJ And because timelessness
was the f i r s t  basic understanding o f Being's and reason's dimension-
2
a l i t y ,  the whole range o f philosophical thinking—ontology,
(A History of Western Philosophy: and Its  Connection with P o lit ic a l
and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present 
[New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945J, p. 47). For additional com-
mentary on Parmenides' semata see Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, 
pp. 26, 27.
^ It seems that Parmenides' basic choice was between tim eless­
ness and temporality; see oaspers, The Original Thinkers, p. 29. 
The way of "seeming'' is  what the Goddess is  figh ting  against from 
the beginning. The way of "not-being" is  ju s t impossible ( fra g .  
2) because " i t  is  ju s t the same thing to think and to be" (fra g . 3 ) .  
But, how to choose between the way of "being" and the way of "seem­
ing"? At th is  point the very same language shows that Parmenides 
and, a fte r him, Western philosophy as a whole have iden tified  Being 
w ith timelessness. Yet, there is  nothing that assures the absolute 
certa in ty  of the choice made. A fter this id e n tific a tio n  is  done, 
the rejection of the "seeming" way is  just a logical consequence. 
So Parmenides (fra g . 6 ) may say that those who follow  the "seeming 
way" are two-headed [ fiticpavot ] because "for them to Be and Not to  
Be [ t o  veXeiv t c  c a t  ouk e t v a i ]  are regarded as the same and not 
the same [ xauxov v cv o t t iax a t  kov xauTow]" ( fra g . 6) .  According 
to^ Burnet (p. 174, n. 2 ) ,  "there is no difference between
tcXc iv  and e i v o i  except in  rhythmical value." In short, the "way 
of seeming" is  not to be chosen because i t  couches within i t s e l f  
the unthinkable "not-Being." Hence, appearance and sense perception 
are not part of the way of Truth; see Cornford, P lato and Parmenides, 
p. 29; and Gomperz, 1:181. So "p lu ra lity , becoming, change, motion, 
are in some sense unreal" (Cornford, p. 28). Gilson (L'Etre, p. 27) 
expresses Parmenides' in te rp re ta tion  of temporal being in a c le a re r  
way when he says that Parmenides' sensible world as a whole, w ith  
the eternal changes proper of i t ,  "must be excluded from the order 
of Being and seen as appearance." We see then that in th is  
primordial presupposition "there is  no possible transition  from the  
One Being to the manifold and changing world which our senses seem 
to reveal" (Cornford, pp. 29, 5 1 ).
2
Parmenides' thinking is  the beginning of "ontology" 
(Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, p. 33; Cleve, 2:543). The s ta rtin g  
point is  also what conditions classical metaphysics and epistemology 
as a whole, even the discussion about the p o s s ib ility  of metaphysics. 
See Marias, Idea de la M eta fis ica , p. 381; Jaspers, The O rig in a l 
Thinkers, p. 32. For a very good presentation on the o rig in  and
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1 2  3epistemology, even logic and theology --was shaped by i t .
Epistemological Framework
4
A fter Parmenides' pioneer thinking on the fundamental nature 
of Being, philosophy proceeded to develop its  tools. The next step
development of, the idea of Being from Parmenides to Thomas Aquinas, 
see Gilson, L 'E tre , pp. 24-123.
^ It  is perhaps at th is  level that Parmenides' th in k in g  on 
Being is  to  play the most in flu e n tia l ro le  in the history o f Western 
philosophy and Christian theology. His thinking on the ground of 
Being, a fte r  a long process of development determines the epistemo­
logical framework— logos—of Western c iv iliz a t io n . Adorno remarks 
that in  Parmenides the understanding o f Truth, Being and Unity "are 
also d irection  how to think" (p. 83 ). Even though some may consider 
Parmenides' re flec tion  as pure emptiness and nonsense ( fo r  instance, 
Cleve, 2:541), Jaspers explains in a very clear way how the paramount 
influence o f Parmenides in Greek and Western thinking is  to  be seen 
in the epistemological framework: “Parmenides' influence has been
enormous. This may seem surprising in view of the predominantly 
logical character o f his thinking. But fo r Parmenides the seeming 
emptiness of his statement was supreme fullness, and fo r  a l l  who 
came a fte r  him i t  represented a challenge to f i l l  his molds of
thought, which, once communicated, become purely formal. But there
are other reasons fo r his h istorica l influence. The methods of 
thought he developed came to be u tiliz e d  independently, while the ir  
orig ina l meaning was overshadowed or lost" (The Original Thinkers,
p. 31 ). Perhaps the deepest mold of thought that Parmenides imposed
on Western thinking was the "gap" or chorismos between the sensible 
world (Lebenswelt) and the world of Truth and Reason. See Cornford, 
pp. 34, 3b; Cleve, 2:546; and Raschke, p. 384.
?
Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, 31.
3
"Parmenides does not call Being God. But what he conceived 
as the signs of being, became a f ie ld  of categories which were sub­
sequently transferred to God when theologians sought to define His 
a ttr ib u te s . From Parmenides came the motifs appropriate to a thought 
structure embracing the imageless God, to the apprehending o f tran­
scendence by pure thought. His 'ontology' provided 'theology' with 
i ts  tools" ( ib id . ,  p. 33). What Jaspers here calls "tools" is  what 
we c a ll "epistemological framework" o f reason's structure. We see 
in a more detailed analysis how correct is Jaspers' statement in 
our second chapter.
^After Parmenides’ expression o f the timeless primordial 
presupposition, there was no other re fle c tio n  on the subject matter 
of the ground of Being as "No-thing‘* u n til Heidegger. Heidegger
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to be taken was the interpretation  o f the ontological and epistemo- 
logical frameworks1 on the basis provided by Parmenides' presupposi­
tion o f timelessness.
P la to . Parmenides' two ways—way of Truth and way o f doxa— 
were developed by Plato into a worldview in which the unabridgeafale 
gap that Parmenides maintained between Truth and doxa began to blur. 
However, the gap only blurred; i t  did not disappear. Rather i t  came 
to form an essential and constitutive part of P lato 's understanding 
of the whole of re a lity . This came about in what is  known as P lato's  
theory o f the two worlds, a dualism which Plato expressed in terms
himself recognizes th a t Parmenides saw the connection of Being and 
beings and so Being as "No-thing"; see Heidegger, Early Greek Think­
ing, pp. 98, 99. Yet, even though he recognizes th a t Greek philos- 
ophy made at least " in i t ia l  contributions towards an In terpretation  
of the ground of Being , “ he rather sees him in terpreting  being from 
"what is  present without considering presencing, " which implies 
that he interpreted Being from the viewpoint of beings and th is  from 
the mere "present" of being, disregarding the deeper level of th e ir  
"presencing." See Early Greek Thinking, pp. 35, 98, 99.
Hhe in terpretation  of the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks is  what we find  in the history of philosophy as ontologi­
cal and epistemological theories. Obviously,, a fte r  Parmenides the 
whole o f such interpretations was developed on the timeless dimen­
s iona lity  of Being and reason. This in terpretation of the ontologi­
cal and epistemological framework on the timeless ground of Being 
was confused with reason i ts e lf .
Werner Jaeger (A ris to tle : Fundamentals of the History of
His Development, 2 ed. LOxford: Clarendon Press, 1948J, pi 531
remarks th a t the development of a Weltanschauung is  one of Plato's  
greatest philosophical powers. Here Weltanschauung is  synonymous 
with ontology and metaphysics.
2
„ Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 29, 51; and Gilson, 
L'Etre, p. 27. See also p. 83, n. 1 and p. 84, n. 2 above.
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of dimensionality by saying that “time imitates etern ity ."^  In th is  
way Plato gave b ir th ,  on the background of Parmenides' primordial 
presupposition, to the ontological theory o f the x<* a i « v a  .
Plato Timaeus 37.d-38.c (trans. R. G. Bury, LCL, 7 :74-79). 
Here Eternal Being L &*i6iov ouo lav], even when i t  may re fer to  ever­
lasting duration; see A ris to tle  Or. the Heavens 284a.5-20 (tran s . 
W. K. C. Guthrie, LCL, 132, 133). i t  is  c learly  understood by Plato  
as timelessness: “Time, then, came into existence along with the
Heaven, to the end th a t having been generated together they might 
also be dissolved together, i f  ever a dissolution of them should 
take place; and i t  was made a fte r  the pattern o f the Eternal Mature 
[ sxaiwvio ♦uaemc ] ,  to  the end th a t i t  might be as like  thereto  
as possible; fo r whereas the pattern is existent through a ll  e te r ­
n ity  [vavxa aiuva ] ,  the copy, on the other hand, is through a l l  
time, continual^ having existed, existing , and being about to  ex is t  
[ tcto te Kal col feadpevoc ]" ( ib id . ) .  So time came in to  being 
at the same time as the heavens. This leaves the realm of tim eless­
ness fo r Eternal Being, since duration i ts e lf  belongs to the realm 
of time (of the copy which im itates e te rn ity ). Plato (Parmenides 
151e-153b [trans. H. N. Fowler, LCL, 282-89]) remarks on £fie 
contradictions that arise  when the One is supposed to be in  tim e. 
On Plato's timeless understanding of beings and re a l ity ,  see Eduard 
Z e lle r , Plato and the Older Academy (New York: Russel and Russel,
1962), ppl 366-82; aiicl John F . Callahan, Four Views of Time in  
Ancient Philosophy, rev. ed. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood,
1979), pp. 3-27. Jaspers remarks on Plato's dependence on Parmenides 
regarding the cen tra l Platonic m otif of the "theory of the two 
worlds": "The d is tin c tio n  between tru th  and opinion, between the 
being of being and the illu s io n  o f the world, was la te r  fixa ted  in 
the so-called theory o f the two worlds. This became possible once a 
certain independent r e a l ity  was imputed to nature, i . e . ,  the world of 
i llu s io n , once illu s io n  became a natural phenomenon, i . e . ,  an 
appearance, while being became a transcendent realm, another being, a 
second world, a 'world behind the w orld .' With th is  the Parmenidean 
unity of being and knowledge was transformed into a dualism which, in 
a variety of forms, has run through a l l  Western history" (The O rig inal 
Thinkers, p. 33). We should not be confused by the term "dualism." 
There are not two principles fo r the understanding and in terp retation  
of the world, according to P lato; there is ju s t one, namely, 
timelessness. Dualism here re fe rs  to the incorporation o f the 
sensory world in to  the realm o f philosophy as i t  is considered to 
"im itate" the realm of timeless being. The d ua lity  is  then rooted in 
the unity of being and meaning. D uality  is recognized as appearance 
turns to be an im ita tio n  of timeless being. Timelessness is  the 
sole source of both being and meaning.
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That is  to  say, i t  was a theory not of timelessness as merely an 
empty dimension, but rather a theory of timeless beingsJ In P lato 's  
theory, these timeless beings were considered to  be the source of 
Truth. Obviously, then, P la to 's  ontological theory demanded a par­
ticu lar way in  which knowledge was supposed to function in  order to
2
achieve tim eless tru th .
Western philosophy adopted the main lines of P lato 's  world­
view, in  which timelessness and temporality were no longer opposites. 
On the contrary, temporality was, by im ita tio n , ordered and condi­
tioned by timelessness, which was regarded as the source o f both 
Being and knowledge not only fo r  timeless beings but also fo r  tem­
poral ones. With Plato philosophy became the philosophy of timeless 
3
essences— ideas —which belonged to the ideal world in  re la tio n  
to which our sensible world is  considered a temporal im ita tio n .
Heidegger is correct; Plato does not address himself to  
the study of the ground of Being. Yet he knows i t  very well and 
uses i t  in a masterful way as he approaches the in terp retation  of 
re a lity  as a^whole. So, as he refers to "etern ity ,'* he is  speaking 
of *avTo oiM va (Timaeus, 3 8 .a ) .  This could not have been accom­
plished were not Being already understood as pertaining to the dimen­
sionality  of timelessness.
2
As beings are understood and interpreted as pertaining or 
being e s s e n tia lly  related—temporal e n titie s — to timelessness, the 
ontological framework which is  required by the structure of reason 
begins to take the shape th a t determines the meaning of the logos 
for Western thought.
3
P e ro tti (p. 7) points out that since Plato, metaphysics 
has been a study of essences. According to P lato , beings are in te l­
lig ib le  because they have in te ll ig ib le  natures—ideas, essences. 
The in te l l ig ib le  nature of the essence gives b ir th  to what Kant la te r  
called th in g - in - i ts e lf . But, what determines the in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  
of the thing? This main issue has been already settled by Parmenides 
when he chose the ground of Being to be timelessness. "T ran s ito ri- 
ness o f appearance has been attributed to the realm of doxa, to  
illu s io n , and essence has been reserved fo r etern ity" (Adorno, p. 
87).
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Consequently, P lato 's epistemological framework had provisions fo r  
reaching the timeless essence which the sensible world e ith er par­
tic ip a te s  in or imitates.^ True knowledge, then, was that kind of 
knowledge which was able to grasp timeless ideas, elim inating those
features of an object that pertained to the temporal, sensory 
2
world.
Plato's in terp re ta tion  of the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks has been so in flu e n tia l in Western c iv iliz a t io n  that 
i t  is  no overstatement to say that the whole of philosophy has been
3
a series of footnotes to Plato. P lato 's  astonishing influence lie s  
mainly in  the fac t th a t he was the f i r s t  philosopher to develop in 
a technical way the ontological and epistemological frameworks of 
reason, and so he was the one who provided the structure of reason 
with the basic contents and categories which i t  needs to function. 
Thus reason (as a technical tool fo r  thought, namely logos) was 
born a t the same time that i t  became timeless. Reason and tim eless­
ness belonged together in Plato's in terp re ta tion , and, through P lato ,
^See W. T. Jones, 1:135-38; and Emile Brehier, The Hellenic  
Age, v o l. 1, in The History of Philosophy (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Pressi 1963), pp. IZ0-1Z I, to r commentary on Plato 's par­
tic ip a tio n  and im ita tion .
2See W. T. Jones, 1:121-46; and Marias, History of Philos­
ophy, pp. 43-53, fo r further commentary on Plato*s theory of know­
ledge.
^See Majorie Grene, p. 617; Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great 
Chain o f Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 24; and Stephen t .  Toulmin, Human 
Understanding, 3 vols. (Princeton, Mew Jersey: Princeton Umver-
s ity  Press, 1972), l : v i i .
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in  the generally held interpretation  o f Western s c ie n tific  and 
philosophical th inking. With Plato reason as logos became tim eless. 
Plato's influence has been so strong that the timeless in terpretation  
of reason's structure came to be considered as pertaining to the 
structure of reason i t s e l f .  The hypothetical character o f reason 
was overlooked, even denied.
A r is to tle . Like P lato , A ris to tle  did not think i t  was
necessary to address himself to the in terpretation  of the ground
1 2 of Being. Parmenides’ insight was enough. Perhaps the most re le ­
vant contribution of A ris to tle  to philosophy was his denial o f the 
two-world theory and his understanding o f being as pertaining to 
or expressed in sensible e n titie s .^  His interpretation o f the 
ontological framework developed the Platonic eidos in to  the
"A ris to tle  is  well aware of the presence of such a concept. 
He expressly teaches that i t  is not E n tity . Entity—Being ^ua 
Being— , however, is  what the Primary Philosophy treats. The concept 
'being ', therefore, cannot be i ts  object" (Owens, p. 471).
2
"And ju s t as the Platonic Ideas, or Ontos Onta, so is  th e ir  
A ris to te lian  counterpart, those innumerable unchangeable and eternal 
forms, or Kinds of Being. . . . Supported by the authority of Plato 
and A ris to tle , the Einai has become an in tegra l ingredient of Western 
philosophy" (Cleve, 2 :&58).
3
"Being fo r A ris to tle , accordingly, retains the fundamental 
connotations derived from Parmenides and P lato . ’To be' means to 
endure. I t  denotes 'not to change.' As fo r  Plato, i t  continues 
to mean form and difference. . . . The new conception removes the 
sharp antithesis  between the changing and unchangeable, the sensible 
and the knowable. Final causality accomplishes what partic ipa tion  
or any other Platonic explanation was unable to do. The sensible 
thing, in  s triv ing  a fte r  the permanence o f separate E n tity , im itates  
and expresses the permanence, the Being o f separate E n tities  them­
selves. That is  the. Being which is  derived to sensible things. 
That is the Being which they express, and which is expressed even 
by 'becoming' and 'not-being'" (Owens, p. 464).
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metaphysical principle of (morphe) J  In th is  way, being as a whole— 
as a system which interprets re a lity  as a hierarchy that includes
also sensible concrete individuals—was s t i l l  understood from the
2
perspective of timelessness. Now, however, the timeless Platonic  
“idea," having become the A ris to te lic  "form," was in the world, in
Hirschberger (1:191) gives his in terpretation of how the 
Platonic eidos becomes the A ris to te lic  morphe, and Owens (p . 461) 
explains how form is ordered to the eternal and the d iv ine, th a t is  
to say, to permanence or timelessness. I t  must not be overlooked, 
however, that even though A ris to tle  understood being—e n tit ie s — from 
the viewpoint of timelessness and permanence, th is  is not synonymous 
with " s ta tic ."  . His understanding of being is  timeless but ac tive . 
This is  apparent when we re a liz e  that being is to be understood not 
only as "form" but also as " a c t.” A ris to tle  considers being as 
energela on (Metaphysics, 4.1003a). For a commentary on th is  dynamic 
aspect of A ris to tle  s timeless being, see Ortega y Gasset, La idea de 
Princip io  en Leibniz, p. 278. Owens (pp. 466, 467) fu rther points 
out that A ris to tle 's  dynamic understanding of being would leave out 
the issue of existence. However, he also remarks that such d e f i­
ciency appears only when A ris to tle 's  thought is  considered in  the 
lig h t o f la te r  reflections. As we w ill  see in our second chapter, 
Thomism claims o rig in a lity  fo r developing in the idea of esse some­
thing which is not present in classical philosophy. I t  seems, how­
ever, th a t from the A ristote lian  idea of being as energeia 5n, the 
Thomistic re flec tion  on esse also has its  s tarting  point in A ris to tle . 
For a summary of A ris to tle 's  classical metaphysics, see Marias, Idea 
de la  M etafisca, pp. 380-84.
2
"Form" or essence is  called by A ris to tle  the “second o u s t  a . 1 
The " f i r s t  ousia” is the hyle-morphe synolon, that is to say, the 
re a l, actual, concrete e n tity . Yet the synolon receives i ts  meaning 
from the realm of the second ousia or essence; see Hirschberger, 
1:167. And fo r A ristotle  essence is  timeless. This is  apparent in 
the way A ris to tle  names the essence through a strange expression 
t o  t  i nv c tv a i which has been translated into Latin as god quid 
erat esse, that is "what being was." See Marias, History o f P h il- 
osopy. p. 74; and A ris to tle  Metaphysics, 7 .4 .3 -6 . This expression 
shows timelessness in that i t  en ta ils  that which the en tity  is  before 
i t .  In more concrete terms, the second ousia is  onto log ically  and 
epistem ologically prior to the f i r s t  ousial But the f i r s t  ousia is  
in time, hence the second ousia is  not in time and determines what 
appears in time. Hirschberger (1:167) id en tifie s  the A r is to te lic  
"form" as a metaphysical princip le  with the Platonic idea which 
is tim eless. See p. 87, n. 3 above.
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tiraeJ Nonetheless, A ris to tle  was not expressing a temporal
primordial presupposition. On the contrary, time was simply recog-
2
nized and included in his synthesis. Meaning and Being did not
3
pertain to time but to timelessness, to the form. The particu lar
For A ris to tle  "the world is  no longer in the idea, but the 
idea is  now in the world. The form no longer appears in its  univer­
s a lity , but in its  concrete and particular rea liza tio n . For 
A ris to tle  only the f i r s t  substance, not the second as was the case 
with Plato, moves about in the world. And i f  the form becomes opera­
t iv e , th is is due to its  a c tu a lity  both in space and in time" 
(Hirschberger, 1:167).
2
Time fo r A ris to tle  is  “the measure of movement" Metaphys- 
sics, 1 2 .2 .5 ,1069b.10-15; and 1 2 .7 ,1072b.14,15; Physics, 4 .1 1,220a). 
Hirschberger remarks that fo r A ris to tle  "time remains, nevertheless, 
inherently bound up with the m aterial world. Outside our world there  
is consequently no time, ju s t as there can be no waste time. The 
unit o f measurement in time is  the 'now,' the present moment"
(1:190, 191). "Time is the number of motion, and without natural 
body there cannot be motion. I t  is  obvious then that there is
neither place nor void nor time outside the heaven, since i t  has 
been demonstrated that there neither is nor can be body there"
(A ris to tle , On the Heavens, 279.a .15). Cf. Cornford, p. 185. I t  
follows that where no "natural body" exists, there is  no time, hence 
there is timelessness or Being i ts e lf .  Callahan synthesizes 
A ris to tle 's  timelessness by saying that "things that are not moved 
or are not at rest are therefore not in time" (p. 69). Cf. 
Hirschberger, 1:190. The very A ris to te lian  in terpretation  of time 
i t s e lf  which is done from the viewpoint of the "now" is  not temporal. 
“The 'now,' therefore, as a l im it  is  not time, but is  incidental
to time" (A ris to tle  Physics, 4 .9 .220a .20 ). For fu rther commentary, 
see Callahan, pp. 38-87.
2
“In A ris to tle  the proper re a lity  of sensible things was 
divine. The restless seeking o f the divine, the im itation of the 
divine, was the way of fin a l causality  that brought Being into the 
sensible world. But that causality  was of an ex trin s ic  type. I t  
effected no in tr in s ic  change whatsoever in e ith er the natures of 
sensible things or in the natures of separate E n titie s . Neither 
the changeless permanence of the divine nor the in tr in s ic  re a lity  
of sensible things had in any way to be sacrificed to the interests  
of th e ir common unity in the one and the same universe. Against 
th is  background, A ris to tle 's  doctrine of Being may be summed up in  
a few words. Being is  a group o f equivocals, o f which the primary 
instance is form in the sense of act. Form includes a ll  the i n t e l l i ­
gible content in a thing. I t  cannot be 'empty.' Form means d i f f e r ­
ence" (Owens, pp. 469, 470). Cf. Hirschberger, 1:165.
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individual was to be understood in the lig h t o f the timeless univer-
So the ontological framework in  A ris to tle  was interpreted and
developed along the lines provided by the Parmenidean primordial
presupposition. A r is to tle 's  ontological framework proposed a close,
yet extrin s ic , re la tio n  between timelessness and temporality. The
realm of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  was timelessness, because timelessness was
considered to be the dimension of Being i t s e l f .  And Being is  the
2
source of knowledge. This ontological framework provided the basis
for A ris to tle 's  understanding o f the theos which was only the ground,
foundation, and foremost expression of ontology i ts e lf .  Obviously,
then, theos is  understood to be timeless being in its  maximum and
3
most perfect expression.
"The universal is actually  more important than the p a rtic u la r;  
fo r the p articu la r is now understood only by means of the universal" 
(Hirschberger, 1:165). And the universal is  what belongs to the 
essence, that is , what is tim eless. So r e a l i ty ,  temporal r e a l ity ,  
is understood from the Parmenidean perspective of timelessness. 
Thus we note that "the form has appeared as the ultimate basis of 
a ll  universal s c ie n tif ic  knowledge, just as i t  has emerged as the 
ultimate foundation of Being" (Owens, p. 457).
Obviously, we cannot fo llow  here the very detailed and complex 
way in which A ris to tle  develops the meaning of the ontological 
framework. For an introduction to A ris to tle 's  Ontological Theory, 
see Marias, Idea de la M etafisica, pp. 380-84.
2
God is  understood in the maximum category of Being, and so he 
is actus purus (Metaphysics, 12.8 .18, 1074a.3 5 ). He is pure form 
or essence, "xb xt fiv ctvai ipuxov " and as such is the maximum 
expression of timelessness. The idea of God as being the f i r s t  mover 
is Platonic in s p ir it ;  see Hirschberger, 1:194, 195). For a t re a t ­
ment of A r is to tle 's  idea o f the f i r s t  mover and the d if f ic u lt ie s  
of its  in te rp re ta tio n , see Jaeger, A r is to tle , pp. 342-67. A r is to tle  
seems to regard the timelessness— immutabi l i t y —o f God as pertaining  
to the common tra d itio n a l domain (see On the Heavens, 279a. 31). 
A ristotle  also speaks of God, however, as a “ liv ing  tiod" (Metaphys­
ics, 12 .7 .8-12). L ife , of course, is to be understood in reference
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In the context of th is ontological framework, which included 
as its  maximum expression the timeless theos, A r is to tle  grounded 
and developed his epistemological framework on the presupposition 
of timelessnessJ
A ris to tle 's  epistemological framework was decisive fo r  
classical reason because in i t  A r is to tle  developed an understanding 
of cognitive a c tiv ity  as a process of abstraction, following his 
understanding of re a lity  as “essence" (and of course following the  
Platonic tra d it io n ). By means o f abstraction one could reach the  
timeless re a lity  of being which was present and involved in  the con­
crete temporal e n tity . The temporal en tity  was considered only to  
provide the starting point fo r reason's abstractive a c tiv ity . In  
short, abstraction was the a c t iv ity  o f logos understood as the grasp­
ing of the timeless truth present in  the ontological essence o f the
to Being. So neither L ife  nor e te rn ity , as they apply to God, are 
in any way temporal. They are predicated o f God in  an analogical 
way. I t  is  clear, however, th a t God, according to  A ris to tle , is  
not an empty concept but rather the most perfect Being which has 
a c tiv ity  and happiness. God's a c t iv ity  is , y e t, to  be understood 
in the context of Being as vonot votfoewc [th inking his own 
thought] (Metaphysics, 12.9.4; and 1 2 .7 .2 -5 ). See Brehier, p. 203. 
As knowledge is For A risto tle  timeless, so is  God's a c t iv ity .  
A ris to tle 's  concern with God's a c tiv ity  is th a t God's s e lf -  
suffic iency may be preserved at the same time that a c t iv ity  is predi­
cated of him. So God moves temporal re a lity  as he is "the object 
of desire and the object of thought" (Metaphysics, 1 2 .7 .2 -5 ). See 
also Marias, Hi story of Phi losophy, pp. 72, 73. B rie fly , fo r  
A ris to tle , God acts and lives, but in a timeless action and l i f e .  
A dditionally , the theos in A r is to tle 's  thinking pertains to the whole 
of Being and is the maximum expression of Being's hierarchy, from 
which perfection of being and knowledge flows and is  grounded.
^Marias in Idea de la M etafisica (p. 395) remarks that logos 
as a tool of knowledge is t ra d it io n a lly  id en tifie d  with the a t t r i -  
butes of Being; and in his H istory of Philosophy he explains, com­
menting on A ris to tle , that ‘'Logos te l ls  us what things are, and is
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thing by the dismissal of whatever temporal, sensible element may 
be involved in  the process—whether from the object's  side* or the 
subject's side. In this way, the epistemological framework as a 
whole was developed in the timeless dimensionality of Being, becoming 
consequently the a priori condition fo r any knowledge that claimed 
to be “s c ie n tif ic ,"  that is ,  "true knowledge."'* With A r is to tle
closely related to being. The principles of lo g ic --fo r example, 
the principles of identity or contradiction— are ontological p r in c i­
ples that re fe r to the behavior of e n titie s . I  cannot say or think  
that A is  and at the same time is  not B, because A cannot be and 
not be B. Logic is  nothing but metaphysics" (p . 75).
^Hirschberger remarks th a t “in A ris to te lian  abstraction, 
however, i t  is  precisely the ideal structure o f being that is  recog­
nized, eidos (species) and morphe (form ). . . . His abstraction  
is the in tu itio n  of the essence, an abstraction that is  gained and 
performed in tu it iv e ly . To him sense knowledge is  as l i t t l e  an e f f i ­
cient cause as i t  was with P lato . I t  is  only a material cause and 
consequently cannot actuate Nous" (1:156, 157). See also ib id . ,  
p. 141.
2
"The Nous which forms these non-sensible notions is  conse­
quently a creative principle which of i t s e l f  develops the notional 
essence, but not under the determining influence of the phantasms 
which are only material; fo r  i t  is 'separable, impassible, 
unmixed . . .  in  its  essential nature a c t iv ity . '  This active  in te l ­
lec t is , as consequence, something eternal and something immortal" 
(Hirschberger, 1:155). Cf. A ris to tle  On the Soul 3.5 (tran s . W. 
S. Hett, LCL, 171). N. Hartmann (41 .a) in his post-Kantian analysis 
considers the active in te lle c t as not required by reason's system. 
Epistemological framework functions independently from the ontologi­
cal framework. Yet, for A ris to tle  there must be an ontological 
foundation fo r timelessness, both from the object's side: the
essence of the thing to be known, and from the subject's side: the
active in te lle c t  which is the timeless substance or nature o f man— 
something divine in him—which has the power to produce the in te lle c ­
tiv e  act that is  called "abstraction" and on which the whole of 
reason's a c tiv ity  is  grounded.
3
That is , i t  is not mere doxa which here is  rejected as much 
as i t  was in  Parmenides. Hirschberger explains that "according to 
A risto tle  two things are characteris tic  of the essence of science: 
i t  is knowledge based on reason, and its  propositions are concerned 
with circumstances and facts which are s t r ic t ly  necessary and hence
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“true knowledge" was knowledge o f the movable, changeable temporal 
re a lity  as i t  movesJ But the knowledge that was to be reached was 
knowledge not simply of th is  r e a l ity  as movable but rather in so 
fa r as i t  expressed th a t timeless dimension that was the foundation 
of i ts  being.
With A ris to tle 's  in terp re ta tion  of the epistemological frame­
work reason reached i ts  classical expression. Classical logos was 
an in terpretation  o f reason's functioning closely tied  to the 
ontological framework from whose in terpretation  i t  sprang. Its  
epistemological framework developed the a p rio ri conditions of coher­
ence and meaning on the basis of the in terpretation  i t  i ts e lf  already 
gave o f re a lity  in the ontological framework. According to i t ,  time 
(the individual, h is to ry , the world o f concrete sensory perception, 
the Lebenswelt) , though included in the whole, did not furnish the 
ground fo r the meaning of r e a l ity ,  e ither as individual e n titie s  
or as a whole. Meaning and r e a l i ty  came from th e ir  only possible 
source, the timeless realm.
cannot be other than they are (Post, An., 1 ,2 ). . . . The foundation 
and starting  point o f s tr ic t  science is accordingly always a know­
ledge of essences. And in th is  knowledge we have knowledge based 
on reason. . . . Because of th is  the knowledge of essence fa r sur­
passes the knowledge o f bare facts" (1 :151).
^Not as in Plato where s c ie n tif ic  knowledge was of the sepa­
rated ideas in the topos ouranos and had no d irec t re lation  to the 
illu s o ry  world of sensible appearances. In A ris to tle  the Platonic 
world is  kind of "incarnated" in  the sensory appearances. So, 
s c ie n tif ic  knowledge must reach the "incarnated" essence. This 
is achieved through abstraction. See p. 94, n. 1 above.
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Kant. With Kant, A r is to tle ’ s ontological grounding fo r  both 
the ontological and epistemological frameworks Was rejected as impos­
s ib le . Yet, in spite of his rejection of the classical ground of 
meaning, Kant s t i l l  gave expression to the classical epistemological 
framework, which now was supposed to ground i t s e l f  independently 
of the tra d itio n a l ontological ground. B r ie f ly , Kant turned the 
classical understanding of reason from an ontological grounding to 
an epistemological transcendental oneJ This in te rp re ta tion  o f know­
ledge as centered and grounded in the cognitive subject may be seen
2
as beginning with the cogito ergo sum of Descartes.
^That is , in Kant’ s terminology, transcendental. This is  
also the main trend in neo-Kantism. See R. Vancourt, pp. 18-20.
2
"The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for 
philosophizing has revealed i t s e l f  as the implantation of a balefu l 
prejudice, which has kept la te r  generations from making any thematic 
ontological analytic of the 'mind' [ ‘Gemutes'3  such as would take 
the question of Being as a clue and would a t the same time come to 
grips c r i t ic a l ly  with the tra d itio n a l ancient ontology” (Heidegger, 
Being and Time, In t .2 .6 ) . Thus we see in Descartes a c r i t ic a l  view­
point which only provides a new foundation in  the mental realm, for 
the same Platonic-Aristotelian in terpretation  in its  Thomistic 
expression. Heidegger continues, saying th a t “everyone who is  
acquainted with the Middle Ages sees that Descartes is 'dependent' 
upon medieval scholasticism and employs i ts  terminology. Birt with 
th is  ’discovery’ nothing is  achieved philosophically as long as i t  
remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has 
influenced the way in which posterity has determined or fa ile d  to 
determine the ontological character of the res cogitans” ( ib id . ) .  
See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Phenomenology (The Hague! Martinus N ijh o ff, 1960), p. 24. Through 
th is  h is to ric  process A risto te lian  trad ition  was developed and consti­
tuted the ground of Western m entality. What we ca ll "Western mind” 
is "A risto te lian  mind.” At least th is  is true regarding the basic 
lines of reason's structure. A ris to tle 's  influence, since i t  shapes 
the structure of reason, does not reach only philosophy and theology 
but also natural sciences in general. Edmund Husserl points out 
that “very significant metaphysical presuppositions” underlie  "at 
least a l l  those sciences that are concerned with actual re a l ity ."  
A fter an enumeration of presuppositions as fo r  instance " th a t a ll
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Kant denied the ontological foundation of knowledge by s ta t­
ing that knowledge does not reach the th in g -in - its e lf  but only the 
phenomenon.  ^ This basic Kantian idea seems to place Kant's theory
beyond the influence of tra d itio n a l A risto te lian  ontology and even
2
epistemology. However, what Kant actually accomplished in the
process is  subject to the causal princip le ," he affirms th a t "these 
presuppositions, a l l  to be found in the framework of A r is to tle 's  
F irs t Philosophy, are at present ranked under the quite unsuitable  
rubric o f 'epistemology"' ( Logical Investigations, p. 59). Since 
A ris to tle 's  influence is so obvious even a fte r Kant, I skip the pre- 
Kantian developments because they do not render any substantial new 
insight regarding the structure o f reason.
^Kant in Critique of Pure Reason (p. 54) sums up his position  
on the phenomenical nature of knowledge.
2
What Kant actually re jects  is the trad itio n a l ontological 
foundation of knowledge on r e a l ity  i ts e lf .  The existence of the 
so-called th in g -in - its e lf  is not denied though. Kant only claims 
that i t  is  not knowable ( ib id . ,  p. 46). In Kant's understanding 
of the th in g - in - its e lf  can s t i l l  be seen a Platonic influence. The 
th in g -in - its e lf  lie s  beyond time fo r  both Plato and Kant; hence i t  
is , following Parmenides, tim eless. The difference between them 
is that fo r Plato the th in g - in - its e lf  is  not only "knowable" but 
the ground of true knowledge i t s e l f ,  while fo r Kant i t  is  "unknow­
able." So Kant put asunder what since Parmenides was considered 
as belonging together, namely thinking and being (see p. 35 , n. 
3 above). The transcendence and timelessness o f being are accepted 
by Kant he ju s t provides a new immanent foundation fo r knowledge 
in independence from ontology. With Kant again, as i t  was o r ig in a lly  
with Parmenides, there is no way fo r crossing the gap between being 
and doxa. Kant’ s position, however, is much more complex since for 
him the sensible world is no longer the world of opinion but rather 
the world of true knowledge, s c ie n tif ic a lly  necessary knowledge, 
afte r the Platonic-Aristotelian in terpretation  of i t .  Thus tim eless­
ness is also present in Kant’s epistemological theory and not only 
in his ontological re flec tio n . Kant, then, suggests a "disconnec­
tion” between the ontological and epistemological realms th a t goes 
against not only trad itiona l philosophy but also against the struc­
ture of reason i ts e l f .  The disconnection is  expressed in technical 
language as being between the noumen ( th in g - in - its e lf )  and the 
phainos noumen (appearance). The severing is  caused by the accept­
ance of the Platonic chorismos, which is  the expression of 
Parmenides' v ia  negativa fo r  the understanding of the ground of 
Being. A fter Parmenides, however, trad itio n  crossed the gap through
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epistemological realm was to deny knowledge of any suprasensible 
origin.^ But as already noted, a suprasensible orig in  was at the 
basis o f A ris to tle 's  in te rp re ta tion  of the epistemological framework 
of reason's structure.
In place of the tra d itio n a l ontological foundation Kant pro­
vided a transcendental foundation fo r knowledge. That is  to say, 
he explained the ground o f s c ie n tific  knowledge from the perspec­
tive  of the cognitive structures of the subject. The transcendent 
ontological foundation proposed by A ris to tle  was replaced by an imma- 
nent cognitive foundation. Yet, Kant developed his own in terpreta­
tion o f the meaning o f the epistemological framework on the ground
analogy and abstraction. This was possible because of the ontologi­
cal A ris to te lian  theory of analogia entis according to which, to put 
i t  in a nutshell, noumen and phainos noumen were complementary. This 
complementary connect!on disappears Tn Kant's theory. Then, what 
appears is  no longer connected to the appearance. So a problem is  
posited; namely, how to in te rp re t the nature of phenomenal knowledge 
in the context of disconnection proposed by Kant. Two main answers 
have been provided so fa r ,  namely, Jaspers' and Heidegger's.
^Kant's denial of the suprasensible does not only include the 
knowledge of God but also, in a deeper way, includes the in te r­
pretation o f the cognitive act that requires an “eternal and immor­
ta l"  in te l le c t ,  see p. 94, n. 1 above. However, Kant believed in the 
immortality of the soul ( C ritique of Practical Reason, pp. 132, 133).
His epistemological stance is the consequence of his theory of the 
th in g - in - its e lf .
2
Immanence here is  to be understood over against the tra d i­
tional understanding of transcendence as linked and grounded on the 
timeless theos. For Kant, knowledge is  immanent not because i t  per­
tains to the sensible world but because i t  pertains to the phenomenal 
world, in  which, according to Kant, not only sensory but also 
extra-sensory elements are involved. These extra-sensory elements 
are the a priori forms the subject provides. So they are 
extrasensory but pertain to the world. Thus in Kant, “immanence" 
means the denial of supernatural origins fo r knowledge. I t  does not 
mean the acceptance of the Parmenidean world of doxa as realm for 
knowledge. In the "natural” world of Kant, tra d it io n a l, timeless-
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of A ris to te lian  ontology. He interpreted the phenomenon (the basic 
original cognitive un it) by means of A ris to te lian  ontological cate­
gories o f matter and form^--matter corresponding to sensation (time)
categories, in the way o f "forfns," "categories," and "transcendental 
ideas," s t i l l  are the basic source for s c ie n tific --" tru e “— knowledge. 
See C ritique  of Pure Reason, p. 25; and Critique of P ractica l Reason, 
pp. 132, 133.------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
^At th is point we should bear in mind that the A ris to te lian  
matter and form are not only ontological but also epistemological 
princip les . Kant in C ritique  of Pure Reason explains the structure  
of the phenomenon in a very clear and foundational statement: "The
undetermined object of an empirical in tu itio n  is  called phenomenon. 
That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensatioT^ I term 
i ts  m atter; but that which affects the content of the phenomenon 
that can be arranged under certain re la tions , I  ca ll i ts  form. But 
that in  which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they 
are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be i t s e l f  sensa­
tion . I t  is , then, the matter of a l l  phenomena that is  given to 
us a p o s terio ri; the form must l ie  ready a prio ri fo r  them in the 
mi nd, and consequent ly  can be regarded separately from a l l  sensation" 
(p. 41). The phenomenon, then, is  constituted by matter— sensation— 
and form— that does not come from sensory experience. A dd itionally , 
form is  said to be a p r io r i .  That is  to say, i t  has i ts  ground not 
in sensation ( ib id . ,  p. 26 ). I t  has i ts  ground in an in tu it io n  as 
that of the  active in te lle c t  in A ris to tle  which reached the th in g -in - 
i ts e lf .  Now, according to Kant’s “Copernican Revolution," i t  has 
its  ground in the pure in tu itio n  of the forms of s e n s ib ility  and 
in the transcendental deduction of categories. A ll th is  is an 
intra-m ental a c tiv ity . Kant, as he describes the a p r io r i cogni­
tions ( ib id .) ,  makes i t  c lear that he is  talk ing about the same uni­
versal, necessary, kind o f knowledge as in - trad itiona l philosophy. 
I t  can be seen how the two ways of Parmenides, or the P.latonic theory 
of the two worlds, are present at the core of Kant’ s system. The 
world of the senses is  present within the phenomenon as i ts  matter, 
which provides the access to the individual and contingent. The world 
of necessary, absolute, and universal truths is  present in the form 
of the phenomenon, which through tra d itio n  has a timeless grounding 
for i ts  meanings. The actual grounding, however, is seen as happen­
ing in the epistemological realm in disconnection from the ontologi­
cal one. Adorno (pp. 96, 97) sees Kant as "an apologist fo r prima 
philosophy" as “he continued to defend the primacy of form ." And 
Jaspers (The Foundations, p. 309) sees that Kant's knowledge since 
i t  has to  follow the “form" cannot grasp the actual individual in 
its  concrete dimension. C f. Dooyeweerd, 1:50, where Kant is  seen 
understanding re a lity  in a d ua lis tic  pattern.
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and form to  science (timelessness)J
The picture gets more complex, however, in the lig h t of
Kant's claim that time is  one of the forms of the phenomena. Yet
i t  must be remembered that Kant's positing of time as the "formal
2
condition a p rio ri of a l l  phenomena whatsoever" did not deal with 
time in  the realm of reason's dimensionality. Hence, time is  not 
to  be understood, in Kant's in terp retation  of the epistemological 
framework, as replacing the Parmenidean timelessness as the primordial 
presupposition.^
Leaving aside Kant's understanding of the ontological realm
That the form is  the foundation of science is  c lear since 
Kant ( C ritique of Pure Reason, p. 52) says that time and space, which 
are "the two pure forms of sensuous in tu it io n  are also “two sources 
of knowledge, from which, a p r io r i, various synthetical cognitions 
can be drawn. Of th is we find  a s trik in g  example in the cognitions 
of space and its  relations, which form the foundation of pure mathe­
matics" ( ib id . ,  42).
2
Ib id . ,  p. 50.
3
As A risto tle  in terprets  time from the perspective o f a time­
less understanding of Being—from the viewpoint of the s ta tic  "now" 
as "measure of movement," th is  can be seen as he includes time as 
one o f Being's categories (Metaphysics, 5 .7 .4 );  see also p. 91 , n. 
2 above. Kant also in terprets time from the viewpoint o f timeless­
ness, as a formal dimension fo r a ll possible phenomena. Obviously 
time does not affect being ( Critique of Pure Reason, p. 52 ). Time 
in i t s e l f  does not belong to the ontological framework ( ib id . ,  p. 
49 ), but to  the epistemological framework ( ib id . ,  pp. 49, 50). And 
in the epistemological framework i t  is interpreted as being a p r io r i,  
th a t is  to  say, understood to be in disconnection with the sensible 
world, the world of doxa. Time, thus, pertains to the timeless
world of tra d itio n . However, in an in d ire c t way, as he introduces
time in the epistemological framework, Kant is  paving the way for 
the introduction of time in  the ontological framework. This task 
is  done, notably, by Heidegger. Heidegger, in Being .and Time ( In t .  
2 .6 ) ,  points out that Kant's fa ilu re  may be seen in his neglecting 
the problem of Being, his accepting q u ite  dogmatically Descartes' 
position , and following the tra d itio n a l understanding of time.
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from the perspective of the th in g - in - its e lf  J  one can say th a t from
the perspective of reason's structure  Kant conceived the epistemo-
2
logical framework of reason as working in a timeless dimension,
w hile that which would correspond in  his theory to the ontological
framework at least implied a temporal dimension.^ In th is  way,
Kant's theory involved a disruption of the basic correspondence and
unity  that reason's structure requires between its  ontological and
4
epistemological framework.
^See p. 97, nn. 1, 2 above.
2
•This can be seen not only in his in terpretation  of sensib i­
l i t y ,  but also in his in te rp re ta tio n  of in te lle c t  and reason (see p. 
99, n. 1 and p. 100, n. 1 ). G ier c learly  affirm s that "Kant models 
his transcendental logic on A r is to te lic  logic” (p. 46). Cf. Mayer, 
pp. 293, 296. We see, then, th a t the meaning of "object" and 
"objectiv ity" in Kant is the same as the classical one, namely, 
o b jec tiv ity  c a lls  fo r necessity, un iversality , and exactness. 
Besides, Kant in Critique of P rac tica l Reason (p. 123) affirms th a t  
God is timeless; obviously, then, also the ideas of reason should be 
understood as working in a tim eless dimension. Jaspers ( The 
Foundations, p. 284) expresses i t  c learly : [ in  Kant] "the ideas are 
the breach through which the supersensible enters into knowledge.”
2
Sensible in tu it io n , considered as the lim it  for the possi­
b i l i t y  of knowing particu lar concrete individuals, seems to point 
dimly to a temporal primordial presupposition. Dimly, we say, 
because Kant's understanding of the phenomena is expressly disconnec­
ted from the realm of being. Yet, since sensations are originated  
neither in the mind nor in the th in g - in - its e lf ,  the door is s lig h tly  
opened for someone to investigate the origin of the phenomena.
4
In Kant’ s theory there is  unity of meaning. I t  is t r a d i­
tio n a l unity. I t  is  provided by the realm of forms, categories, and 
transcendental ideas. However, since in Kant the epistemological 
framework works in a c lear, tim eless primordial presupposition, and, 
at the same time, the origin o f sensible knowledge, in its  particu ­
la r i t y ,  seems to point to the p o s s ib ility  of a temporal primordial 
presupposition, the complete coherence and unity of meaning are 
threatened. In A ris to te lian  tra d it io n a l reason, as both epistemolog­
ic a l and ontological frameworks worked in the timeless dimension, 
coherence was complete. The temporal aspects of re a lity  were incor­
porated as categories of Being which is said in many ways; see
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With Kant, then, trad itional ontological re fle c tio n  lost 
its  grounding ro le1 while at the same time i ts  basic content provided 
the meaning of the a p rio ri conditions o f reason, namely of the 
in terp re ta tion  of the epistemological framework. In the f in a l analy­
s is , trad itiona l ontology was not denied but rather smuggled in 
through the actual in terpretation  o f the concrete meanings of the
a p r io r i conditions o f knowledge. In th is  way, the tra d it io n  o r ig i­
nated by Parmenides' re flec tio n  on Being as tirseless no-thing reached
its  most developed and sophisticated philosophical expression as
an epistemological framework. Classical timeless Being had given
2
place to classical timeless logos.
A r is to tle  Metaphysics, 4 .2 .4 : " to  6 v u r e r a i  #oAAax«c*“ Reason
cannot work assuming d iffe ren t primordial presuppositions fo r the 
epistemological and ontological frameworks. The primordial presup­
position is the ultim ate ground fo r meaning, coherence, and unity 
which has to condition both frameworks. In Kant, the working 
primordial presupposition is the c lass ica l, timeless one. As the 
part th a t sensible knowledge—of the concrete ind iv idu a l— plays in 
"s c ie n tif ic "  knowledge is  minimal, the disruption th a t his system 
en ta ils  is  also minimal— even imperceptible. We mention i t  because 
la te r  on this disruption becomes more v is ib le , thus playing an impor­
tan t ro le , especially in the theological realm.
1"Taking P lato 's  lin e  as heu ris tic , i t  can be said that Kant 
denies not the power of noesis, but the objective structure which 
is i t s  aim to know” (Derek Kelly, p. 29). See W. H. Walsh, “Kant 
and Metaphysics," Kantstudien 67 (1976):383. This lacking of onto­
logical ground fo r know I edge is perhaps the most re levant way in 
which Kant influences theological thinking which was used through 
Thomism and orthodox Protestantism to the absolute coherence provi­
ded by the timeless ontological foundation of classicism.
^Adorno, speaking about Kant, remarks that he "liquidated  
the question of Being and yet taught prima philosophia, 'foundation' 
(Grundlegung), on any account" (p. 90 ). Henri Bergson says i t  
c le a r ly : "Tiie whole Critique of Pure Reason ends in establishing
th a t Platonism, ille g it im a te  i f  Ideas are things, becomes legitim ate  
i f  Ideas are re lations, and that the ready-made idea, once brought 
down in th is way from heaven to earth, is  in fa c t, as Plato held,
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Kant's theory shaped the structure of reason into the form
which in its  broad lines is followed by modern science. The
epistemological framework is  s t i l l  understood and developed in terms
of timelessness, following the A ris to te lian  idea of “form" as the
general pattern fo r  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  This provides a grounding fo r
the ideals o f exactness and necessity—o b je c tiv ity —that contemporary
natural science seeks in its  investigation o f nature ( Physis) J
At the same time the object to be known is considered to be spatio-
2
temporal, yet with no particu la r ontological implications. The 
resu lt of th is  pattern or model of knowledge ( 1 ogos) is  that objec­
t iv i t y  in p articu la r and knowledge as a whole are understood as per­
ta in ing  only to the spatio-temporal re a lity . But the "s c ie n tif ic  
knowledge" to be reached in regard to these spatio-temporal re a lit ie s  
is at the same time supposed— as a priori condition fo r i t —to be 
"objective," that is  to say, i t  is  supposed to follow  the patterns  
proposed by classical timeless reason, namely, necessity, universal­
i t y ,  and exactness.
the common basis a like  of thought and of nature" (An Introduction
to Metaphysics [London: Macmillan, 1913], pp. 72, 73H
^Jaspers remarks on th is  feature of s c ie n tific  knowledge
by saying that "as we came to know an unfathomable remote re a lity  
accessible only to measurement, the world began at the same time 
in a mysterious way to take on the character of 'appearance' fo r  
us. In the end we were able to take this appearance fo r fu ll  r e a lity
once more, but in such a way th a t now 'tru e ' re a lity  is nowhere.
Every thing is  only a perspective" ( Philosophy of Existence
[Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, l97lJ , ppT 557
67).
2
For the way in which philosophy lost the primacy as ground­
ing science and natural sciences took over, see ib id ., pp. 5 -9 .
This basically  happened because a fte r  Kant the Platonic ideal of
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Yet, Kant's immanentism, which called fo r sensations as the 
indispensable origin fo r  knowledge of re a l ity ,  implied a t least the 
p o s s ib ility  of a d iffe re n t in terpretation  fo r the dim ensionality  
of reason and BeingJ
Jaspers. In Jaspers may be seen a representative of
classical logos in the post-Kantian era. For Jaspers s c ie n tif ic
2
and philosophical knowledge are two d iffe re n t kinds of knowledge.
3
Following Kant, he held that o b jec tiv ity  belongs only to the f i r s t ,
knowledge was considered to be possible only in the realm o f temporal 
nature which is the realm of natural science. In other words, 
through the epistemological framework in  which the idea o f "ob jecti­
v ity "  is  a true a p rio ri of reason's structure the ontological tra d i­
tion  o f Plato and A ris to tle  is kept as determinative as i t  provides 
the ground for the understanding of the a p rio ri o f "o b jec tiv ity"  
as meaning "universality ," "necessity," and "exactness.” (See p. 39, 
n. 1 above.) Thus, what does not f i t  the a p rio ri condition of the 
timeless in terpretation of ob jectiv ity  is  ju s t not knowledge. I t  
belongs to the ind iv idual.
1 Ib id . , p. 94.
2
"For philosophy cannot arise from s c ie n tific  ways of th ink­
ing and sc ien tific  knowledge alone. Philosophy demands a d iffe re n t  
thinking" ( ib id .,  p. 12 ). Yet, we should remember th a t fo r  Jaspers, 
s c ie n tif ic  knowledge is  at the very ground of the understanding of 
the whole, since he sees the flux of meaning going from the part 
to the whole, reversing in that way the ordo of reason’ s structure  
which goes from the whole to the part; see p. 47 , n. 1 above. 
Jaspers says that "the sequence of the three—phenomena, signs, 
ciphers— makes the understanding of each subsequent one dependent 
on the one before. In speaking, therefore, we must use the guide­
lines without which no cipher language becomes rea l: phenomena for 
signs and ciphers, and the signs which illum inate Existenz fo r our 
re la tio n s  to Transcendence" ( Philosophical Faith , p. 95 ). This flu x  
may be better understood i f  one remembers that fo r Jaspers "phenom­
ena" stand for a s c ie n t if ic , conceptual, objective kind o f knowledge; 
and th a t "signs" and "transcendence" stand fo r the "d iffe ren t"  kind 
of knowledge that philosophy requires.
O bjectivity , fo r Jaspers, means what has been explained 
above; see p. 103, n. 2 . Additionally, i t  means the absence of
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while Knowledge o f being corresponds only to the la t te r J  Jaspers'
threefold d iv is ion of reason's a c tiv ity  (also following a Kantian
pattern) considered reason as working through "concepts," "signs," 
2
and "ciphers." Science, which produces and works with concepts, 
provides an exact, necessary, and universal knowledge of what is  
not being but ju s t appearances. Knowledge o f being is (following
"sub jectiv ity" (Philosophy o f Existence, p. 9 ): "Science has in teg­
r i t y  as value-free science." that is why s c ie n tific  experiences 
have "demonstrated the possibi 1 i ty  o f possessing a wholly determined 
and concrete knowledge at any given time" ( ib id . ) .
^"S c ien tific  cognition of things is not cognition of being. 
S c ie n tific  cognition is p articu la rly  concerned with determinate 
objects, not with being its e lf"  ( ib id . ,  p. 10 ). We can see how, 
via Kant, the realm of concrete, individual re a l ity  is not the realm 
of science. Science, according to Jaspers, holds the same Platonic  
ideal o f knowledge. Science is to  provide “exact," "necessary," 
"universal" knowledge of concrete temporal re a l ity .  Here the dis­
ruption between the ontological and epistemological frameworks that 
Kant's theory en ta ils  reaches its  fu l l  expression: temporal, con­
crete, indiv idual re a lity  is  understood in an objective timeless way 
(see p. 101, nn. 3, 4 ) .  An ontological framework— at least 
im p lic it— is  faced in order to produce meaning, in the subject-  
ob ject-re lationsh ip  which is  knowledge, by a timeless epistemological 
framework.
2
"Appearance is described and thought in concepts. Signs 
convey what I am and can be as myself. Transcendent r e a l ity ,  to 
be experienced by Existenz alone, is manifested in ciphers'* (Jaspers, 
The Philosophical Faith, p. 95). So, concepts correspond to Kantian 
concepts w ithin th e ir phenomenal spatio-temporal lim it; that is  to 
say, they re fe r to "appearances." Moreover, to ta lk  about "appear­
ances" already indicates that "appearance" is  not being. Being is  
beyond appearances. This is  another way in which the Platonic time­
less in te rp re ta tio n  of re a lity  appears. Things, which are studied 
by science in an objective, exact way, belong not to the realm of 
being but to the realm of doxa (appearance). "Signs" belong to the 
new kind of knowledge that jaspers suggests fo r  the in terpretation  
of man's being. I t ,  then, corresponds to the Kantian idea of soul. 
"Ciphers" is  the new kind of knowledge th a t Jaspers suggests for 
the understanding of that Being which is  beyond man, that is  for 
the "understanding" of "transcendence." "Transcendence" corresponds 
to the Kantian idea of God.
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Kant again) knowledge of what lies  beyond appearancesJ That is ,  
i t  is  knowledge o f the th in g -in - its e lf .  In th is  context, Jaspers' 
concern was to provide a way in which knowledge could reach the 
ontological realm in  order to provide meaning fo r the ideas of man 
and God.
The basic problem in dealing with the ideas o f man and God
in the classical structure of reason accepted by Jaspers is that
th is structure places them in the realm beyond knowledge. They had
been declared, by Kant's interpretation of the epistemological
?
framework, to be "unknowable.1' However, as both Existence and
Here the meaning of ''appearance" is  the old Platonic one 
which points to doxa as that which is  not being. Cf. Jaspers, 
Philosophy of Existence, pp. 10, 66.
2
Jaspers describes man's access to ontology as a crossing 
from existence in to  Existenz. “Existenz" is the term he has chosen 
to express “the self-being that relates to i ts e lf  and thereby also 
to transcendence from w hich.it knows that i t  has been given to i t s e l f  
and upon which i t  is  grounded" ( ib id . ,  p. 21). And th is  is  a cross­
ing in to  timelessness: " I t  is the leap from everything that can
be experienced in time and can be known timelessly (and therefore  
always remains mere appearance) to real and eternal being i t s e l f  
(which therefore is  not knowable in temporal existence even though 
i t  comes to expression fo r us only in temporal existence)" ( ib id . ,  
p. 25). This las t statement is most interesting fo r  in i t  Jaspers 
himself expresses th a t what we know in the world of appearances is  
temporal—ontological framework—and the way of knowing i t ,  as being 
timeless—epistemological framework; see above, p. 105, n. 1 . On 
the other hand and at the same time, he considers th a t man's real 
being is  “eternal" and unknowable in the realm of appearances (tem­
p o ra lity ) .  I f  Existenz is  not accessible in the realm of time, i t  
obviously belongs to what is not temporal, that is to  say, to time­
lessness. Consequently, Jaspers adds that Existenz is  beyond con­
ceptua lity ; see ib id . ,  p. 22. Conceptuality cannot reach being, 
we are to ld , because " i t  lacks universal v a lid ity "  ( ib id . ,  p. 27). 
“Man is  real only as h is to ric ,"  we are to ld . Yet th is  does not mean 
that we should understand man's being h is to ric a lly — as, fo r  instance, 
in Heidegger—because "the h istorica l and v is ib le  o b je c tiv ity  of 
p artic u la r individuals is  not ERI h is to r ic ity  of Existenz. To 
id e n tify  h is to r ic ity  in the form of the h istorica l p lu ra lity  is to
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Transcendence* were seen by Jaspers as belonging not only to the 
realm beyond "appearances" but also to a c le a r ly  timeless realm,
cause transcendence to disappear into mere w illfu lness" ( ib id . ) .  
I t  is clear then, that according to Jaspers, timeless understanding 
of Existenz, even the meaning of h is to ric ity , must not be understood 
in a temporal h is to rica l way when referred to being.
*Jaspers c learly  considers transcendence to be timeless: 
"This transcendence is to Existenz in trin s ic  being, the cause of 
i ts  own being. I t  is  the Now that has no Before and no A fte r, the 
Now that includes its  own past and future and is  real despite of 
them, the Now that must not be conceived as tim eless, therefore,
but as temporal at the same tim e. The presence o f th is  transcendence 
is not the end o f time. I t  was not in the past, and i t  w il l  not 
be only in the fu tu re . I t  is  now, the Now without anything else 
to come, because nothing is  in  the flux any more and everything is  
eternal" (Philosophy, 3 vols. [Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1971], 3 :51). The Parmenidean pattern is apparent. However, some 
expressions lik e  fo r  instance that the "Now" must be conceived as 
being timeless and temporal a t the same time seem awkward and
deserve some explanation. The fact is that here Jaspers refers  
to time and timelessness as categories in the Kantian sense. As 
categories, time and timelessness can re fer only to objects, but 
not to that which lies  beyond objects, namely, being. See above, 
p. 106, n. 2 .  In order to re fe r to Being, time and timelessness must 
be transformed in to  "ciphers" through d ia lec tics . So transcendence 
is beyond natural re a lity . Time and timelessness belong to natural 
re a lity  as categories fo r i t .  Hence, Transcendence lie s  beyond time 
and timelessness, considered as categories. But when time and time­
lessness are considered as “ciphers," then they "become identical 
as eternity" ( ib id . ,  pp. 51, 5 2 ). I t  is not certa in  what th is "iden­
t ity "  may mean. I t  is not our point e ither. What is  important to
notice is th a t Jaspers is not talking through these expressions 
regarding Being dimensionality as i f  the Being and doxa of Parmenides 
were mixed beyond recognition. What Jaspers is  re a lly  doing when 
he goes beyond time and timelessness as categories is leaving the 
realm of temporal, objective re a lity  to which categories apply and 
entering in to  the realm of timelessness as dimensionality, which 
he calls "e tern ity" and to which, according to the Kantian pattern, 
no objective knowledge can apply. The rest o f the statement is , 
however, c lear enough as pointing to the Parmenidean timeless dimen­
sionality  fo r transcendence. C f. ib id .,  3:21, where Jaspers comments 
that "the paradox o f transcendence lies  in the fa c t that we can grasp 
i t  only h is to r ic a lly  but cannot adequately conceive i t  as being his7 
to ric  i t s e l f ."  What he c le a r ly  rejects is  not the beyond nor the 
timeless dimensionality fo r i t ,  but rather the Platonic d u a lis tic  
ontic objective in terpretation  o f i t .  "The beyond as just another 
re a lity  is an untenable illu s io n " ( ib id . ,  3 :10 ). He further explains
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the Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition appears to have 
conditioned his epistemological frameworkJ
Since Jaspers worked w ith in  the Kantian framework he rejected  
the classical procedure fo r reaching the knowledge of what was sup­
posed to be tim eless, namely, abstraction and analogy. In th is  con­
tex t, Jaspers tr ie d  the d i f f ic u l t  task of overcoming the via negativa
2
in search fo r a positive knowledge of transcendence by replacing
3 4the c lass ica l, analogical procedure with a d ia lectica l one.
that “reason would certa in ly  lik e  to be able to grasp in te lle c tu a lly  
what th is  is  which is before a l l  phenomena, before a ll tim e, before 
a ll  worlds, and which is equally a fte r  a l l  phenomena, and a l l  time 
and a ll worlds—yet which is  re a lly  neither before nor a f te r ,  but 
something in  phenomena, in tim e, in  the world, namely, re a l, unhis- 
to rica l Being i t s e l f .  I t  is  that which does not become, i t  is that 
which is . But reason cannot think i t ;  i t  can only keep i t  undefiled  
by the fa ls e  thinking that would s trive  to enclose i t  in categories, 
images and verbal structures" (Reason and Anti-Reason, p. 47). Cf. 
ib id ., pp. 43, 44. A. L ich tig fe ld , “Jaspers in English: A Failure
Not of Communication but Rather o f Interpretation," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 41 (1980), p. 222, also sees that the real 
dimension of Jasperian inquiry is  "what is timeless throughout time."
^That is  to say, Jaspers adopts the epistemological framework 
in its  Kantian in terp re ta tion . This determines Jaspers' understand­
ing of the ontological framework. See Philosophical F a ith , pp. 94- 
102.
o
The analogical way is c lea rly  rejected by Jaspers. See, 
for instance, ib id . ,  p. 258; c f . pp. 136, 137.
^Since analogy is ruled out and equivocal refers  only to 
concrete individual re a lit ie s , the only way le f t  to overcome the 
via negativa (P latonic chorismos) is to use the via negativa as the 
negation in a d ia lec tic  method that should lead to a new "meaning" 
in what is le f t  when the contraries are brought together. For an 
example of th is  procedure at work, see above, p. 107, n. 1 .
^Jaspers expressly declares that he follows Anselm's tra d i­
tion in believing that the g u lf (Platonic chorismos) th a t lies  
between man and transcendence can be bridged in cog itative  forms 
( ib id .,  p. 256). Of course, such a task c a lls  for a d iffe re n t kind 
of thinking; see Philosophy of Existence, p. 12.
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On one side Jaspers affirmed that knowledge of transcendence
is not possible and so pertains to the realm of "silence"^ and the
2 3"unthinkable." On the other side, he said that Existenz alone
has the necessary "sens itiv ity" to  hear transcendence or to  be in 
touch with i t .  What is  supposed to happen on this level is  a "meta­
physical experience," "a real personal involvement," which "makes 
being transparent in existence." I t  is  not "thoughtless"; on the 
contrary, the experience of being includes “thought." Yet, since 
what happens at th is  level "implies a translation of being from mere
4
existence into e te rn ity , which is beyond knowing," what is  actually  
reached is  not an understanding. Yet i t  is  the basis of a l l  under­
standing.^
1 Jaspers, Philosophical F a ith , p. 125.
2
"Unable, in my thinking, to hold fast to a thought o f trans­
cendence, I must, in the same th inking, void the things I have 
thought. This is what happens in transcending from the thinkable  
to the unthinkable" (Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:34).
3
Existenz is  understood not as pertaining to the dimension 
of tem porality but to timelessness; see p. 106, n. 2 above. Existenz, 
is in  the same dimension as transcendence and so i t  is  possible fo r  
i t  to  get in touch with transcendence at least in some way, since 
transcendence is wholly other than Existenz. Cf. Oswald 0 . Schrag, 
Existence, Existenz, and Transcendence: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne
University Press, 1971), p. 8 ; Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:113; Philoso­
phical F a ith , p. 125.
4Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:114.
^Sinee Jaspers himself is here try ing to express in  objective  
th inking—which is  the only level in which knowledge is  possible 
at a l l  (Philosopnical Fa ith , p. 92)—what is unthinkable, the analy­
s is , and especially the explanation o f the realm of transcendence 
becomes very complex. Jaspers explains what "happens" in  the "meta­
physical experience" as follows: " I f  a not-knowing was the negative
lim it  o f my experience o f a mundane thing, of l i f e  and thought as
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After the “metaphysical experience" has occurred, man wants 
to convey the content of that “f u l f i l l i n g . ”  ^ This has to be done 
in knowledge, the only realm in  which communication is possible;
hence i t  has to  be done through o b jec tifica tio n s  of that o rig ina l
2
“fu lf illm e n t."  This is done as the philosopher “reads the o rig ina l 
cipher script by writing a new one" 3 through analogy. Yet, because 
a fte r  Kant analogy was no longer possible, Jaspers believed that 
the only way o f being “more accurate" in our meanings as we ta lk  
of “unthinkable transcendence" was to press the negative way a l i t t l e  
fu rth e r than trad itio n a l metaphysics did. Now the v ia  negativa was 
conceived as applicable to the very idea of e n tity  or o b je c tiv ity , 
but not to its  timeless re a lity .  This gives place to what Jaspers 
called  the "turnabout”  ^ in philosophical th inking, expressed in the
such, th is  becomes now a f u l f i l le d  not-knowing as I  return to present 
sensory re a lity "  (Philosophy, 3 :114 ). So, from a cognitive view­
po in t, what happens in the encounter is  to be seen as a " fu lf i l l in g "  
of "not-knowledge." That is to  say, a fte r the encounter with trans­
cendence or more properly w ith the "language of transcendence" 
( ib id . ,  p. 113), we s t i l l  have no knowledge; however, we have some­
thing “new” coming from i t ,  namely, " fu lf i l l in g ."
^See above.
2
This happens in manifold ways. Some ob jectification s are
"concrete" or "em pirical,” as, fo r  instance, in  mythology, and some 
are "abstract," as in tra d itio n a l ontology. See ib id .,  3:115-119; 
c f. Schrag, pp. 228-30.
3Ib id ., 3:117.
^This shows that Jaspers denies P la to 's  in terpretation  of
timelessness as im ita tio  of temporal e n tit ie s . See above, p. 107,
n. 1 . Jaspers’ denial is to  be considered as a step back in to
Parmenides’ interpretation o f timelessness. Jaspers' approach may 
be considered a more detailed expression of what a timeless being is .
^Jaspers, Philosophical F a ith , p. 77. This is bas ica lly  
the new perspective that Jaspers suggests fo r  philosophical thought.
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transformation of ontological concepts in to  “ciphers of transcen­
dence."^
This “turnabout," which Jaspers' acceptance of the tra d itio n  
via Kant demanded in order fo r trad itio n a l philosophical understand­
ing of reason to  survive in  a post-Kantian era,im plied a re in te rp re -
2
tation of ontology and metaphysics. I t  was claimed that there is
3
a ground fo r  them in the "metaphysical experience” or " fu lfillm en t."
However, knowledge, even though s t i l l  having an "ontological ground"
as tra d itio n a l philosophy required but which Kant ignored, had lost
4
the basis fo r  its  o b jec tiv ity  as philosophical thinking. Hence, 
philosophical thinking in i ts  new mode o f "ciphers" was supposed 
to work in the hypothetical realm and under the changeable influence 
of the h is to ric  situation from which existence goes to transcendence
I t  is not a denial of tra d itio n a l abstraction; on the contrary, i t  
is rather i ts  further expression because in  i t  the v ia  negativa 
requires not only that what is  concrete, temporal, and individual 
be excluded from knowledge, but the idea o f en tity  or o b je c tiv ity  
i ts e lf  is  to be excluded too. This rad ical timeless abstraction  
is the "basic operation" which "would tempt us with statements of 
a knowledge i f  i ts  underlying sense of non-objectiveness did not 
constantly control our speech and thinking" ( ib id . ) .
^"The great step in which man transforms himself occurs when 
the supposed corporeality of Transcendence is  given up as deceptive 
and the ambiguous cipher language is heard instead—when the contents 
that have been conceived and visualized are stripped of objective  
re a lity . Instead of tangibles there remain ciphers open to 
in f in ite ly  varied interpretation" ( ib id . ,  p. 92).
2 Ib id . ,  p. 201.
3See above, p. 109, n. 5.
4
O b jectiv ity  s t i l l  exists in i ts  trad itio n a l Greek-Kantian 
way applying to the realm of temporal empirical re a lit ie s .
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for its  " fu lfillm e n t"  and to which i t  returns to express i t J
The logos—the epistemological framework—was s t i l l  the same 
tra d itio n a l timeless one. I t  determined what s c ie n tif ic  “objective" 
knowledge was supposed to be, and i t  also determined what ontological 
knowledge could be. Objective spatio-temporal knowledge was in te r­
preted by applying the A risto te lian  "form" to the in terpretation  
of the epistemological framework fo r s c ie n tific  meanings. This pro­
vided the ground fo r the in terpretation  of "o b jec tiv ity"  i ts e lf  and 
conferred the characteristics of un iversa lity  and necessity to objec­
t iv e  s c ie n tif ic  knowledge. At the same time, however, s c ie n tific  
knowledge was considered as happening in  the realm o f parmenidean 
doxa, since o b jec tiv ity  dealt with temporal appearances and not with 
Being i t s e l f .
Ontological knowledge was also timeless. But now the
In trad itio n a l philosophy, fo r  instance, in Thomas Aquinas, 
man is considered to have the power of "going out" of nature—time— 
and reaching transcendence. Transcendence is  thought, add itionally ,
to be in the realm of being, that is ,  in the realm of e n tit ie s  which
are the ground of o b jec tiv ity . And, as knowledge pertains precisely 
to th is realm of timeless o b je c tiv itie s , when man comes back from his 
cognitive encounter with transcendence, he is able to  express the 
concepts and meanings reached in propositions which have objective
and certa in  value as knowledge because they have ground in the
knowledge of re a lity  i t s e l f ,  namely, timeless being as e n tity . On 
the contrary, fo r Jaspers, man ju s t does not "go out of" nature- 
Transcendence is present in time. So the encounter, even though 
happening in  a timeless dimension, is  not a contact w ith the super­
natural. Additionally, transcendence which is present as timeless­
ness in time is not an en tity . Consequently, i t  does not render 
knowledge but rather "non-cognitive fu lf i l lm e n t."  When man wants to 
express such a fu lf illm e n t he has to do i t  in knowledge. There is  no 
other realm for expressing and communicating i t .  As no knowledge is 
brought from the encounter with transcendence, the cognitive 
expression is ,  in its  content, not originated in transcendence or the 
encounter but completely in the h is to rica l s ituation  from which the 
subject "goes out to" and "comes back from" transcendence.
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object—ontological re a lity —was considered to  be timeless while  
the knowledge we may atta in  o f i t  was considered to be temporal. 
The tra d itio n a l timeless logos—a fte r  Kant's re in terp re ta tion  of 
i t —determined that our knowledge of timeless re a lity —transcen­
dence—cannot be objective. So ontological knowledge was “timeless" 
regarding its  re fe ren t, but temporal regarding i ts  actual content. 
And the relevance o f the temporal content was determined by timeless 
logos. In other words, temporal logos was the realm of Parmenidean 
doxa, of "mere" appearances which not only are not in touch with  
th e ir  referent but are to be seen in  detachment from "o b je c tiv ity ,"  
the last remnant of c lassica l, epistemological timelessness in  scien­
t i f i c  knowledge. In short, s c ie n tif ic  knowledge was knowledge of 
spatio-temporal re a lit ie s  (appearances, Parmenidean doxa) because 
of the Kantian in terpretation  o f the c lassica l epistemological 
framework in an A risto te lian  tra d it io n . Ontological knowledge, on 
the contrary, was knowledge of timeless r e a l ity  which can only be 
reached in the temporal dimensionality (Parmenidean doxa) and so 
i t  can only render a changeable, hypothetical, individual meaning.
The concrete result of th is  in terp re ta tion  of the epistemolog­
ical framework was, then, that objective knowledge pertained only 
to the realm of the sciences, while philosophical knowledge was to 
play in the realm of meaning a re la t iv e , in d ire c t, changeable, sub­
jec tive  function as a "pointer" to transcendence.
Consequently, while both ontological and relig ious knowledge 
move in the realm of what Jaspers called the "subject-object s p lit"  
(the level of o b je c tiv ity ), th e ir  contents cannot have an “objective"
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ground. The ground fo r th e ir  contents, then, is shifted from the 
object--which is  unreachable ju s t because i t  is  no-object— to the
subjectJ This entails  a re in terp re ta tion  o f both tra d itio n a l onto-
2 3logical and theological contents.
Jaspers rejects the charge that his position en ta ils  subjec­
tivism; see ib id . ,  pp. 80, 81. He affirm s th a t “fa ith "  is  not just 
a subjective f i l l in g  with no referent or ground a t a l l .  The referent 
is transcendence with which Existenz does get in touch, in  a non- 
cognitive metaphysical experience though. We can see that his posi­
tion is  not "subjectivism" in the sense of not being “groundless," 
as i f  transcendence were nothing. The " fu lfillm e n t"  reached in the 
"encounter" is  the "certain" ground of fa ith .  Yet i t  is  a non- 
cognitive ground, and we are concerned w ith  knowledge. Knowledge, 
according to Jaspers, refers  always to objects. I t  is  impossible 
fo r i t  to reach transcendence. Thus, as man refers to transcendence 
in knowledge as “ciphers o f transcendence," the meaning o f them 
springs from th e ir  objective referents which exist in tim e. The 
selection o f knowledge, then, is  determined neither by non-cognitive 
transcendence nor by objective e n tit ie s . I t  is  determined by the 
subject, who selects the "more appropriate" meanings at his disposal 
and then provides them with the function of pointers. What is  impor­
tant is not the actual meaning o f ciphers, but rather th e ir  function 
as pointers. The meaning is  irre leva n t, since i t  never reaches 
transcendence. The meaning of ciphers is  then subjective. D ifferen t 
subjects may choose d iffe re n t expressions which may appear, from 
a cognitive point of view, contradictory. This ju s t shows, in 
Jaspers' understanding, th a t beyond them, as they suppress each other 
in th e ir  meaning, lie s  unreachable and unknowable transcendence. 
As ciphers lose the ir meaning in the d ia le c tic a l procedure, they 
reach th e ir  "pointer" function which is the only possible language 
we can reach o f transcendence.
2 Ib id . , p. 201.
"Children w ill receive ciphers with deep fee ling , lik e  fa iry  
tales where the question of re a lity  or u n rea lity  does not ye t clearly  
arise, and th e ir  impact on the adult is  not lost even when they 
unequivocally cease to be re a lit ie s  fo r him. Tales of an act of 
God, of d ivine event, of a man who is  more than human, endure as 
ciphers. Their re a lity  is  voided, and yet as ciphers they retain  
a voice. . . .  Do such concepts mean a weakening of revelation?  
They certa in ly  change i ts  meaning; as a cipher i t  is  no longer what 
the believer in revelation meant i t  to be. In any case, the theo­
logian would be distinguished from the philosopher by the potency 
of his unfolding of the cipher. . . . The paradox seems inescapable: 
the contents o f revelations would become more pure, more true, i f






The re fle c tio n  on time in  general and as a primordial pre­
supposition in p a rtic u la r appeared rather la te  in  the history of
philosophy.^ Kant seems to have set the stage, so to speak, fo r
2
th is appearance. Kant's system provided the ground not only fo r
continuity with tra d itio n a l epistemology in the s c ie n tific  era but 
also for d iscontinu ity  from and c ritic ism  of tra d itio n a l
th e ir  re a lity  were discarded. The re a lity  as such would turn in to  a 
cipher of the presence of God, lending an extraordinary weight to the 
contents" ( ib id . ,  p. 340). Jaspers then goes on remarking that fa ith  
would "undergo a metamorphosis" which "under the conditions of our 
time, of its  new knowledge and i ts  new world situation . . . would 
occur in line with the nature of things. Not the substance, but the 
appearance in consciousness would change. Philosophy and theology 
would be on the road to reunification" ( ib id . ) .  In our second chapter 
we come back to th is  structure of reason and the way i t  is considered 
to work in theology.
^Our p a rtic u la r task is  to  show time as a working primordial 
presupposition in philosophy. We have no time to deal with the 
related issue of tim e's meaning. Yet, as we deal with time as 
primordial presupposition the search for time's meaning is en lig h t­
ened. A basic knowledge of the history of the in terpretation  of the 
meaning of time is ,  however, indispensable fo r an accurate under­
standing of the ro le  time is  supposed to play as primordial 
presupposition. A very clear analysis of the main interpretations  
that the idea o f time has received throughout the history of philos­
ophy may be found in F r itz  Guy's "Man and His Time: Three Contem­
porary Theological Interpretations" (Ph.D. d issertation , University  
of Chicago, 1971), pp. 6-108.
p
Time is  central for Kant's theory on the schematism of con­
cepts. Heidegger in  Being and Time points out that Kant is  "the 
f i r s t  and only person who has gone any stretch o f the way towards 
investigating the dimension of tem porality or has even le t  himself be 
drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves" ( In t .  2 .6 ) .  
See p. 100, n. 3.
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timelessnessJ From the viewpoint o f the history o f philosophy,
epistemological c ritic ism  preceded and paved the way fo r  re flec tion
on the dimensionality of Being and reason.
Because of his insightful epistemological analysis and his
2
d irect influence on contemporary philosophical c ritic is m , Edmund 
Husserl may be regarded as the one who introduced time in to  episte­
mological re flec tio n , and through epistemology in to  ontology.
A classical expression of th is  c ritic ism  is  provided by F. 
Nietzsche who renders a summary of his critic ism  in four propo­
sitions . “F irs t proposition. The reasons fo r which 'th is ' world has 
been characterized as 1 apparent’ are the very reasons which indicate  
its  re a lity ;  any other kind of re a lity  is absolutely indemonstrable. 
Second proposition. The c r ite r ia  which have been bestowed on the 
‘true being* of things are c r ite r ia  of not-being, of naught; the 
'true  world' has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual 
world: indeed an apparent world insofar as i t  is  merely a
m oral-optical illu s io n . Third proposition. To invent fables about a 
world 'o ther' than th is  one has no meaning at a l l ,  unless an instinc t 
of slander, detraction, and suspicion against l i f e  has gained the 
upper hand in us: in th a t case we avenge ourselves against l i f e  with
a phantasmagoria of 'another,' a 'b e tte r ' l i f e .  Fourth proposition. 
Any d istinction  between 'tru e ' and an 'apparent' world--whether m  
the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant ( in  the end, an 
underhanded C h ris tia n )--is  only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom 
of the decline of l i f e .  That the a r t is t  esteems appearance higher 
than re a l ity  is no objection to th is  proposition. For 'appearance' in 
th is  case means r e a l ity  once more, only by way of selection, 
reinforcement, and correction" (""Twilight of the Id o ls ,” in The 
Portable Nietzsche, ed. Halter Kaufmann [New York: The Viking Press,
I954J, p. 4841. Cf. ib id .,  pp. 479-81; Adorno, pp. 87, 88- P e ro tti, 
pp. 37-41, comments on Nietzsche's c ritic ism  and its  influence on 
Heidegger. On the c ritic ism  of tra d itio n a l timelessness, see among 
others, Kenneth Chandler, "Dewey's Phenomenology of Knowledge," 
Philosophy Today 21 (19771:43-53 passim; G ier, p. 47; Adorno, pp. 
77-103; Rosenthal, p. 214; Carl Raschke, “The New Cosmology and the 
Overcoming of Metaphysics," Philosophy Today 24 (19801:379; and 
P e ro tti, p. 39.
2
Jean Paul Sartre sat in his classes during a year, and 
Heidegger was his personal assistant at Freiburg during several 
years; see Lauer, p. 163, n. 1. Obviously re flec tio n  on time along 
Husserl’ s line has its  antecedents; among them we must remember Franz
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Husserl's thought is widely known as a transcendental idealism^ which
2
at f i r s t  glance seems to lead to solipsism. Upon further re fle c ­
tion, however, Husserl's epistemological c ritic ism  seems to point 
rather toward the ontological realm and to a temporal h istorica l
4
understanding of its  dimensionality. According to Husserl, the
Brentano, Henry Bergson, W. D ilthey, and Collingwood. Regarding
Husserl's paramount place in contemporary philosophy see Lauer, 
p. 163.
^Husserl's transcendental idealism is  expressed at the very 
beginning of his Ideas: “Posited as real (w irk lich ), I am now no
longer a human Ego *n the universal, e x is te n tia lly  posited world,
but exclusively a subject fo r  which th is  world has being, and purely, 
indeed, as that which appears to me, is  presented to me, and o f which
I am conscious in some way or other, so that the real being of the 
world thereby remains unconsidered, unquestioned, and its  v a lid ity  
le ft  out of account" (p . 14). I t  seems clear that in th is  in i t ia l  
stage Husserl pays respects to Kant. Knowledge deals with phenomena. 
The realm of Being is  to be seen, according to Husserl, as 
“bracketed." James J. Valone, "Conflicts in the Later Husserl's 
Ontology and Theory of Knowledge," Proceedings of the American Catho­
lic  Philosophical Association 51 l 1 9 7 /):21b, c r itic ize s  Husserl's 
procedure because i t  severs Togic from Being.
2
Lauer explains th a t Husserl’ s phenomenological reduction 
has three main steps. F ir s t ,  i t  reduces a l l  beings to a correlate  
of consciousness. Second, i t  reduces phenomenal being to the state 
of being g iv e n - in - its e lf . And th ird , i t  reduces a ll knowledge to 
a systematized whole. We should bear in  mind, however, that Husserl, 
at th is  point, is  not developing an ontological analysis as Descartes 
did. Husserl (Cartesian Meditations, 2.18) points out rather that
knowledge stands by i t s e l f .  Knowledge is not in need of assuming 
something from "outside" i ts  realm as Kant's th in g -in - its e lf  seemed 
to suggest: "The 'o b je c t' of consciousness, the object as having
identity  'w ith i t s e l f '  during the flowing subjective process, does 
not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, i t  is 
included as a sense in the subjective process its e lf"  ( ib id . ) .  
Lauer (p . 145) add ition a lly  notes the fac t that Husserl belongs to 
the em piric ist tra d itio n  o f philosophy.
^See Lauer, pp. 147, 170; and Adorno, p. 101.
4
Against tra d itio n a l in terpretation  Being is seen as belong­
ing to the realm of appearances, namely, to Parmenidean doxa. 
Husserl puts i t  in the following way: "On broad lines we can always
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temporal h is to rica l world of Parmenidean doxa, the Lebenswelt, “pro­
vides the materials with which consciousness deals.
What was im p lic it and undeveloped in Husserl's approach was 
brought in to  sharp focus and c a re fu lly  analyzed by Martin Heidegger, 
notably in  Being and Time. Heidegger consciously addressed the realm 
of the primordial presupposition, and he provided, over against 
the Parmenidean tra d itio n , a temporal understanding and in te rp re ta ­
tion  of i t . ^  Heidegger conceived and expressed the foundations of
see that transcendent Being in general, whatever i ts  genus may be, 
when understood as Being for an Ego, can become a datum only in  a way 
analogous to that in which a thing is  given, thus only through 
appearances. Otherwise i t  would re a lly  be a Being which could also 
become immanent; whereas what is  immanently perceivable is th is  and 
nothing more. Only when we f a l l  in to  the confusions we have in d i-  
cated above, and have now cleared up, can we hold i t  possible that 
one and the same could at one time be given through appearance, in 
the form of transcendent perception, and at another through immanent 
perception" (Ideas, p. 138). C f. Cartesian Meditations, 2 .17, and 
18. However, i t  seems that Husserl's burden was on the epistemologi- 
cal side of reason's structure, hence he did not take fu ll  advantage 
of his discovery of the Lebenswelt. See Valone, pp. 212-18, who 
further explains how Husserl'$  thinking moved from transcendentalism 
toward time and history.
^Valone, p. 213. See also Farley, p. 503; and David Carr, 
Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl's
Transcendental Philosophy ttvanston: Northwestern Press, 1974). Lari
Taylor I"Lebenswelt and Lebensformen: Husserl and Wittgenstein on
the Goal and Method of Philosophy," Human Studies 1 [1978]:191) 
develops a c ritic ism  of what he considers Husserl's absolutization of 
history.
2
See p. 68, nn. 2, 3 above; and p. 69, nn. 1; p. 70, nn. 1, 
2; p. 71, nn. 1 , 2  above.
^“Our aim in the following tre a tis e  is  to  work out the ques­
tion of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provi­
sional aim is  the Interpretation o f time as the possible horizon fo r  
any understanding whatsoever of ffeing" ( Being and Time, 
prologue).
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a temporal understanding of the dimensionality of Being*--and 
reason.^
In order to make his point o f view clear regarding his onto­
logical stance in Being and Time, Heidegger explains himself in the 
following way: “For tn is  reason the tre a tis e  which sought to point
the way back into the ground of metaphysics did not bear the t i t l e  
'Existence and Time,' nor 'Consciousness and Time,' but Being and 
Time. Nor can th is t i t l e  be understood as i f  i t  were p a ra lle l to  
the customary juxtapositions of Being and Becoming, Being and Seem­
ing, Being and Thinking, or Being and Ought. For in  a l l  these cases 
Being is  lim ited, as i f  Becoming, Seeming, Thinking, and Ought did 
not belong to Being, although i t  is obvious that they are not nothing 
and thus belong to Being. In Being and Time, Being is  not something 
other than Time: 'Time* is called the f i r s t  name o f the tru th  of
Being, and this tru th  is  the presence of Being and thus Being i ts e lf"  
("The Way Back," pp. 213, 214). Heidegger was already expressing 
the tem porality of Being fo r he declared that "the fundamental 
ontological task of interpreting Being as such includes working 
out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problem­
atic  o f Temporality the question o f the meaning of Being w il l  f i r s t  
be concretely answered" ( In t .  2 .5 ) .  Hence, his much referred to 
analysis of Dasein as "Care Structure" (Beinp and Time, 1 .6 .41; and 
2 .5 .74) is  to be understood both as standing on, as an expression 
of temporal Being; c f. "Letter on Humanism," p. 281, regarding the 
way temporal understanding of Being determines the meaning o f p h il­
osophical terms, even of the famous Sartrian phrase on the superiority  
of ex is ten tia  over essentia, ( ib id . ,  p. 280). This position is  not 
changed in what is known as the " la te r  Heidegger" or Heidegger a fte r  
Being and Time. Heidegger comments on his work a fte r Being and Time, 
p a rtic u la rly  regarding his l i t t l e  book On Time and Being (New York: 
Harper 4 Row, 1972), whose t i t l e  seems to suggest a reversal from 
his e a r l ie r  work. He c learly  points out that “th is  reversal is  not 
a change from the standpoint of Sein und Z e it , but in i t  the intended 
thought fo r the f i r s t  time attains the place of the dimension from 
which ’Being and Time' is  experienced; and, indeed, experienced from 
the basic experience of Being." ("Letter on Humanism," p. 280). Cf. 
Heidegger, Foreword to Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought
by W illiam  J. Richardson I The Hague: Martinus N ijh o ff, 1974), p. 2t);
W. J . Richardson, Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought,
p. 63!#; and P ero tti, p. /b . we see, y e t, that Heidegger’ s proposal 
regarding Being as pertaining to Parmenidean doxa is  so revolu­
tionary that often philosophers are unable to foi low him, and, conse­
quently, in terpret his thought as a "new" approach which moves along 
the lin e  of Parmenidean primordial presupposition. These may be 
challenged. See, fo r instance, J . M arita in , The Ranpe of Reason, 
p. 9; Pasquale Orlando, "L'esperienza In te lle tt iv a  tom ista," p. 23 /; 
Cornelius Ernst, "Metaphor and Ontology in ’ Sacra D o ctrina ',"  Thomist 
38 (1974) :424; Anthony M. Camele, "Time in Merleau-Ponty ancT
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What this new temporality means may be seen from several 
angles in  Heidegger's p ro lif ic  work. Because of space lim ita tions , 
I deal here with only two of them which are in my opinion founda­
tio n a l, namely phenomenology and h is to r ic a lity  ( G eschichtlichkeit) .  
A temporal primordial presupposition is  already a t work as Heidegger 
expresses his understanding of phenomenology as the method fo r  his 
ontological investigation. Through the understanding and application  
of th is  method, Heidegger's in terp retation  of Being's dimensionality 
determines the meaning of his philosophy as a whole. Since Being 
is  temporal, there is  no Platonic-Kantian th in g -in - its e lf  beyond 
the phenomena. The realm of beings and Being is the realm of appear­
ances. The realm of Parmenidean doxa is the realm of Being. The 
analysis of logos, then, as a whole (including i ts  dimensionality 
as well as its  ontological and epistemological frameworks) is  an 
enterprise to be developed w ithin the temporal dimensionality J
Heidegger," Philosophy Today 19 (1975):268, n. 39; Sisto Cartechini, 
"Pensiero di Heidegger e Teologia," Doctor Communis 31 (1978):409; 
and T. Langan, “H is to r ic ity  and Metaphysics,1' Proceedings o f the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 (1 9 /4 ) : id.
2
Heidegger's concern is  c le a rly  ontological; see The Essence 
of Reasons, p. 45. Yet, as “thinking" and "Being” belong together 
(see pi 35, n. 3) both are seen as pertaining to the temporal 
dimensionality. A dditionally , the center of meaning proceeds from 
the ontological framework; see p. 36, nn. 1-4; p. 37, nn. 1 -3 . In  
other words, even though Heidegger's concern is not d irec tly  as 
epistemological as ours, his re flec tions on time and Being have a 
foundational bearing fo r the realm of reason's primordial presupposi­
tio n .
^Heidegger goes beyond Husserl's idealism and transforms 
phenomenology into the tool fo r ontology i ts e l f ;  see Heidegger, 
Foreword to Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought, p. x iv . In
Being and Time Heidegger explains his ontological understanding of 
phenomenology: "Phenomenology is  our way of access to what is  to
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Furthermore, the ideas of time and temporality themselves 
are understood by Heidegger in a d iffe re n t way, namely a temporal
be the theme of ontology, and i t  is our way of giving i t  demonstra­
tive  precision. Only as phenomenology is  ontology possible. In the 
phenomenological conception of ' phenomenon' what one has in  mind as 
that which shows i t s e l f  is the Being of e n t it ie s , its  meaning, its  
modifications and derivatives. And th is  showing-itself is  not just 
any showing-itself, nor is i t  some such thing as appearing. Least of 
a l l  can the Being of e n titie s  ever be anything such that 'behind i t '  
stands something else 'which does not appear'. 'Behind' the 
phenomena o f phenomenology there is essen tia lly  nothing else; on the 
other hand, what is  to become a phenomenon can be hidden" ( In t .  
2 .7 .c ). This "hiddenness" o f the phenomenon is  of course a temporal 
historical "hiddenness." In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger 
explains that " i t  was the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was 
declared to be mere appearance and thus degraded. At the same time, 
being, as idea, was exalted to a suprasensory realm. A chasm, 
chorismos, was created between the merely apparent essent here below 
and the real being somewhere on high. In that chasm C h ris tian ity  
settled down, at the same time re in terp reting  the lower as the 
created and the higher as the creator" (p . 106). Heidegger ( ib id .,  
pp. 98-101) goes back to the original meaning of appearance and Being 
in early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. He sees there that " fo r Greeks 
stan d in g -in -itse lf was nothing other than standing-there, standing- 
in -th e -lig h t. Being means appearing. Appearing is not something 
subsequent that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is the very 
essence of Being" ( ib id . ,  p. 101). And of course, "appearance is 
historical and i t  is  history" ( ib id . ,  p. 105). Yet, Heidegger sees 
himself discovering a realm unknown so fa r ,  namely, the realm of the 
ground of Being. Because he does not see the "spontaneity of the 
subject" working in  the understanding of the ground of Being, he is 
unable to distinguish between his temporal in terpretation  of the 
ground of Being and the dimensionality i t s e l f  o f the ground o f Being. 
Consequently, he in terprets  Greek philosophy as a "necessary" step 
in the history of the forgottenness o f Being ( ib id . ,  p. 114). 
Moreover, even though Heidegger recognizes Parmenides’ unique ro le in 
the history of philosophy ( ib id . ,  p. 96), he does not reach the 
ground of Being but only a d istortion  of i t  when a part of Being, 
namely, the Present, is  taken fo r the whole; see below, p. 125, nn. 
1, 5. Nonetheless, phenomenology helps Heidegger to "destroy"
trad itional metaphysics; see "Letter on Humanism," p. 281; c f. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975),
pp. 229-39; idem, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University
of California Press”  19/6), p. 138; Camele, p. 265; and L ich tig fe ld , 
p. 219. In  contemporary philosophy, however, Heidegger does not 
stand alone in his expression of the temporal primordial presupposi­
tion from the angle of the unity of Being and Appearance. Jean-Paul 
Sartre (Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology
[New YorlT* Pocket Books, I966J, p. x l v i i ) also expresses Ene
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way. Time is no longer interpreted from the viewpoint of timeless­
ness— as tra d itio n a lly  since A ris to tle — but rather from its  very
flu x , which is disclosed in an ontological analysis of Dasein^ (the
2
ontological framework in its  f lu x ). The in terp re ta tion  of Dasein
in the f lu x  of time eventually leads one to grasp Being as h is to r i-
c a l i ty .  In h is to r ic a lity  the depth and breadth of the temporal p r i -
3
mordial presupposition is  expressed.
temporal primordial presupposition from the phenomenological perspec­
t iv e  o f the id e n tific a tio n  of Being and appearance—denying in th is  
way completely the Platonic-Kantian th in g - in - its e lf .  See also 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1962)1 ppl v ii-x v ; cT. A. De Waelhens, Une 
Philosophie de V'ambiguite: L’existentialism e de Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty (Louvain: Publications U n iversitaires de Louvain, 1 9 5 1 ) ,  p.
3 9 1 ; and Remy C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau- 
Ponty (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1 9 6 3 ) ,  p. 120. Also,
in Merelau-Ponty's case his understanding of phenomenology points to  
a temporal understanding of Being, see Alphonso L ing is, Foreword to  
The V is ib le  and the Invisib le by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. x lix ;  and Kwant, p. 105.
^"Dasein" (being-there) is  a technical term that Heidegger 
uses to re fer to the en tity  that man is . "Dasein" expresses the 
concrete, factual, individual re a lity  of man as ex is ten t.
2
Obviously i t  is impossible fo r us to provide even an 
abridged introduction to Heidegger’ s in terp re ta tion  of Dasein’ s 
structure as i t  is  given to us in the flux o f time. Temporality 
as dimensionality requires that the in terp re ta tion  o f Dasein should 
fo llow  the "being-in-the-world" structure (Being and Time, 1 .2 .12 , 
13), which is to be complemented and completed by the structure of 
Care: "The form ally existentia l to ta l i ty  of Dasein’ s ontological
s tructu ra l whole must therefore be grasped in the following struc­
ture: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itse lf-B eing-a lready-in -
(the-w orld) as Being-alongside (e n tit ie s  encountered w ith in -the- 
w orld). This Being f i l l s  in the significance o f the term * care1 
[Sorge], which is  used in a purely ontologico-existential manner" 
( ib id . ,  1 .6 .41 ). This quotation represents the summary of Heidegger's 
long analysis which precedes i t .  This is  one of the most care fu lly  
developed treatments o f the temporal ontological framework so fa r .
^Heidegger arrives at h is to rica l i ty  toward the end of Being 
and Time. H is to r ic a lity  is basically  a property of Dasein ( ib id . ,
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This temporality implies a very particu la r re la tio n  to tra d i-
1 2 tional philosophy. B r ie f ly , i t  e n ta ils  the "destruction11 and
3
"overcoming" of metaphysics. (And because o f the onto-theo-logical
2 .5 .7 3 ). He clearly states that "the in terp re ta tion  of Dasein's 
h is to rica l i ty  w ill prove to be, at bottom, ju s t a more concrete work­
ing out o f temporality" ( ib id . ,  2 .5 .7 4 ) .  And as Heidegger unfolds 
his in te rp re ta tion  we can see how Dasein is  in a structure from which 
meaning flows to him. This structure springs from tem porality and 
stands on i t .  Heideggers in terp retation  may be appreciated at least 
in a n u tshe ll, when he links h is to rica l i t y  with Destiny [ Geschick] : 
" If  fa te fu l Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentia lly  in 
3eing-with-others, i ts  h istorizing  is  co -h istoriz ing  and is  determin­
ative fo r  i t  as destiny [Geschick] .  This is how we designate the 
h is to riz in g  of the community, of a people. Destiny is  not something 
that puts i ts e lf  together out of ind iv idual fates, any more than 
Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of 
several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in  advance, in 
our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness 
for d e fin ite  p o s s ib ilit ie s . Only in communicating and in struggling 
does the power of destiny become fre e . Dasein■s fa te fu l destiny in 
and w ith its  ■generation1 goes to make up the fu l l  authentic his­
to riz ing  o f Dasein" ( ib id . ) .  In short, temporality receives its  more 
comprehensive and deep meaning in h is to ric a l i ty ;  c f. Heidegger, The 
Question of Being, p. 87; P ero tti, pp. 13, 35; and Reiser, p. 475. 
TE seems that Heidegger considers th a t neither existentialism  
(Sartre) nor phenomenology (Husserl) are able to reach the level 
where tem porality becomes historical i t y  see "Letter on Humanism," pp. 
281, 287. This evaluation, in our understanding, seems to f i t  
Jaspers existentia lism . I t  is d i f f ic u l t  to see, however, how i t  may 
apply to  S a rtre^  existentialism  which turns toward Marxism. Perhaps 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty express h is to ric a l i ty  in a d iffe ren t way 
from the one chosen by Heidegger.
V o r  Heidegger, metaphysics, which needs to be overcome, is
that philosophical re flec tio n  that ta lk s  o f beings as beings from the
viewpoint of what he ca lls  "unconcealedness." That is  of the 
isolated s ta tic  Present dimension of tim e. The grounding flux  is 
forgotten (concealedness). This fa te fu l situation determines the 
history o f the oblivion o f Being which runs from Plato to Nietzsche, 
according to Heideggers in terpretation; see "The Hay Back," p. 210; 
and P e ro tt i, p. 12.
p
For Heideggers claim of destruction, see Being and Time, 
In t. 2 .6 ; c f. "Letter on Humanism," p. 281; and P e ro tti, 11.
^"Metaphysics remains the basis o f philosophy. The basis of
thinking, however, i t  does not reach. When we think of the truth
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structure of metaphysicsJ Christian theology is  also to be over-
2
come.) At the same time, however, Heidegger interprets Greek 
philosophy as not having reached the realm of primordial presupposi­
tions. The re flec tion  on the "ground of Being" has been forgotten  
throughout the history o f metaphysics. Consequently Heidegger claims 
to be the f ir s t  in dealing with and expressing "something that has 
not been thought."^ Since, according to Heidegger, there is re a lly  
only one understanding of the ground of Being, namely, temporality, 
Greek philosophy is  interpreted as stemming from the Present of
Being, metaphysics is  overcome" ("The Way Back," p. 2C8). And, 
of course, this going beyond metaphysics into the ground of metaphys­
ics enta ils  "a change in human nature, accompanied by a transforma­
tion of metaphysics" ( ib id . ,  p. 209). This stance, obviously, goes 
beyond Jaspers' humble project of “re interpreting" metaphysics from 
the viewpoint provided by non-objective transcendence; see p. 124, 
nn. 2 , 3. In i ts  being overcome, metaphysics is  expected co be 
rather "re-shaped" from the new depth of perspective provided 
by the now known "tru th  of Being," namely, temporality ( ib id . ,  p. 
214). Old trad itiona l metaphysics, then, is introduced as a neces­
sary step in Being's history or fa te . At th is  point, i t  should be 
noticed, Heidegger lapses into a timeless epistemological framework 
from which he in terprets  the h is to rica l process. I f  temporality 
and h is to ric a lity  were applied by Heidegger consistently a ll  the 
way in to  the ground of Being, the "necessity" of trad itio n a l philos­
ophy as a part of "Being history" disappears. See additionally  
ib id . ,  p. 218; P e ro tti, pp. 57, 58; and Raschke, p. 384.
^See above, p. 50, n. 2.
2
This happens because theology u tiliz e s  the ontological cate­
gories of trad itional metaphysics. See "The onto-theo-logical Con­
s titu tio n ,"  pp. 55-60; and P e ro tti, pp. 12, 39. For an introduction 
about Heidegger's in terp re tation  o f C hristian ity  as a whole, see
Vycinas, pp. 312-21.
3
Heidegger, "The onto-theo-logical Constitution," p. 48;
and "The Way Back," p. 210.
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1 2 Presence, a mode which pertains to time but which misses i ts  true
3
dimensionality as the ground of Being. This h istorica l happening 
constitutes what Heidegger ca lls  the "necessary," "unexplainable"
4
"fate" of metaphysics, in short, the destiny of Being.
I cannot agree, however, with Heidegger's understanding of 
a groundless tra d itio n a l metaphysics.^ Traditional metaphysics was
Ib id . ,  p. 214. "Entities are grasped in th e ir  Being as
'presence' FAnwesenheit']; th is means that they are understood with 
regard to a d e fin ite  mode of time—the 'Present' CGegenwart']"  (Being 
and Time, In t .  2 .6 ) . And th is  is due, among other reasons, to the
fact th a t in Heidegger's system "the problematic of Greek Ontology,
like  that o f any other, must take its  clues from Dasein its e lf"
( ib id .) .
“A concealed hint of Time speaks not only out of the earli­
est metaphysical names of Being but also out of its  last name, which 
is 'the eternal recurrence of the same events.' Through the entire  
epoch of metaphysics, Time is decisively present in the History of 
Being, without being recognized or thought about" ("The Way Back," 
p. 214).
3
That is  to say, i t  is  neither aware of the realm of the 
ground o f Being beyond e n titie s —No-thing— nor of i ts  temporal 
nature.
^This is  what Heidegger sees as necessary "two-foldedness" 
of metaphysics, which is grounded in the fa c t of the "ontological 
difference" between Being and beings. Heidegger, then, believes 
that man was bound to grasp f i r s t  the realm of beings which is 
clearer in i ts  appearance, and only afterwards he was thought to 
be able to reach the ground of Being ( ib id . ,  p. 216). Even though 
we agree on the nature of the ontological difference as such, we 
do not see th a t Heidegger’ s h istorica l in terpretation  follows from 
the nature o f such structure.
^Heidegger does not see Parmenides reaching a timeless in te r­
pretation of the ground of Being as we have suggested; see above, 
pp. 75- 87. In Being and Time Heidegger in terprets Parmenides' key 
role in the h istory of metaphysics as follows; "Legein i t s e l f —or 
rather noein, that simple awareness o f something present-at-hand 
in its  sheer presence-at-hand—which Parmenides had already taken 
to guide him in his own in terpretation  o f Being—has the temporal 
structure o f a. pure 'making-present' of something. Those en tities  
which show themselves in th is and fo r i t ,  and which are understood
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developed on the background of a very precise understanding o f the 
ground o f Being in Parmenides' timeless presupposition. 1 Thus, in 
a sense, what is brought up by Heidegger's in terpretation o f the 
ground o f Being as tem porality in its  opposition to trad itio n a l meta­
physics may be explained as "necessary" and as being the “fa te "  of 
Being, but not in the Heideggerian sense. Heidegger's opposition
as e n tit ie s  in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with 
regard to the Present; that is  they are conceived as presence 
(ousia)" ( In t .  2 .6 ). Jose* Ortega y Gasset, who can be considered 
among those who studied the temporal primordial presupposition some­
time before Heidegger's publication of Being and Time (1926)— see 
Philip  W. S ilv e r, Ortega as Phenomenolo^Tst: The Genesis o f Medita-
tions on Quixote (Hew York: Columbia U n ivers ity  Press, 19 /6 ), p. 89,
who traces Ortega's foundational understanding of man as “yo y mis 
circunstancias" back to 1914—properly c r it ic iz e s  Heidegger's in te r­
pretation by pointing out that "Heidegger adopts the usual opinion 
that Greek philosophers only understood Being as 'what there is '  [* lo  
que hay’ ] ,  as what man finds before him. We think th is  is  neither 
correct nor accurate because the movement th a t Greek philosophers 
invented and that we c a ll 'to  do philosophy' consisted in rejecting  
Being [Ente] as meaning simply 'what there  is ' by denying the 
Being-of-what-there-is and requiring behind i t  what i t  t ru ly  is —the 
ovtoc ’ov —ontos on. What is unusual regarding what tru ly  is  is 
that i t  is  not p la in ly  given [es que no 1 o hay sin mas]. I t  is 
rather necessary to discover i t  behind what there is . . . .  I t  is , 
then, a lim ine, an error to affirm  th at fo r  the Greeks, and through 
th e ir  influence, fo r a l l  th e ir successors u n til Kant, the Being of 
e n titie s  [e l Ser del Ente] consists only in  that i t —e n t it ie s —is 
what there is  there [ '  1 o hay ah i]—Vorhandenheit" (La Idea de 
Princip io , pp. 277, 278). Obviously, fo r  Heidegger, timelessnes' is 
unthinkable. So tra d itio n  is to be grounded in a distorted  
understanding of the unique ground, namely, time. We can agree with 
Heidegger in understanding trad itiona l philosophy deriving its  
meaning from the present c f. Marias, Reason and L ife , p. 388. Yet 
we must agree with Ortegay Gasset when he explains that what has its  
starting  point as content in the "Present" o f the temporal realm is 
then to be changed by negation in to  timeless s ign ifications. 
A dditionally , to claim a groundless tra d it io n a l metaphysics would 
mean to overlook the claims of classical philosophers who express Being 
at the level of the ground of Being; see, fo r instance, S. Breton, p. 
151: " I I  me semble au contraire que c e tte  difference ontologique,
lo in  d 'avo ir ete oubliee, a toujours ete ressentid a l 'in te r ie u r  des 
grandes metaphysiques."
^ e e  pp. 84-114 above.
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to  the trad itio n  is  to be understood as "necessary" and as the "fa te"  
of Being only inasmuch as i t  reveals the hypothetical structure o f  
reason which is  involved in the understanding o f the meaning o f the  
ground o f metaphysics J  What is  unavoidable is  the hypothetical 
character of the understanding of the ground o f Being i ts e lf ,  and 
so o f the structure of reason i t s e l f .
Even though Heidegger is  the philosopher who has addressed
him self to thinking through and e x p lic it ly  expressing the meaning
2
o f the ground of Being and reason, he does not stand alone. Ortega
3 , 4
y Gasset and his discip le Julian Marias also deal with a temporal
^See pp. 50-74 above.
Besides th is  important feature of Heidegger's thought we 
have chosen him because he both springs from a theological background 
(see Hans KLing, Does God Exist?" An Answer fo r  Today [New York:
Vintage Books, 1980J, p. 492) and goes on to influence theological
re fle c tio n , especially in Protestantism. See J . M. Robinsion and 
John B. Cobb, eds., The Latter Heidegger and Theology (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963); c f. Kiing, p. 4 9 /.
^Ortega y Gasset explains the meaning o f h is basic expression 
" I am I and my circumstances" (see p. 126, n. 1) by saying that " in  
order to speak, then, of man's being we must f i r s t  elaborate a 
n o n -E lia tic  concept of Being, as others have elaborated a non- 
Euclidean geometry. The time has come fo r the seed sown by 
Heraclitus to bring forth  its  mighty harvest" ( History As a System 
and Other Essays toward a Philosophy of History L Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961J, p. 203 j .  fhen he goes on to
say th a t "man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is h is to ry" 
( ib id . ,  p. 217), and that history is  a system “of human experiences
linked in a single, inexorable chain. Hence nothing can be t ru ly
c le a r in history u n til everything is  clear" ( ib id . ,  p. 221). For 
an introduction to Ortega y Gasset's work, see the analysis by 
P h ilip  S ilver, Ortega as Phenomenologist and C iriaco Moron Arroyo, 
El Sistema de Ortega y Sasset (Madrid: Ediciones Alcala, 1968).
^Marias follows his teacher Ortega y Gasset as he affirm s  
in  Idea de la  Metafisica (p. 412) th a t "the theory of human l i f e  
(concrete in a ll  i ts  complexities and broadness) is  Metaphysics." 
He adds that “we go from Being to l i f e ,  from Being as an in te rp re ta ­
tio n  of re a lity  to re a lity  beyond any in terpretation" ( ib id . ,  p. 
397). Cf. idem, Reason and L ife , p. 193.
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understanding of the dimensionality o f reason. The same may be
said of Jean-Paul Sartre J  The same approach but from a more
2
epistemological viewpoint, is  used not only by Husserl, but i t  is
3 4also used by Ludwig W ittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and
Sartre 's  Being and Nothingness addresses i ts e lf  to the onto­
logical investigation in the realm o f th e  phenomena and i ts  temporal 
understanding; see p. 120, n. 2 above.
2
See p. 117, nn. 3 and 4 above. As Husserl approaches the 
investigation of the Lebenswelt, his re fle c tio n  is bound to  point 
to a d iffe re n t understanding of re a lity  other than timelessness. 
For a comparison among Husserl's, Kant's, and Heidegger's understand­
ings of time, see R. P. Morrison, "Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger on 
Time and the Unity of 'Consciousness,'" Philosophy and Phenomenologi- 
cal Research 34 (1978):182-87.
3
Gier (pp. 47, 48) points out th a t Wittgenstein, due to his 
understanding of the orig in  of every system of meaning in the " fu l­
ness and richness of lived experience," may be considered as pertain­
ing to phenomenology in th a t broad sense o f a return to the Lebens­
welt as ground for meaning. As we have seen above, the turning 
of epistemological re flec tion  to the Lebenswelt entails a temporal 
primordial presupposition. See Shinerl pi TT9; Charles H. Cox, 
p. 80; and Earl Taylor, p. 197.
4
Merleau-Ponty begins in his foundational analysis of Phenom­
enology of Perception with an epistemological study which works on 
the assumption of a temporal dimensionality of Being. Merleau-Ponty 
understands both the subject and object of the cognitive relationship  
as pertaining and working in the temporal dimension. He says that 
"past therefore, is not past, nor the fu tu re  future. I t  exists only 
when a sub jec tiv ity  is there to disrupt the plenitude of being in 
i t s e l f ,  to  adumbrate a perspective, and introduce non-being into 
i t .  A past and a future springs fo rth  when I reach out toward them" 
( ib id . ,  p. 421). Cf. Heidegger's h is to r ic a lity  of the subject 
(p. 122, n. 3 ). See ad d itio n a lly , Phenomenology of Perception, 
pp. 416, 417, 428. According to Merleau-Ponty the subject is also 
to be considered as being-in-the-world ( ib id . ,  p. 430). He plain ly  
declares that " i t  is through time th a t being is  conceived, because 
i t  is  through the re lations of tim e-subject and tim e-object that 
we are able to understand those obtaining between subject and the 
world" ( ib id . ,  pp. 430, 431). Regarding the cognitive object he 
declares that "objective being has i ts  roots in the ambiguities of 
time" ( ib id . ,  p. 333), and that i t  would be "more accurate to say 
that nothing exists and th a t everything is  'temporalized'" ( ib id .,  
p. 332). This clear, temporal dim ensionality which is apparent in 
Merleau-Ponty’ s epistemological framework is  the starting point for
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Ernst BlochJ In general terms, however, not one of these philos­
ophers actually proceeds into  the analysis of the hypothetical 
character of reason's structure which they imply and which they
reveal through th e ir w ritings (in  contrast to tra d itio n a l meta-
2
physics). Nonetheless, Hartmann is  rig h t when he evaluates the 
new trends in ontology and sees them pointing toward temporality
his ontological re flec tions in his last inclusive work The V is ib le  and 
the In v is ib le  (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). For
fu rth er analysis see Camele, pp. 256-59; and M. Grene, pp. 605, 
612-15.
^Ernst Bloch is  a Marxist rev is io n is t. Heidegger already saw 
Marxism reaching h is to rica l i ty  (see p. 122, n. 3 ) .  Bloch expresses 
his "•.iniversal formula th a t applies at the beginning o f philosophy: 
S is not yet P, no subject already has i ts  adequate predicate" (Man 
on His Own: Essays in  the Philosophy of Religion [New York: Herder
and Herder, 19/OJ, pi 9 0 ). This en ta ils  a temporal ontological 
framework. He in terp re ts  the tension of h is to r ic a lity  from the
viewpoint of the future (n o t-ye t): “The genuine reference-and-return
is towards what is s t i l l  in the fu tu re , and therefore what has not 
come to be in the past; ultim ately i t  is  a return to the s t i l l  
underived derivation o f a l l  that happens" ( ib id . ,  p. 83 ). This 
represents a basic m odification from Heidegger's in te rp re ta tion  of 
the flow  o f meaning springing "equiprimordially" in tension both from 
future and past (Being and Time, 2 .5 .7 4 ). Cf. Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 417. As the "not-yet" is  "unreach- 
able," and at the same time is determinative of meaning, i t  could be 
seen as a reflection  of the Platonic chSrismos—vis epistemological 
framework—embedded in the in terpretation  of the ontological frame­
work. William A. Johnson, (The Search for Transcendence: A
Theological Analysis o f Nontheological Attempts to Define Transcen­
dence LNew York: Harper and Row, 19/4J, pp. 92, 93) points out
Bloch' s awareness regarding the B ib lical understanding of r e a l ity  and 
his influence on Jurgen Moltman ( ib id . ,  pp. 79-80).
2
I t  is very important to bear th is  in mind. We do not claim  
that the philosophers we are quoting as pointing to a temporal
primordial presupposition in terpret i t ,  in the f in a l analysis, as 
standing in opposition to trad itio n a l timelessness as primordial 
presupposition, as we do. No matter how radical they may sound, at 
some point of other in  th e ir  analysis they fa ll  short of applying 
h is to r ic a lity  and tem porality a ll  the way so as to reach a hypotheti­
cal understanding of the ground of Being.
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as a dimension for Being and reasonJ
Epistemological Framework
The temporal presupposition in i ts  very appearing provided
a new form and in terp retation  fo r the ontological framework which
is now centered in the in terp re ta tion  o f Dasein as the ecstatic
2
structure of Care developing out of the fac t of Being-in-the-world.
3
Since Being and Thinking belong together, the changes o f meaning 
in the primordial presupposition and ontological framework brought
4
along a change in  the epistemological framework too.
In comparison to timeless logos, temporal logos can be seen 
as a newcomer to philosophy. Yet, some of its  basic features are
already c lear enough to be recognized as foundational cognitive 
directions,^ which the epistemological framework assumes as i t  is
N. Hartmann, New Ways of Ontology (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Publishers, 1975), p. 26.
2
Perhaps the most deta iled  study of th is  structure is  presen­
ted by Heidegger in Being and Time, "Preparatory Analysis o f Dasein.”
This same approach is followed in broad lines and with obvious modi­
fications by Jean-Paul S artre  in Being and Nothingness and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology o f Perception. See p. 122, n. 2 above.
o
See G ier, p. 46; Heidegger, What Is C_a^ e<* Thinking (New
York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 240-44; and p. 35, n. 3 above.
^That the temporal primordial presupposition and the temporal 
ontological framework c a ll fo r  a "new understanding o f the meaning 
of logos" is  conceived in an epistemological realm. From a chrono­
lo g ic a l  perspective i t  seems th at the epistemological re flex ion  pre­
cedes the ontological. Perhaps the way into a temporal understanding 
of Being and logos began w ith the em piricist claim that experience 
is the source fo r our knowledge; see John Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, abridged ed. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press,
1928),'p p . 9-52.
5
We are concerned here, as e a r lie r  when we dea lt with the 
classical logos, with broad ideas and guidelines and not with
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interpreted in the temporal dimensionality of Being. I t  is  therefore  
possible to point out b rie fly  how logos, when temporally understood, 
is  supposed to function at the levels of o b jec tiv ity  and system.^
Temporal O b jec tiv ity . When the subject-object re lationsh ip  
is  understood as working in the temporal dimensionality o f knowledge, 
the in terpretation  o f what essence and ob jec tiv ity  mean in themselves 
is  bound to d i f fe r  from the classical timeless in te rp re ta tio n  of 
them. Even though no single author may be id e n tifie d  as providing
a f in a l description of the new temporal in terpretation  of ob jec t-
? 3iv i t y ,  several authors have contributed, namely Husserl,
detailed  interpretations of e ith e r the ontological or the ep is te ­
mological frameworks. Such a detailed treatment does not belong 
to our phenomenological study of the structure of reason but ra ther  
to the realm of ontological theories and theories o f knowledge.
*As we follow  this order from o b jec tiv ity  to metaphysics, 
our purpose is  one of achieving c la r ity .  We are not following the 
Kantian pattern.
This may be due to the early  stages o f development in which 
th is  kind of re fle c tio n  finds i t s e l f .
^ It  is  very d if f ic u lt ,  and not rea lly  our task, to determine 
whether Husserl actually came to the understanding of temporal cate­
gories for reason and o b jec tiv ity . His philosophy presents motives 
th a t link him with classical timeless categories, as, fo r instance, 
his transcendental reduction; see Cartesian Meditations, 1; Lauer, 
pp. 130, 134; and Adorno, pp. 100, 101. rhere are in his w ritin g s , 
however, other motives that, lik e  the very idea o f phenomenon, ground 
his thinking in temporal experience and time-consciousness. Lauer 
(pp. 119, 122) grasps this ambivalency. Perhaps th is  is unavoid­
able when the process of thinking is  moving from one dimension of 
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  to another. As we use Husserl's insights about 
essence and o b je c tiv ity , we in te rp re t them as related to temporal, 
concrete, ontological en tities  in the Lebenswelt. His phenomenologi­
cal reduction is , then, interpreted as being ju s t a temporary method­
ological step which, following Heidegger's in terp re ta tion , is  la te r  
to be removed.
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1 2 3Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and W ittgenstein, who a l l  provide basic
insights we need to be aware of in our critic ism  o f theological 
4reason.
The "newness" o f temporal logos is understood as i t  is com­
pared to the in te rp re ta tion  that trad itiona l logos renders of
I t  is true th a t Heidegger accepts the tra d itio n a l object­
iv ity  fo r the s c ie n tif ic  enterprise; see Heidegger, “The Theological 
Discussion of 'The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speak­
ing in Today's Theology ’ — Some Pointers to Its  Major Aspects," in 
The Piety of Thinking, eds. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo 
IBloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 28.
Raschke (p. 380) explains that Heidegger s t i l l  understands science 
in its  p o s itiv is tic  in te rp re ta tio n . Yet, as Heidegger develops his 
ontological thinking in  a temporal primordial presupposition we find  
relevant insights which point to a d iffe re n t kind of o b je c tiv ity .
2
Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception may be 
one of the authors th a t deals more d irec tly  and extensively with 
the new kind of temporal o b jec tiv ity . His insights, however, should 
not be taken as f in a l on the subject, but rather as pointers fo r 
fu rth e r analysis. For an introduction to Merleau-Ponty*s epistemolog­
ical thinking, see Thomas Langan, Merleau-Ponty's C ritique of Reason 
(New Haven: Yale University PresT^ 19fe6); kemy C. Kwant, From
Phenomenology to Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Last Period of
Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical L ife  (Pittsburgh, Philadel^hia: 
Duquesne University Press, 1966); and Gary Bient Madison, La Phenom-  
enologie Merleau-Ponty: une recherche des lim ites de la  conscience
IParis: Editions Klincksieck, 1973).
\ .  W ittgenstein's analysis is  useful in a more ind irect 
way since i t  is expressed from a lin g u is tic  perspective. Addition­
a lly ,  due to the non-systematic s ty le  of his w ritings , we find in 
him a rather germinal thinker who provides insights which stand in 
need of further development.
^This s itu a tio n  may resu lt in e ither an advantage or a d is­
advantage for theology. I t  w ill depend on the results  of our entire  
investigation. I f  our study points to some form of classical reason 
as the one suitable fo r  theological enterprises, the germinal, unde­
veloped stage in  which temporal reason finds i t s e l f  is  irre levan t. 
But, i f  our investigation should point to h istorica l logos i t  would 
be a disadvantage. However, i f  our investigation should point 
add itionally  to the theological realm—over against the trad itiona l 
philosophical one— as the responsible agent for providing the in te r ­
pretation of reason as a tool for theology, th is germinal stage w il l
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ob jectiv ity .^  Temporal logos, however, does not entail merely a
"reinterpretation" of the old tra d it io n a l epistemological framework—
as, fo r instance, in Jaspers. I t  rather requires the development
of a new epistemological framework. This “newness" is  required when
logos sees i t s e l f  working in  the f lu x  of time, consciousness, and 
2
Lebenswelt.
In terms of temporal dim ensionality, meaning is f i r s t  formed,
constituted, grasped, and only then is  i t  expressed. Thus, meaning
3 4 5is  formed in a pre-theoretica l, p re-pred icative, or p re -lin g u is tic
level of knowledge. 6 This is  the level of the rea l, concrete,
prove to be an advantage because theologians w il l  not be tempted to 
re ly  on a "ready to use" philosophical in terp re ta tion .
^The lim its  of our investigation  prevent us from dealing 
with th is comparison. For an introduction to classical o b je c tiv ity  
as "representational thinking" ( vorstellendes Denken) ,  see P e ro tt i,  
pp. 29-31. The basic features of tra d itio n a l o b jec tiv ity  we need to 
remember as we proceed in our analysis are "universality" and 
"necessity." When they are achieved they produce “certainty" in the 
cognitive subject. These two features of o b je c tiv ity  are required by 
the timeless primordial presupposition. In modern p o s it iv is t ic  
sciences they shaped the idea and meaning of "exactness," which is  
rather an idea l. Yet, Wittgenstein confesses th a t "we do not know 
what we should be supposed to imagine under th is  head" (Philosophical 
Investigations, p. 881.
^Husserl ( Cartesian M editations, pp. 2, 20) realizes th a t he 
is  dealing with "Heraclitean flux '* and that in th a t realm to proceed 
with the standards valid fo r tra d it io n a l sciences would indeed be 
foolish. He needs a new approach and understanding of o b je c tiv ity .  
See Valone, p. 216; and Lauer, p. 139.
^Taylor, p. 186. ^Valone, p. 213.
5J. N. Findlay, Foreword to Logical Investigations by E. 
Husserl (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 5.
6This is  not a non-cognitive realm as the relation between 
Existenz and transcendence is  according to Jaspers’ theory (see 
above, p. 104, nn. 1, 2, 3 ). This p re-theoretica l area points ra ther
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w holistic , complex, dynamic, temporal, h is to rica l l i f e  world
(Lebenswelt) J  As in  classical logos, even though knowledge is
2
present at th is  level as the s tarting  point, i t  is  not reduced or 
confined to i t .  Logos proceeds in to  the theoretical realm through 
abstraction (from the object's side) and categories (from the sub­
je c t 's  side).
Abstraction (th is  paramount cognitive a c t iv ity )  and its  out­
come (the knowledge of the essence, of the object) are to be under­
stood now in an e n tire ly  d iffe ren t way. In timeless logos abstrac-
4
tion stands b as ica lly  in discontinuity to the Lebenswelt, while
to the area where meaning is constituted, that is to  the area where 
the subject-object relationship actually functions. We should not 
conceive this level as working necessarily without words, predicates, 
or theories, otherwise we would be creating a new kind of "Platonic  
worlds" in time. In the constitution of meaning at th is  level many 
factors are involved both from the subject's and the object's sides. 
The area where meaning is constituted is obviously previous to the 
expression of the constituted meaning. This le v e l, however, cannot 
explain the whole of the cognitive a c tiv it ie s . I t  should be con­
sidered, though, to  be at the very basis of any meaning whatsoever.
^This is  the world of Parmenidean doxa.
p
The Lebenswelt cannot simply be denied. I t  is  there. From 
Plato onwards i t  is  interpreted and provided a place in the cognitive  
process. For instance, in P lato 's  theory the Lebenswelt is  consi­
dered to provide the "stimulus" that causes "reminiscence," "remem­
brance" to get s tarted .
^In temporal logos meaning also starts at the level of the 
Lebenswelt. However, i t  develops the cognitive functions of reason 
as a whole w ith in  th is , the only available world, namely the 
Lebenswelt. See above, p. 135, n. 5 above.
^This discontinuity is  grounded in the v ia  negativa which 
Parmenidean primordial presupposition requires. This primordial 
presupposition e n ta ils  a negative evaluation of the Lebenswelt as 
not-being; see pp. 75-87 above. See Adorno, p. 85.
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in the temporal logos i t  stands in continuity with i t J  Abstraction
enta ils  a reduction regarding the Lebenswelt in both timeless and
temporal logos. Yet, in each case the reduction is  achieved in a
d iffe ren t way and implies a d iffe ren t meaning fo r the essence and
o b jec tiv ity  reached through i t .  In timeless logos the reduction
is achieved by a negation of the Lebenswelt. The abstraction means
2
more than the Lebenswelt. In temporal logos the reduction is  due
to the fact that the nature and richness o f the Lebenswelt cannot
be expressed in a f in a l absolute form by any single predicate or
3
judgment. Here the abstraction is less than the Lebenswelt.
This is  required by the temporal primordial presupposition, 
which entails  a positive  evaluation o f the Lebenswelt as the realm 
of Being, and consequently of beings as beings; see pp. 113-30 above. 
This continuity is  expressed by Merleau-Ponty's analysis which is 
abridged in an in s ig h tfu l statement by Grene: "There is  no turning
from the so-called phenomenal to an in te ll ig ib le  world. I t  is true  
that the in te ll ig ib le  is  inv is ib le , but i t  is the in v is ib i l i t y  of 
the v is ib le , not some other which we saw when, following the chariots 
of the gods, we l i f te d  up our heads into the outer heavens. Nor, 
of course, on the other hand, is Merleau-Ponty suggesting fo r a mom- 
emt an irrationalism : an attempt to philosophize through the reduc­
tion of meaning (o f sens) to mere sensations. Seeing is  not in te l ­
lection; i t  is  not the thought of seeing, Merleau-Ponty keeps in s is t­
ing; yet neither is  i t  a dumb show. I t  is  the coming in to  being 
of meanings, o f beings with meaning, at the pre-conceptual, pre- 
th e tic  level which has to support a l l  conceptualization" (p. 618). 
Cf. Lauer, p. 110; Faber, p. 61; and Valone, p. 214.
2
Through the v ia  netjativa on which abstraction is  grounded, 
the Lebenswelt is  to be denied as a whole in order fo r the in te lle c t  
to be able to grasp i ts  true object; c f . p. 133, n. 1 , above, on 
"representational thinking'* ("vorstellendes Denken") .  Consequently, 
abstraction produces a reduction of the Lebenswelt in to  a timeless 
expression of i t ,  which entails a projection out o f i t  and so i t  
means “more" than the Lebenswelt. At th is  point Heidegger fa i ls  
in his in terpretation  o f classical logos- He sees c lass ica l abstrac­
tion  as just reducing the temporaI f  1 ux from a s ta tic  present, but 
he does not fo llow  tra d itio n  in its  abstractive process via analogia 
which points beyond the Lebenswelt.
3
This richness is  due to the fa c t that in a temporal dimen­
sion for Being and Knowledge both, subject and object, stand in the
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This difference in the understanding of abstraction calls  
fo r a d ifference in the in terp re ta tion  of "o b jec tiv ity" and "exacti­
tude” in each logos. 1 Timeless logos understands the nature o f the
knowledge of essences or "ob jec tiv ity" as being "necessary," "univer-
2
sal,"  and “exact." Temporal logos understands the knowledge of
flu x  of time, and so they are in change and movement. Consequently, 
abstraction and essences have to be understood in th is  new setting . 
Lauer remarks that "because an object is always more than what is 
actually present to consciousness, the essence of an object cannot 
be constituted except in a successive actua liza tion  of aspects—to 
which must be added the sum to ta l of the horizons constituted by 
the whole of experience" (p. 139). This "more than" is  due to the 
h istorica l dimensionality recognized by h is to rica l logos. This "more 
than" is  in continuity with what is  "actually present to conscious­
ness." Therefore the “reduction" is  due to the fac t that man can 
only grasp its  object as i t  and he himself flow  and change in the 
flux  o f time; c f. Marias, Reason and L ife , p. 190; and Lauer, p. 
138.
^Classical timeless epistemological framework is unable to 
grasp a temporal rea lity  temporally and h is to r ic a lly . The only way
i t  can function is  by freezing both subject and object in a s ta tic
relationship which is conceived to be "ideal" or "true." Objectiv­
i ty  and exactness find th e ir  meaning in the context of th is  freez­
ing of the flux  of time in to  a static  re lationsh ip . Temporal 
epistemological framework considers subject and object in movement 
and change and develops structures and procedures to grasp the mean­
ing as i t  develops and changes. In this context, the very meaning
of o b jec tiv ity  and exactness is  d iffe re n t.
2
"Necessity," "un iversality ,"  and "exactness" have here 
a special meaning. They express a knowledge that is th is way, cannot 
be any other way, and for which i t  is impossible not to be as they 
are. Of course, there is  a margin for error or lack of exactitude,
which is due to remnants of temporality in the cognitive process.
The basic concepts of necessity, un iversa lity , and exactness are
not eliminated from the concepts of h istorical temporal logos, they,
however, receive a d ifferent in terp re ta tion , hence they have a d i f ­
ferent meaning, that affect the s c ie n tific  enterprise as a whole. 
When these old traditional words are used in th e ir  new temporal 
h isto rica l meaning, they are bound to be m isinterpreted by both 
philosophers and theologians who are not yet aware of the change 
of meaning required by the newly-adopted primordial presupposition. 
See Adorno, p. 86; and Marias, Reason and L ife , p. 96.
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essences or "ob jectiv ity" as "determinable indeterminacy"; that
is  to  say, as h istorica l residuum of h istorica l thickness. F in a lly ,
abstraction appears and is corrected as i t  gets in touch w ith the
2
realm of Being, that is , with timeless essences fo r timeless logos,
Husserl describes in  deta il the meaning of "o b je c tiv ity ,"  
that is , of the nature th a t the knowledge o f essences is  supposed 
to have in a temporal logos, as follows: "And the meaning o f th is  
indeterminacy is  once again foreshadowed by the general meaning of 
the thing perceived as such, or by the general and essential nature 
of this type o f perception which we ca ll thing-perception. The 
indeterminacy necessarily means the determ inability of a rigorously  
prescribed mode (S t i ls ) .  I t  points forward to possible patterns 
of perception, which, continually passing o ff  into one another, 
coalesce in the unity of a single perception in  which the contin­
uously enduring thing in ever new series o f perspectives reveals 
ever again new 'aspects' (or retraces the o ld ). Meanwhile, the sub­
sidiary co-apprehended phases of the thing come gradually in to  the 
focus of real presentation as real data, the indeterminacies define 
themselves more c learly  to turn at length into clear data themselves; 
contrariwise, what is  c lear passes back in to  the unclear, the pre­
sented into the non-presented, and so fo rth . To remain fo r  ever 
incomplete a fte r  th is  fashion is  an ineradicable essentia I of the 
correlation Thing and Thing-perception. I f  the meaning of TRTng 
gets determined through what is  given in Thing-perception (and what 
else could determine the meaning?), i t  must require such incomplete­
ness, and we are referred of necessity to  unified and continuous 
series of possible perceptions which, developed from any one of 
these, stretch out in an in f in i te  number of directions in systematic 
s tr ic t ly  ordered ways, in  each direction endlessly, aTiS always 
dominated throughout by some unity of meaning. In principle a margin 
of determinable indeterminacy always remains over, however fa r  we 
go along our empirical way, and however extended the continua of 
actual perceptions of the same thing which we may have treasured. 
No God can a lte r  th is  in any way any more than He can the equation 
1 + 2 = 3, or the s ta b ili ty  of any other essential truth" ( Ideas, 
pp. 137, 138). Lauer, commenting on Merleau-Ponty, remarks that 
"the world in its  history does not follow a preconceived model; 
rather i t  takes on sense through its  h istory, which is  t ru ly  a 
history only in and through a subject-object d ia lectic" (p . 184). 
Cf. Raschke, pp. 377, 378; and Putnam, pp. 31, 41.
^See above, p. 87, n. 3; p. 90, n. 1; p. 91, n. 3; p. 92, 
n. 1; p. 99, n . l ;  and p. 100, n. 1.
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and the Lebenswelt fo r temporal logosJ
In h istorica l temporal reason as in classical timeless rea­
son, the “categories" are that which is brought a p r io r i to the
2
subject-object re lationship by the cognitive subject. However,
in temporal reason they obviously do not come from timelessness but
rather from the past in to  the present and future. This movement,
3
by the way, corresponds to the flow of meaning in temporal reason.
Marias puts i t  in  the following way: “This obliges us to
study the re a lity  in  question in i ts  concreteness, and therefore
circum stantially . That re a lity  must be brought back, actually or
imaginatively, to my l i f e ,  the only 'place' in  which i t  is
authentically  re a l, and thereby seen w ithin the set of a c tiv it ie s  of
mine which are related to i t :  i . e . ,  see happening" (Reason and L ife , 
p. 189). Yet, th is  coming back to the ground of meaning is not a 
simple task. The fu rth e r back we need to go the more d i f f ic u lt  the 
enterprise becomes. This is p a rtic u la rly  true in metaphysics where 
we need to grasp the meaning of the present from the perspective of 
the past history as a whole; see Heidegger, Being and Time, 2 .5 .72.
2
So, categories in th e ir  broadest meaning include the 
epistemological framework as a whole.
3
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception, p. 433, calls i t  
"thickness." Heidegger remarks th a t "vrtien h is to r ic a lity  is
authentic, i t  understands history as the 'recurrence' of the 
possible, and knows th at a p o s s ib ility  w ill recur only i f  existence 
is open fo r i t  fa te fu lly ,  in a moment of vision, in  resolute repeti­
tion" (Being and Time, 2 .5 .7 5 ). He adds that "Dasein temporalizes 
i t s e lf  in  the way the future and having been are united in the
Present" ( ib id .,  2 .5 .7 6 ). Cf. Reiser, p. 475. Heidegger remarks
that the flux  may be misunderstood as being determined by the past or 
when the past is  interpreted in terms of the present ( ib id .,
2 .5 .7 3 ). The procedure of in terpreting  the past in terms of the 
present is  at the core of the H istorical C ritica l Method in exegesis; 
see Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 2: Zur religiosen  
Laqe, Religionphilosophie und Ethik (Tubingen: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 
1922), pp. /Z9-53; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols. 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 1:107, n. 3; and Gerhard Hasel, Old
Testament Theology: Basic Issues in  the Current Debate, rev. ed.
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972), p. 135, n. TCT. See also
Marias, Reason and L ife , p. 369.
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This epistemological flow is  complemented by the ontological flow  
of time, which goes from the fu ture to the present and in to  the 
pastJ But i t  is  the epistemological flow th a t provides the unity  
and coherence o f meaning through the flow and changes of re a l ity .
Otherwise meaning would be given in isolated "epochs'1 with no connec-
2
tion  among each other. Also the subject-object re lationship  is 
understood in a very d iffe ren t way which a ffects  the very constitu ­
tion of meaning. In temporal logos the subject-object re lationsh ip  
is conceived as a wholistic enterprise in which no gap is  re a lly  
present.^
Once knowledge happens or is  constituted, i t  is  expressed 
in language, and language, in order to communicate meaning and par­
tic ip a te  in the further constitution of meaning, needs to be in te r ­
preted. In terpretation  follows the primordial presupposition and 
epistemological framework that the in terp re ter brings with himself 
as he comes to language as the place fo r meaning. Yet, on the other 
side of language there is  always the cognitive subject who spoke 
as a result of his own cognitive a c tiv ity  (both theoretical and pre- 
theoretica l} . For language to f u l f i l l  its  purpose of communication.
"^The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic tempo­
ra l ity  is the fu tu re" (Heidenger, Being and Time, 2 .3 .65 ). See also
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, chapter on "Temporality."
2
This happens always when the meaning of what develops in
the flux o f time is understood from a timeless epistemological
framework.
3
In classical reason the subject-object relationship is  not 
denied. I t  is  rather interpreted as a unity of two things th a t by 
nature are severed from each other. Hence, i t  constitutes a
dichotomy; see Jaspers, Philosophical Faith , p. 79; and Heidegger,
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the hearer, receiver, in terp re ter of language stands in  need of 
grasping f i r s t  the dimensionality and epistemological framework from 
which the language has been uttered. Otherwise there is  no communi­
cation and so, in the f in a l analysis, no language.^ Even when i t  
is b u i l t  into the very process of constituting meaning, however,
language as the expression of reason is  not able to go beyond its
2
function as sign of meaning. Only as sign, may language—that is ,  
word— be considered as 1ogos. ^
The Question of Being, p. 77. In the realm of a temporal primordial 
presupposition the subject-object relationship receives also a new 
in te rp re ta tio n  that Heidegger ca lls  "transcendence." See Heidegger, 
The Essence of Reason, pp. 37, 39.
^Reiser remarks that "language guarantees th a t objective  
expression can survive from one generation to the next and thus gives 
ris e  to  tra d itio n . I t  encapsulates the world-view of a people non- 
them atica lly  in its  structure, grammar, syntax, origins; i t  is  also 
h is to rica l" , (p. 481). However, language is used not only ”non- 
them atically" but also "them atically," i . e . ,  " th eo re tica lly ."  In 
both cases language is  a sign and plays the essential ro le  in commu- 
ni ca ti ng.
p
'We are to conclude, therefore, that language discloses 
the gathering of a ll things into nearness. Language is  a sign of 
our own being drawn in to  the unifying sweep in which the regions 
of the world come face to face. But saying is likewise a showing. 
That is  why the word, Logos, is  so rich ; i t  contained philosophy's 
o rig in a tiv e  insight in to  the manifestness of what is  in  the a l l -  
embracing nearness of things" ( ib id . ,  p. 48b).
3
In the context of the history of philosophy the philosophi­
cal analysis of language is  rather recent. Its  insights w il l  surely 
be very useful in fu ture philosophical analysis. Moreover, a c r i t i ­
cism o f reason deals with the constitution of meaning—not d ire c tly  
with i t s  expression or communication. A phenomenological analysis 
of language may point toward some features of reason but w ill  
be unable to provide f in a l answers or go further in to  the realm of 
the theory of knowledge. A sample of th is  may be seen in the work 
of W ittgenstein taken as a whole. For further comments on the re la ­
tionship o f reason and language, see M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, 
Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); idem, On the Way to Language
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Mauri ce Merleau-Ponty,
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Temporal System. So fa r  i t  is  c lear that the primordial
presupposition of temporality has developed new patterns fo r  the
understanding of “o b je c tiv ity ." *  The analysis, however, becomes
more complex and d if f ic u lt  as we look fo r the systematic realm of
2
the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. As noted e a r l ie r ,  th is
3
realm is  centered in the theos which provides for coherence and 
unity of meaning beginning w ith an in terp re ta tion  of the ontological 
framework. The theos, then, appears as the ultim ate foundation for
4
the coherence and system of reason's structure.
Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973).
*That is  to say, temporal logos brings a new way of under­
standing the same temporally lim ited r e a l ity  that Kant, in  the 
A ris to te lian  trad itio n , interpreted by applying the same classical 
epistemological framework in a transcendental in te rp re ta tion ; see 
pp. 99-103 above.
2
At th is  point, we must remember that the classical 
epistemological framework has developed throughout a more than 
twenty-five-century span. We have been able to point a t i t s  most
relevant moments. However, we cannot do the same regarding temporal 
logos. This "newness" o f the subject matter adds to i t s  thematic 
d if f ic u lty .
3
See pp. 34-51 above.
4We see, then, th a t A ris to tle 's  approach to r e a l i ty  as a 
whole is  the basic task to be accomplished by metaphysics. Metaphys­
ics may s t i l l  have the tra d itio n a l meaning of dealing with what 
is beyond the physical realm, but only in  the sense of what is  beyond 
the objectives of natural sciences, and no longer in the tra d itio n a l 
sense of what is beyond th is  h istorica l temporal world. I t  is  proper 
to remember that reason needs, as part o f i ts  structure, to have 
an in te rp re ta tion  of re a lity  as a whole, ontological framework, in 
order to provide unity and coherence to i ts  procedures. Therefore, 
in temporal logos the A ris to te lic  ontological framework—metaphysical 
hierarchy— is  to be replaced by a new one. This task also involves 
the in te rp re ta tion  of God. Here, in an in d ire c t way, we reach the 
realm of our critic ism  of theological reason. The basic issue that 
is to be reinterpreted regarding the theos is  the idea of i ts  onto­
logical transcendence.
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The anti-metaphysical trend of post-Kantian philosophy^ leads 
to a new kind of metaphysics, a metaphysics that is supposed to  
develop in the temporal dimensionality o f beings and knowledge.** 
The whole is  now seen in movement—in the flu x  of time—and the mean­
ing of i t  is  to be reached as the whole and the cognitive subject 
move in re la tio n  to each other. I t  is  precisely the complexity that 
represents not only the whole but also the whole in movement that 
constitutes the main d iff ic u lty  fo r rendering a systematic in te rp re ­
ta tio n  of metaphysics.^ As metaphysics is needed for reason to
Breton (p. 148) shows how today's s c ie n tific  reason is  con­
sidered to be the mental structure th a t remains a fte r its  ontological 
foundation has been denied by the anti-metaphysical trend o f our 
times; c f .  P e ro tti, p. 59.
2
M. Faber, commenting on Husserl, remarks that "acts of 
thought may re fe r to transcendent or even to non-existent and impos­
s ib le  objects. But the meaning of such experiences is c la r if ie d  
purely on the basis o f experience" (p. 54). This basic p rin c ip le  
of temporal logos does not entail the denial of transcendence. I t
rather points to the cognitive realm and its  primordial presupposi­
tio n  where any in terpretation of transcendence is  to be understood.
Grene, commenting on Merleau-Ponty, describes the real com­
p lex ity  of the subject matter of metaphysics in a temporal dimension­
a l i t y  which seems to be a rather impossible task: "What one has
to try  to  do, in radical re flec tion , is to catch the Being o f some 
being from w ithin our experience as experienced. But there are 
in d e fin ite ly  many such centers of Being and we are, never in a ll
of them, but, in the chiasm, entangled, in many dimensions, in  many 
at once. True, we glimpse th e ir universal interrelatedness, but 
only as, and through, the very intertw ining that we are. An over­
view would be, fo r us, or so fa r  as we can t e l l ,  fo r any being, on 
princ ip le  impossible. Logos, the ultim ate coherence in and behind 
language, possesses us, but never d e fin it iv e ly , once fo r  a l l ,  
any more than, d e fin it iv e ly  we can master i t "  (p. 623). J . Ortega 
y Gasset, in  The Dehumanization of A rt, and Other Writings on Art 
and Culture (Garden C ity , Flew York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 114,
explains w ith an example the complexity of the real world o f time 
and history which as a whole is the subject matter of temporal meta­
physics. He shows how the very same event, the death of a person,
means d iffe re n t things to four d iffe re n t observers. The fa c t is
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function in its  complete capacity fo r coherence and meaning, tempo­
ra l reason stands in need e ith er o f developing a new metaphysics
or of using the structure of the old one as part of its
epistemological framework.
Since philosophical thinking is  ju s t beginning to deal with
the whole in its  temporal f lu x , there is  no "fina l"  approach that
may be singled out as the most relevant and in flu e n tia l one. None­
theless, reflection in th is  area has developed fa r  enough to allow
an iden tifica tio n  of three in terpretations which are already influen­
t ia l  and which surely provide the germinal insights fo r  fu rther
developments: evolutionism (as developed by Teilhard de Chardin),
Marxism, and Heideggerian temporal "metaphysics."
The evolutionist in te rp re ta tion  ' o f temporal r e a l ity  provided
by Teilhard de Chardin works on the basis of a timeless presupposi-
1 2 tio n , to which the en tire  process o f temporal re a lity  is  oriented.
The ultim ate meaning comes from outside time, that is  from the theos
(the Omega point), which is tim eless. Teilhard de Chardin's
that the actual meaning of th is  h is to rica l event is  the whole of 
what the four grasped in d iv id u a lly . Cf. Marias, Reason and L ife ,
p. 188.
H h is  appears c le a r ly  at the very beginning of Teilhard de 
Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper i  Row, 1959), p. 
29, when he remarks that his analysis "deals with man solely as a
phenomenon." And then he adds that he has "not tr ie d  to discover
a system of ontological and causal re lations between the elements 
of the universe" ( ib id . ) .
2Teilhard, pp. 254-72.
^Teilhard, re ferring  to the transcendence o f the Omega 
point, says that "Omega must be independent of the collapse of the 
forces with which evolution is  woven" (p. 270). And he adds that
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in terpretation  of temporal re a lity  follows the s c ie n tif ic  ra t io n a lity  
which represents the f in a l expression of classical logosJ  Nonethe­
less Teilhard's synthesis provides a coherent understanding of tem- 
poral re a lity  from an evo lu tion is tic  viewpoint in  which both 
Marxist3 and Christian4 motives are included. Teilhard may be seen 
as providing the most coherent in terpretation o f temporal re a l ity  
thus fa r  developed using classical sc ien tific  1 ogos.** Yet, since
i f  by its  its  very nature i t  does not escape from the time and space 
which i t  gathers together, i t  would not be Omega" ( ib id . ) .  See also 
ib id . ,  p. 273.
^See Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution," p. 52; 
and idem, "A Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking," pp. 28-29. See 
above also, p. 103, n. 1.
2
That is to say on the basic motif of b iological evolution, 
Teilhard develops evolutionism as a tool or foundational category fo r  
the understanding o f concrete temporal re a lity  as i t  moves. 
Evolution is the viewpoint that supposedly reaches the center of the 
movement of re a lity  as i t  progresses, and so i t  is  able to render i t  
in te ll ig ib le .  I t  is at this point where Teilhard's analysis, even 
though developed from a trad itio n a l ontological and epistemological 
perspective, could provide categories for a temporal ontological 
framework. Teilhard’ s approach, in order to be able to do that should 
consider the phenomenon to correspond to the order of Being. His 
phenomenological theory should be declared to be, as i t  is , ontologi­
c a l. This, however, he expressely re jects .
3
Teilhard, pp. 256, 257. I t  must be pointed out that 
Teilhard is not a M arxist, yet his synthesis is broad enough to be 
able to include Marxism as a part o f i t .
4Teilhard, pp. 264-67, incorporates in his synthesis the idea 
of "Love" and "Great Presence."
^N. A. Whitehead's in terp re ta tion  of temporal re a lity  as 
process is also worked out from the epistemological structure o f 
classical reason. His system, however, is not as comprehensive as 
Teilhard 's . On the other hand, according to Whitehead, the f in a l  
foundation for his classical system challenges the tra d itio n a l under­
standing of the theos as i t  becomes "dipolar” in order to include 
both time and timelessness; see A lfred North Whitehead, Process and 
R eality : An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957),
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his approach assumes ontological and epistemological frameworks that
are already developed, his in terp re ta tion  o f temporal r e a l i ty  does
not ground a "new” in te rp re ta tio n  of Being. On the contrary, i t
re lie s  on the trad itional in te rp re ta tion  of Being in order to  ground
its  own coherence.
Marxism also works w ith in  the temporal dimensionality of
re a lity ,^  but approaches i t  following the d ia le c tic a l method devel- 
?
oped by Hegel. We can say, then, that in  Marxism metaphysics is 
replaced by a particu lar philosophy o f history—d ia le c tic a l
p. 524; and F r itz  Guy, "Comments on a Recent Whiteheadian Doctrine 
of God," Andrews University Seminary Studies 4 (1966):107-134. This 
suggestion^ based on an analogical process, interprets the theos 
as embracing in its  bosom the two Platonic worlds. Such " d ip o la r ity '1 
destroys the One, which is  the basis of coherence and system, in 
i ts  very core. This system, whose c ritic is m  cannot be undertaken 
here, "solves" some tra d itio n a l problems of philosophy by creating  
more and more d if f ic u lt  ones. On Whitehead’ s in terp re ta tion  of 
Being, see W. T. Jones, 5:84-86.
^Within the same classical understanding of reason and its  
ontological framework can be seen, fo r instance, Whitehead, who in 
his The Function of Reason considers that “the Greeks produced the 
f in a l instrument fo r d is c ip lin e  of speculation” (p. 41). Whitehead, 
however, considers that Greek reason is  not fin a l in s c ie n tif ic  
endeavors. Cf. A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philos­
ophy, vo l. 4: Philosophy from the Age of Positivism to the Age of
Analysis (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
197 'lT ,'p . 97.
2
I t  is  widely known that in order to  grasp the movement of 
history and its  meaning, Marx adopted the Hegelian d ia le c tic s  and 
applied them to the study of “m atter," th a t is  to h is to ry  as
"praxis." See Etienne G ilson, gen. ed ., A History of Philosophy,
4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1966), vo l. 4: Recent Philosophy:
Hegel to the Present, by Etienne Gilson, Thomas Langan, and Armand
A. Mauer, p. 4!T Hegelian d ia lec tics  grasp the meaning o f what 
moves (temporal ontological framework) from a classical epistemologi­
cal framework. Traditional o b je c tiv ity  is  assumed—idea o f essence— 
in order fo r negation to be. In order to understand two r e a lit ie s  
or events as contradictory to each other— as thesis and an tithesis  
of the d ia le c tic  method—th e ir  meaning or essenqe is to be considered
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m ateria lism J Consequently i t  is  th is  philosophy o f history which
2
provides the in terpretation  of the ontological framework of reason.
In i ts  in terpretation  o f concrete h is to rica l re a lity  Marxism provides
3
a new “temporal hierarchy" which is  to shape its  epistemological
4
framework.
as "closed," that is  as “frozen." And this can be done only in a 
timeless primordial presupposition which requires the object to be 
“s ta t ic ."  Should temporal epistemological framework be applied— 
temporal o b jec tiv ity—no contradiction arises—only the richness 
and manifoldness of the Lebenswelt in  i ts  many complementary meanings 
and forms. Hegel's and Marx's d ia le c tic s  are interesting and surely  
represent a step forward in the concern and investigation of the  
temporal ontological r e a l ity .  For an introduction to  Hegel's idea 
of d ia le c tic s , see W. T. Jones, 4:125.
^ It  is not conscious, however, of the ground or dimensional­
i ty  of Being and Reason. I t  works in  the level of beings as beings. 
I ts  perspective, however, assumes a temporal primordial presupposi­
t io n . See Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 28 /. rhis feature  
of Marxism is apparent already in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels 
as they affirm  that "Communism abolishes eternal tru ths , i t  abolishes 
a l l  re lig io n , and a l l  m orality, instead of constituting them on a 
new basis; i t  therefore acts in contradiction to a ll  past h is torica l 
experience" ("Manifesto of the Communist Party," in  Karl Marx and 
Friedrich  Engels on Religion, ed. R. Niebuhr [New York: Schocken 
Books, 1964J, p. 8 9 ). We find here a more radical dismissal of past 
philosophy than in Heidegger.
2
For an introduction to Marx's philosophy of history— 
H is to ric a l Materialism, see W. T. Jones, 4:184-92. For fu rth er  
c ritic is m  and analysis, see William H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of H istory  
(Stanford, C alifo rn ia: Stanford University Press, 19/8).
3
Shaw remarks tha t "Marx's model ranks the spheres of social
l i f e  in  a hierarchy. This allows him methodologically to put aside
certa in  realms of social existence in  his investigation of more fun­
damental relations; but i t  also assumes, I would contend, that the  
d eriva tiv e  character of secondary and te rtia ry  social realms is sys­
tem atic. Accordingly, the nature o f the derivation would be suscep­
t ib le  to  s c ie n tific  analysis and formulation" (p. 68) .
^This happens in  a l l  revisionisms of Marxism and in a ll those
who use the Marxist method. See, fo r  instance, Jean-Paul Sartre
who confesses to be a "Marxist" ( C ritique  de la raison d ia lectique, 
precede de Question de Methode [P a ris : Gallimard, 1960J) but who,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
Marxist in te rp re ta tion  of h is to ric  re a lity  is not done, how­
ever, using the temporal epistemological framework^ (which was s t i l l  
undeveloped in Marx's day); rather i t  uses the c lass ica l, timeless 
one.^ The use of c lassica l logos in  Marxism may be seen in  the
according to W ilfrid  Desan's evaluation, "does not claim to introduce 
an in terp re ta tion  of h is to ry  that is  counter to the Marxist view, 
that is  to d ia lectica l materialism, but he wants merely to  become 
aware o f the d ia le c tic , and through th is  awareness, to  show its  
ra t io n a lity  (when we 11-understood) and necessity" (The Marxism of 
Jean-Paul Sartre [Gloucester, Massachusets: Peter Smith, I9 /4J,
IT 74). Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Between Existentialism  and Marxism 
(New York: Morrow Q u il l ,  1974), pp. 33-64. This procedure has also
been introduced into theology as a method; see Jose Miguez Bonino, 
Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1 9 7 5 ) ,  pp. 96-91)'.------------------------------------
What is to say, Marxist logos in  its  epistemological 
framework follows the classical pattern of reasoning in i ts  modern 
s c ie n tif ic  expression. I t  follows neither the "temporal o b jec tiv ity"  
nor the temporal abstraction in continuity to the flow o f concrete 
individual re a lity  in the equiprim ordiality of past and fu tu re  from 
whose tension springs, in  the "moment of vision," from the Present, 
the true meaning of the whole; see Heidegger, Being and Time, 2 .5 .74 .
2
I t  is true th a t Hegel's synthesis includes aspects that
r ig h tly  may be considered as antecedents of h istorica l logos; see
W. T. Jones, 4:110. However, the understanding of temporal objectiv- 
i ty  and abstraction may be considered to begin with Edmund Husserl, 
and so, to be a twentieth-century happening. Marx's ideas were, 
however, settled—in th e ir  broad lines— by 1848. See Marx and 
Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," pp. 89, 90. Marx's
analysis does not fo llow  the epistemological realm which could have 
led him to develop Hegel's insights on temporal logos.
Ws Marx works in  a very high level of abstraction he is
able to  interpret h ie ra rch ica lly  h is to rica l re a lity  on the basis 
that the force that moves history is  economic, and w ith in  the eco­
nomic realm, the class struggle constitutes the process and the 
meaning of history. See Shaw, pp. 68-75. Reality is  not grasped 
and interpreted h is to r ic a lly . A classical procedure follow s: F irs t
re a lity  is  evaluated and a decision is  taken regarding the nature 
of i ts  "true" source or power; i ts  pertaining to the economic realm. 
In th is  step re a lity  is  not denied nor reduced to only economic 
expression (see Shaw, pp. 66 , 67), but i ts  meaning is seen in  a h ier­
archy, from whose top, the class struggle, meaning flows to the 
whole. In a second in te lle c tiv e  movement, Marx reaches, by
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procedure followed to reach the foundational p rin c ip le  fo r the in te l ­
l ig ib i l i t y  of the system, namely the productive fo rcesJ  Marx does 
not reach th is  p rin c ip le  by reasoning h is to r ic a lly , that is to say,
from the past and future considered equiprim ordially, but rather
2
by addressing the present a fte r  having abstracted i t  from both past 
and fu ture . That is ,  once ins ta lled  in the present, he abstracts, 
from the manifold richness of the Lebenswelt, one particu lar aspect 
and declares i t  to  be the f i r s t  princip le of in te l l ig ib i l i t y .^  Only 
a fte r th is  classical rational procedure is complete is reason, 
equipped with a new non-Aristotelian f i r s t  p rin c ip le , to be applied 
to history in order to  in terp re t i t .  This obviously renders a non- 
h istorica l understanding of history by imposing present categories
abstracting from his present economic s ituation , the foundational 
idea o f class struggle, which is , in a th ird  step, elevated to play  
the ro le  of cognitive f i r s t  reached through a process of abstraction 
as i t  is  made to play the " f ir s t  mover* role o f the trad itio n a l theos 
in the epistemological realm of the onto-theo-logical structure of 
reason. See ib id . ,  p. 163. "The two German iconoclasts [Marx and 
Engels] only tender an a lte rn ative  world-view, which—despite i ts  
a ttrac tio n —is more speculative and quite a b it  less empirical than 
they imagined" ( ib id . ) .  The trad itiona l timeless epistemological 
framework is not only to be seen in Marx's approach to the "core" of 
re a lity  but also in the way he understood its  movement, namely, in  
d ia lec tics .
^See Shaw, pp. 59-66.
2Ib id .,  p. 73.
^The obvious "choice" dimension of Marx’ s system is pointed 
out in d ire c tly  by Shaw as he comments that Marx's idea that "the 
'rea l premise' of human existence, that men must eat, have shelter 
before they can pursue p o litic s  and philosophy, hardly shows the 
explanatory primacy o f that realm" (p. 59). A dditionally , i t  should 
be noted th a t Marx's choice regarding his " f i r s t  principle" is  not 
a choice of primordial presupposition, but rather a "new" one w ith in  
the tra d itio n a l timeless primordial presupposition.
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on the past. Through th is  procedure the meaning of the past is  
bound to  be lo s tJ
In Marx's system the theos as transcendence disappears, as 
re a lity  is  conceived on the basis o f a temporal presupposition.*1 
Theos s t i l l  appears, however, in i ts  formal cognitive function of 
" f ir s t  p rinc ip le" of the epistemological framework, namely, as the 
productive forces and the class struggle they o rig in a te .1'
See above, p. 138, n. 3. Additionally, the timeless 
epistemological framework in Marx's approach to history may be seen 
in the class struggle principle i t s e l f .  See p. 147, n. 3 above. 
Yet, as Marxism deals with history, i t  is  bound to express h istorical 
insights th a t recapture part of the past; see, fo r  instance, 
Friederich Engels, "Engels to Bloch," in Karl Marx and Friederich  
Engels on Relig ion, ed. R. Niebuhr (New York-* SChocken Books, 1964), 
p. 276.
o
"The atheistic  character of Marxism is  not questioned by any 
serious scholar" (G iulio  Girardi Marxism and C h ris tian ity  [New York: 
Macmillan, 1968], p. 19). Ernst Bloch, the Marxist rev is io n is t who 
is closer to  Christian sen s ib ility , expresses c learly  how in Marxist
epistemology the theos—Kantian idea of God—has been given not only
a "new content," but also a “new dimension," that is , temporality: 
"God appears therefore as the hypostatized ideal of the as yet tru ly  
undeveloped essence of man; he appears as Utopian entelechy. So the 
banner should cry not 'Demythologize! ’ —without distinguishing  
Prometheus or Baal from the 'Kerygma'--but 'De-theocratize! 
(Atheism in C h ris tian ity , The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom 
[New York: Herder S Herder, 1972J, pi 82). In short, “The
forward-look has replaced the up-ward-look" ( ib id . ,  p. 265); see also
idem, Man on His Own, pp. 208-216.
^E. Bloch expresses Marxism in terms of temporal ontology, 
the "ontology of Not-yet-being" (Atheism in C h ris tia n ity , p. 66). 
Yet, the meaning of h istory does not come from the fu tu re . The not- 
yet-being points to the ontological temporal dimension which provides 
openness fo r  the process. But history as process receives its  mean­
ing from the analysis of what is present. Bloch c a re fu lly  avoids the 
charge o f determinism usually made against Marxism (Shaw, pp. 66, 
67) as he sees the content of the concrete utopia springing from the 
humanum which is constituted by a pluralism- of actual cultures in 
th e ir  pro jection  into the future (A Philosophy of the Future [New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1970], ppl 144, 111). This future utopia
as Utopian Omega takes the place th a t God has in trad itiona l
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
In summary, Marxism works in a temporal ontological dimen­
s io n a lity  but i t  pursues the understanding o f i t  from a timeless  
epistemological framework. This approach allows Marxism to  render 
a "coherent" in terpretation of h istorical r e a l ity .  However, as th is  
"coherence" is  developed by i ts  timeless epistemological framework, 
the in te rp re ta tion  of the h is to rica l whole is  bound to be reduced 
to those aspects of i t  which may f i t  the chosen framework fo r  in te l ­
l ig ib i l i t y .^
In his la te r works Heidegger expresses, perhaps in  a manner
more c lear than any. other contemporary th in ker, the rad ical d i f f i -
2
culty o f developing a temporal in terpretation  of re a lity  as a whole
metaphysics and relig ion; see Atheism in C h ris tia n ity , p. 265.
Bloch's understanding o f theos as Utopian Omega develops in a 
timeless cognitive dimensionality, not only because i t  springs from 
the present but because the understanding of the various present
cultures geared toward the not-yet-being is  developed not w ith  the 
h istorica l logos but from the Marxist timeless logos whose " f ir s t  
mover"— theos—is the abstract "class struggle." See ib id . ,  pp. 
267-73.
^We are aware th a t Marxism, as Engels says ("Engels to 
Bloch," p. 274), sees h istory determined "ultim ately" and not
"solely" by productive forces. This remark, however, does not change 
the s itu a tio n  in which economy determines the meaning of the whole. 
I t  is ju s t  the same epistemological framework as the one used by
A ris to tle . The A ris to te lian  " f ir s t  mover" is  certa in ly  not the 
"only” fa c to r in the constitu tion  of meaning, but receives i t s  mean­
ing and unity from i t .  Marxism, and any Marxist revisionism , is 
bound to accept and work w ith th is  " f i r s t  p rinc ip le ."  To re ject 
i t  would amount to rejecting Marxism.
2
Heidegger (Being and Time, 2 .5 .74) expresses two aspects 
that point to the u tte r complexity of metaphysics conceived as a 
temporal enterprise. On the one hand, he says that Oasein as Being- 
in-the-w orld is in its  h is to r ic a lity  a being-with-one-anotner. This 
points to a p lu ra lity  of Daseins. On the other hand, he c la r if ie s  
that his analysis of h is to r ic a lity  in Being and Time is  ontological 
and not ontic; that is to  say, i t  deals w ith Dasein in general but 
i t  does not deal with the p lu ra lity  of its  concrete factual
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when reason has decided to follow  h is to r ic a lity  a l l  the way and not
to force upon i t  any pattern which does not fo llow  its  f lu x . Thus
h is to rica l logos rejects the selection of a new content fo r a " f i r s t
principle" because i t  is seen as an imposition of the meaning of
a part on the whole, and so as inverting the normal flow of meaning
from the whole to the p a rtJ
The la te r  Heidegger thinks that logos as i t  approaches the
2
understanding of the whole is  to  assume a poetic expression. In
th is  connection he is only able to  provide guidelines for approaching
the whole which are expressed poetica lly  as the “foursome" (G ev iert)
3
which "is the interplay of earth , sky, gods, and men as m orta ls ."
expressions. Yet, the ontological investigation points to the whole 
as constituted by the to ta l i ty  o f factual Daseins as they move in 
the ontic realm; that is , the subject matter o f temporal metaphysics. 
A dditionally , Heidegger recognizes, as he works in a temporal logos, 
the fact th a t there is not any particu lar privileged viewpoint from 
which the whole and its  meaning may be reached and surveyed— as 
Marxism in i ts  classical logos does.
^See above, p. 47, n. 1.
See Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," in 
Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago, I l l in o is :  Henry
Regnery, 1967), pp. 281-84. "The poet names the gods and names a ll  
things in th a t which they are. This naming does not consist merely 
in something already known being supplied with a name, i t  is  rather 
that when the poet speaks the essential word, the existent is  by 
th is  meaning nominated as what i t  is .  So i t  becomes known as exis­
ten t. Poetry is the establishing of being by means of the word” 
( ib id . ,  p. 281).
■*See Vycinas, pp. 224-237; and P e ro tti, pp. 84-93. This 
approach is  harshly c r itic ize d  by Bloch in Atheism in C h ris t ia n ity , 
as he says that "Heidegger re a lly  t r iv ia l iz e s  metaphysics, making 
of i t  the o ld , untenable theory of mere remembering—of the eternal 
return" (pp. 67, 68) . This is ,  however, as fa r  as Heidegger could 
go in developing an in terp re ta tion  of metaphysics as h is to ric a l 
re a lity  which at the same time would be fa ith fu l to temporal logos 
and that would not force meaning upon the natural spontaneity of 
h is to r ic a lity .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
Through these poetic expressions Heidegger describes the basic realms 
that the whole includes in its  development. As man is p art of the 
process, and as there is  no particu lar "viewpoint" fo r surveying 
the whole that may provide unity of meaning, man as metaphysician, 
as in te rp re ter of the meaning of the whole, is  considered to be the 
guard of the tru th  of Being^ as i t  appears to him.
For Heidegger the radical acceptance of temporality as dimen­
sionality  not only o f Being but also of the logos i t  generates 
entails the to ta l exclusion of the theos pole of reason's structure.
In Marxism, theos was denied as transcendence, but not in i ts  cogni-
2
tive function in the structure of reason. Heidegger's radical 
acceptance of h is to r ic a lity  leaves theos out even of the cognitive 
picture. Yet he does not deny the realm of d iv in ity  as possible
As re a lity  is  perceived in i ts  to ta l complexity and rich­
ness, Heidegger is aware that man has no possib ility  o f grasping 
the meaning of what is present to him as a whole. Man's knowledge 
of the whole is impossible because the whole surpasses man absolutely 
not only in i ts  future and past dimensions which man cannot control 
nor encompass, but in the very same present dimension which in its  
richness and manifoldness surpasses any in tent of understanding. 
Heidegger remarks that "man is rather cast by Being i t s e l f  into the 
truth of Being; in order that he, ex-si sting thus, may guard the 
truth of Being; in order that in the lig h t of Being, beings as beings 
may appear as what i t  is . Whether and how i t  appears, whether and 
how God and the gods, history and nature, enter, presenting and 
absenting themselves in the clearing of Being, is not determined 
by man. The advent of being rests in the destiny of Being" ("Letter 
on Humanism," p. 281). Cf. ib id ., p. 271; and P ero tti, pp. 78, 79.
^See p. 149, nn. 2, 3 above.
3
Consequently, reason in Heidegger works in an onto-logical 
structure. The theos is  denied because i t  entails  a logos—theo- 
logia—which brings with i ts e lf  tra d itio n a l ontology to the realm 
of meaning from the perspective of the epistemological framework. 
Heidegger sees th is  process centered in the theological claim of 
God as being causa su i; see "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution,"
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for DaseinJ Nonetheless, when God—who now is  conceived as a
“s ilen t" God—decides to come out of his silence, theology is
2
supposed to  render a quite d iffe ren t expression of Him from the 
one provided by trad itiona l Christian theology.^
pp. 71, 72. Temporal logos fo r a temporal metaphysics has to be, 
according to Heidegger, godless, that is o n to lo g ic a l, and no longer 
onto-theo-logical ( ib id . ) .  He should notice that i t  is  precisely  
the lack of the theos dimension o f reason—which is  present in 
Marxism— th a t determines the absence o f unity in Heidegger's approach 
to the whole, and the role of the philosopher as “guardian o f Being" 
as w e ll. Yet, from the viewpoint o f a temporal primordial 
presupposition Heidegger is  correct in leaving i t  outside of his 
system. God cannot be introduced in the system as Marxism does, 
because th is  implies the timeless logos which Heidegger is  replacing 
with a temporal one. The only way of including the theos again in 
the structure of reason would be through a reshaping of the very 
idea of transcendence where the via negativa of Parmenidean timeless 
primordial presupposition is  stTTI firm ly  couched determining the 
meaning o f both philosophical and theological inqu iries . This could 
not be done u n til the philosopher, and the theologian, were able 
to have a t least a basic introduction to a temporal logos, function­
ing at leas t at the level of o b je c tiv ity . This is  what Heidegger 
and others attempted to do—to develop an onto-logical structure of 
reason th a t is  godless but not a th e is tic . God is in silence. Once 
man has access to the temporal onto-logical structure of reason he 
has also an ear to hear God's voice, i f  God decides to come out of 
his s ilence . However, in th is  pattern, God no longer forms part 
of reason's structure as i t  did in tra d itio n a l reason. Onto-theo- 
logical reason, according to Heidegger, becomes onto-log ica l. This, 
however, en ta ils  a foundational lack which, in the f in a l analysis, 
destroys the very source of meaning and coherence, which is  what 
reason is  a l l  about.
^"The god-less thinking which must abandon the god o f phi­
losophy, god as causa sui, is  thus perhaps closest to the d ivine God. 
Here th is  means only: god-less thinking is more open to Him than
onto-theo-logic would like  to admit” ( ib id . ) .
2
This would happen, of course, only in the case that theology 
should decide to follow the temporal onto-logical understanding of 
logos th a t Heidegger suggests.
^Heidegger considers that the three past manifestations of 
the d iv in e—Greek, Jewish, and Christian— are no longer meaningful 
to us; see P e ro tti, p. 95. So i t  seems that he placed d iv in ity  not 
in the temporal realm (Being and Time, 2 .5 .74) in which past and
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Summary and Conclusion 
The f i r s t  step o f th is  investigation toward a critic ism  of 
theological reason is  completed. I t  has uncovered the onto-theo- 
logical structure o f reason at i ts  two foundational levels . In the 
f i r s t  level reason's structure was seen from the viewpoint of its  
functioning. Its  complex functioning is  grounded in the subject- 
object relationship which is the place where meaning is  constituted. 
This original re lationsh ip  then expanded to include, from the 
object's  side, the ontological framework, and, from the subject's  
side, the epistemologifcal framework, both re lated  to each other in  
a coherence that is  provided by the theos as ground fo r the system 
of reason.
The onto-theo-logical structure of reason also appeared, 
functioning in a hypothetical way which reached a ll  i ts  levels . 
The ground for reason's hypothetical nature was provided by the
fu tu re  are equiprim ordial, but rather in the not-yet-being of Bloch. 
In Heidegger, however, the content of the theos comes not from the 
present as in Bloch, but rather from the fu tu re  i t s e l f .  We see, 
then, that in th is  foundational enterprise, namely, the theological 
one, Heidegger is  not fa ith fu l to his understanding o f Being as his­
to r ic a l i ty .  He is not able to hear the theos equiprim ordially, from 
past and future, but rather from the future, which as i t  comes w ill
be the trad itiona l approach from the present. This is forgottenness
of Being. Let us, however, say in Heidegger's behalf, that the task
of dealing with God pertains to theology and not to  philosophy. So,
in his philosophical approach Heidegger is not in the correct 
perspective to deal w ith God, at least with the Christian God. I t  is  
in teresting  that Heidegger does not apply the viewpoint of h istorica l 
continu ity , basic fo r  a temporal logos, that he does apply fo r the 
understanding of Being, to the understanding o f the theos. Perhaps 
the critic ism  of theological reason should search fo r the under­
standing of the theos in  the history of the theos' temporal manifes­
ta tio n s . However, the f i r s t  step, s t i l l  ahead o f us, consists of 
deciding under which primordial presupposition reason is to work in 
theological enterprises.
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spontaneity of the cognitive subject. This basic character of reason 
is , then, grounded at the very core of the “place" where every mean­
ing whatsoever is constituted, namely, at the core o f the subject- 
object re lationsh ip . F in a lly , reason's structure pointed to the 
realm of the ground o f Being, the realm of primordial presupposition 
as the ultim ate ground o f meaning, coherence, and system. This realm 
appeared as essentia lly  involving a choice regarding the dimension­
a l ity  in  which the whole of reason's structure is  supposed to 
functi on.
The second leve l of the investigation has disclosed that 
"reason" is  not merely an abstract description of i t s  functioning 
alone but rather a p a rtic u la r in terpretation  of the epistemological 
framework which incorporates a p articu lar in terp re ta tion  of the 
ontological framework as a priori categories fo r understanding. 
Besides, the ontological framework is  grounded on the interpretation  
of the ground of Being or primordial presupposition. The flow of 
meaning appears to go from the dimensionality through the ontological 
framework into the epistemological framework which conditions 
a p r io r i the meaning o f every particu lar meaning both in its  individ­
u a lity  and in its  systematic relation to every other meaning.
The discovery o f th is "flow" of meaning points to a new per­
spective fo r  developing a critic ism  of reason. Throughout the his­
tory o f philosophy, the critic ism  of reason has been usually directed 
toward the problem of the origin o f knowledge. I t  was fe l t  that 
the problem of meaning could be solved i f  c ritic ism  could decide 
what kind of "object" the primary source for meaning was. This
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tra d itio n  of c ritic is m  was unaware that in the f in a l analysis meaning 
as a whole is  not determined by the object alone, but also by the 
a p rio ri epistemological structure which reason needs in order to 
function and which is always present, from the subject's s ide, in 
any knowledge of objects. Kant, with his transcendental c ritic is m  
of reason, was the f i r s t  to point toward the new and decisive view­
point fo r c r itic is m . This new perspective, then, involves reason's 
dimensionality and structure as the realm fo r a critic ism  of reason 
in  general, and o f theological reason in p a rtic u la r.
Consequently, the analysis of the onto-theo-logical structure  
o f reason was directed to i ts  ground or dimensionality. That 
involved leaving the area of a formal description of reason's 
functioning and entering the area of a concrete description o f rea­
son's actual functioning as i t  interprets i ts  own structure. Here
the history o f philosophy discloses that the ground of Being has
been interpreted following two opposite ways.
The f i r s t  way, the interpretation o f the ground o f Being 
as timeless, was originated at the very b irth  of Greek philosophy 
i t s e l f  through Parmenides' foundational insight. Reason as we know 
i t — in its  broad lines and foundational aspects—even as i t  is  used 
by contemporary science, is the product of a long series of in te rp re ­
tations and revisions of the ontological and epistemological frame­
works on the assumption that dimensionality of Being is tim eless.
The second way, the interpretation o f the ground o f Being
and reason as temporal, appears rather late in  the history o f phi­
losophy. Its  systematic development, even i f  seen germinally in
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Hegel, is  a twentieth-century happening. Its  youth shows up. Its
ontological framework has been developed only at the level o f human
being in  order to provide the foundation fo r a new understanding 
of reason's structure a t  the level of o b jec tiv ity . The theological 
and metaphysical aspects of reason (tha t is , the system and the
ground fo r  unity and system) in its  temporal dimensionality are s t i l l  
in th e ir  in it ia l  stage o f re flec tio n . Through d iffe ren t approaches, 
Evolutionism and Marxism try  to grasp the temporal h is to ric a l mean­
ing o f the whole by using a timeless epistemological framework. Even 
though these approaches provide coherent interpretations fo r the
whole, they lose i ts  h is to r ic a lity . Heidegger, on the other hand, 
represents in a notable way those who are sensitive to the necessary 
correspondence that must ex is t between Being and Knowledge; in other 
words, to  the need th a t reason's structure has of functioning within 
the same dimensionality. Yet he is unable to provide an in terpre­
ta tion  fo r the ontological framework at its  metaphysical le v e l--  
system— mainly because in  his thinking the theos aspect o f reason 
is to  be put aside. He does not suggest atheism, as does Marxism 
which nevertheless keeps the theos as cognitive function, but rather 
a godless structure fo r  reason and philosophy. In short, Heidegger 
replaces the onto-theo-logical structure of reason w ith an onto­
logical one.
Thus the phenomenological analysis of reason's structure  
shows not only that reason as we generally use i t  is  the product 
of a long series of interpretations but also that reason i ts e lf ,  
from the core of i ts  very structure, provides the ground on which
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the interpretations develop. This hypothetical nature of reason, 
however, does not mean that reason is  able to work in  such d iffe re n t  
ways as to lose a l l  its  relevance and authority as the ground of 
meaning and communication. In short, the hypothetical nature of 
reason does not sink reason in to  conceptual re la tiv ism . Reason's 
actual dynamics, however, show th at i t  can function in  two d iffe re n t  
ways of constitu ting  meaning. So reason is  s t i l l  the proper tool 
fo r meaning and communication. But reason does not appear to be 
e ither the f in a l source of tru th  or its  judge. In other words, once 
reason is working within a particu la r dimensionality i t  may lead 
us to tru th . Yet reason by i t s e l f  is  unable to decide which dimen­
s ionality  leads to tru th  because its  own structure and nature 
include dim ensionality and hypothetical procedures.
Reason cannot go beyond its  structure and dimensionality 
to reach a fu rth e r reference which may allow i t  to decide. This 
lim ita tion  both reveals reason's unfitness as f in a l judge o f tru th  
and opens up anew Parmenides' choice by asking fo r  the foundation 
of the choices made by philosophers (e ith e r  Parmenides' or 
Heidegger's). So we reach here the ultimate question to which the 
critic ism  of reason leads and whose answer would provide the founda­
tion  and beginning of c ritic is m . The answer to th is  question, how­
ever, does not determine the structure of reason's functioning but 
rather the way th is  functioning must go in order to be a tool for 
tru th . I t  seems, then, that in  order to answer th is  foundational 
question we need to meet ultim ate truth at least in a p a rtia l and 
germinal way.
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At th is point two paths are possible in the task of seeking 
th is  in i t ia l  germinal contact with tru th , namely, the philosophical 
and theological. This investigation is  going to try  the theological 
way in search fo r a perspective that in touch with theological tru th  
may help us both to  decide the proper dimensionality of reason as 
a theological tool o f meaning and to indicate, from the viewpoint 
of the chosen dimensionality, the in i t ia l  steps toward a critic ism  
of theological reason a t a l l  its  structural levels.
The next step in this investigation is to observe how reason 
has been actually used throughout the history of theology in order 
to discover its  dimensionality and structure in the development of 
systems o f doctrines and the overall meaning of C h ris tian ity .
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CHAPTER I I
THE 0NT0-THE0-L06ICAL STRUCTURE OF 
REASON IN THEOLOGY
The analysis developed in chapter I regarding the onto-theo- 
logical structure o f reason as place and ground fo r the constitution  
of meaning makes i t  possible for our investigation to enter into 
its  second step, namely, the analysis of the way in which reason 
actually works in theological discourse. Logos in theo-logia, as 
place and ground fo r the constitution o f meaning, works in and
through the onto-theo-logical structure already analyzed. Both the
material and the object of our phenomenological analysis are to be 
found in the actual systems of theological thought which o ffe r for 
investigation already constituted meanings which point to reason 
and its  structure as th e ir  basis. This is  what, with Kant, we could 
call the "fact" of theological reasonJ
Among the great variety of theological systems available 
for investigation , we have chosen, as the place fo r our phenomeno­
logical analysis, the systems of Thomas Aquinas and Rudolf
^This procedure is followed by Kant, C ritique of Pure 
Reason, pp. 33, 34. Kant's lim ita tio n , though, which has brought 
critic ism  to his system as a whole, lie s  in  that he id en tifie d  a part
of reason's a c t iv ity  with the whole. In other words, he saw
Newtonian physics as physics i ts e lf .
160
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BultmannJ Within the broad and extensive material that both systems 
provide our inquiry w ill  be directed to the realm of the primordial 
presupposition and a p r io r i conditions fo r  the constitution o f mean­
ing in order to discover in  which dimensionality and structure reason
was actua lly  used as Christian theology was developed in two o f its
2
major tra d itio n s .
My choice of the theological systems of Thomas Aquinas and 
Rudolf Bultmann as representatives of classical and s c ie n tific  theo­
logy is based on the follow ing reasons. Representatives are needed, 
because to analyze "schools o f thought" or "theological tendencies" 
would e n ta il the prior and very d if f ic u lt  task of defining what is  
meant by "school" and "tendency.” Yet, performing such a task would 
be useless because i t  would represent one's own rational structure  
or at least include i t ,  confusing the whole investigation. In short, 
the "fact" o f theological reason to be investigated would be lost. 
On the other hand, i t  is  m ateria lly  impossible to come up w ith an 
epistemological analysis of each important theologian. Thus repre­
sentatives are needed so th a t in a way the summary of theological 
approaches may be presented by the history of theology i t s e l f .  I t  
is perhaps too soon to speak of "history o f theology" in the case 
of Bultmann, but since a choice had to be made, Bultmann*s theology 
has at leas t as much relevance as any other modern s c ie n tific  Protes­
tant theology. Moreover, there is  l i t t l e  doubt that both Thomas 
Aquinas and Rudolf Bultmann are highly in flu e n tia l theologians whose 
particu la r understanding o f reason is s t i l l  followed today by the 
great m ajority of Christian theologians. In their systems, some 
rational choices have been made and coherently developed to th e ir  
fin a l consequences and im plications. As representatives of c lass i­
cism and scientism, and o f Catholicism and Protestantism, they in 
a way comprise the whole of the history of Christian theology. Care 
should be taken not to id e n tify  e ither Thomas's or Bultmann’ s systems 
with theology i ts e lf .  They represent only a part of the broad spec­
trum of theological " fa c t."  Yet, as the whole of theological “fact"  
is impossible to analyze at th is  point, we choose to analyze theolog­
ical reason in its  Thomistic and Bultmannian expressions. On the 
other hand, we should remember that the structure of reason's 
functioning is  not given by i ts e l f  but rather co-given in the system 
i t  produces. See pp. 44-50 above.
Consequently, the purpose of th is  chapter is not to develop 
a "new understanding" of Thomas Aquinas or Rudolf Bultmann. Such 
is not the purpose of th is  investigation. The whole of th e ir  theo­
logical projects and th e ir  manifold implications also f a l l  outside 
of the epistemo logical lim its  of th is  analysis. I w il l  not deal
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A preliminary glance at both systems reveals the fa c t that 
neither Thomas Aquinas nor Rudolf Bultmann has addressed himself 
e ith er to the realm or to the interpretation of the meaning o f rea­
son's (or Being's) dimensionality.^ Consequently, our investigation  
has to be developed in the realms pertaining to the ontological and 
epistemological frameworks in which Thomas and Bultmann actually  
used reason as an indispensable theological to o l. From the starting  
point provided by these frameworks we focus mainly on the primordial 
presupposition they e n ta il.  At the same time our analysis makes
us aware, in a structural way, of the way reason functions in  each
2
theological system. Our analysis is developed following a h is to rica l
with th e ir theologies: exegetical procedures as such, or explicate  
th e ir  understanding of such related issues as revelation or mythol­
ogy. S im ilarly a detailed analysis and critic ism  of th e ir  
epistemological-philosophical writings or of the ongoing discussion 
and critic ism  that they have aroused in the theological community 
are not intended here. I w il l  deal with th e ir  philosophy and theo­
logy only insofar as the use and in terpretation  of the structure
of reason in th e ir  system requires.
^Ortega y Gasset in La Idea de P rinc ip io , p. 271, explains
th a t Being has not been aske3 about its  meaning since 480 years
before Christ. He also points out that Scholasticism in particu la r  
did not ask fo r the meaning of Being but rather fo r A r is to tle 's  
understanding o f Being.
2
A detailed study of Thomas’ s and Bultmann's use and in te r ­
pretation of reason's ro le in theology is not possible in our study, 
which searches fo r the a p rio ri conditions u t iliz e d  by reason rather 
than fo r a description of reason's manifold procedures and features. 
I t  should be c lear at th is  point that reason's actual procedures 
in the constitution of meaning is determined by the a p r io r i condi­
tion s , presuppositions (ontological and epistemological), and primor­
d ia l presupposition chosen fo r reason’s functioning. A detailed
and complete study should go beyond our structural determination 
of reason's dimensionality and basic procedures at the framework 
leve l, to both a detailed analysis of reason’s functioning as i t  
constitutes d iffe re n t kinds of theological meaning and to show the 
way in which the actual resu lt, that is  the theological idea w ithin
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order.* Consequently we deal f i r s t  w ith classical reason and then,
2
in the second part o f th is  chapter, w ith  s c ie n tific  reason.
While we search in each theological system fo r  reason's 
dimensionality as the ultim ate a p r io r i ground fo r meaning, we should 
remember that according to the analysis developed in chapter I ,  two 
possible primordial presuppositions have been recognized by philoso­
phical re fle c tio n , namely, timelessness and tem porality. In th is  
context we ask which one is  at work in  each theological system.
As the primordial presupposition determines the very 
functioning of reason through the in te rp re ta tion  o f i ts  framework, 
the f i r s t  and foundational decision th a t any system, philosophical 
or theological, should consciously make is the decision regarding 
the primordial presupposition to be used. Such is  also the f i r s t  
step to  be taken in the area of the critic ism  of reason. Only on
the given system, depends for its  meaning and in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  upon a 
p articu la r understanding of reason's ro le  that each theologian chose 
to fo llow .
^The h istorica l order is used fo r  the same reason presented 
in the case of the analysis of reason's dimensionality in its  philo­
sophical development. See above, p. 75, n. 2 .
The name is chosen only fo r the practical purposes of quick 
id e n tific a tio n . We are aware that both classical theology and its  
structure of reason are also ''s c ie n tif ic ,"  at least from Thomas' 
classic claim onwards: "Dicendum sacram doctrinam scientiam esse,"
ST, I .  1, 2 (in  specialized lite ra tu re  quotes from Thomas follow  
several styles, of which I have chosen one). However, since the 
s c ie n tif ic  model has changed substantia lly  since Thomas's times, we 
use the term "s c ie n tific "  in the sense of a carefu l procedure of 
investigation that searches for tru th  in  the natural realm. I t  
should be added that the term "s c ie n tif ic "  is used in  i ts  Newtonian 
p o s it iv is t  sense and not in i ts  ra th e r recent and yet unexplored 
meaning brought about by modern physical discoveries. See Werner 
Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp.
154-65; and idem, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern
Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 187-21)6.
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th is  basis may both the ontological and epistemological frameworks 
of reason's structure be developed.
In chapter I our analysis provided the philosophical and 
epistemological contexts that the decision regarding the theological 
primordial presupposition requires. The main purpose of th is  second 
chapter is to provide the theological context from the realm o f the 
history of theology. Our th ird  chapter completes the necessary theo­
logical context from the realm of Sacred Scripture. Only then can 
a c r it ic a l choice regarding both reason and i ts  primordial presuppo­
sition  be possible.
Classical Reason 
As we consider classical reason in the way i t  is represented 
by Thomas Aquinas, we should bear in mind th a t Thomas's in te rp re ta ­
tion of reason’ s structure is generally accepted and u t il iz e d  fo r  
the constitution of theological meanings not only by Roman Catholic  
theology^ but i t  is also accepted by conservative Protestant
Thomas Aquinas's system influences the in te llec tu a l s truc­
ture of Roman Catholicism when i t  provided the basis for the Vatican  
Council I 's  declaration of reason (Vatican Council I ,  Dogmatic Con-  
s titu tio n  Concerning the Catholic Faith, chap. 4, in The Sources 
of Catholic Dogma, ed. Henry Denzinger (S t. Louis: B. Herder Book
Zo7, i9 b /J :I^95-1800). See Mary Cecelia Wheeler, Philosophy and 
the Summa Theologia of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington D .C .: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1956}, p. 101; and Giuseppe 
Mario P izzu ti, "Teologia e Metafisica: La radice Kantiana d e lla
posizione de Karl Barth .nella Kirch1iche Dogmatik," F ilo s o fia  28 
(1977) :574. On the function and relevance o t  ihomas’s system fo r  
Catholic thought, see M. D. Chenu, Is Theology a Science? (New York: 
Hawthorn Books, 1959), pp. 11-113; John Paul ITT "Discours de S. 
S. Jean-Paul I I  sur L 'ac tu a lite  de saint Thomas," Revue Thomiste 
(1980) :9; and Wheeler, pp. 98-102. To be a Catholic theologian one 
needs not be a Thomist. However, at least the structure and place 
of reason in theology is to follow Thomas Aquinas's broad
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1 2 theology. Consequently, our analysis attempts to uncover the
structure o f theological reason as i t  has been u t il iz e d  by both
3
tra d itio n s .
In order to show both the way in which reason actually  
functioned and the dimensionality which reason, in i ts  classical 
expression, chose fo r i ts  functioning, we search Thomas's
in te rp re ta tio n . This is  a common denominator that we can fin d , fo r  
instance, in theologians such as Karl Rahner (Robert Moloney, 
“Seeing and Knowing: Some Reflections on Karl Rahner's Theory of
Knowledge," Heythrop Journal 18 [1977]:412), Hans Kung (Does God 
Exist?, pp. 621, 22, 56; c f .  Catherine Mowry Lacugna, The Theological 
Methodology of Hans Kung [Chico, C a lifo rn ia : Scholars Press, 1982J,
pp. 8-bb)V Teilhard de Chardin (The Phenomenon of Man, p. 29), and 
Gustavo G utierrez, (Theology of L iberation: HistoryT P o litics  and
Salvation [New York: Orbis Books, I973J, pp. 56, 5 / ,  69-72 ).
^ It  is clear that both the Reformers and Protestant Orthodoxy 
developed th e ir  systematic theological thinking w ithin the Catholic 
Scholastic framework of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  "A good portion of p a tris ­
t ic  theology was absorbed in to  medieval theology, and a good portion 
of medieval theology was taken over by the Reformers. A great deal 
of the m aterials of a standard Protestant orthodox work on theology 
can be found, for example, in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica" 
(Bernard L. Ramm, The Evangelical Heritage [Waco, Texas: Word Books,
1973], p. 58 ). See also Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, 7 vols. 
(New York: Dover, 1961), 7:238, 243-44; Reinhold Seeberg, The His-
tory of Doctrines, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Bakerj T977)
2:223-24; Kiing, pp. 497-98; Wheeler, p. 84; c f. Ghislain Lafont, 
"La pertinence theologique de l 'h is to r ie :  Dialogue avec Pierre
G isel," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques 63 (1979):181, 190; Leonard 
Hodgson, Towards a Christian Philosophy (London: Nisbet, 1946),
pp. 12-26; arid Robert H. Ayers, "Language, Logic and Reason in 
Calvin's In s titu te s ," Religious Studies 16 (1980):284, 285.
2
Focused mainly on Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra
Gentiles.
3
At least in some degree, modern lib e ra l Protestant theology 
departs from th is  pattern. We address th is  departure in  the second 
part of th is  chapter.
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in terpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworksJ
Ontological Framework:
Timelessness
The center of g rav ity  of Thomas Aquinas's system may be found
2
in the understanding o f being, namely, in his metaphysics. Thomas's 
metaphysics is developed a fte r the pattern and model provided by
"2 A
A ris to tle 's  metaphysics. This fac t already points to a timeless
As we ta lk  about "framework" the reader should bear in mind 
two things. F irs t , th a t what we c s ll "framework" is  what Thomas 
Aquinas or any other author ca lls  "theory" both o f ontology (onto­
logical framework) and of knowledge (epistemological framework). 
Me ca ll them "framework" because our epistemological analysis has 
shown that reason needs such interpretations in  order to function. 
However, i t  should be remembered that since the content and meaning 
of any framework is  produced by reason i t s e l f ,  i t  stands in the level 
and character of "theory," hence, i t  is  a hypothetical following 
of the character of reason as a whole. See pp. 32-52 above.
2
See Wheeler, pp. 24-25; and Etienne Gilson, Le Thomisme: 
Introduction a la  philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin, bth ed. rev. 
(Paris: L ib ra irie  Philosophique J. V rin , 1947), p. 43. Thomas
Aquinas himself provides a useful summary of his in terpretation  of 
Being in his On Being and Essence, trans. with an introduction and 
notes by Armand Mauer (Toronto, Canada: the P o n tifica l In s titu te  
of Medieval Studies, 1949). Of course, Thomas's metaphysics may 
be found in a much more developed form in his two Summas.
3
Thomas Aquinas was not the f i r s t  to use A ris to tle  for theo­
logical purposes, see Yves M. J. Congar, A History of Theology 
(Garden C ity, New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 8b. A sw ift glance
into Summa Theologiae shows that Thomas made use not only of 
A ris to tle  but also of many other th inkers, such as Augustin of Hippo, 
Pseudo-Dionysious, and Maimonides; see E. Gilson, The Philosophy 
of St. Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1924), pp. 12-
lb. Though A ris to tle  provides the framework fo r Thomas Aquinas's 
system, the neo-Platonic heritage of Thomas's metaphysics must not 
be forgotten. See G. M. P izzu ti, "Per una interpretazione s to r i-  
cizzata de Tomaso D'Aquino: Senso e l im it i  di una prospettiva,"
Sapienza 29 (1976):460. For additional commentary on the Aristo- 
telism of Aquinas, see, fo r instance, L o ritz , pp. 291-94.
4
Even though the Aristotelism  of Aquinas may be interpreted  
in d iffe re n t ways and with d iffe re n t emphases, the basic fact that
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primordial presupposition standing at the very basis of Thomas's sys-
temJ In th is  context, Thomas's contribution to  both philosophy and
theology may be seen in his Christian in terpretation  of the A ris to -
2
te lian  pattern fo r  both being and knowledge.
Ontos
A fter Thomas Aquinas's death his ontology has been in te rp re -  
3
ted in various ways. Among them i t  is possible to distinguish  
two major tra d itio n s , namely, essentialism and existentia lism  as 
either essentia (form) or esse (existence), both being aspects of
the pattern of thought followed by Aquinas is  confessedly A r is to te lic  
is generally accepted by scholarship on Thomas.
^As we have already pointed out (see above, pp. 88 -96 ), 
A ris to tle 's  system assumed and worked in a timeless primordial 
presupposition both in the ontological and epistemological frameworks 
of reason's structure .
2
Thomas saw that A r is to tle 's  metaphysics was able to provide 
the basic framework for in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  needed fo r approaching the 
study of theology as a whole in a sc ien tific  way. Etienne Gilson in 
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random 
House, 1958), pjT 364, 365, remarks that (nomas's  approach to 
theology from the viewpoint of the A ris to te lic  framework produced a 
revolution both in theology and philosophy. However, we should 
remember th a t Thomas interpreted the f i r s t  principles of A r is to te lic  
metaphysics and theory of knowledge from a Christian viewpoint 
( ib id .) .  The purpose of Thomas's philosophical re flec tio n  was to 
provide theology with a necessary background fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  
Hence, in his thinking philosophy and theology stand together in an 
unbreakable relationship . See Josef Peiper, Introduction to Thomas 
Aquinas (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), ppT 152-53. Thomas' s
metaphysics provides theology with a "rational bridge" which helps 
him to bring the supernatural content of revelation into man's normal 
realm of knowledge (Congar, p. 113). F in a lly , Thomas's metaphysical 
pattern as ontological framework of the structure of reason affects  
not only the form but the very content of theological meanings. See 
ib id ., p. 86 .
3
We are not. concerned here with Thomism as a school of 
thought. For a b r ie f h is to rica l introduction to the main trends in 
Thomism, see (Ciing, Does God Exist? pp. 22-26.
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Thomas's ontology are emphasized J  Neo-Thomist approaches seem to
2
be more comfortable with the e x is te n t ia lis t  in terp re ta tion . An 
analysis o f Thomas's w ritings, however, shows that both esse and 
essentia are foundational fo r his ontological framework.
3
According to Aquinas, esse is  the act of existence which 
is  found at the root o f re a lity  and which is ontologically prior
4
to everything else including essentia. Esse is "the most perfect 
thing of a l l , "  which is  the condition even fo r the foundational meta-
5
physic concepts of matter and form; potency and act. Existential
^Gilson, Thomisme, pp. 49, 138.
2
For instance, see Jacques Mari ta in , Existence and the Exist­
ent (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1964)1 Savagnone, pp. 73-76;
Pasquale Orlando, "Verso un Tomismo Esistenzia le ," pp. 382-410; 
Gilson, L 'E tre , p. 301, and Thomisme, pp. 49, 138. I t  should be 
noticed th a t, as M arita in , Existence and the Existent, p. 1, says, 
Thomas's is  a "d iffe ren t kind" of ex is ten tia lism  which must not be 
confused with the contemporary one (as in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, 
fo r instance). Thomas's existentia lism , o f course, is fo r Thomists 
the “only authentic existentialism " ( ib id . ) .  This already suggests 
that a particu lar in terpretation  or understanding of the esse is 
involved.
3
Thomas uses the word ens to  re fe r  to an e n tity  and the word 
esse to re fer to the act of existence of an e n tity  or substance. See 
GiIson, Thomisme, p. 44. ST, I .  5, 1 ad 1, explains that being (ens) 
properly s ign ifies: some tHTng-existing-in-act (esse in actu).
4SCG, 2. 54, 50, 51. So the essentia as we find  i t  presup­
poses the esse as i ts  ontological ground. See SCG, 2.52; and BE, 
chapter 5; c f . Octavio Derisi, "El fundamento de la  Metafisica 
Tomista. El esse e in te llig e re  d iv ino , fundamento y causa de todo 
ser y entender participados, Sapientia 35 (1980):15, 16. “The most 
perfect thing of a ll is to exist Lipsum esse], fo r everything else is 
potential compared to  existence" (S I, I .  4. 1 ad 3 ).
^"Nothing achieves actuality  except i t  exists , and the act of 
existing is therefore the ultimate a c tu a lity  of everything, and even 
of every form" (ST, I .  4. 1 ad 3 ). So esse is  the ground of every 
form of being, be i t  natural (ST, I .  3. 4) or supernatural (separate 
substances, BE, p. 44; c f . SCG,- ?. 54. 10). Cf. M arita in , Existence, 
p. 37.
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Thomism likes to remark that in  the idea o f esse, Thomas was facing 
(and solving) a problem unnoticed by A ris to tle , namely, the problem 
th a t appears when being as being is  related to  nothingJ In a sense 
Thomas may be considered as an e x is te n tia lis t  philosopher since esse 
precisely points to "being there” (Dasein) as the basic precondition 
fo r any meaning at a l l .  However, the s im ilitude  between Thomas's 
existentialism  and modern existentia lism , in general, ends rig h t  
here, namely, where i t  begins.
In Thomas's thinking the concept o f esse neither exhausts 
the ontological realm nor provides the ground fo r  the in terpretation  
of either the epistemological and ontological frameworks. The concept
For instance, Gilson, Thomisme, p. 49. This nothing refers  
to the not-being as in Parmenides. TRus i t  is  the question fo r  the 
explanation of the existence o f being, and not fo r  its  meaning as, 
fo r instance, Heidegger's analysis suggests. See "The Way Back," 
pp. 216-218. As we w ill see, the question of the meaning of Being 
in Aquinas has been, basically , answered by Parmenides; hence, such 
a question does not need to be posited. For Heidegger, on the con­
tra ry , the question fo r existence as such, in  disconnection from the 
question fo r meaning, has neither relevance nor meaning, since 
re flec tion  begins because of i t  as what is  there (Dasein) . For 
Heidegger, in his h istorical context, what is  important is the ques­
tion  for the meaning of what is  there. On the other hand, in Thomas, 
the idea of creatio  is  applied to esse, but not as the ground for 
the meaning of being as Heidegger claims (An Introduction to Meta- 
physics, pp. 7, 8 ) .  Heidegger claims that Christian  thinkers cannot 
formu1 ate the ultim ate question fo r the meaning of Being because 
they have the answer in the idea of creation. This Heideggerian 
idea misunderstands the purpose and place o f the idea of creation  
in Christian theology. Creation points to the esse, yet i t  does
not ground, neither in the Bible nor in Thomas, the meaning or ground 
of Being; c f. "The Way Back," pp. 216-18. I t  is  proper, however,
to say in Heidegger’ s behalf, th a t in classical theology the idea
of the meaning of Being is  so hidden that at f i r s t  glance i t  seems
to be reduced to the question fo r  existence in  the creatio answer. 
Further analysis, however, reveals that the meaning of Being, both 
in creation and in the creator himself, has another ground and fo l ­
lows a d iffe ren t level of inqu iry . See the analysis of the meaning 
of Being according to Moses in the th ird  chapter.
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of esse rather expresses the independence of the ontological realm 
from the cognitive realm and provides the ground fo r  the p o s s ib ility  
of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks.^
Meaning, in  Thomas's system, appears when esse is  seen in  
i ts  unbreakable re la tio n  to essentia. Meaning happens in the level 
or realm of essentia as essentia is  considered to be "that through
ST, I .  44, 1 ad 1. Since the cause does not enter into the 
d e fin itio n  of an ens which is  caused, esse as the ontological 
"cause," or at least as the precondition for meaning o f ens, is  not 
related or included in its  actual meaning; c f. BE, p. 4(k  The non­
conceptualization of the act of esse as basic orvEological ground or 
realm is explained by Gilson as he says that tru th  consists in "the 
operation of an in te lle c t  that going beyond the simple grasping of 
quiddity of Being reaches the act th a t causes i t "  (L 'E tre , p. 123). 
As we can see "quiddity" is the cognitive term th a t refers to  
knowledge as existing  in the epistemological framework, corresponding 
to the essence in the ontological framework. Hence, beyond meaning 
we can see the ontological cause or act that originated meaning,
namely, esse. But th is  esse, as such, has no meaning of i ts  own
independent of essentia. Hence esse is not re a lly  grasped but rather  
co-grasped with the essentia with which i t  co-appears. M aritain  
( Existence, pp. 34, 35) ca lls  esse, as ontological ground, the
"super-intel 1 ig ib le" ground fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y ,  th a t is , he sees 
esse as transcending the realm of mind and knowledge. He also 
fu rther explains th a t "to say that which exists is  to jo in  an in te l ­
l ig ib le  to a super in te ll ig ib le ” ( ib id . ) .  Kant works precisely on 
th is  understanding of Thomas regarding existence as esse, when he 
affirm s, as he c r it ic iz e s  the Ontological Argunent fo r the existence 
of God, " I f  I take the subject (God) with a ll i ts  predicates (omnipo­
tence being one), and say: God is ,  or There is a God, I add no new
predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or a ffirm  the 
existence of the subject with a ll i ts  predicates— I posit the object 
in re la tio n  to my conception. The content of both is  the same; and 
there is  no addition made to the conception" (C ritique  of Pure Rea­
son, p. 350).
2
The real d istinction  between esse and essentia is  at the 
core o f Thomas's ontological framework. "From th is  is  clear that the 
act of existing is  other than essence or quiddity" (BE, p. 46). See 
also ST, I .  3. 4 . This d istinction  is  not present in the case of 
God'sUeing because "sua ig itu r  essentia est suum esse" ( ib id . ) .
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which and in which a being has its  act of existing [esse ] . " 1 As
essentia is  understood, following A ris to tle , as “quod quid erat
2 3esse," the Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition shows
up as i ts  precondition. Timelessness can add itionally  be seen as
essentia follows form. I t  is  clear that essentia, in Thomas, refers
4
to the nature of both composite and separate substances. I t  is
BE, p. 28. Essentia according to Thomas is meaning as con­
sidered in its  ontological ground in union with esse. Quiddity is 
the epistemological correlate to essentia in  the mind of the cogni­
tiv e  subject ( ib id . ) .  We should notice at th is  point th a t the real 
d is tin c tio n  between essentia and esse means that essentia by i ts e lf  
is not the ultim ate ground fo r re a lity  and meaningl Tn” th is  sense 
the essentialism of Plato and the formalism of A ris to tle  are overcome 
by Thomas. See, fo r instance, Savagnone, pp. 73-75. However, when 
there is  esse there is always essentia. That is , essentia always 
en ta ils  as its  ontological support an existence, an esse as actu. 
ST, I .  3, 4 ad 2, expresses that esse insofar as i t  is  said means 
actum essendi. that is , the ontological realm is in close relationship  
with essentia and compositionem propositionis. That is ,  esse points 
to the epistemological realm.
2
BE, p. 27. Armand Mauer comments on the meaning o f essence 
as "what a thing was to be," pointing out that "the past tense of 
the verb (was) does not express past time. I t  expresses absolutely 
the d irection  of the tendency of a being's nature" ( ib id . ,  n. 6 ). 
So, i t  seems that the etymological meaning of essenti a already points 
to the dimensionality where a "being's nature" is given according 
to Thomas Aquinas's thinking, that is  to say, i t  points to timeless­
ness.
^See p. 72 , n. 2 . Gilson (Thomisme, p. 126) remarks that
essentia in  Latin corresponds to the Greek ousia; c f .  James F.
Anderson, An Introduction to the Metaphysics oT St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), pp. 32, 24.
^SCG, 2. 54. 10. Composite substances are formed by matter
and form (BE, pp. 30-32), and essentia embraces both. Separate sub­
stances are composed of potency and act (th is  also applies to compo­
s ite  substances, SCG, 2. 54. 10). See ST, I .  75, 5 ad 4; and BE, 
p. 45. Essentia, then, refers in m ateria l being, to the composite 
substance (matter and form), and in the separate substances to  form 
and i ts  entailed potency, namely, to i ts  participated esse.
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clear also that the essentia of these two main kinds of ontological
substances is expressed through the ontological concepts o f form
and potency-matter J  Now, according to Thomas, form as the p rin c ip le
2
of Being, has primacy over matter. And since matter points to  the
3
temporal dimension of re a l ity  while form points to timelessness
a
(a fte r  the P latonic-Aristotelian tra d it io n ),*  i t  follows th a t in
Since a separate substance does not have matter (BE, 
pp. 43, 44) and is , therefore, a form, the p o te n tia lity  that belongs 
to matter (namely, the changeability of tem porality) does not apply 
to i t .  However, the potency o f its  esse as partic ipated  in  re la tio n  
to God's does apply to separate substance; God does not partic ­
ipate esse because he is  ipsum esse. "There is  in them a compo­
s itio n  of form and act of existing LesseJ" (BE, p. 44).
*The principle of knowledge is form (ST, I .  12, 1 ad 2 ). 
In the case of the natural composite substances, Thomas explains 
that "we find the re la tio n  of matter and form such that form makes 
matter e x is t. I t  is thus impossible that matter exists without some 
form" (BE, p. 30). He fu rth e r adds: "On th is  account, the essence
by reason of which a thing is  called a being, cannot be e ith e r form 
alone or matter alone, but is  the two together, even though the form
alone in its  own way is  the cause of such an act of existing" ( ib id . ,
p. 31). Thomas explains th a t " i f  we find some forms which can ex is t
only in matter, this happens to them because they are fa r  removed
from the f i r s t  Principle, which is primary pure act" ( ib id . ,  p. 44); 
c f . Gilson, Thomisme, p. 48, as he comments th a t according to Thomas, 
form determines matter and gives in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  to i t ;  and SCG,
2. 54. The primacy of form is  obvious in separate substances (imma­
te r ia l  e n titie s ) as angels who have no matter. See, fo r instance, 
ST, I .  50. 2. This should not be confused with essential ism. Essen- 
TTalism suggests the primacy of essence by disregarding the idea 
of esse.
3
Matter, in Thomas's system, points to the temporal dimension 
only as materia signata (BE, p. 32). "Only corporeal matter stands 
in the way of in te l l ig ib i l i ty "  (BE, p. 44). Yet undesignated matter 
is included in the essence of composite substances (BE, pp. 30-32 ). 
In general, matter points to change ( SCG, I .  17. 2 arid 5 ) . Potency 
also en ta ils  change (SCG, I .  16). fife see, then, how time is  
certa in ly  included in Thomas's ontological framework. However, 
matter (tim e) is not the princip le of knowledge, hence i t  is  not 
the princip le  of Being e ith e r. Matter with no form is  unknowable 
( ignotum) (ST, I .  12, 1 ad 2 ).
4
Thomas does not use e x p lic itly  the idea of timelessness 
to re fe r to or describe "form." However, i t  is  c lear that he uses
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Thomas's in terpretation  of the ontological framework timelessness 
has primacy over tem porality. Moreover, regarding the dimensionality 
of Being and knowledge, i t  is  apparent that only timelessness is 
possible.^ This ontological pattern and its  determinative timeless­
ness may be seen in Thomas's in terpretation  of man's being which
2
plays a central ro le in  his in terpretation of reason's structure.
Man is a natural composite substance. As such man is com-
3 4posed o f matter and form which correspond to body and sou l. Hence,
the idea o f "form" in  i ts  A ris to te lic  meaning (BE, pp. 37, 38) as 
pointing to u n iversa lity , necessity, in t e l l ig ib i l i t y ,  and abstrac­
tion . A ll these foundational ideas, in d iffe ren t ways, assume a 
timeless ground fo r th e ir  understanding. See above, p. 90 , nn. 1 
and 2 .
^"Materiae non perfectae per formam ignotum es" (matter not 
perfected by form is ,  as such, unknowable)" (ST, I .  12, 1 ad 2). 
And "formae non lim ita tae  per materiam est secundum se maxime notum" 
(form not confined by matter is in i t s e l f  supremely knowable). 
That matter in i t s e l f ,  as changeable and temporal, cannot be the 
princip le  of knowledge, enta ils  that i t  does not belong to Being, 
"for i t  is  the same thing to think and to be"; see p. 35, n. 3. Hence 
matter, even though recognized and included as part o f re a lity  as 
a mode of i t ,  is not to be considered at the level of Being's dimen­
s io n a lity . On the contrary, since form is the p rin c ip le  of know­
ledge, timelessness appears as Thomas's im p lic it primordial presuppo­
s itio n .
2
The in terp re ta tion  of man is  central for any philosophy, 
obviously because i t  deals with man's being, and so i t  conditions 
the in terp re ta tion  o f the cognitive subject and i ts  capab ilities  
(p o te n tia lit ie s  in Thomas's language). The in terp re ta tion  of man 
is central for theology too, besides the already-mentioned reasons 
for the case of philosophy, because in theology man is  also the cen­
te r and place for the constitution of meaning. Hence, the particu lar 
in terp re ta tion  of man's being that any system adopts determines the 
broad lines which the constitution of meaning follows in i t .
3BE, pp. 32, 34, 38. We cannot enter into the c la r if ic a t io n  
of the d istinction  th a t Thomas makes between materia sipnata as prin­
cip le o f individuation and designated matter as con stitu tive  of the 
d e fin itio n  (concept, essentia, quiddity) o f man; see ib id . ,  p. 32-
4S I, I .  75. 4.
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according to the primacy of form, the soul as in te lle c tu a l nature^
2
is  not absorbed by corporeal matter but is considered to be man's 
3
specific  nature. Soul, as form, reveals that man's being is  also 
conceived as pertaining to timelessness. As we have already seen, 
the idea that in Thomas Aquinas more clearly  points to tem porality  
as Parmenidean doxa ( Lebenswelt) is  to 'be found in the concept of
4
m atter. Since matter does not pertain to the nature o f the
1ST, I .  76, 2 ad 2. See also I .  79.
2ST, I .  76, 1 ad 4.
S^CG 2. 60. See Ricardo Marimon B atllo , "Orden Natural y 
Orden Sobrenatural en Santo Tomas de Aquino,” Sapientia 33 (1978):22. 
Of course the soul is  not the man, but the form of the human body 
(ST, I .  97. 6; SCG, 2. 68- 70. 7V 57; ST, I .  75. 4 ) .  Man is  the 
composite of bodyand soul. Soul, through i ts  function as "form" 
leads in the realm of being and meaning.
4
That is  to say, p o ten tia lity  for not-being. The idea of 
m atter entails essential change and corruption as i t  may be found 
in  contingent temporal re a lit ie s . "To be subject to  change or to  
undergo i t  belongs to m ateria lity  by virtue o f i ts  p o ten tia lity "  
(ST, I .  75, 5 ad 2 ). Not a ll p o te n tia lity , however, points to tem­
p o ra lity . For instance, the separate substances also have poten­
t i a l i t y  in two ways which do not entail tem porality as in the 
Parmenidean doxa dimensionality. One is the p o te n tia lity  of the 
form of the separate substance in re la tion  to i ts  esse (ST, I .  75,
6 ad 4; SCG 2. 54). The other is  the movement (non-essentfal change) 
th a t the in te lle c t undergoes from "ignorance to knowledge" (ST, I .  
75, 5 ad 2 ). The soul, at least in v ia , is potential in the la s t  
two senses (BE, p. 44; ST, I .  79). How timelessness is  implied by 
m atter and c o rru p tib ility  may be seen as Thomas remarks that "in  
every thing which is corrupted there must be p o te n tia lity  to non- 
being. Hence, i f  there be a thing in which there is  no p o te n tia lity  
to non-being, such a thing cannot be corruptible. Now, in the in te l ­
lectual substance there is no p o ten tia lity  to non-being. . . .
Hence, neither in the case of the corruptible substances is there  
p o te n tia lity  to non-being in the complete substance i t s e l f ,  except 
by reason of the matter. But there is no matter in  in te lle c tu a l 
substances, fo r they are themselves complete, simple substances. 
Consequently, there is  no p o ten tia lity  to non-being in them. There­
fo re , they are incorruptible" ( SCG 2. 55. 5 ). I would add: there­
fo re  they are tim eless. Due to Iack of space I  cannot comment here
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soul,* i t  follows that the soul is  timeless. In v ia , y e t, man is  
not timeless in  the way the separate substances are. Notwithstand­
ing, man is  to  be interpreted in  his specific  and determ inative  
2
nature as tim eless.
In p a tria  man w ill be transformed a fte r  the likeness o f his
soul's timeless nature. In p a tr ia  man is c e rta in ly  going to have
a body, but i t  w ill be an incorruptible body whose "matter" w il l
4
be in complete subjection to the human soul. Man's body w il l  be 
raised, onto logically  to a level of re a lity  "up above every body
on how the above-mentioned p o te n tia litie s  regarding the incorrupt­
ib le , simple, immaterial in te lle c tu a l e n titie s  may be seen as an 
analogical remnant of time in  the way timeless being is in terpreted  
w ithin a hierarchical order which reaches its  climax in God who alone 
is  absolute being ipsum esse, and to whom, therefore , pertains time­
lessness in i ts  absolute mode. Cf. Marimon B a tllo , "Orden N atura l,"  
p. 22.
* “Hence there is in no way a composition of matter and form 
in a soul or an intelligence so that matter may be thought to ex ist 
in them as i t  does in corporeal substances" (BE, p. 44).
2SCG, 2. 6&.
3
"The body, then, w ill be commonly disposed in a l l  men in 
harmony .w ith the soul, with th is  result: The incorruptib le form
bestows an incorruptible being on the body in  sp ite  of i t s  composi­
tion  from contraries, because in respect to corruption the matter 
of the human body w ill be e n tire ly  subject to  the human soul. But 
the glory and power of the soul elevated to the divine v ision w il l  
add something more ample to the body united to i ts e lf .  For th is  
body w ill  be en tire ly  subject to the soul— the divine power w il l  
achieve th is — not only in regard to its  being, but also in regard 
to action, passion, movements, and bodily q u a lities"  (SCG, 4. 86 . 1 ). 
So, the body is  not anihilated as i f  man should become as the angelic  
separate substances. Yet m atter, as fa r as c o rru p tib il ity  is  con­
cerned, is to  be eliminated through its  absolute submission to  the 
soul, whose timelessness, so to speak, w ill absorb the body and those 
aspects which are incompatible with man's new ontological s ta te  in 
p a tr ia . See, fo r instance, SCG, 4. 87. 2, regarding the “new" way 
Tn wfTich the senses are supposed to function. Thomas does not 
explain, however, what would be in  patria the object of the "new"
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whatever"^ as i t  is  transformed according to the characteris­
t ic s  of the heavenly bodies.^ This picture is  completed when we
3
are told that in  pa tria  "time shall be no longer," and th a t a ll
4
animals and plants "w ill be no more." I t  is now possible to see, 
then, how the timeless dimensionality of reason e n ta ils  or
senses, since a l l  material re a lit ie s  as we know them today w il l  
disappear. See also SCG, 4. 97. 5.
1SCG, 4. 87. 2.
2
SCG, 4. 87. 1. Now, heavenly bodies are the most unchanging 
of a l l .  They c e rta in ly  do not change essentia lly  or su b stan tia lly . 
Hence, they are incorruptible (ST, I .  115. 3 ) ,  they only change
place. I t  is apparent, then, that the result o f the subjection of
the matter by the soul entails  a change in  the very nature of 
our body from corruptib le (temporal) to incorrup tib le  (tim e less). 
Additionally, i t  should be noticed that the cognitive p o te n tia lity  
of the soul w il l  disappear in the state of b lis s  in pa tria  as every 
desire is put to res t in the vis io  Dei (SCG, 1. 63)1 The only poten­
t i a l i t y  that, according to Aquinas, w ill remain in  man w il l  be th a t  
of his participated esse in re la tio n  to God's ipsum esse.
^"Now, generation and corruption in in fe r io r  bodies are 
caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore, that generation  
and corruption may come to a stop in the in fe r io r  bodies, the move­
ment of the heavens must also come to  a stop. And on th is  account 
the Apocalypse (10:6) says 'th a t time shall be no longer"' ( SCG,
4. 2 ). As we can see, according to Thomas, the movement of corrup­
tion  and generation not only w il l  come to a stop in the in fe r io r
bodies but they w il l  disappear altogether (see note below).
4
"But the other animals, the plants, and the mixed bodies, 
those en tire ly  corruptible both wholly and in p a rt, w ill not remain 
at a ll in that s tate  of incorruption" (SCG, 4. 97. 5 ). This w il l  
be effected by the fin a l f ir e  ( SCG, 4. "957 6 ) .  The Lebenswelt is  
destroyed and overcome as consequence of the overa ll timeless in te r -  
pretation of Being that Thomas u t il iz e s  as background of i n t e l l ig i ­
b i l i t y  for the understanding of the being of man both in v ia  and 
in p a tr ia . This shows the Parmenidean timeless primordial presuppo- 
s itio n  as being the one Thomas chose for both his philosophy and 
his theology. Obviously, such timelessness is embedded in the s truc­
ture of reason i t s e l f ,  as the in terpretation  o f the meaning o f the 
concepts of essence, existence, en tity , tru th , goodness, being, 
etc . . . . and the hierarchical order in which they are conceived.
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1 2 includes a timeless dimensionality fo r  man's being.
Theos
The theos idea provides, w ith in  the general structure o f 
reason, the ground fo r  unity, coherence, and system.^ Thomas
I t  is necessary to remark that perhaps, from a h is to rica l 
viewpoint, the timelessness of man's being may be seen as the f i r s t  
ground that timelessness had in the philosophical realm. I t  seems to  
be c lear that P la to 's  understanding o f an immortal soul (timeless) 
has i ts  origin in O riental Orphic relig ious thought. See Wilhelm 
Windelband, A History of Philosophy, 2 vols. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1958)2:123, 124; J . R. lurcher, The Nature and Destiny of Man: 
Essay on the Problem o f the Onion o f the Soul and the Body in Rela­
tion  to the Christian Views of Man INew York: Philosophical L ibrary, 
1969), pjT 15-17; Carsten Johnsen, Man the In d iv is ib le : T o ta lity
versus Disruption in the History o f Western Thought (Oslo: Universi- 
te tfo r la g e t, 1971), pp. 83-85. When timelessness came to determine 
the philosophical primordial presupposition, i t  could not but render 
a timeless in te rp re ta tio n  of man's being.
2
The timeless understanding of Being can be seen also as 
present in Protestant theology as i t  follows tra d itio n a l b e lie f in  
the immortality o f the soul. See, fo r  instance, John Calvin, In s t i ­
tutes of the C hristian Religion (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
1979), TI lb. 6- 8 ; c t .  Emi l Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian
Anthropology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1939), pp. 469-70;
idem, Dogmatics, v o l. 3: The Christian Doctrine of the Church,
Faith and the Consummation (Phi ladelphia: Westminster, 1962), p.
379. For a discussion within the Reformed trad itio n  of the problem 
of immortality in  i t s  re lation  to the resurrection of the bodies, 
G. C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image o f God (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1962), pp. 234-278. This position is challenged, however, 
from a b ib lica l perspective by theologians such as Oscar Cullmann, 
Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (New York: 
Macmillan, 1958), pp. 69, 60; see also Carsten Johnsen, pp. 313-324.
3
Without th is  idea reason ju s t cannot function. I t  pertains  
to reason's s tructure , not only to the interpretation of i t .  As 
reason constitutes meaning theos is  always present, e ither con­
sciously or unconsciously guiding the process. We should be aware 
th a t the theos aspect of reason structure may be expressed in d i f f e r ­
ent ways by d iffe re n t systems. For instance, theos i t s e l f ,  the 
expression we have chosen for our analysis, has obvious theological 
connotations. In philosophy the ONE plays the ro le  of theos in both 
the structure of reason and in the system i ts e lf .  Thomas e x p lic it ly  
explains that in his system theos plays the role of the Platonic ONE 
(ST, I .  44. 1 ). In Marxism the "class struggle" concept plays
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in te rp re ts  theos w ith in  the context of his ontological categories^
2
as the being (ens) whose essentia est suum esse. God, conceived
as act of existence ( esse), is the foundation of Thomas's system.^
4
Thus the criticism  th a t Thomas' ipsum esse is  an empty concept is
the ro le  of theos. See p. 144, n. 3 above. For the ro le of theos 
as structural ground fo r meaning and system, see pp. 41-51.
H his is apparent, as soon as we get in to  Thomas's f i r s t  
a rtic le s  of ST. The ontological in terpretation  th a t he developed 
in his early years and which is  expressed in an abridged form in  
BE is  presupposed as basic condition fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in  ST. 
I T  is  also apparent th a t Aquinas follows the onto-theo-logical or3o 
of the flux of meaning within the structure of reason. See p.
64, n. 3 above.
ZST, I .  3. 4; BE, p. 50.
3
Maritain explains the c e n tra lity  of God as ipsum esse in  
the following statement: "The act of existing insofar as i t  grounds
and centers the in te ll ig ib le  structure of r e a l i ty ,  as i t  expands 
in to  a c tiv ity  in every being, and as, in i ts  supreme, uncreated 
plenitude, i t  activates and a ttrac ts  to i ts e lf  the e n tire  dynamism 
of nature. At th e ir  ontological peak, in the transcendence o f the 
Pure Act and the Absolute, Being and Reason are one and the same 
r e a l i t y ” (The Range o f Reason, p. 8 7 ). See also Pasquale Orlando, 
"Verso un Tomismo es is tenzia le ,"  p. 389.
4
This idea is  broadly held by Protestant in te rp re ters  and
theologians; for instance, Paul T i l l ic h  in his Systematic Theology, 
3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press^ 1951-1963), 1:247.
T i l l ic h  sees in th is  Thomistic formula a negation o f the idea of 
l i f e :  "Potentiality and actuality  appear in c lassica l theology in
the famous formula th a t God is actus purus, the pure form in which 
everything potential is  a c tu a l.- ! ! . In- th is  formula the dynamic 
side in the dynamics-form p o larity  is swallowed by the form side. 
Pure actua lity , that is ,  actua lity  free  from any element of poten­
t i a l i t y ,  is a fixed resu lt; i t  is  not a liv e ” ( ib id . ,  p. 246). I t  
seems that T illic h  approaches the in terpretation  o f Thomas's thought 
from an essentialist perspective which disregards the basic idea 
of esse. I t  is in teresting  to notice that T i l l ic h 's  proposal regard- 
ing the "power of being” has many s im ila r it ie s  with the idea o f esse. 
For an analysis and comparison between Thomas's esse and Ti 11 ic h ‘ s 
"power of being," see Lewis S. Ford, " T illic h  and Thomas: The
Analogy of Being," The Journal of Religion 46 (1966):239-45. Accord­
ing to Pizzuti ("Teologia e M etafis ica," p. 585) the same seems to  
be the case, for instance, in Karl Barth's in te rp re ta tio n  o f the
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incorrect since i t  ignores the foundational idea of esseJ  At the
2
same time, however, we should notice th a t the "essentia lis t" in te r­
pretation of Thomas's idea of God is  not denied but rather included 
in the proper understanding of God as ipsum esse. 13 That is  apparent
classical position. In short, this s ituation  is due to an essential- 
is t  in terpretation  of Thomas Aquinas's idea of God according to which 
God is reduced to a general and empty concept in which the liv in g , 
dynamic God o f the Bible is  lost.
^Gilson (Thomisme, p. 52) affirm s that to in te rp re t Thomas's 
God as an abstract being is  to commit treason against Thomas. Regard­
ing the idea of esse and its  meaning in  Thomas Aquinas, see pp. 61,
62. Gilson, (Thomisme, pp. 126, 127) points out that Thomas overcame
the Augustinian essential ism through his proofs of God's existence 
(esse) . See ST, I .  2. 3; c f. Derisi, "El Fundamento," p. 12.
2
Essential ism refers  to the understanding of God as an 
abstraction which follows the ontological idea of form in the matter- 
form pattern of A ris to te lic  philosophy. I t  follows the path of the 
Platonic idea. And th is  is an ess en tia lis t in terpretation  of the 
Platonic Idea, because the Platonic Idea may also be understood as 
referring to or representing actual existing Being, only in another 
dimension (namely, what is  called Platonic "realism ").
3
This is apparent, fo r instance, in ST, I .  3. 2, where Thomas
affirms that God “is  essentia lly  form." In other words, esse points 
to the existence and l i f e  in God. See ST, I .  3. 3, where Thomas 
connects the ideas of God's esse and essentia to the idea of l i f e .  
So, according to Thomas Aquinas, God is  a liv ing  God. The idea of
l i f e  is grounded on the idea of esse. Yet at the same time God's
esse is  his essentia. Thus, the idea of God understood from the
viewpoint of the A ris to te lian  form is  kept as part of the idea of 
God. The basis fo r the analogia entis is  provided by the esse. 
The idea of essentia provides the ground fo r a human understanding
and in terpretation  of God’ s esse. In other words, the understanding 
of God as esse is  reached in the grasping of his essence. The esse
its e lf  is  never grasped, not even in the v is io  Dei in p a tr ia . The 
visio Dei is  a grasping of God's essentia but not of his esse. The 
esse cannot be grasped. I t  just rather co-appears with the essen­
t ia . So the esse dimension of God’s being keeps the mystery of God's 
TTFe a liv e  in the Thomistic and Catholic system. In short, neither 
Thomism nor Catholicism can be c r itic iz e d  on account of an abstract, 
empty interpretation  of God. The in te rp re ta tion  of God as form does
not exhaust God's re a l ity  into an empty idea. What s t i l l  can be
analyzed, however, is  whether Thomas's in terpretation  o f a liv ing  
God from the viewpoint of a timeless dimensionality for Being is com­
patible with the B ib lical interpretation of a liv in g  God.
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when we are to ld  that since the idea of esse points to God as
act, namely, as a liv ing  re a lity  which is  his essentia, the idea
of God must include every possible perfection.^ Thus, the ipsum
esse is the ens perfectissimum whose perfection follows the ontolog-
2 3ical pattern  of form and ac tu a lity  at th e ir  maximum expression. 
That e n ta ils  that God’ s being, as esse-essentia (maximum re a lity )
4
be understood as timeless, since i t  excludes absolutely both matter
5
and p o te n tia lity .
"God possesses a l l  perfections in His very act of ex is tin g” 
(BE, p. 5 1 ). “Unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse 
in~ actu, e t per consequens maxime perfectum" (ST, I .  4. 2 ) . See 
also SCG, 2. 52. 4; 3. 1; Orlando, "Verso unTomismo," p. 389;
Derisfi "El Fundamento,” pp. 25, 26; and G ilson, Thomisme, p. 51. 
That in God esse and essentia come together as complementary ideas 
or approaches fo r the in terp re ta tion  of re a lity  as a whole, and par­
t ic u la r ly  fo r  the in terp retation  of the maximum re a lity , namely God, 
is c le a r ly  expressed by Thomas as he not only refers to God as the 
being “whose essence is  His very act of existing" (BE, p. 50); but 
also asserts that "God is His essence" (SCG, 1. 21T7 and "that in 
God Being and essence are the same" (SCG, TI 22 ). "Thomas c learly
explains th a t "although God is  simply- the act of ex isting , i t  is 
not necessary that He lack the other perfections or excellences" 
(BE, p. 5 1 ). So "God possesses a l l  perfections in His very act of 
existing" ( ib id . ) .  Bloch points out that the "equation between being 
and perfection" in scholastic theology has i ts  source in "Plato 
rather than Christ" (Man on His Own, p. 209).
2
"God then is essen tia lly  form, and not composed of matter
and form" (ST, I .  3. 2 ). He cannot partake of matter because i t
would imply p o ten tia lity  ( ib id . ) .
■*Ibid. God "contains no p o ten tia lity , but sheer actuality." 
God "is pure act" (SCG, 1. 17. 7 ).
4SCG, 1. 17. 1-5.
5SCG, 1. 16. 1-7. Both matter and p o te n tia lity  re fe r to 
timelessness as negation o f the Parmenidean doxa. The realm of 
matter in  Thomas is the realm of Parmenidean doxa. P o te n tia lity  
is , in Thomas's hierarchical understanding of Being, what remains 
of time (analogically ) in timeless substances, th a t is , in substances 
which do not belong to the realm of Parmenidean doxa.
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In Thomas Aquinas, the idea of God's timelessness (e tern a l) 
is  based on the idea of immutability of Being J  And the idea of
immutability is  grounded on Parmenides' timeless primordial presuppo-
2
s itio n . A dd itiona lly , God's timelessness can be seen as Thomas
3
affirm s that "e te rn ity  and God are the same th ing ."
“E te rn ity , in  the true a. . proper sense, belongs to God 
alone, for e te rn ity , we said, follows upon unchangeableness ( immuta-  
b ilita tem )"  (ST, I .  10. 3 ). And as we w il l  see, e tern ity  is
timeless.
2
This, o f course, is not d ire c tly  expressed by Thomas any­
where. However, when we consider his arguments to  prove his basic 
idea of the immutabilitas Dei (ST, I .  9. 1 ), we rea lize  that his 
arguments do not prove i t  except on the assumption of the A ris to te lic  
ontological concepts of p o te n tia lity  and a c tu a lity , in which
p o te n tia lity  and change do not belong to being. Both th is  
description of the ontological framework and the in terp retation  of i t  
stand only on the assumption o f a timeless dimension for Being, 
namely, on the Parmenidean primordial presupposition. That immuta­
b i l i t y  entails  th a t timelessness is  apparent as Thomas says “that the 
notion of e te rn ity  derives from unchangeableness in  the same way that 
the notion of time -derives from change" ( ST, I .  10. 2 ).
^“Those beings alone are measured by time th a t are moved. For
tim e, as is made c lear in Physics IV , is 'the number of motion.’ But
God, as has been proved, Ts absolutely w ithout motion, and is  
consequently not measured by tim e. There is ,  therefore , no before 
and a fte r in  Him: He does not have being a fte r  non-being, nor non-
being a fte r being, nor can any succession be found in His being. For 
none of these characteristics can be understood without time. God, 
therefore, is without beginning and end, having His whole being at 
once. In th is  consists the nature of e tern ity" ( SCG, 1. 15. 3 ). 
"Time and e te rn ity  clearly  d iffe r"  (ST, I .  10. 2 ad 3 ). The basic 
difference is  to  be seen in the facF  that "e te rn ity  exists as an 
instantaneous whole, whereas time does not" (ST, I .  10. 4 ). Now, 
e te rn ity  (God) as instantaneous whole does not perta in  to the “now" 
of time (ST, I .  10. 4 ad 2 ). This is  so because time measures "not 
only movement but also rest, the state of the movable when not 
moving" (ST, I .  10. 4 ad 3 ). So e te rn ity  is a d iffe re n t dimension of 
r e a l ity  wfiTch belongs properly only to God (ST, I .  10. 3 ). The idea 
of e tern ity  is  fu rther c la r if ie d  as Thomas explains that "anything 
existing in e te rn ity  is unending ( interm inable) , that is to say, 
lacks both beginning and end" ( ST~ TI TO^  TT. Additionally, as 
instantaneous whole, etern ity  also lacks successiveness ( ib id . ) .  
This position which clearly excludes time even in its  dimension of 
present from the ideas of e te rn ity , God, and Being, c lea rly
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God is , in Thomas Aquinas, the center of the theological 
and philosophical system J  The ordo ad Deum, as i t  pertains to the
contradicts Heidegger's in terpretation  o f trad itiona l Being as 
springing from and re fe rrin g  to temporal Present as presence; see 
p. 125, n. 5 above. Moreover, in Thomas' hierarchical understanding 
of being as whole, the dimension of e te rn ity  or timelessness belongs 
absolutely only to God. The rest of being pertains e ith e r to time 
or to the intermediate s ta te  which " is  ne ither time nor e te rn ity ,"  
namely to  the “aeon" (ST, I .  10. 5 ). B r ie f ly ,  as in time there are 
present (leading in the understanding of temporal beings) timeless 
aspects which flow from God's being, as, for instance, form, 
essentia, esse, and act, in  the intermediate state of aeon, the time­
less dimensionality finds within i t s e l f  temporal elements such as 
p o te n tia lity  and the movement from ignorance to  knowledge. Addition­
a lly , as God's e te rn ity  "comprehends ( in c lu d it ) a ll phases o f time” 
(ST, I .  10. 2 ad 4 ) . Thomas in terprets God as being in re lation  
to a l l  beings both in the aeon and in tim e. I t  should be remembered 
that th is  is the timelessness of the ipsum esse and so i t  refers  
in no way to an empty abstract concept according to the essen tia lis t 
tra d itio n  of in te rp re ta tio n . Timelessness rather points to the very 
dimension in which God, as ipsum esse, as liv ing  being, lives  and 
acts. Me see, then, th a t God, and w ith him the very idea o f trans­
cendence, is developed by Thomas Aquinas following the Parmenidean- 
P laton ic-A ris to te lian  pattern of ontology. See Orlando, "Verso un 
Tomismo,!1' p. 401; Joseph de Finance, "Eternity," "Sacramentum 
Mundi": An Encyclopedia of Theology (1968), 2:250, 251; Gilson,
L 'E tre , pT 521 Marias, History of ^Philosophy, p. 193; M aritain, 
Existence, p. 43; Ernst, p. 408; c f. 5T, I .  12. 3; I .  13. 7; SCG, 
J7TT.  ~
^ST, I .  prologue to question 2: "The fundamental aim of
holy teacfnng is to make God known, not only as he is  in himself, 
but as the beginning and end of a ll things and of reasoning creatures 
sp ec ia lly ."  See also ST, I .  1. 3 ad 1; Ernst, p. 423. Wheeler, 
p. 49, points out the necessity of the ordo ad Deum, and the f u t i l ­
i ty  of the Protestant ordo ad Christum because “one cannot have an 
explanation of anything except in terms of princip les, and ultim ately  
of the F irs t Principle o f the being and operation of every object 
of our thought." What Wheeler does not re a liz e  is that in  Protestan­
tism the ordo ad Christum replaces the ordo ad Deum as f i r s t  principle  
of in te l lig ib i l i t y .  This change was effectuated by Luther in the 
context of Nominalism. After Thomas a Nominalist current was 
developed in Scholastic philosophy. A complex ontological- 
epistemological controversy was centered on the kind o f re a lity  
that belongs to "universal" concepts, that is to say, what 
ontological foundation is  to be supposed fo r true knowledge (true  
knowledge is universal knowledge). Nominalism denied any “ontologi­
cal re a lity "  to the universal concepts. Roscelin’s extreme position
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onto-theo-logical structure of reason, provides the basis fo r the
considered them to be mere fla tu s  vocis (Windelband, 1 :296). Occam's 
nominalism, which through Gabriel BTel d irec tly  influenced Martin 
Luther (Seeberg, 2:185, 86 ) ,  “s trikes  these species in te ll ig ib le s  
as useless doubling of external re a lity "  (Windelband, 1:325). For 
Nominalism, then, the individual concrete re a lity  is  the only ex is t­
ent re a lity ;  the species in te ll ig ib le s  (universal concepts) do not 
exist at a l l ,  hence they have no meaning at a l l .  The problem that 
Nominalism was yet unable to solve was that of providing new cate­
gories that could be used fo r the understanding of the individual 
concrete re a lity . For Nominalism, re a lity  was ind iv idu a l, but the 
cognitive categories were s t i l l  claiming a universal (tim eless) know­
ledge. In th is context, knowledge, at the most, was to be considered 
as being only a "sign" with no exact correspondence in  re a lity  
(Windelband, 1:326). In th is  in te lle c tu a l context arose Luther's 
Protestantism. Luther's theologia crucis (William M. Landeen, Martin 
Luther's Religious Thought LMountain View, C a lifo rn ia : Pacific
Press, 1971J, p. 4b) placed the center of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  of Protes­
tantism outside the realm of the species in te llig ib le s  (timelessness) 
into the. very flow of ind iv idu al, concrete, sensible, h is to r i­
cal re a i ity ,  that is  to say, in the Parmenidean doxa. Yet there 
were no cognitive categories to work with such a realm of re a lity  
in the in te llec tu a l realm. Protestantism placed i ts e lf  before cogni­
t iv e  crossroads: whether i t  had to create a new set o f cognitive 
categories that could match the nature o f re a lity  i t  had chosen or 
i t  ju s t had to accept the classical timeless structure o f in * e l l ig i-  
b i l i t y  of classic theology. H istorical Protestantism changed the 
ordo ad Deum and i ts  Aristotelian-Thom istic meaning fo r  the ordo 
ad Chnstum in a Lutheran in te rp re ta tion  of the doctrine of ju s t i f i ­
cation by fa ith  in Paul. In other words, in Protestantism the theos 
of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason is not denied but i t  
is rather provided w ith a d iffe re n t in terpretation . The ontological 
framework, then, points to ten ^o ra lity , but the epistemological 
framework s t i l l ,  through the accepted trad itional framework for 
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y ,  points to timelessness. Hence, the in te llec tu a l 
enterprise that is  theology develops in the realm of timelessness. 
The ordo ad Christum, then, which replaces the ordo^ad  ^Deum is  reached 
through a trad itio n a l process of abstraction, as in the case of the 
class struggle of Marxism (see p. 147, nn. 1-3, and p. 148, nn. 
1 - 3 ) .  Thus the Protestant ordo ad Christum is timeless in both the 
idea of ordo which re la tes  to Christum not in a temporal h istorical 
way fo r understanding, but rather in the timeless classica l way of 
reasoning, deduction, and conclusion; and the idea of Christus which 
also is  not the product o f a temporal historical reasoning or consti­
tution of meaning, but rather is  the result of an abstractive cogni­
t iv e  procedure applied to the B ib lic a l tex t. I t  is  apparent that 
Wheeler's critic ism  of Protestant ordo ad Chri stun had a point insofar 
as the ordo ad Christum is  s ti 11 constructed on the assumption of 
the, ordo ad Deum as ontological framework. I t  is also apparent that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
184
ordo disci pi inae. 1 This ordo ad Deum is  embedded in  the A ris to te lian
hierarchy of being which provides the metaphysical background fo r
2
reason’ s coherence and in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  In th is  h ierarchical
interpretation o f being, timelessness and time are conceived as
the ontological and epistemological frameworks determine the meaning 
of theology and system even when in some way the thinker may be 
reacting against them. In short, as the ordo ad Christo of Protes­
tantism does not challenge the ontological an3 epistemological 
frameworks of classical reason, i t  is  developed in  and through them 
so that i t  just represents a d iffe ren t mode w ith in  the same 
dimensionality and in terpretation  o f the structure o f reason. The 
difference is a difference of in te llec tu a l system within a same
dimensionality fo r reason, as, fo r  instance, are Rationalism and
Empiricism as philosophical systems.
Hhe ordo disci pi inae of Thomas' Summa Theologiae has been 
interpreted in d iffe re n t ways. For instance, M. D. Chenu (Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964], pp. 298-
318) suggests that the pattern followed by Thomas in  his Commentary 
on the Sentences, which is  Neo-Platonic in o r ig in , also provides 
a key fo r understanding the ordo disciplinae o f Summa Theologiae. 
However, according to Per ErTIc Persson ( “Sacra Doctrina11: Reason 
and Revelation in Aquinas [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970],
pp. 251, 252), A. Hayen denies a Neo-Platonic pattern and suggests 
that Thomas’ s system is  based upon the idea of cau sa lity . Persson 
(pp. 258-62) proposes that the ordo disciplinae in  Thomas Aquinas 
is grounded on the ordo ad Deum. Wheeler (pp. 48, 49) add ition a lly  
points out that Tn Ihomas the ordo d iscip linae is  based on 
Aristotelian-Thornistic theories of Being and Knowledge. Thus
Persson’ s and Wheeler’ s positions complement each other in that 
Persson’ s points to the structural movement of thought as i t  pertains  
to the structure of reason, while Wheeler's points to  the actual 
in terpretation of such structure according to the A ris to te lia n  t r a d i­
tional pattern.
2
For a b rie f summary on the hierarchy of being, see BE, chap.
5. The hierarchy, obviously, is determined by the ontological cate­
gories of matter and form; potency and act. Pure act and form
(essentia) are given only in God. Then, through the ordo ad Deum,
the whole of r e a lity  partic ipates of Being (ac t and form). This 
partic ipation is  given in degrees, notably, separate substances, 
man, and composite substances. Man and composite substances are 
in time. Separate substances are not in time, but in the aeon. 
The ordo ad Deum determines that in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  and meaning have
to follow  the princip les of being and knowledge which are essentia
and form, namely timelessness. Matter, namely tem porality
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integrating the whole p ic tu re d  Meaning and being, however, pertain  
to the timeless dimensionality which, through the ordo d isc ip linae ,
(Lebenswelt), is the very opposite to Sod and timelessness (SCG, 
11 17. 6 ) .  Additionally, form is the princip le of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  
(ST, 1. 12, 1 ad 2 ). For further commentary, see Anderson, pp. 29,
327 and Wheeler, pp. 26, 27, 33. This hierarchical order in  which
the whole of being is conceived furnishes the framework o f  reference 
fo r reason to constitute i t s  meanings, judgments, and reasonings.
Hhe hierarchy of Being is given in degrees. I t ,  therefore, 
enta ils  degrees in which timelessness and temporality are given and 
co-given in the constitution of several en tities  (substances) within 
the hierarchy. Temporality is given in the composite substances 
(matter and form). We should remember, however, that composite sub­
stances, as far as they "are," partake of e tern ity  in a temporal 
mode. They both are and may be known insofar as they as form are 
related to timelessness (being). Separate substances which have 
no matter are neither temporal nor timeless, but pertain to  the aeon 
(ST, I .  10. 5 ). They partake of timelessness, however, in  th a t being 
essences they do not change. Yet they partake o f tem porality  in
that a cognitive change from ignorance into knowledge is  possible
in them, and in that they are not esse but receive th e ir  esse from 
the creative act of God who alone is esse, and, therefore , who alone 
is tim eless. Thomas explains the crite rio n  that he used to  determine 
the hierarchy: "The fu rth e r  a thing fa l ls  short of abiding exist­
ence, the further i t  f a l ls  short of eternity" (ST, I .  10. 5 ) . I t  
is c le a r, then, that timelessness is  the c rite rio n  th a t determines 
the hierarchy of being and, hence, the constitution o f meaning in
i ts  systematic dimension. See also Anderson, p. 35; G ilson, L '£ tre , 
p. 99. The way in which temporality is  included harmoniously within  
the framework of timeless being may be add itionally  seen, from
another angle, in Thomas's central idea about the naturale desiderium
(ST, I .  12, 8 ad 4 ) , which applies to re a lity  as a whole. "Created 
tTTTngs are made like  unto God by the fac t that they a tta in  to divine 
goodness. I f  then, a l l  things tend toward God as an u ltim ate  end, 
so th a t they may a tta in  His goodness, i t  follows th a t the ultimate
end of things is to become like  God" (SCG, 3. 19. 1 ) .  See also
I - I Ia e .  3. 8 . So, movement, that is to say, time is conceived and 
explained within the framework of timelessness a f te r ,  again, an 
A ris to te lian  pattern. In short, a ll movement, as desire, is
explained as movement toward God, namely, toward timelessness. And, 
since happiness is the fu lf illm e n t of the naturale desiderium (SCG,
3. 63. 9) in the v is io  D ei, i t  follows that tem porality, as involved
in eth ics , reaches i ts  end as i t  leads to timelessness (e te rn ity ) .
This princip le , (the naturale desiderium) is a general princip le  
through which Thomas is  abIe to incIude time as movement within a 
timeless structure. Consequently, the princip le o f naturale 
desiderium applies to a l l  beings according to each one's nature.
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namely the ordo ad Deum, penetrates the whole scope of r e a l i ty ,
determining the meaning and in terpretation  o f both ontology and
theory of knowledge.^
Moreover, the hierarchical systematic ordo of being provides,
as the structure of reason, the foundation on which Thomas builds ud
his understanding about the harmonious re lationship that is supposed
2
to exist between both philosophy and theology, and the natural and
3
supernatural orders. This harmonious understanding of r e a l i ty  as
I t  applies to  material things (SCG, 3. 21. 3. 6 ; 3. 24. 6 ; ST, I . -  
Ilae . 11. 2; I .  80. 1 ), to animals ( SCG, 3. 24. 7 ), and in a special 
way to man. In  the case of man, Thomas fu rther includes the temporal 
mode of being w ith in  his timeless ontological structure as he d is t in ­
guishes the natural desiderium to  see God in man as following man's 
historical movement in three stages, namely, ( 1) in the o rig in a l is  
justiae state  (ST, I .  100. 1 ad 2; I .  95. 1; I .  94. 1; I .  95. 4 ad 
' I ; “ SCG, 3. 62;“ ST, I - I Ia e .  3 . 8 );  (2 ) in v ia  (ST, I - I Ia e .  1. 4 ); 
and (3) in  p a tr ia  when de v is io  Dei is  achieved (SCG, 3. 62. 5 ). 
The basic temporal structure of naturale desiderium also applies 
to the angels (who liv e  in the aeon} (51, I .  59. FT I .  62. 5; SCG, 
I .  19. 1 ad 2 ) .  Neither Aquinas's ordoU iscip iinae nor his in te rp re ­
tation of reason's structure can Be properly understood i f  the 
naturale desiderium is  forgotten. This makes apparent the f le x ib i -
1 i ty  and broadness of Thomas' in terpretation  of the structure of 
reason, which is  able to include time as i t  interprets i t  from the 
viewpoint of timelessness. In  short, i t  is  c lear that, even when 
both time and history have a harmonious place in Thomas's system, 
meaning is constituted from the viewpoint and assumption of tim eless­
ness. Temporal being is not understood qua temporal but qua time­
less. See D e ris i, "El Fundamento," p. 131 For a commentary on the 
relevant ro le  th a t history plays in Aquinas's synthesis, see Gilson, 
CEtre, p. 99; and M. Froidure, "La Theologie Protestante de la  Loi 
Nouvelle peu t-e lle  se reclamer de Saint Thomas?" Revue des Sciences 
Philosophiques e t Theologiques 51 (1967):58, 59.
*See fo r  instance, Wheeler, pp. 47-49.
^For an introduction to th is  aspect of Thomas’s system, see 
Gilson, Thomisme, pp. 9-41; and ST, I .  1; and SCG, 1. 1-8.
3For an introduction to the study of the Thomistic in te rp re ­
tation of the natural and supernatural orders in  th e ir  in te rre la tio n ­
ship and complementarity as grounded in the ontological framework,
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a whole, which is  expressed in a nutshell in Thomas's famous s ta te ­
ment that "grace does not scrap nature but brings i t  to perfection , " 1 
is  a product of Thomas's ontological framework which reason uses 
in the constitution o f theological meaning in a l l  i ts  forms.
I t  is  apparent, then, that Thomas's in terp retation  o f the 
ontological framework provides the necessary framework fo r i n t e l l i ­
g ib il i ty  that theology as a science needs fo r the constitution of 
meaning. Moreover, i t  is also apparent, from the analysis already  
done, that such a foundational in terpretation  assumes a timeless under­
standing of Being's dimensionality. In other words, i t  assumes a 
timeless primordial presupposition in the Parmenidean-Platonic t r a d i ­
tion of Greek philosophy.
Epistemological Framework:
Timelessness
The analysis of the structure of reason in classical theology 
needs to be completed by an investigation in to  the p articu la r way 
in which the epistemological framework was interpreted and u t il iz e d
see Marimon B atllo , “Orden Natural y Orden Sobrenatural," pp. 17-38; 
c f. Luigi Bogliolo, ''Theologia A ncilla  Philosophiae, ” Aquinas 15 
(19721:261; and Gilson^ Reason and Revelation in the MTHdle Ages 
(New York: Charles Scribner’ s Sons, 1946), pp. 69-99.
^ T , I .  1. 8 ad 2. As we w ill see la te r , th is p rin c ip le  
plays an important role in his theology and even in his theory of 
theological knowledge namely, in  the understanding of the cognitive  
as visio f id e i ,  v is io  prophetiae, and visio  D e i). At th is  point, 
however, i t  is  important to re a liz e  that such a princip le , namely, 
that “gratia supponit naturam" does not stand by i ts e lf .  On the 
contrary^ rE stands only on the ground of Thomas's understanding 
of Being as a hierarchy which is  ordered in degrees centered in  its  
climax which is provided by the timeless theos. Gratia supponit
naturam, therefore, is  neither the ground nor the foundation of
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in the constitution of theological meaning. As in the case of the 
ontological framework, Thomas Aquinas developed his epistemological 
framework following the A risto te lian  p a tte rn J  Following the basic
agreement between Being and Knowledge, Thomas Aquinas's in terp re ta ­
tion of the epistemological framework develops assuming also a tim e-
3
less primordial presupposition.
Our purpose here is  not to enter into a detailed account 
of Thomas Aquinas's theory cf knowledge but rather to present i t  
as a c tiv ity  which, from the subject's side, develops in the 
assumption of a timeless dimensionality both fo r being and fo r the
Thomas's system. I t  is  rather a way o f expressing in simple terms 
what is  the resu lt of his in terpretation  of the ontological frame­
work of reason's structure.
^Thomas Aquinas follows the basic pattern provided by the 
A ris to te lian  s c ie n tif ic  model or Theory of Knowledge. See Pasquale 
Orlando,  ^ “L'Esperienza," p. 228; L o rite , “Prelim inares," p. 299; 
Ortiz-Ose's, "Communicacion E Interpretacion," p. 434; c f .  Wheeler, 
p. 85; and Edwin Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon 
the Christian Church, 2nd ed., ed. A. M. Fairbairn  I Covent Garden, 
London: Williams & Norgate, 1891), pp. 116-138. I t  is  on this basis
that Aquinas made the revolutionary statement th a t "sacram doctrinam 
unam scientiam esse" (ST, I .  1. 3 ) . Even though A ris to tle 's  model 
was already linked to TReological in vestig a tio n s ,. as, fo r  instance, 
in Ph ilip  Chancellier (1236) and W illiam  Auxerre (1231) (M. D. Chenu, 
La Theolopie comme science au X II I  s iec le , 3rd ed. Paris: L ib ra ir ie  
Philosophique J. Vrin , T969J, p. 67), Thomas's in te rp re ta tion  became 
the classical one. The basic motifs that Thomas takes from
A ris to tle 's  s c ie n tific  model are the following: that science is
knowledge of the essence that science is  knowledge by the cause, 
that science is  knowledge of what is  necessary, and that science 
uses the argumentative and demonstrative method. See Tharcisse 
Tshibangu, Theologie positive et theologie speculative: position
tradi t i  onneTTe et nouvelle problematique I Louvain: Publications
de l'U n ivers ite  de Louvain, 1965), pp. 1-168.
2
See p. 35, n. 3 above.
3
This is apparent from Thomas’ s choice of the A ris to te lian  
pattern fo r both ontology and epistemology which run in the timeless
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cognitive a c tiv ity  i t s e l f .  This analysis allows us to see how theo­
logical meanings are constituted, and how the timeless primordial 
presupposition plays the central and determinative role in both the 
form in which such a c tiv ity  or constitution is  achieved and the con­
tent or f in a l re s u lt, namely, the constituted theological meaning 
i t s e l f .
Lumen ra tion is
Thomas's interpretation of human knowledge develops w ithin  
the framework of his hierarchical in terp retation  o f being as a whole 
within a timeless primordial presupposition. Within th is context 
we approach the understanding of Thomas's in terpretation  of the epis­
temological framework of reason's structure from the perspective 
of what he ca lls  lumen ra tio n is ,^ that is , of man as composite sub­
stance, knowing what is natura lly  available to him, namely, other 
composite substances.
The proper object of man's knowledge is  the nature or
dimensionality. See p. 91 , n. 3 above. "Santo Tomas descubrio el 
alcance a-temporal, a-h istorico , de la obra del Nous griego en su 
dimension radical" (L o rite , p. 294).
^Aquinas’s theory of knowledge may be approached from several 
angles. We are concerned here with a basic awareness of his under­
standing of the cognitive a c tiv ity  in a general sense, that is  to 
say, with what Thomas calls "lumen natural is  ration is" (ST, I I - I I a e .  
171. 2 ; he also ca lls  i t  "lumen In te l lectuale, 1' LST, T7 79. 4 ] ) .  
As we w ill see, th is  provides the basis fo r the complementary analy­
sis of human knowledge as lumen f id e i ,  lumen prophetiae, and lumen 
g loriae . I t  also provides the basis fo r the analysis and in terp re­
ta tion  of the cognitive a c tiv ity  of the separate substances (angels) 
and the cognitive a c tiv ity  of the ipsum esse himself, namely God. 
Yet, as theology is developed by man^  and not by e ither angels or 
God, we w il l  not touch Thomas's in terp retation  in those areas.
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i 2
quiddity that is to be found in m atter. Then, according to the 
ontological framework already analyzed, knowledge has fo r  object 
the timeless being that is  in  time as a form of matter in the con-
3
s titu tio n  of a composite substance. In  short, the object o f know-
4
ledge is  the form of a th ing , not i ts  m atter. However, since in 
our present state in via man cannot have access to forms except
“Quiddity" refers to the epistemological framework while 
“essence" refers to the same re a lity  of a thing, from an ontological 
framework (BE, pp. 26-28).
2ST, I .  84. 7; I .  85. 1.
^In ST, I .  84. 1, Aquinas explains how the basic thread of 
his theory oF knowledge, which follows the A r is to te lic  “form" over 
against "matter" (as changeable and hence temporal), derives from 
Plato 's  search for cognitive certa in ty . The basic difference between 
Aquinas and Plato does not re fe r to the nature or dimension in Which 
the form is  supposed to pertain , nor in the fa c t th a t knowledge 
refers  to the form, but i t  rather has to do with the way in which 
the form is given to man. In Plato forms are given through “reminis­
cence" (see p. 88, nn. 1, 2 above), while in Thomas they are given 
only through the senses. This makes c le a r that knowledge has for 
object what is timeless in  time, and not time, m atter, or change. 
Precisely what hindered certa in ty , and thus knowledge, was the con­
tinual flu x  of time. In order to avoid th is  uncertainty, P lato, 
says Thomas, suggested another class of beings separated from matter 
and change, that is , a new class of timeless beings. Aquinas rejects  
that such beings may exist as Plato claimed, that is , as immaterial 
forms. The same timeless dimension fo r knowledge, however, is  
accepted by Thomas, as he in terprets the cognitive object as timeless 
forms in time (see p. 174, n. 4 ) .  The timelessness of knowledge may 
also be seen from the viewpoint of im m ateria lity . Gilson explains 
that according to Thomas, "im m ateriality is  as such and by its  
nature, in te llig ib le "  (Thomisme, p. 161). See also ib id . ,  p. 160.
4BE, p. 45. A dditionally, the in te lle c t ,  insofar as i t  knows 
the ind iv idual, knows "matter," but a fte r  the mode of the in te lle c t ,  
which, as we w ill la te r  see, is  also tim eless. So Thomas explains 
that "the in te llec t receives material and changeable species of 
m aterial things in an immaterial and unchanging way, in  accord with 
i ts  nature" (ST, I .  84. 1 ). See also ST, I .  86. 1 ad 3.
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through sense images,^ the cognitive process has to develop as a
departure from m atter. This departure from matter (and time) is
2
what is called abstraction, which renders in te lle c tu a l knowledge,
3
that is , objective knowledge.
" It  is  impossible fo r our in te lle c t, in  its  present state  
of being joined to a body capable of receiving impressions, actually  
to understand anything without turning to sense images" (ST, I .  84. 
7 ).
2
“Now to know something which in fac t exists in individual 
m atter, but not as existing in  such or such matter is to abstract 
a form from individual matter, represented by sense images. Thus, 
we have to say th a t our in te lle c t  understands material things by 
abstraction from sense images" (ST, I .  85. 1 ). I t  should be noticed 
that in ST, I .  85. 1 ad 2, Thomas presents degrees of abstraction. 
In th is  graduation of abstraction i t  is c lear that abstraction at 
least entails a denial of and hence a discontinuity from matter as 
"individual sensible matter." However, matter may be included in 
the quiddity of a thing as common matter, or in te ll ig ib le  matter. 
In short, abstraction provides the elim ination of the movable tem­
poral sensible r e a l ity  of the Lebenswelt as such. Abstraction needs 
the senses ju s t to get started, rhe mode in which composite substan­
ces are given is  certa in ly  temporal, but the mode of both being and 
man's knowledge is  certa in ly  timeless. Even though abstraction e l i ­
minates matter as sensible change, some quiddities require that tem­
poral (m aterial) connotations should be included in them, as, fo r  
instance, bones and flesh in man. But they are included not as 
actual concrete bones and flesh , but rather as part of the timeless 
essence of man. In other words, matter is included insofar as, as 
a general p rinc ip le , i t  constitutes a part of the essence of a compos­
i te  substance. In order fo r matter to get in to  the realm of know­
ledge, i t  has to be abstracted from its  sensible, changeable features  
(as materia s ignata), and thus i t  has to be made another feature  
of the timeless form of a sensible, natural, composite substance. 
This aspect of Thomas's thought shows the very complex and detailed  
ways in which Thomas Aquinas understood the integration of time in 
the realm of being and knowledge. Yet, at the same time, i t  also 
shows the primacy of the form, hence the primacy of timelessness 
as basic category fo r knowledge.
3
In te lle c tiv e  knowledge, the knowledge of the quiddity of 
a thing, is real knowledge, certain knowledge. I t  is  true knowledge 
in  its  basic features of un iversa lity  and necessity, since true know­
ledge is supposed to express the unmovable, changeless essence of 
a thing. Changelessness and immutability are the very nature
of the form and are inherited from the Parmenidean-Platonic
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Besides, as knowledge follows the ancient p rin c ip le  that
" like  is known by like"^ and as the mode o f understanding depends
on the nature of the knower, abstraction requires a p a rtic u la r
interpretation of the cognitive p o te n tia litie s  of the subject who
3
realizes the process of abstraction and determines the mode o f know­
ledge. This is  what Thomas, following A r is to tle , addresses as the
4
active or agent in te lle c t .
5
The active in te lle c t  is a power of the soul, which as prin ­
ciple of the act of understanding is "some kind of incorporeal and 
subsistent principle."® Yet the im m ateriality of the soul as passive
tra d itio n . This knowledge, then, is true "objective" knowledge since 
i t  is able to reproduce perfectly  its  timeless, object, namely, the 
essence or quiddity of the th ing . Thus we can see how, even in  theo­
logy, o b jec tiv ity  is linked to timelessness, necessity, and univer­
s a lity .
^ST, I .  84. 2. This principle expresses the already
mentionetr”correspondence between subject and object and the dimen­
sionality  in which both of them are given.
2ST, I .  84. 1.
V o r  a contemporary presentation and discussion in d e ta il of 
Thomas's theory of knowledge from the viewpoint of i ts  abstractive  
procedure, see E. H. W. Kluge, "Abstraction: A Contemporary Look,"
Thomist 40 (19761:349, 358-59. See also the analysis by John 
Frederick P e ifer, The Concept in Thomism (New York: Bookman Asso­
ciates, 1952); M. C. O'Arcy, Saint Thomas Aquinas (Maryland: Newman
Press, 1954); and F. Adorno, T. Gregory, and V. Verra, S toria  della  
F ilosofia  (Rome: Editori Laterza, 1975), pp. 473-74.
^The need for a particu lar understanding of the cognitive  
subject is  made clear as Thomas declares "that forms are not actually  
in te ll ig ib le  unless they are separated from matter and m ateria l con­
ditions; nor are they rendered actually in te ll ig ib le  except through 
the power of an in te ll ig e n t substance which receives them within  
i ts e lf  and produces them" (BE, p. 43). I t  is  c lear, then, th a t the 
ontological framework determines knowledge not only from the side of 
the object but also from the side of the subject in the subject- 
object relationship, as i t  determines the timeless dim ensionality for 
both.
5ST, I .  79. 1. 6ST, I .  75. 2.
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p o te n tia lity  fo r abstractive knowledge is not enough for producing 
the actual abstract knowledge. There must be an in te llec tu a l agency, 
namely the active in te lle c t ,  in order fo r abstraction to be possi­
b le .  ^ Thus, "the abstractive in te lle c t  creates the concept in  its
2 3universality  by abstracting i t  from m a te ria lity ."  In th is process
time has p rio rity  in the order o f discovery (o r ig in ) , while tim eless-
ness (etern ity) has p r io r ity  in  the cognitive order. 4 This shows
ST, I .  79, 3 ad 3. "An in te llec tu a l soul is indeed ac tua lly  
non-material, but i t  is a s ta te  of p o te n tia lity  as regards grasping 
the natures of things. Images, on the contrary, actually  are 
likenesses of certain things grasped, but are only p o te n tia lly  
non-material. Nothing can stop the one same soul from having, 
because of its  actual non-m ateria lity , a power enabling i t  to dema­
te r ia l  ize things by abstracting them from the conditions of m aterial 
ind iv iduality" (ST, I .  79. 4 ad 4 ) .
ST, I .  79, 5 ad 2. The a c tiv ity  th a t pertains to the 
active in te lle c t is not of the kind of "self-movement apparent in 
animal locomotion, certa in ly  not a self-movement within the potency 
of the soul" (W illiam E. Murnion, "St. Thomas Aquinas's Theory o f the 
Act of Understanding," Thomist 37 [1973]:118). According to Umberto 
Degl' Innocenti ("L'eniima 3 e l l ' in te l le t to  agente," Aquinas 13 
[1970]:40) "The active in te lle c t  is  a kind of in tu itio n  that in the 
way of an habit goes always with our soul."
^To explain the process according to which the universal and 
necessary essence can be reached from the s tarting  poi..t of the 
sensible temporal re a lity , Thomas suggests that human in te lle c t  works 
in a twofold manner, namely, in an active and passive way, following  
the ontological A ris to te lic  pattern of matter and form (ST, I .  79. 
4 ). The active in te lle c t  does not work d ire c tly  on the sensory, 
temporal re a lity  but rather on the "phantasmata" (ST, I .  85. 1. 2 )— a 
kind of image—which is provided by sensory knowledge to the  active  
in te lle c t .  I t  is on this basis that the active in te lle c t is  able to 
draw from temporal sensory r e a l i ty  the timeless essence (qu idd ity) 
(Adorno, Storia de lla  F ilo s o fia , p. 474). From th is , i t  is  c lear 
th a t in Thomas's epistemological framework only what is immaterial 
(tim eless) may be s c ie n tif ic a lly  knowable (P e ife r , p. 52). The time­
less nature of s c ie n tific  knowledge may be also seen when Thomas 
explains that in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  is  incompatible w ith the singular, not 
as such, but as material (ST, I .  86, 1 ad 3 ).
4ST. I .  79. 9.
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clearly  the timeless dimensionality in  which knowledge as such is
supposed to function in order to be knowledge at a ll J  The relevance
and p r io r ity  of timelessne'ss in the cognitive order is  apparent as
the active in te lle c t is  considered to  be both place and source of
2
the constitution of meaning.
According to the ontological framework, the whole of being 
includes more than composite substances, namely, separate substances 
and God, who is the subject matter of theology. Regarding them, 
the epistemological framework allows only, as lumen ra tio n is , the 
analogical and negative procedures. However, since being and know­
ledge pertain to the timeless dimension (im m ateria lity ), other forms 
of knowledge are also possible in v ia , namely, those produced by
] See ST, I .  86 , 1 ad 3.
2
As is seen in the second part of th is chapter, the main 
difference between the classical and s c ie n tific  interpretations of 
reasons regarding th e ir  structures lie s  in th is  point: Thomas's
ontological framework allows the proposal of an active  (cognitive) 
timeless in te lle c t , while the ontological framework o f modern reason, 
even though allowing a timeless dimension fo r being, does not allow 
the cognition of i t .  Hence, there cannot be anything l ik e  an active 
in te lle c t .  I t  is  precisely on th is  point that Cartechini (p. 407) 
c r it ic iz e s  Heidegger on account o f closing the entrance to metaphys­
ics by understanding the thinking of Being with a f in i t e  in te lle c t, 
a fte r the Kantian pattern , Thomas's proposal regarding the active 
in te lle c t  was interpreted in various ways. See Moloney, p. 401.
"^We know incorporeal r e a l it ie s ,  which have no sense images, 
by analogy with sensible bodies, which do have images, just as we
understand truth in the abstract by a consideration of things in
which we see tru th . . . . Furthermore, we cannot, in  our present 
state, know other incorporeal r e a l i t ie s ” (ST, I .  84, 7 ad 3 ). This 
is due to the fact that in  via man’ s knowledge is t ie d  up, for its  
starting point, to sensible temporal data (ST, I .  84. 7 ). So, the 
sensible temporal aspect of knowledge is the starting  point of real 
knowledge. In Kant, on the contrary, temporal knowledge becomes
the lim it  of a ll  possible knowledge. See p. 97, n. 1 .
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the lumen prophetiae and the lumen f id e i . As we w ill see, however, 
because of the ontological-epistemological frameworks already  
developed, the new forms do not scrap the lumen ration is  pattern  
but rather perfect i t J
Lumen prophetiae
The lumen prophetiae refers to the problem of the orig in
of theological knowledge which in its  in terpretation  assumes the
structure of reason in both i ts  ontological and epistemological
o
frameworks ( lumen ra tio n is ) .  Prophecy, according to Thomas Aquinas,
3
"primo et principal i te r  co n s is tit in cognitione," and only second- 
a r ily  refers to "utterance or speech ( locutione) P r o p h e c y  may 
re fer to temporal or timeless re a lit ie s ,^  but we are in terested
V[, I .  8 ad 2 .
2
For an introduction to Aquinas's idea of insp ira tion  and 
revelation under the prophetic m otif, see Persson, pp. 19-40. "We 
search in the w ritings of Thomas in vain fo r the kind of discussion 
of revelation which characterizes more recent works of doctrine. But 
we must not conclude from th is  that revelation  has no decisive part 
to play in his theology. A closer investigation w ill soon disclose 
that on the contrary revelation is the basic presupposition of a ll 
his writings" ( ib id . ,  p. 19).
3
Aquinas considers revelation not 'as a spoken or w ritten  
word' but regards i t  prim arily as an event which takes place in the 
depths of the soul" (Persson, p. 49). See also, ib id .,  pp. 20, 21. 
The encounter, therefore, happens in timelessness. From a Catholic  
perspective Rene Latourelle concludes his analysis of Thomas's under­
standing of revelation pointing out also that "Saint Thomas is  p r i­
marily interested in immediate reve la tio n , ind princ ipa lly  prophetic 
revelation. He spealcs of th is  essen tia lly  as a cognitive act" 
(Theology of Revelation (Staten Island, New York: Alba House, 1966],
p. 171). The divine-human encounter, therefore , happens in tim eless­
ness. For fu rther commentary see Latourelle , pp. 159-172.
4ST, I I - I I a e .  171. 1.
5ST, I I - I I a e .  171. 3.
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mostly in  prophecy as a source of knowledge regarding supernatural 
r e a l i t ie s ,  that is to  say, in te lle c tu a l, s p ir itu a l, and divine re a l­
it ie s .^  In order fo r  th is  kind of knowledge to be possible the sub­
je c t  has to have access to its  new supernatural object. This
2
requires God's special assistance both from the ob ject's  and from 
the subject's side. The divine assistance from the object's  side 
is ca lled  revelation. Divine assistance from the subject's side 
is ca lled  inspiration .^  Because o f the cognitive pattern in which
1 Ib id .
2
According to  Thomas, tru th , in prophetic knowledge, may 
be conveyed through sensu exterius (externally by means of the  
sense), per formas imaginarias I by forms of the imagination), and 
by species in te ll ig ib le s , d ire c tly  infused into the soul without 
passing through sense perception (ST, I I - I I a e .  173. 2; SCG, 3. 154; 
Persson, p. 23). Of course, tru th  aEides in the realm of the species 
in te ll ig ib le s  (ST, I I - I I a e .  174. 2 ) . Hence, a process o f abstraction  
Ts also assumecT in the very heart of revelation: " In te llec tu a l
vision is  not affected by bodily and individual images, but by an 
in te lle c tu a l image. . . . Such an in te llectua l image in prophetic 
reve la tio n  is sometimes immediately impressed by God; sometimes i t  
derives from imaginative forms with the help of prophetic l ig h t ,  
because from these same imaginative forms a more delicate tru th  
becomes apparent in the radiance of a higher l ig h t” (ST, I I - I I a e .  
173, 2 ad 2 ). So th is  new 'abstraction* is developed By the lumen 
prophetiae. For the discussion about the d iffe ren t "degrees" in  
prophecy see ST, I I - I I a e .  174. 3.
^ST, I I - I I a e .  171, 1 ad 4. "Prophecy calls  fo r a lig h t which 
surpassesHEhe lig h t of natural reason" (ST, I I - I I a e .  171. 2 ). Yet, 
since the light of natural reason (in  the active in te lle c t)  is con­
sidered to be a p artic ip a tio n  in the . ligh t by which God sees and 
knows everything (ST, I .  1, 8 ad 3; I - I Ia e .  92. 2 ) ,  the lumen 
prophetiae (insp ira tion ) is ju s t additional power infused in the 
active  in te lle c t . Thus, between lumen rationis and lumen prophetiae 
there is  a quantitative difference and not a q u a lita tiv e  one. Proph- 
ecy is  reason (tim eless) perfected so as to be able to get in touch 
with non-sensible re a l it ie s  in v ia . In short, insp iration  for Thomas 
does not refer to the inscnp turation  of revelation (ST, I l la e .  
68 . 1; Persson, p. 3 8 ), but rather to  the elevation of man's reason 
(ac tive  in te lle c t) by an act of God’ s grace (Persson, p. 39).
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prophecy is  to  be understood, the assistance of God from the sub­
je c t's  side plays the foundational ro le J
Revelation, Iowever, properly occurs when the cognitive act 
2
happens. Revelation, as source of theological meaning, is  to  be 
found in the Bible. Yet the Bible as such is  not revelation  but
ST, I I - I I a e .  171, 2 ad 2; 173, 2 ad 3. I f  the g i f t  o f grace 
were not conceded to humans, there would be no prophetic knowledge. 
In th is regard i t  must be noted that for Aquinas neither prophecy nor 
revelation can be regarded as a habitus but only as a passio vel 
impressio transiens (ST, I I - I I a e .  17l. 2; I I - I I a e .  1761 2 53 TT 
Persson, p. 27).
2ST, I I - I I a e .  173. 4; I I - I I a e .  171. 1; c f. SCG, 3. 154. 1-9. 
"Dio si n v e la  per venire incontro a lia  ragione" (Bogliolo, p. 258). 
See also Persson, pp. 24, 25. I t  is apparent, then, that revelation  
according to Thomas "cannot consist, for example, in events recorded 
in the Gospels— the b irth , death or resurrection of Christ, and the 
lik e . We may not even regard the incarnation as a divine reve lation . 
Only knowledge of the incarnation can be revelation, and th is  is 
always something internal to man" (Persson, p. 25). Thomas's 
position is  remarkably s im ila r to  Bultmann's (KM., p. 42), fo r  whom 
what is important is not the h istorical fac t of resurrection  
(h is to r ie ), but its  meaning as produced through the apostolic fa ith  
and preaching. Moreover, fo r Thomas the content of prophecy is  not 
the vision o f God himself. The visio Dei is  supposed to be the 
eschatological result of a fu rth e r g i f t  of grace ( lumen g lo ria e ) 
which the saints w ill receive in  patria  (ST, I .  12. 1-10; I - I I a e .  3.
1-8; SCG, 3. 51-63; Persson, pi 26; Gilson, Thomisme, p. 150). 
Prophecy "is  not a vision o f the divine essence i t s e l f .  When the 
prophets see what they do see, i t  is not in the divine essence but in 
certain sim ilitudes lighted up by a God-given light" (ST, I I - I I a e .  
173. 1. See Persson, p. 29 ). The idea that revelation is  cognitio  
and not i ts  expression ( lo cu tio ) , along with the idea th a t THe 
prophet's cognitio does not grasp "a ll that the Holy S p ir it  intends 
in visions, words, and even deeds" (ST, I I - I I a e .  173. 4 ) , provides 
the basis fo r the in te rp re ta tion  of- the so-called " fu lle r  sense" 
(sensus p len ior) of the Scriptures and the exegetical procedure to 
reach i t .  Regarding the methodological aspects that sensus plenior 
entails  in its  contemporary Catholic in terp retation , see Raymond L. 
Brown, The "Sensus Plenior" o f Sacred Scripture (Baltimore, Maryland: 
J. H. Furst, 1955); idem, "The History and Development of the Theory 
of a Sensus Plenior," Catholic B ib lical Quarterly 15 (1953):141-62; 
and idem, "The Seiisus P lenior in the Last Ten Years," Catholic  
Biblical Quarterly 25 (1963):262-85.
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contains and communicates i t J  From a cognitive viewpoint (which
2
is  the viewpoint of tru th  and reve la tio n ), the h is to ric  dimension
in which Sacred Scripture contains and communicates the tru th  of
reve lation  is considered as having been properly chosen by God since
3
in  v ia  man's cognitive facu lties  require a sensible o r ig in . Yet,
See p. 195, n. 3 above. The B ible plays a foundational role  
in  Aquinas's theology (Persson, pp. 49-56). This position is ,  ye t, 
very s im ila r to the basic idea of Neo-Orthodoxy and Encounter Theol­
ogy in  modern times. See William Hordern, "The Nature o f Revela­
t io n ,"  in The Living God, ed. M illia rd  J. Erikson (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Baker t I JtKJl , pp. 177-196. The d ifference, however,
between Thomism and Encounter Theology lie s  mostly in the fa c t that 
fo r  Thomas the encounter is  essentially cognitive and objective while 
fo r Encounter Theology i t  is  non-cognitive. This basic d ifference is  
required by the epistemological framework o f reason's structure that 
each theological system adopts as its  own. Thomas's structure of 
reason requires an active in te lle c t able to know timelessness, while 
Encounter Theology's does not allow such active in te lle c t  a t a l l  (see 
p. 194, n. 2 above). That is why the "encounter" happens in a 
non-cognitive area of being according to the Kantian-Jasperian 
pattern  (see pp. 104-13) above. I t  should be noted, however, that 
Thomas's cognitive revelation is not to be confused w ith "proposi- 
tio n a l revelation" as i t  is  understood in the contemporary inerrancy 
controversy. See Achtemeier, p. 39; Kenneth S. Kantzer, "Revelation 
and Inspiration  in Neo-Orthodox Theology," Bibliotheca Sacra 115 
(1958): 121; Dewey M. Beegle, Scripture, Tradition , and ln ta l n b l l i t y  
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 19 /3 ), p. 199; A. A. Hodge and A.
A. W arfie ld , "Inspiration ," The Presbyterian Review 2 (1881):225-60); 
and L indse ll, The B attle  for the Bible I Grand" Rapids, Michigan: 
Zondervan, 1976H Those who favor “inerrancy" do link revelation  as 
knowledge with its  propositional expression in the B ible.
2
Aquinas recognizes this dimension as he considers, in the 
realm of exegesis, that the basic sense of Scriptures is  the h is to r i­
cal l i t e r a l  one (ST, I .  1. 10). M. 0. Chenu remarks that " l ’ Ecriture  
t r a i t e  d'un bout a 1 'autre de fa its  singuliers" (La theologie comme 
science, p. 68). In other words. Scriptures movel from beginning 
to end, in a temporal, concrete, h is to rica l dimension. I t  should 
be noticed, however, th a t Thomas's va lo riza tion  of the l i t e r a l  his­
to r ic a l sense of Scripture as the one on which Dogmatics should be 
b u ilt  is to be understood in the context of reason's structure, which 
from its  epistemological framework requires, in v ia , a sensible his­
to r ic a l beginning.
3ST, I .  84; I .  1. 9.
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since the truth  that the Bible contains and exemplifies is understood
to  be tim e le s s j i ts  h is to rica l dimension does not constitute part
2
of theological tru th  but ra th e r constitutes only a pedagogical
3
device in order that timeless tru th  may be properly conveyed to
Theology, fo r  Thomas Aquinas, is  ordered from and toward 
God as veritas prima. Yet God is  to be understood as ipsum esse 
as the most perfect timeless being. See Ernst, p. 405. In th is  
context Thomas assumes that, since Truth is  One, the truth o f the 
Bible must function in the same dimension that is  proper to a ll  tru th  
and mainly to metaphysical t ru th . See Thomas R. Potvin, "Exigences 
de 11In te llectus F id e i,"  Eglise e t Theologie 8 (19771:386. So the 
veritas prima is  the source o f aTI tru th . Then, a ll tru th , qua 
tru th , is timeless, notably theological truth which because o f its  
nature stands closer, in the h ierarchical ontological framework of 
Aquinas, to God.
2
As revelation is an in te lle c tu a l act, there is no room fo r  
the h istorical dimension of Scripture in the realm of the essence 
of tru th . "A ris to tle 's  science had no room fo r h istorica l fa c t and 
the Bible was history" (Gerald A. McCool, "S c ien tific  Theology: 
Bonaventure and Thomas R evis ited ," Thought 44 [1974]:382, 83 ). "St. 
Thomas chooses to follow, not the  h istorica l pattern, but a pattern  
of in te ll ig ib le  p r io r it ie s  . . . ” (Thomas C. O'Brien, "Sacra Doctrina 
Revisited," The Thomist 41 [1977 ]:500 ). "In his Summa Thomas fo l-  
lowed a s t r ic t ly  logical and s c ie n tif ic  order, inherited from 
A ris to tle 's  Posterior Analytics. Each question has its  logical place 
in  the whole, and each a r t ic le  has i ts  proper place in the question; 
even the objections are posed in a logical order" (James A. 
Weisheipl, "The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I . q . l , "  
The Thomist 38 [1974]:53).
3
ST, I .  1. 9. Weisheipl explains th a t Sacred Scripture  
uses paraTTTes, poetry, and metaphors "both out of necessity and out 
of convenience. The text o f Scripture is the Word of God in  the 
words of men, fo r God speaks to man in terms easier for him to under­
stand; the sublim ity of th is  doctrine requires that wisdom clothe  
herself in metaphors and symbolic language fo r  three reasons;
( 1 ) lest there be error in our conception of the d iv ine, the language 
most remote from the re a lity  should be used; ( 2 ) 'understatement
is  more to the point with our present knowledge of God,' le s t  we 
think that our speech and thought rea lly  represent him; and
(3) 'd iv ine matters are more e ffe c tiv e ly  screened against those 
unworthy of them.' In Sacred Scripture God takes into account man's 
nature, which is to arrive a t in te llec tu a l and sp iritua l tru ths  
through the sense and bodily images. In other words, metaphorical 
language is most accessible to  most people, and at the same time
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and grasped by a ll people, even those who are not capable o f profound 
in te lle c tu a l thinking.^
I t  is clear, then, that the structure of c lassical reason 
in i ts  ontological and epistemological frameworks determines the 
basic in terpretation of the origin of theological meaning (the  idea
there is  less danger of confusing symbol with re a lity "  (p . 77). 
See also SCG, I .  6 . The metaphoric aspects of Scriptures may be 
seen, fo r  instance, when as in James 4:8  God is conceived o f as in 
the realm of change (tim e ). See ST, I .  9, 1 ad 1; c f. Ernst, p. 
423.
^Since Scripture works in the temporal pedagogic dimension, 
i ts  tru th  is  to be reached through the cognitive powers o f abstrac­
tion  which lead the exegete and theologian to in te lle c tiv e  knowledge 
that is  at the origin of the B ib lic a l, temporal, metaphoric utteran­
ces. Thus, the structure of reason, according to Thomas's timeless 
in te rp re ta tio n  of i t ,  when applied to the Bible, requires, in order 
that tru th  may be reached, the development of an in te lle c tiv e  proce­
dure which is aimed at the elim ination of the tem poral-historical 
clothing in  which God had to convey timeless in te lle c tu a l tru th . 
This procedure is in general sim ilar to Bultmannian demythologiza­
tio n . "What is certa in ly  true is th a t St. Thomas stands fo r a 
demythologization of the word" (Ernst, p. 418). Of course, as we 
have already pointed out, the actual outcome of demythologization 
is  d iffe re n t in both Thomas and Bultmann just because they work 
w ith in  a d iffe ren t structure for reason's functioning. See p. 196. 
n. 1 above. Additionally, the h is to r ic a l c r it ic a l method, as a 
s c ie n t if ic  advancement, can be applied to  the exegetical enterprise  
in the context of Thomas’ s system. Such exegetical procedure does 
not a ffe c t the dogmatic enterprise since i t  deals with the h is to r i­
c a l, temporal, pedagogic clothing of the Bible and not with its  
in te lle c tu a l timeless tru th . As we can see, th is also is  the posi­
tion  of Bultmann. Regarding the h is to r ic a l c r it ic a l  method, as 
accepted within the Thomistic structure fo r reason and theology. 
See Potvin, p. 373. The independence of the historical vehicle that 
is used by the Bible to convey tru th , from the in te lle c tu a l tru th  
actua lly  conveyed, may be seen in the following way: "The philoso­
phical soundness of the Summa Theologiae is  not impaired by i ts  use 
of au thority , since wherever the data are amenable to reason, the 
d icta  o f authority on the subject are scrutinized s c ie n t if ic a lly  
before e ith er acceptance or rejection" (Wheeler, p. 55).
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of reve la tio n ), and also the nature of both theological tru th  and 
i ts  w ritten expression. 1
Lumen ra tio n is  is the realm of philosophy and the sciences. 
Lumen prophetiae refers to the particu lar realm o f knowledge (reve­
la tio n ) that applies to a reduced number o f persons, namely, the 
prophets. Lumen gloriae refers  to the eschatological destiny of 
reason which w ill  be transformed not to depend on the senses any 
more. As is  apparent, none o f these are the realm of theology or, 
as Thomas ca lls  i t ,  Sacra Doctrina. The realm of Sacra Doctrina 
is  the realm of the lumen f id e i.
Lumen fid e i
Lumen fid e i is  grounded on the lumen ra tio n is  which receives
3
additional power from the infusion of God's grace into i t .  Lumen 
f id e i is a kind of knowledge insofar as i t  is  not a direct knowledge 
as in  vision (in te lle c tu a l or sensory), but i t  is a knowledge as
4
i t  accepts what somebody else sees. That is  why Thomas considers
This also makes clear that a critic ism  of reason in theology
cannot begin with the problem of the origin o f theological meaning.
The origin of theological meaning is  bound to be interpreted through 
the categories that the epistemological framework of reason's struc­
ture is supposed to provide.
^ST, I .  1. 2. 3. 7; see also Persson, pp. 12-19; Weisheipl,
pp. 49-80T"Wheeler, pp. 34-36.
3ST, I I - I I a e .  6 . 1; I - I Ia e .  109. 1; c f .  I .  54, 4 ad 2;
I .  79, 3 ad 2; I - I Ia e .  110. 1; Potvin, pp. 371-96 passim; Terence
Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas," Religious 
Studies 13 (1977):137-38. Again, the princip le  that grace does not 
scrap nature but rather perfects i t  is at work.
V a ith ,  according to Aquinas, is "a kind of knowledge" 
because from the subject's side, i t  exists in  act as an act of the 
in te lle c t .  Thomas’ s d e fin itio n  of fa ith  (which he sees based upon
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theology to be a “subalternated science."^ The object of fa ith  as 
cognitive act is to be seen in the a rtic le s  of f a i t h ,£ which at the
Paul's d e fin itio n  in Heb 11:1) says that "be lie f is  immediately an 
act o f in te lle c t  because its  object is  tru th , which is  the proper 
concern of in te lle c t"  (ST, I I - I I a e .  4. 2 ). Yet, a t the same tim e, 
from the object's side,- fa ith  fa i ls  its  object ( i t  does not reach 
i t ) .  In other words, fa ith  does not make contact with i ts  object 
as in v ision. "Now things are said to be seen when they themselves 
cause the mind or the sense to know them. C learly, then, no b e lie f  
or opinion can have as object things seen, whether by sense or by 
in te lle c t"  (ST, I I - I I a e .  1. 4 ). That is why " fa ith  is  a sort of 
knowledge in- that i t  makes the mind assent to something. The assent 
is not due to what is  seen by the believer but to what is seen by 
him who is  believed. In that i t  lacks the element o f seeing, fa ith  
f a i ls  to  be genuine knowledge, fo r such knowledge causes the mind 
to assent through what is seen and through an understanding of f i r s t  
principles" (ST, I .  12, 13 ad 3 ) . This determines that theology 
is a subalternated science in Thomas's system of thought. In other 
words, we believe (sort of ind irect knowledge) what the angels and 
the blessed in p a tr ia . See ST, I I - I I a e .  1. 5 ).
H h is  means that theology as a science is  grounded in what 
other beings see ( ib id . ) .  That is why fa ith  is knowledge understood 
and accepted on the basis of the testimony of somebody else who sees. 
This contact is made through revelation and the lumen prophetiae. 
What the prophet sees, the believer and the theologian accept in  
fa ith .  Faith is not absence of knowledge. But i t  is  a knowledge 
in search of knowledge, namely, f ides quaerens in te llectum . The 
p rin c ip le  o f the subalternation o f the theological science is  pre­
sented by Thomas .in ST, I .  1. 2. See also ST, I I - I I a e .  2. 3; 
I I - I I a e .  1. 4; Persson, p. 28; Congar, A History oT~Theology, p. 95.
The object of fa ith  is not the B ib lical content, not even 
i ts  l i t e r a l  sense, since as knowledge, fa ith  re la tes  to what is  
in te lle c tu a l, that is to say, to which is abstract and tim eless. 
Thomas explains how i t  was necessary to draw the principles of theo­
logy from the Bible: “The truth  of fa ith  is contained in sacred
Scripture, but d iffu se ly , in divers ways, and, sometimes, darkly . 
The resu lt is  that to draw out the tru th  of fa ith  from Scripture  
requires a prolonged study and a practice not w ith in  the capacities  
of a l l  those who need to know the truths of fa ith ;  many of them, 
taken up with other cares, cannot find leisure fo r  study. That is  
why there was a need to draw succinctly together out of the Scrip­
tu ra l teaching some clear statement to be set before a ll  for th e ir  
b e lie f . The symbol is  not added to Scripture, but drawn from Scrip­
ture" (ST, I I - I I a e .  1, 9 ad 1 ). I t  is  clear, then, how the f i r s t  
princip les of theological science are to be found w ith in  the B ib lic a l 
m aterial through abstraction of its  historical dimension. I t  is
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same time are the f i r s t  principles of theological scienceJ Such
princip les , as sc ien tific  principles, are timeless. From them,
also apparent how the f i r s t  principles o f theology are determined 
in th e ir  meaning through reason's structure and the presupposition 
that i t  includes in order that reason may function. A dditionally , 
i t  should be noted that the ultimate object of fa ith ,  fo r Thomas, 
is not doctrine or the A rtic les  of F a ith , but rather God. The A r t i ­
cles of Faith just allow fo r us in v ia  to  reach our object from afar 
o ff.
^The Artic les o f Faith are at the core of Aquinas's System 
of theology (Congar, A History of Theology, p. 95). "The a rtic les  
of fa ith  are to the teaching of fa ith  what the f i r s t  principles are 
to a d isc ip lin e  evolved by natural reason" (ST, I I - I I a e .  1. 2; 
Persson, p. 74). They are not se lf-ev iden t principles as the philo­
sophical principia per se nota, and fo r  that reason they would seem 
to be o f a lower kind than the philosophical princip les. However, 
Thomas provides the following explanation regarding the certa in ty  
of the principles of theology. He says th a t the theological princ' 
pies are more certain regarding the object, namely, God and the 
science o f the blessed. The doubt and uncertainty is  due to disa­
b i l i t y  o f our minds to grasp their ob ject. "Doubt about the a rtic les  
of fa ith  which fa lls  to  the lo t of some is  not because the re a lity  
is at a l l  uncertain but because the human understanding is  feeble" 
(ST, I .  1. 5 ). We see here how the ontological framework is  u tilize d  
to explain a particu lar epistemological issue within the Thomistic 
system. What Thomas ca lls  "artic les  o f fa ith ,"  explains Congar, 
is "the Symbol of the Apostles or Creed of the Apostles" (A History 
of Theology, p. 95). Cf. ST, I I - I I a e .  1 . 9 .  As principles of theo­
logical science the a rtic le s  of fa ith  contain a ll the main aspects 
of fa ith  in an in te ll ig ib le  abstract way as expected from the f i r s t  
princip les of any science. “In p r in c ip iis  scinetiae v ir tu a lite r  
tota sc ien tia  continetur" (ST, I - I Ia e .  3. 6 ; c f. I .  1. 7 ).
2
ST, I i - Ia e .  1. 7. The timelessness of the a rtic le s  of fa ith  
or f i r s t  principles of theological science is apparent as Thomas
explains that the a rtic le s  “are im p lic it  in certain primary ones, 
namely th a t God exists and that he has providence over man's salva­
tion . For the truth that God is includes everything that we believe
to ex is t eternally in God and that w il l  comprise our beatitude"
(ST, I I - I I a e .  1. 7 ). So, the a rtic le s  o f fa ith  are an explication, 
in v ia , in propositions (whose o rig in  is  the v is io prophetiae of 
what in re a lity  is something non-composite) of God as Veritas Frima 
( I I - I I a e .  1. 2 . ) .  Thomas, dealing with the question of whether or not 
the a r t ic le s  of fa ith  have changed through h istory, c le a rly  expresses 
th e ir unchangeableness as he says: "the things to be hoped fo r were
the same at a ll times fo r everyone" (ST, I I - I I a e .  1, 7 ad 1).
Obviously, then, theology as in te llectuaT  science is a timeless
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in  a deductive procedure, the whole of theology is developed. 1 In 
v ia , then, theology renders provisional, imperfect knowledge. Theo- 
logy is fides quaerens in te llectual. I ts  search, however, is  not
science. I t  could not be otherwise since theology is to constitute  
i t s  meanings with a reason which is interpreted as functioning though 
a timeless structure.
1u0n the basis of such principles some point stands proved 
fo r  believers in a way sim ilar to that whereby fo r a ll men something 
stands proved on the basis o f principles known connaturally" (ST,
I I - I I a e .  1, 5 ad 2 ). See also ST, I .  1, 5 ad 2; I .  1. 8 , and ad” ?; 
Persson, pp. 78, 79. For an analysis not only of the deductive
procedures o f reason in theology but also of its  demonstrative, 
apologetic, and exp licative ro les , see Congar, History of Theology, 
pp. 92-100. Reason, as lumen ra tio n is , is  therefore in via the tool 
fo r  theological knowledge! Wheeler explains th a t what is  tru th  "can 
be explained in understandable terms by sound philosophical methods" 
(p . 80). So, through the deductive method o f reason in its  A ris to ­
te lia n  pattern, the ontological framework, which already determined 
the epistemological framework, the idea and meaning of reve la tio n , 
and the nature of the a rtic le s  of fa ith  as timeless cognitive f i r s t  
principles of theological science, passes to determine also the very 
way in which reason is  supposed to constitute theological meaning in 
both exegesis and dogmatics. See how Wheeler shows the influence of 
reason’ s structure and presuppositions in  the dogmatic construction 
regarding the doctrines of transubstantiation, T r in ity , grace, 
incarnation, and sacraments in Thomas's system (pp. 79-97). See also 
in  th is respect Chenu, Toward an Understanding, pp. 304-318. 
Moreover, i t  should be remembered that the formulation of a symbol of 
f a ith  (a r tic le s  o f fa ith ) belongs to the Supreme P o n tiff, according 
to  Thomas (ST, I I - I I a e .  1. 10). In th is way, then, the hierarchical 
structure oF being is also determinative o f the hierarchical 
understanding of the Church in Catholicism.
2
Fides quaerens intellectum  may have two applications w ith in  
Thomas's system of thought. F irs t ,  since divine revelation includes 
tru ths that may be reached through reason (SCG, I .  4 ), Fides quaerens 
in te l lectum may re fe r to the search of in te l lectual truths th a t the 
lumen rations can reach by i t s e l f  and that fo r practical reasons have 
been included by the lumen prophetiae in the revelation o f God. 
However, revelation properly refers to that which we in v ia  cannot 
reach, that is  of what we cannot have cognitive contact or v is io n . 
This aspect of revelation refers properly only to the a rt ic le s  of 
fa ith  which are the principles of theological science. In a second 
sense, then, fides quaerens intellectum  is  to be understood w ith in  
the context of the hierarchical ontological framework of Thomas, as a 
cognitive movement of ascent from a lesser to a higher degree or mode
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completed in v ia . I t  can only be achieved by God's special g i f t  
of grace that in p a tria  enables man to  understand (by d irec t vision) 
what now can only be grasped through the kind of knowledge that is  
fa ith . Theology, then, as fides quaerens in te llectum , is to be 
developed in  the realm and with the powers of lumen ra t io n is . Conse­
quently, theology as cognitive enterprise is  bound to deal with theo­
logical re a lit ie s  (the understanding o f the A rtic les  o f Faith and 
God him self) in the in d irec t way o f which human reason is  capable, 
namely, v ia negativa and via analogical  Such procedure assures 
timelessness, and so an essential discontinuity of meaning between
what is  given to the understanding in  via through the senses
2
(Lebenswelt) and the actual in te lle c tu a l true meaning is  to be 
observed a t the basis o f the constitution o f theological meaning.
Summary and Par­
t ia l  Conclusion
The b rie f analysis of Thomas Aquinas's in terpretation  of 
both ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure
of knowledge. In via th is  movement is  to work through analogy and 
demonstrative procedures which, however, as i t  is of the highest 
re a lity  causes "the greatest joy’’ ( SCG, I .  8 . 2 ). In patria the 
fides quaerens intellectum  reaches i ts  goal, and, therefore comes 
to  an end when through grace the lumen gloriae is  conferred upon 
the blessed ones so that i t  is possible to see God ( SCG, 3. 51-63; 
c f. L o rite , p. 16).
^ e e  p. 194, n. 3 .  "There is  no reason, however, why man 
cannot by analogy s tr iv e  to penetrate the meaning o f the truths  
revealed and thus give fu lle r  meaning and greater force to facts  
which, in the very nature of things, are accepted on fa ith "  (Wheeler,
p. 8 0 ).
^See p. 134, n. 4.
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shows that i t  has been developed on the assumption of a timeless 
primordial presupposition in  the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian  
trad itio n  o f philosophy. Thomas himself does not deal with the prob­
lem of the ground of Being and reason. He ju s t develops in d e ta il 
the consequences that the timeless primordial presupposition has 
fo r  reason's structure in general and for theological reason in  par­
t ic u la r . As both subject ( lumen ) and object (essentia, form, 
quiddity) are conceived as pertaining to a timeless dimensionality, 
structure allows fo r perfect systematic coherence.
Moreover, since time is  not excluded from being but is  rather 
included as a mode of i t  (not as dimensionality) at the level of 
composite substances within the hierarchical metaphysical context, 
Thomas's in terpretation  of reason's structure makes reason a perfect 
instrument to deal with the whole of re a lity .  This allows classical 
reason to provide room fo r natural sciences. This explains why 
Thomas's system has been able to subsist and be meaningful even a fte r  
the s c ie n tific  revolutions of the past two centuries.
O b je c tiv ity , in classical reason, is  shaped in its  meaning 
as o b jec tiv ity  by the features provided by the timeless knowledge 
of timeless essences. Temporal re a lit ie s  are included only insofar 
as they include being within th e ir  composite re a lity ,  namely, insofar 
as they include timelessness.
Transcendence is also interpreted in  terms of timelessness. 
Consequently the knowledge of both timelessness and transcendence 
is  possible only because of man’s timeless cognitive potencies 
(lumen )
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As there is  no temporal being, there is  no temporal under­
standing (there is  only a temporal mode of timeless being and know­
ledge). The classical in terpretation of being and theory of know­
ledge (as structure o f reason) determines the answers that theology 
provides fo r the problem of the o rig in  of theological meaning (reve­
la tio n , Bible) and to the problem of the in te lle c t iv e  background 
of reference fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  (metaphysics, ordo d isci p iinae) .
In Thomas's system the Bible represents the place where theo­
logical re fle c tio n  is  supposed to begin, since i t  contains the record 
of prophetic revelations. Yet, as the Bible has been given to man­
kind fo r practical purposes, i t  is  mainly concerned with pedagogical 
temporal exem plifications of timeless tru th . Thus, as reve la tion , 
the Bible is  reduced, through the a c tiv ity  of the lumen ra tio n is , 
to a few f i r s t  timeless s c ie n tific  principles of theology as science. 
This makes apparent that the “facts" or "phenomena" of theology, 
namely, what theology has as its  object, are not ju s t  something 
"objectively given" with no preconditions brought in to  the "facts"  
or "phenomena" from the subject's side. The very "facts" or "phenom­
ena” of theology appear as they are interpreted onto log ically  and 
epistemologically through the categories provided by the structure  
of reason.
Our analysis also makes apparent that Thomas's theological 
system, through the structure of reason, assumes th a t there is only 
one possible understanding of being, namely the tim eless one. Hence, 
i t  is understood also that the Bible has been thought and w ritten  
on th is  universal timeless assumption of tru th .
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F in a lly , we should notice that classical reason functions 
regarding the flow  of meaning, in  the onto-theo-logical d irec tio n . 
In other words, the Parmenidean in terpretation  o f the ground o f being 
as timeless provides the f i r s t  necessary precondition fo r  the
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  o f re a lity , namely the ontos. The ontos ad d itio n a lly
requires, fo r the completion of its  structure, the inclusion and 
in terpretation o f theos. I t  is  in th is context that logos (epistemo­
logical framework) is  interpreted in order to provide an adequate 
cognitive procedure to  grasp the knowledge of being in its  h ie ra rch i­
cal timeless complexity.
Our analysis must now begin to consider the way in  which 
modern lib e ra l Protestant theology has u t il iz e d  reason fo r the con­
s titu tion  of theological meaning. We turn, then, to the analysis
of "s c ie n tific  theological reason."
S c ie n tific  Reason 
m s  we focus our attention on the s c ie n tific  in te rp re ta tion  
of reason’ s structure as i t  is  represented by Rudolf Bultmann’ s theo­
logy, i t  should be remembered that Bultmann's understanding o f rea­
son's structure^ is rather " lik e  a paradigm fo r much of modern
Vrom the very beginning i t  should be noticed that Bultmann 
is not a philosopher like Aquinas. Bultmann does deal w ith founda­
tional philosophical matters but he does not develop them in the 
systematic and profound style of the Aquinate. Consequently, a sys­
tematic development of e ither ontology or epistemology is  not found 
in Bultmann's w ritings. However, ontological and epistemological 
reflections do spread throughout his w ritings. This fact determines 
that the phenomenological analysis in search of the structure of 
reason and i ts  dimensionality should proceed more slowly and with  
greater d i f f ic u lty  in Bultmann’ s theology than in Thomas's theology. 
Jaspers appreciates Bultmann more as a h istorian  and exegete than
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theology,"^ which is  shared by re lated  but independent thinkers such
2 3as T i l l ic h  and Jaspers.
Bultmann's programmatic influence on modern theology is  due 
mostly to his concern about the nature of theological "understanding" 
(Verstehen)^ and to his coherent in terp re ta tion  o f the ontological
as a philosopher ( “Myth and Religion," in Kerygma and Myth I I :  A
Theological Debate, ed. Werner Bartsch [London: 5 .P .C .K ., I962J,
p. 178}. -----------
^Robert C. Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann's Theology: A C ritic a l
In terpretation  (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1976), p. 10. See
also Schubert M. Ogden, Foreword to  Existence and Faith : Shorter-
Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, Rudolf Bultmann (New York: Meridian
books, c. I960), p. 9; and Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: 
New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with 
Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein 
IGrand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1980), p. 24.
2
Even though T i l l ic h 's  t.ieology is  worked out w ithin the same 
Kantian framework fo r the in terp re ta tion  of reason's structure  
(Systematic Theology), 1:82), the way in which i t  is  developed shows 
a closer re lation  to classical theology and philosophy than 
Bultmann's. A dditionally , .T il l ic h  develops in greater d e ta il, and 
with greater c la r ity  and philosophical expertise, issues and motives 
that Bultmann's analysis only suggests or implies, fo r  instance, the 
cognitive use of analogy fo r the knowledge of God.
3.
As their dialogue in the debate on demythologization shows 
(KMII, pp. 133-94) both work within the same basic in terp retation  of 
the Kantian framework and share the same approach regarding the 
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  and meaning of theological statements. In the f in a l 
analysis, they d if fe r  not regarding the procedure reason is  supposed 
to fo llow  in the process of demythologization, but rather regarding 
the extent to which such procedure should be applied. In broad lines  
Bultmann stands closer to Jaspers than to T i l l ic h .  I t  seems clear 
that Jaspers and Bultmann (as well as T il l ic h )  have developed th e ir  
systems independent from each o ther's  influence. In other words, 
both have faced the challenge of performing the theological task 
within the pattern fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  proposed by Kantian thought. 
Surprisingly enough they reach s im ilar conclusions, agreeing in the 
foundational approach and disagreeing only in matters o f d e ta il.
^Roberts, p. 10.
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and epistemological frameworks of theological reasonj
As Aquinas developed his in terpretation  of the ontological 
and epistemological frameworks for theological reason fo llow ing the
A ris to te lian  pattern, Bultmann developed his following the Kantian
o
pattern. Yet since Bultmann not only does not re fe r  e x p lic it ly
to Kant but, on the contrary, recognizes e x p lic it ly  the value that
3
Heidegger's ex is ten tia l analysis has fo r the understanding of fa ith ,  
most theological w rite rs  have interpreted Bultmann*s thought as
4
grounded in  a Heideggerian pattern. Recent studies, however,
S b id . ,  pp. 9, 211. See also Ogden, Foreword to Existence 
and F a ith , p. 11.
2
In Kantian thinking re a lity  is divided into  phenomena, to  
which knowledge properly pertains (the realm of Parmenidean doxa), 
and noumena, to which pertains the thing i t s e l f  which is  unknowable 
(the realm of Parmenidean Being). See in chapter I the section on 
Kant fo r  further commentary on the Kantian pattern. I  am aware of 
Jaspers' rather harsh evaluation of Bultmann's philosophical a b i l i ­
ties  ("Myth and Relig ion,'' p. 138). Jaspers considers th a t Bultmann 
is “untouched by the least breath of Kantian or Platonic thinking" 
( ib id . ) .  This, however, does not mean that Bultmann is  not following  
the Kantian pattern. What i t  means is  th a t Bultmann is  not a cre­
ative philosopher. In that evaluation Jaspers is correct. Bultmann 
just accepts the Kantian pattern without critic ism . He is more 
c r it ic a l  o f Heideggerian thoughts than he is of epistemological 
issues in  general.
3
Bultmann recognizes the importance of the e x is te n tia l analy­
sis of Heidegger, Jaspers, and Gogarten fo r theology (FU, p. 327, 
EF, p. 102). According to Ogden (Christ without Myth: A"Study Based
on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann LNew York: Harper and Bros.,
1961j ,  pi 45, n. /3 ) ,  Bultmann's most e x p lic it  statement regarding 
his appropriation of Heideggerian categories is found in Existence 
and Faith  (pp. 92-110).
4See, for instance, Carl Michalson, "Theology as Ontology 
and H is tory ," in The Later Heidegger and Theology, ed. J. M. Robinson 
and John B. CobB (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 136. Cf.
Michael K ra ft, “Thinking Authentically: A Reply to M artin's
'Language, Theology and Subject L i fe ',"  Perspectives in  Religious
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uncover^—although s t i l l  in  a very superfic ia l way—the fa c t that 
Bultmann's thought, and consequently his in terp re ta tion  of reason's
Studies 7 (1980):54, and Reiser, p. 473. Bultmann is not alone in 
using Heidegger's analysis fo r theological purposes. Heinrich O tt, 
Ernst Fuchs, Eberhard JUngel, and Helmut Franz have also used 
Heideggerian insights in theology (P ero tti, p. 12).
^Roberts points out the Kantian framework of Bultmann's 
thought by saying that fo r him "modern man is  a Kantian, fo r  whom 
'nature' and 's p ir it*  never overlap" (p. 152). Thiselton's study 
develops some background on the Neo-Kantian influence on Bultmann's 
thought (pp. 226, 284). Cohen and Natrop are specially in flu e n tia l  
in Bultmann's understanding of knowledge as o b jec tifica tio n  in 
accordance to the principle of law (pp. 209 , 210). In his conclusion 
regarding neo-Kantian influence in Bultmann's thought, Thiselton  
remarks th a t "Bultmann has tr ie d  to respond to  the epistemology of 
Marburg Neo-Kantism, but in so doing has arrived  at a dualism which 
in one respect reverses the concern of the Neo-Kantian philosopher, 
and brings him nearer to Kant himself. Kant, we may say, was more 
d u a lis tic  than the Neo-Kantians. The phenomenological realm was not 
co-terminous with re a lity "  (p. 285). The Kantian pattern in
Bultmann's thought is merged with nineteen-century Lutheranism 
(pp. 211, 213). Arno Anzenbacher remarks th a t the difference between 
the so-called “Encounter theologians" and Bultmann is that the la t te r  
develops the Kantian pattern o f ra tio n a lity  to  its  fina l consequen­
ces. Anzenbacher explains that "them atically, the I-Thou philosophy 
originates in transcendental philosophy and can be understood only in 
re la tio n  to i t .  The dichotomy of existence and o b je c tiv ity  as 
carried out by Marcel, of existence and Dasein by Jaspers, of person 
and proper nature by Buber, e tc .,  are in te ll ig ib le  only on the basis 
of these h is to rica l conditions" ("Thomism and the I-Thou Philosophy," 
Philosophy Today 11 [1967]:240). A dditionally, Thiselton (p. 217) 
points out that Bultmann's perspective on o b je c tiv ity  and law was 
settled  before 1923. Ogden (Foreword to Existence and F a ith , p. 11) 
remarks th a t Bultmann's basic pattern of thought was already a t work 
in 1926 when Heidegger's Being and Time was published for the f i r s t  
time. Bultmann and Heidegger began th e ir dialogue at Marburg at that 
time (EF, p. 286), when both had already developed the basic features  
of th e ir  thinking. Consequently, Heideggerian influence on Bultmann 
has to be seen as applying not to the basis o f his system but rather 
to the philosophical expression of i t .  Even though Bultmann does not 
speak d ire c t ly  about following the Kantian pattern for ontology and 
epistemology, such a pattern can be seen at work in his th inking , for 
instance, in  issues such as the in terp retation  of God's act (KM, p. 
197), the idea of miracle as wonder (FU, pp. 247-61; Giovanni MTegge, 
Gospel and Myth in the Thought o f RudoTF Bultmann [Richmond, V irg in ia :  
John Knox Press, 1960J, p. 80 ), the basic cognitive assumption of 
the "closed continuum" (EF, p. 291, JCM, p. 15; H. A. Nielsen,
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structure, is  developed a fte r the Kantian pattern fo r both ontology 
and epistemology. There is  no doubt that Heideggerian categories 
s t i l l  play an important role in Bultmann's thought, but, they do 
not furnish the pattern fo r reason's structure.* On the contrary,
"Bultmann's Philosophical Troubles," Dialogue 8 [1970]:688, 689), 
and in his search fo r the object o f theology in basic agreement with 
the History of Religion school (Robert W. Funk, Foreword to Faith  
and Understanding, by Rudolf Bultmann [New York: Harper & Row, 1969J, 
pp. lb - I8J. I t  is  apparent that Bultmann applies the c r i t ic a l  epoche 
only to theological theories but not to philosophical ones which 
he accepts quite u n c ritic a lly  as the a priori condition fo r the 
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  of theological meanings. Ogden explains that 
Bultmann sets aside a ll  "previous theological formulation o f fa ith ,  
including even, those of the canonical theologians themselves" 
(Foreword to Existence and Faith , p. 18). On the Kantian pattern  
analyzed from a philosophical perspective, see Walsh, "Kant and Meta­
physics," p. 383.
*The question regarding whether Bultmann understood correctly  
Heidegger's philosophy arises in th is  context. The question is  not 
regarding Bultmann's own awareness of Heidegger's philosophy but 
rather regarding his actual use of i t .  I t  has been suggested that 
a proper answer to th is  question seems to be that Bultmann's thought 
has a superficial resemblance to Heidegger's (George D. Chryssides, 
"Concepts of Freedom in Bultmann and Heidegger," Sophia 17 [1978]: 
20). John Macquarrie (The Scope o f Demythologizing: Bultmann and
His C ritics  [London: SCM Press, I960J, p. 20) believes that Bultmann
makes a correct use of Heidegger's writings which is  grounded also 
in a correct in terpretation  of them. However, Macquarrie also 
remarks that there are, so to speak, two dimensions in Heidegger 
as a philosopher, namely, the ontologist and the e x is te n tia lis t .  
In th is context Macquarrie correctly  interprets that "Bultmann's 
concern is with Heidegger the e x is te n tia lis t"  ( E x is te n tia lis t Theo-  
logy, p. 74). At th is  point a very particu lar switch takes place. 
Bultmann understands Heidegger's ex is ten tia l analysis in iso la tion  
from his ontology. Bultmann himself declares that "we do not 
necessarily subscribe to Heidegger's philosophical theories when 
we learn something from his ex is ten tia l analysis" (KMII, p. 182). 
The switch includes not only the in terpretation of the Heideggerian 
analysis of existence in iso la tion  from Heidegger's ontology but 
also the replacement of i t  by the Kantian pattern fo r ontology and 
epistemology. Thus the Heideggerian existentia l analysis takes over 
a very d iffe re n t non-Heideggerian meaning, namely, a Bultmannian 
meaning. In th is  context Jaspers remarks that Bultmann uses 
Heidegger as "a discovery of 's c ie n t if ic  philosophy"' ("Myth and 
Religion," p. 138). Bultmann has done what, according to P e ro tti,
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in  Bultmann's system, Heidegger's ex is ten tia l analytic^ functions 
w ith in  the framework provided by the Kantian pattern.
As we search fo r Bultmann's in te rp re ta tion  of the primordial 
presupposition of reason and being through a phenomenological inves­
tiga tion  of his in terp re ta tion  of the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks of reason's structure, the Kantian pattern appears more 
c lea rly .
Ontological Framework
Bultmann is p articu la rly  aware o f the determinative ro le  
that ontology plays in the constitution o f meaning in general and 
of theological meaning in particu lar. His emphasis, however, lie s  
on developing the ontological categories o f man as existent. The 
analysis of Dasein's structure, however, is  ju s t the starting  point 
fo r Bultmann's ontology. I t  is  there th a t Heidegger's ex is ten tia l
cannot be done, namely, forced Heideggerian thinking into tra d itio n a l 
categories (p. 4 ).
^See Ogden, Christ without Myth, pp. 69, 70, and K ra ft, 
pp. 54-59. Bultmann himself comments on the value of ex is ten tia l 
analysis fo r theology in the following terms: " I t  is therefore e v i­
dent that i t  is possible to speak of existence per se, and th a t the 
structural elements of existence which philosophy presents are also 
valid  for existence in fa ith" (FU, p. 327). Existential philosophy, 
then, helps theology by providing i t  with "the most adequate perspec­
tiv e  and conceptions fo r understanding human existence" and so ”to 
find  the rig h t concepts for speaking of God non-mythologically" (JCM, 
PP. 55; Ogden, Foreword to Existence and F a ith , p. 19). I t  is  here, 
where the ex is ten tia l analysis Ts connected with the tra d itio n a l 
dimension of transcendence, that Bultmann’s departure from the 
Heideggerian pattern appears more c learly . See Miegge, p. 75.
^Bultmann, w riting  to Barth in 1952, explains that " I think  
I always saw one thing c learly , namely, th a t the decisive thing is 
to make i t  c lear with what concept of r e a l i ty ,  of being and events, 
we rea lly  operate in theology, and how th is  relates to the concepts
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analysis plays its  normative ro le  by providing the access to a 
"correct" understanding of man's being.
Yet, the ontological framework cannot be reduced to the 
analysis of a particu la r region o f being. The in terp retation  of 
any particu la r region of being is  to  be developed in the context 
provided by the understanding of Being as a whole, namely, of Being 
as primordial presupposition. Since Bultmann does not address him­
se lf to the in terpretation  of the primordial presupposition as such, 
we have to address our phenomenological analysis to  the aspect of 
his system in which the primordial presupposition is  bound to appear, 
namely the theos of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. In 
Bultmann's case, since he is a C hristian theologian, the theos is  
to be found in his re flec tion  about God's being. The analysis of 
Bultmann's idea of God's being uncovers his understanding regarding 
the primordial presupposition fo r being and reason, and, at the same 
time, provides the ground for the un ity  and coherence that reason's 
structure needs fo r its  functioning.
In order to get acquainted with Bultmann's understanding 
of the ontological framework I w il l  analyze f i r s t  God's being, and 
secondly, man's being.^ As we proceed i t  should be remembered that 
the ontological framework shows and describes the essential nature
in which not only other people think and speak o f re a lity , being, 
and events, but in which we theologians also think and speak in  our 
everyday lives" (Letters , p. 87).
^Bultmann does not follow  th is  order when he presents his 
ontological analysis which seems to be centered exclusively in man. 
The order I have chosen to fo llow , however, w il l  help to disclose 
Bultmann's primordial presupposition as i t  conditions his in terpre­
ta tio n  o f man's being.
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of the object reason is supposed to reach. The way reason follows 
in order to reach its  object is  furnished by the in te rp re ta tio n  of 
the epistemological framework, which, obviously, has to be adapted 
to the essential nature of the object to be reached.
Theos: Timelessr.ess
God's being appears as timeless in Bultmann's basic insight
that "God is wholly 'Beyond' (Gott is t  der schlechthin Jenseitige)
In other words, God is wholly beyond the world and, consequently,
2
beyond time as dimensionality.
Bultmann applies the tra d itio n a l in terp re ta tion  o f God's 
transcendence in  an absolute, radical way. The "wholly other" pre­
vents God from any dealings with the temporal dimension in  which 
man finds him self. Thus, the understanding of God's being is
FU, p. 41, c f. pp. 49 ., 50. Thiselton points out that 
Bultmann's understanding of the "wholly other" is  more rad ical than 
R. Otto's (p. 229, n. 7).
2EF, p. 167, Essays, pp. 93, 94. "The eternal God is  beyond
the worl<r”that confronts me at any given time, and beyond myself'
(Essays, p. 93 ). "God is other than the world, he is beyond the 
world and that . . . means the complete abrogation of the whole man, 
of his whole history" (FU, p. 40). Ogden fu rther explains th a t the 
idea of “wholly beyond" entails  that God is  even beyond "the eternal 
principles of things as these may be hypostatized in a cosmic 
'S p ir it '  or eternal ’Idea of the Good'" (Foreword to Existence and 
Faith p. 16).
^God's timelessness appears also as Bultmann subscribes to
the classical concept of the in v is ib il ita s  Dei. "The action of God
is hidden from every eye except the eye of fa ith "  (JCM, p. 62). 
“The in v is ib i l i ty  of God excludes every myth which tr ie s  to  make 
God and His action v is ib le ; God withholds Himself from view and 
observation" ( JCM, pp. 83, 84 ). "His being is  not manifest in  nature 
to the observing eye of the reason or of the aesthetic perception, 
but precisely in the enigma, the incomprehensible, the wonderful" 
(Essays, p. 116). Cf. EF, pp. 27, 30; FU, pp. 38, 39. This c lea rly
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developed by Bultmann in  the timeless dimensionality that follows  
the Parmenidean in terpretation  o f the ground o f Being and reason. 
Ypt God is understood as being in re la tion  to  time and history,^  
not in  the sense of suggesting a “temporal" aspect of God's being,
points to the fac t that God's being pertains to  the realm or dimen­
sion of the noumenon (timelessness). Here the core of Bultmann's 
approach to reason and meaning may be found. The in v is ib ilita s  Dei, 
the transcendence of God, with its  c lassical timelessness are 
accepted by Bultmann in the Parmenidean tra d it io n . Yet, at the same 
tim e, they are conceived to belong to the Kantian realm o f the 
noumena. What is  noumenon cannot become phenomenon. The Parmenidean 
gap between timelessness and tem porality, which Greek trad ition  as a 
whole tried  to  overcome in d iffe ren t ways (notably Plato and 
A r is to tle ) , is  at the center o f Bultmannian reason. God in his 
being, is what is not temporal, hence he cannot re late nor even 
reveal himself in the temporal h istorica l dimension. He is the abso­
lu te . Time and history are the realm of r e la t iv i ty  (FU, pp. 30, 
31). —
^Again Bultmann is ju s t following the tra d itio n  which recog­
nizes God's dealings with man, and so his re la tio n  to time, which 
must not be confused with Temporality. The timeless God, the in v is ­
ib le  God, relates to temporal, v is ib le , h is to rica l concrete man. 
That is  the problem theology is  bound to face, and which determines 
i ts  meaning as a whole. Bultmann expresses his conviction th a t God 
re la tes  to time in the following way: "God is  the enigmatic power
beyond time, ye t master of the temporal; beyond being, yet working 
in i t "  ( Essays, p. 5 ) .
2
The tem porality of God's being is  not even present in Pro­
cess theology. In Process theology the dimensionality of Being is  
not in discussion. What is  being challenged is the understanding 
of th a t timeless dimension which tra d itio n  developed from a “s ta tic "  
"timeless" viewpoint. Process theology does not re jec t the classical 
approach. I t  only holds that the classical approach is basically  
correc t, but yet that i t  stands in need of some improvement in order 
th a t its  onesideness may be avoided. That is  why Process theologians 
l ik e  Schubert Ogden are comfortable with the "Neo-Classicism" la b e l. 
I t  is  not possible fo r me to discuss in d e ta il the timeless dimen­
s io n a lity  in which Process theology u t il iz e s  reason. I t  can be, 
however, b r ie fly  pointed out that according to  Ogden ("What Sense 
Does I t  Make to Say ’God Acts in History'?" The Journal of Religion  
43 C1963]: 12, 13), God is to be reached through analogy, an idea 
which assumes the in terpretation  of God's being and his transcendence 
w ith in  the Parmenidean tra d itio n  of via negativa. The via analogica 
can only be developed a fte r the via negativa has been applied. What
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which would be both absurd and contradictory, but insofar as God 
in His act comes in contact with (encounters) men.^
The fact that Bultmann thinks o f God's transcendent Being
2
not only as timeless but also w ithin the Kantian pattern may be
Ogden, following Process theology, suggests is  a more thorough appli­
cation o f analogy from the perspective of the human person (p. 9 ). 
In th is  way what Ogden ca lls  "eminent h is to ric ity "  (p . 13) could 
be applied analogically to  the idea of God. Such "h is to ric ity "  of 
God, however, must not be confused with the temporal dimensionality 
of Being and reason since i t  is  reached a fte r  the timeless via nega-  
tiva  has provided the ground for the analogical procedure! See 
Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method 
(London: SCM Press, 1970), pp. 227-44.
W his aspect is  c la r if ie d  la te r  on as we deal with the 
divine-human encounter and the understanding of d ivine revelation  
in Bultmann's system. Some Bultmannian declarations could be confus­
ing i f  the reader does not place them in th e ir  proper context. For 
instance, i t  could be interpreted that Bultmann is  suggesting a tem­
poral dimensionality fo r God's being when he declares th a t "transcen­
dence does not mean the sphere of the mind over against matter a"d
what is  sensorily perceptible—of what is  timeless and eternal over 
against what develops and declines: God’s transcendence is  rather
his constant fu tu r ity , his absolute freedom" ( Essays, p. 271; c f. 
Roberts, p. 58). This is  not to be interpreted as a d irec t speech 
on God's being (as only the via negativa is  able to o f fe r ) ,  but is  
rather an analogical statement pronounced a fte r  the encounter with 
God. Man's expression is  bound to be h istorica l and temporal. So
God's transcendence is  grasped and expressed by Bultmann in terms
of the analysis of human existence as "constant fu tu r ity ."  But th is  
"constant fu tu rity "  is  not a temporal dimension in God’ s being but 
rather the position from which temporal man is bound to reach ever 
anew his encounter with timeless God. In fa c t, the via negativa 
provides what is usually called "the natural knowledge of God" 
(Essays, pp. 96-98). Bultmann believes that Christian fa ith  does
not provide a d iffe re n t knowledge o f God from the one available  
through the via negativa. Faith "has simply to confirm th is  know­
ledge" ( ib id . ,  p. 98). C f. FU, p. 53. Yet, as we see la te r, a fte r  
th is in i t ia l  procedure through the via negativa is  performed, an
analogical procedure is  recognized as possible by Bultmann.
2KMII, p. 190; FU, pp. 51, 321. Cf. Roberts, p. 261, and
Joseph Runzo, "Relativism and Absolutism in Bultmann’ s Demythologis-
ing Hermeneutic," Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1979):404.
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seen as he declares th a t God "is  not an objective en tity ."^  This
idea resu lts  from a radical application of the via negativa which
2
is  necessary in order to preserve God's absolute transcendence.
This usage of the v ia  negativa is  required by the Kantian pattern
of reason according to  which e n titie s  as objects are cognitively
3
constituted by the a p rio ri concepts of the understanding. And, 
since these concepts apply only to what is  given to the understanding 
through the forms of sensib ility^  (phenomena), i t  follows that 
e n tit ie s  can only pertain to the phenomenal world of the Parmenidean 
doxa.
So the understanding of God as non-entity is not demanded 
by the existence-world dichotomy as Roberts (pp. 259, 260} suggests, 
but i t  is rather the resu lt of Bultmann's application of the Kantian 
pattern fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  The existence-world dichotomy that 
Roberts stresses in his analysis is  also an expression of the same 
Kantian pattern.
2
"Man, in speaking of God's e te rn ity  and transcendence, is  
as yet not re a lly  speaking of God at a l l ,  and . . . he as yet has 
not understood a 11 the logical implications of man's fin itu d e , in 
seeing through the transient and symbolic nature of everything 
belonging to the here and now. On the one hand th is  is his asser­
tion: a ll  ta lk  of the transcendent God becomes illu so ry  when i t
is  an attempt to be more than a mere negation, that is , more than 
the admission that the actual re a lity  of man is devoid of God. To 
imagine God's transcendence behind th is  l i f e  as the sphere into which 
man can take f l ig h t  from the things of th is  world, in theoretical 
contemplation, asceticism and mysticism, is wishful thinking" 
(Essays, p. 106). This amounts to a denial of Platonism in re la tio n  
to God. The via negativa must deny everything to God, even His being 
an e n tity .
3
Kant, C ritique of Pure Reason, pp. 110, 111; c f. pp. 72,
73, 77.
4Ib id . ,  p. 62; c f . pp. 186, 187. Here the timelessness of 
the noumena (th e ir  non-sensory nature) and the absolute gap that 
separates them from the phenomena is expressed in an abridged way.
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In th is  context, i t  is  obvious that God, in  his timeless  
transcendence, cannot belong to the phenomenal world. Therefore, 
God cannot be an e n tity , since e n titie s  are only temporal. Conse­
quently, w ith in  the Kantian pattern for in t e l l ig ib i l i t y ,  the v ia  
negativa is  to  be applied consistently even to the idea of e n t ity  
which is to be denied as pertaining to God's beingJ In th is  way
Bultmann expresses, b rie fly  and c le a rly , the timeless dimensionality
2of God's being over against the temporality of secular re a lity .
Kant himself (Critique o f Pure Reason, pp. 371, 372) expres­
ses the conviction that speculative reason “is  of the highest u t i l i t y  
in correcting our conception" o f God's being. And th is  "correction” 
is  obviously provided by the consistent application of the via nega-  
t iv a  in order “to  eliminate a l l  phenomenal elements" (p. 371) from 
the idea of God. Kant does not apply the via negativa to the e n tity  
of God as Bultmann, who says that God "is not an e n tity ."  This same 
conclusion is  also reached by T i l l ic h :  "God is  b e in g -its e lf , not
a being" ( Systematic Theology, 1:237); and "be ing-itse lf"  re ferred  
To God is what T i l l ic h  calls "the ground of being" ( ib id . ,  p. 235). 
Bultmann also reaches the conclusion that since the God of re lig io n  
is "beyond knowledge" he cannot be the princip le of the un ity  of 
knowledge (FU, p. 60 ). Bultmann is  here speaking of the God of r e l i ­
gion, the TTving God, the God of the noumen. This, however, does 
not deny the theos function of the idea of God in Kantian tra d it io n  
(Essays, p. 98TI What Bultmann wants to express is  that God has 
to be conceived, through via negativa, even beyond the theos ep is te ­
mological function . To identify  God with the epistemological theos 
would amount to forgetting the real God by replacing Him by an idol 
(theos) o f human invention.
2
Temporality and timelessness as dimensionality must not 
be confused w ith the usual way in  which time and timeless are con­
ceived, that is  as pertaining to the categories of the understanding 
in the Kantian pattern. I t  is  in th is  last sense th a t, fo r instance, 
T ill ic h  sees God as an "all-tem porality" very s im ilar in his content 
to the Thomistic "totum simul" (Systematic Theology 1:274, 275). 
Jaspers also deals with time and timelessness as categories of 
thought which must be denied before they may be applied to "Transcen­
dence." In such dia lectica l negation both time and timelessness
are kept in an analogical re la tio n  to transcendence. See p. 107, 
n. 1 above.
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In relation to Bultmann’s timeless understanding of God's
being, one should notice that he is  unaware of the philosophical
orig in  and the hypothetical nature of the dimensionality he is
u n c rit ic a lly  applying to God’ s being, and through God as theos to
the whole of reason's structure. Bultmann sincerely believes th a t
in his d irect talk^ about the nature of God’ s being as timeless he
2
is  only being influenced by the Jewish idea of creation. Yet, what
he is  actually doing is  applying the Parmenidean primordial presup-
3
position to the being of God. I t  is  in Bultmann's understanding 
of the dimensionality of God's being as timeless th a t his radical
I t  is seen la te r  that theological meanings are possible 
only in d ire c tly  through the self-understanding of fa ith  and analogy. 
Yet the analogical in terpretation o f both God and man is  understood 
as ''tru e ,"  objective, d irect ta lk  which ''sets" the realm in which 
theological meaning is  possible.
^Bultmann c learly  expresses his opinion that the “idea of 
transcendence is a legacy of Jewish tra d itio n , and symptomatic of 
th is  is  the idea of creation, the creatio  ex n ih ilo" ( Essays, 
pp. 271, 272). Thiselton explains how “i t  is  precisely because God 
is  'wholly other' and outside the whole system of human knowledge 
th a t Bultmann believes himself to be secure against the p o s s ib ility  
of compromising the tru th  of revelation by drawing on concepts bor­
rowed from philosophy" (p. 228). I t  would seem th a t Bultmann is  
ta lk ing  about the Protestant dream o f changing the onto-theo-logical 
ordo o f reason's structure into a theo-onto-logical one which would 
express the Reformers' principle o f sola Scriptura, in the sense 
of solo Deo. God in his revelation is  the one who determines the 
dimensionality of reason and its  primordial presupposition. The 
suggestion is good and correct. ( I  am going to work on i t  in the 
la s t chapter.) Yet Bultmann is  ac tu a lly  following the Parmenidean 
primordial presupposition and so the onto-theo-logical tra d itio n a l 
ordo o f reason’s structure.
3
Roberts (p. 168) believes th a t Bultmann's position which 
makes impossible a d irect knowledge o f God is determined by his a 
p rio r i e x is te n tia lis t metaphysics. Roberts is correct in seeing 
Bultmann's understanding of God as conditioned by philosophical pre­
suppositions. Yet he is not to ta lly  accurate when he speaks of 
Bultmann’s existentia l metaphysics, i f  such a declaration is to be
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difference and departure from Heideggerian thought can be more 
c le a rly  appreciated as Thiselton underlines.^
Bultmann's understanding of God's being in terms and within  
the dimensionality of timelessness is accepted without fu rther com­
ment by a l l  the theologians involved in  the “demythologization 
debate," whether lib e ra l or conservative, and th is  fact shows that 
the Parmenidean primordial presupposition is  s t i l l  at the basis of
the way reason is  u tiliz e d  fo r the constitution of theological mean-
2
ing in  the post-Kantian s c ie n tif ic  era.
Bultmann's radical understanding of the Being of God as time­
less transcendence enta ils  a foundational change in the functioning 
of reason's structure w ith in  the bosom of Protestantism. Protestant­
ism changed the Thomistic ordo ad deum in to  the Lutheran ordo ad
understood independently o f the Kantian framework w ithin which 
Bultmann develops his metaphysical insights.
^"At th is  point i t  may well seem th a t we have trave lled  fu r­
thest away from any point of contact between Bultmann and Heidegger" 
{Thiselton, p. 224).
2
For instance, T i l l ic h  declares at the very beginning of his 
Systematic Theology that "theology moves back and forth between two 
poles, the eternal tru th  of i ts  foundation and the temporal situa­
tion in which the eternal tru th  must be received. Not many theologi­
cal systems have been able to balance these two demands perfectly"  
(1 :3 ). Barth also explains regarding the framework of his thinking  
that " i f  I have a system, i t  is  lim ited to a recognition of what 
Kierkegaard called the ' in f in i t e  q u a lita tiv e  distinction* between 
time and e te rn ity , and to my regarding th is  as possessing negative 
as well as positive significance: 'God is  in heaven, and thou art
on earth " ' ( Epistle to the Romans, p. 10 ). See also P. Gisel, 
Verite  e t h is to rie , pp. 518, 519. For an introduction to the onto- 
logical and epistemological frameworks as understood by Karl Barth, 
see "The Epistemology of Karl Barth," Heythrop Journal 18 (1977):383- 
398. Regarding timelessness as determining that neither Barth nor 
Bultmann treated seriously the problem of h is tory , see Normann H. G. 
Robinson, "Barth or Bultmann," Religious Studies 14 (1978):281.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
ChristumJ  Trad itiona l Protestant Orthodoxy and even Protestant
Liberalism attempted to develop theological meanings following the
ordo ad Christum. Yet, since the crux included in the Christus
2
enta iled  tem porality and since reason had not as y e t developed cate­
gories to deal w ith  the temporal, sensible, contingent re a lit ie s  o f
the Lebenswelt, such attempts were bound from the beginning to end
3 4in  fa ilu re  and in  the sacrificium in te lle c tu s . In order to avoid
these results, Bultmann connected the timeless transcendence of God
5
and the Lutheran dogma of ju s tif ic a tio n  by fa ith . Thus, Bultmann 
is  able to salvage the sa lv ific  element of the Chri stus through the  
abstract idea o f ju s tific a tio n ,®  which results from the elim ination
^See p. 182, n. 1 above.
2
See Torrence, Theology as a Science, p. 132; c f. N. H. G. 
Robinson, p. 281.
3
Bultmann develops a consistent c ritic ism  of Protestant 




Funk holds that Bultmann’s "programme may be said to aim 
at the rad ica liza tio n  of Luther's doctrine of Jus tification" (Fore­
word to Faith and Understanding, p. 14 ). Cf. FU, p. 46.
®I am aware that for Bultmann ju s tif ic a tio n  by fa ith  is  not 
abstract, that i s ,  equal to unreal, but a very real ontological 
experience. I say that Bultmann applies the "abstract” concept of 
ju s t if ic a tio n  in  the sense that fo r  him the correct understanding 
of ju s t if ic a tio n  must include the elim ination of the h istorica l tem­
poral elements (myths) that the doctrine of ju s t if ic a tio n  includes 
even in Paul and Luther. In th is sense Bultmann reaches through his 
abstractive procedure of demythologization the "correct" in te rp re ta ­
tio n  of ju s t if ic a t io n , which in its  isolation from temporal and h is ­
to r ic a l elements pertains most properly to the transcendent tim eless­
ness of God who according to Bultmann is  not an e n tity .
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of the temporal h istorical dimension o f salvation that the crux 
e n ta ile d J
Commenting on Bultmann's Christology, Barth remarks that 
Bultmann’ s approach consists in "a p r in c ip a lly  timeless Christ idea 
which is  embodied in th is Jesus but can also be abstracted from him" 
(Le tte rs , p. 144). Bultmann c learly  states th a t "'Christ a fte r  the
fle s h 1 is  no concern of ours" (FU, p. 132). He further explains why
i t  is  so by suggesting that "tfie event o f Jesus Christ is the end
of the aeon; he is  the f in a l word which God has spoken and is speak­
ing. The history of the proclamation of the Word is not a segment 
of world hi story  but is consummated outside that history or above 
i t "  (FU, p. 311). Bultmann faces great d if f ic u lt ie s  when he tr ie s  
to express his timeles.s understanding o f Being in temporal concepts. 
In such an attempt Bultmann’ s timeless primordial presupposition is  
apparent. Also apparent is  his e x p lic it  departure from Heidegger’ s 
temporal interpretation o f Being which he calls "temporality of 
nature" over against what he ca lls  "human temporality." Yet, 
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's nature precisely uncovers "human 
tem porality." The context reveals th a t what Bultmann ca lls  “human 
temporality" is  a very confusing way of ta lk in g  about what is  time­
less, that is , of what does not pertain to  the temporal continuum. 
Bultmann explains himself in  the follow ing way: "The future of
C hrist, instead of being a yet unknown segment of time due to appear, 
which w il l  at some time become present and then past, is  the future  
which marks an absolute l im it  and is  ‘ always the opposite of every 
conceivable present. 1 C learly the 'fu tu re  o f Christ’ means—or at 
least needs to mean—nothing more than fu tu r ity  per se, which is  
always the opposite of every conceivable present. Here, therefore, 
we have expressed—although admittedly less c learly—an understanding 
of human temporality in contrast to the tem porality of nature, such 
as we find in Heidegger" (FU, p. 324). In the above statement time­
lessness appears clearly wlien "the fu ture of Christ" is  reduced to 
"future per se" and "future per se" is  understood in opposition to 
“every conceivable present." At th is  point the entire line  of time 
is envisioned in the idea of "every conceivable present.” So what­
ever is le f t  a fte r the en tire  lin e  of time has been considered and 
denied is  "non-temporal,” that is , tim eless. Such is the "absolute 
l im it” o f which Bultmann speaks above. Such lim it  is the Parmenidean 
chorismos. Thus, Christ's resurrection is  reduced to an a r t ic le  of 
fa ith  iKM, p. 41) which has i ts  h is to ric a l temporal counterpart in  
the act “of preaching of the Church (p. 42 ). See also KM, pp. 43, 44,
and EF, p. 33. Yet the preaching o f the church "happens" not only
in history and time but is  linked as to i t s  content to the cross as 
history. Bultmann e x p lic it ly  declares th a t "the cross of Christ is 
no mere mythical event, but a h is to ric  ( geschichtlich) fac t o rig in a t­
ing in the historical (h istorisch) event which is the cruc ifix ion
of Jesus” (KM, p. 37). Here appears what has been called the "incon­
sistency" oT“ 8ultmann’ s system which in synthesis consists in tying
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This foundational perspective represents a step back closer 
to Aquinas's ordo ad deum, but with the advantage that i t  denies what 
has been always annoying to Protestantism, namely Aquinas's h ie ra r­
chical in terpretation  of ontologyJ
Man: Potential Timelessness
Bultmann in terprets  man's being in order to provide, w ith in  
the Kantian pattern, the necessary ontological room fo r  the d iv in e - 
human encounter which plays a central ro le  in his theology.
the timeless divine-human encounter o f salvation to a h is to rica l hap­
pening, that is , to the preaching of the cross. See Ogden, Christ 
without Myth, p. 119; idem, Foreword to Existence and Fa ith , pp. 20, 
21; and Runzo, "Relativism and Absolutism," p. 409. What is  at stake 
here is  the uniqueness of C h ris tian ity , the ephapax of the cross. 
Bultmann trie s  to salvage i t  by grounding i t  on the preaching o f the 
church as event ( JCM, pp. 78-83). This position is  harshly c r i t i ­
cized by the Swiss theologians that follow Jaspers, notably F r itz  
Buri. Buri believes that since Bultmann's demythologization s t i l l  
has room for a h is to rica l temporal aspect in the Kerygma, "demytholo­
gization" needs to  be radicalized into "dekerygmatization." For a 
very good introduction to Buri's radical proposal of "dekerygmatiza­
tio n ,"  see Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, pp. 129-152. 
In order to “solve" th is  inconsistency Ogden suggests the follow ing: 
"The claim 'only in Jesus Christ' must be interpreted to mean not 
th a t God acts to redeem only in the history of Jesus and in no other 
h istory— although he in fact redeems every history— is  the God whose 
redemptive action is  decisely revealed in the world th a t Jesus speaks 
and is" ("God Acts in History," p. 8 ) .  The problem with th is  solu­
tion  is  that the uniqueness of C hristianity is lost along with the 
ephapax of the cross. Be that as i t  may, the abstractive approach 
that Bultmann develops regarding the cross in view o f his timeless 
understanding of God’ s being is clear. The debate between "demytho­
logization" and "dekerygmatization" epistemologically refers only to 
the degree and extension of the way in which abstraction should be 
applied to the h is to rica l event of Jesus Christ.
^This denial of Thomas' ontology is established through 
Kantism and is developed through the ontological categories of 
Heidegger's ex is ten tia l analysis. The ontological timeless framework 
is accepted. At th is  point both Catholic and Protestant tra d itio n s  
agree. Yet 6ultmann in a Kantian trad ition  denies the h ierarchical 
ontology of the Aristotel ic-Thomistic tra d it io n . In the 
Aristotelian-Thom istic trad itio n  timeless being and its  temporal
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Consequently, Bultmann's interpretation o f man's being, insofar as 
man is  essentia lly  re la ted  to God in the encounter, is  conditioned 
by his timeless in te rp re ta tio n  of God's being.
Bultmann re jects  both the Id ea lis t and the M a te ria lis t trad i­
tions that consider man to be a substance or object among objects . 1 
He understands man as event, act, or w i l l .  Yet he also re jec ts  the
idea that man should be considered as an “eternal s e lf ,"  that is , 
as a timeless substance."* Consequently, man as en tity  is  considered
to be absolutely temporal and h is to rica l, th a t is , as belonging to
4
to the dimensionality o f the Parmenidean doxa. The h istorica l
expression are developed together in a harmonious h ierarchical order. 
In Bultmannian thought, both levels or dimension, as constitutive  
of re a lity  as e n tity  or substance, do not mix. Yet, as appreciated 
la te r , in  the "encounter'' time and timelessness, i t  can re la te  in 
a very particu la r non-cognitive way.
1 JCM, pp. 46, 47; and FU, p. 58.
2
“But though human w ill is  in general not without reason, 
the w il l  is to be esteemed as the determining facto r, i f  i t  is cor­
rect that human l i f e  is  lived through decisions" (PE, p. 142). See 
Roberts, pp. 37-38. In EF Bultmann expresses his understanding of 
man as centered in the acT“of decision, namely, in resolve (pp. 106- 
109). "He is  simply identical with his act, taken independent of 
any e ffe c t or product or actuality  which might ensue from i t ;  he is 
identical with pure act thought of as the moment of acting, the 
moment o f decision1' (p . 33 ). Cf. FU, p. 187).
^Essays, pp. 80, 271. Bultmann denies the Greek Platonic- 
A ris to te lian  tra d itio n  o f ontology.
4As man is  obviously perceivable, he belongs to the realm 
of phenomena. Thus he belongs to the closed h is to rica l continuum 
(Roberts, p. 127). No interpretation o f man's being can think of 
man outside th is  realm. Bultmann e x p lic it ly  says that "what to the 
Greek counts as the appearance of r e a l ity  is  actually the true real­
i ty  of l ife "  ( Essays, p. 83). He connects th is idea of h is to ric ity  
with his in te rp re ta tio n  o f existence: “Only men can have 'existence'
because they are h is to ric a l beings" ( JCM, p. 56). This is  to say
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nature o f man is understood as "p o te n tia lity  to be, K^  which provides
the basic category according to which man's being as act or event
is understood. As temporal, man pertains to the three ec-stasies
of time (past, present, and future).
As Bultmann approaches the in terpretation  o f man's being
from the temporal dimensionality, he does make a distinction
3
between ex is ten tie11 and e x is te n tia l, according to  which exis- 
t e n t ie l l  points to man as a concrete individual in his unique p a rti­
cular existence, and existentia l points to the in terpretation  or
that Bultmann sees the "self? as belonging to the "flow" of time and
decisions (PE, p. 145). See add itiona lly  PE, p. 146; FU, p. 139;
Essays, p. TT  and Roberts, pp. 31, 93.
^“We believe th a t we understand the being o f man more tru ly  
when we designate i t  as h is to rica l. And we understand by the histor­
ica l nature of man’ s being that his being is a p o te n tia lity  to be. 
That is  to say, the being of man is  removed from his own control, 
i t  is  risked continually in the concrete situations o f l i f e  and goes 
through decisions in which man does not choose something for himself, 
but chooses himself as his p o ss ib ility"  (FU“ pi 149). See FU, 
p. 187 and Roberts, p. 31. I t  is  c lear that "p o te n tia lity  to Be" 
is linked to the Lutheran idea of ju s tif ic a tio n  and hence to the 
timeless God who acts. For those readers who are fam ilia r with
Heidegger, i t  w ill be easy to see th a t Heidegger's interpretation  
of man's being as p o te n tia lity  does not entail the "removal of man's 
being" from his con tro l. On the contrary, the "authentic" man, 
according to Heidegger, is  the man who is in contro l. For Bultmann 
to be "in  control" is  s in .
As h istorica l being man is "what he was and what he w ill be” 
(FU, p. 200). I t  should be remembered that man's h is to rica l nature 
is understood in Bultmann along the lines provided by nineteenth- 
century Historicism (Friedrich Gogarten, Demythologizing and History 
[New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, I955J, p. 57; an3 PET
pp. n o - 1 3 7 ) .  In short, Bultmann does not fo llow  HeideggeF's 
in te rp re ta tio n  of time and man as temporal being in the three 
extasies and flux  of tim e.
3EF, p. 96; JCM, pp. 58, 66 , 74; KMII, pp. 187-89; c f. KM, 
p. 193. "See also Gogarten, pp. 50-56; Ogden, Foreword to Existence 
and F a ith , p. 7; and idem, Christ without Myth, p. 47. Man, in his
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understanding o f what existence means in general. This d is tin c tio n
is not only present in Heidegger's thought* regarding what is  ontical
and ontological, but goes a ll  the way back to Thomas' foundational
ideas of esse and essentia; fo r esse corresponds to Bultmann's
2
e x is te n t ie ll , and essentia to Bultmann's e x is te n tia l. The real d i f ­
ference between Thomas' and Bultmann's ontological approaches is  not 
in the ways they understand the structure of re a lity  as such, but 
in the in terpretation  of existence they develop. Thomas in te rp re ts  
existence with the categories of A risto te lian  metaphysics. Bultmann 
interprets existence with the categories provided by Heidegger's 
analysis of existence.
1 think that Bultmann has an adequate understanding o f the 
ro le  that the ontological framework plays in theology. He rea lizes  
th a t i t  is ju s t not possible fo r theology to do without an ontologi­
cal in terp re ta tion . In the ontological realm Bultmann believes that
4 . . .Heidegger's in terpretation  is  the correct one because i t  is ,  in a
nutshell, the in terpretation  of the New Testam ent,and  because, as
e x is te n tie ll concrete dimension cannot be reduced to knowledge— in 
BuItmann‘ s terms, to ob jec tiv ity  (FU, p. 175; Roberts, pp. 26, 33, 
44 ). The same i s true i n Thomas' s system where the esse cannot be 
reduced to essentia. See p. 170, n. 1 above.
*See Being and Time, p. 31, n. 3 fo r the basic meaning of 
ontisch (o n tica l) and ontologisch (ontolog ical).
2
See p. 168, nn. 4, 5; p. 169, n. 1; p. 170, n. 1 above.
3EF, p. 96.
^"In fa c t there is no reason why we should not admit that 
what we are concerned with is the 'r ig h t ' philosophy" (Wi, p. 193). 
Ogden (Christ without Myth, p. 45) explains that Bultmann considers 
th a t science of man has been achieved successfully by Heidegger's 
phenomenological analysis in Sein und Z e it.
^''Of course i t  may s t i l l  be necessary to elim inate mythology 
here and there. But the c rite rio n  adopted must be taken not from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
228
i t  is  developed through the phenomenological method, i t  does not 
understand man in an "objectifying" way^  (that is  to  say, in analogy 
to  natural things) but t r ie s  to grasp man's being in  his h is to r ic ity .
Yet, as Bultmann replaces the classical ontological categor­
ies with Heidegger's e x is te n tia lia  applied in  the tra d itio n a l way, 
Jaspers' critic ism  regarding Bultmann's objective application of the
e x is te n tia lia  arises suggesting the questionability  of Bultmann's 
2
existentia lism . Be that as i t  may, i t  is  a t th is  point that
modern thought but from the understanding of human existence which 
the  New Testament i t s e l f  enshrines" (KM, p. 12). See also KM, p. 27; 
Roberts, p. 79; and Ogden, Christ witHout Myth, p. 44. I t  seems that 
here Bultmann wants to provide the foundation fo r his ontology on 
the New Testament tra d it io n . Bultmann tries  to apply the sola Scrip-  
tu ra  principle fo r the interpretation  of man's being.
^At this point, o b jectiv ity  is  used by Bultmann in two d i f ­
fe re n t senses which vary according to the context. F irs t ,  Bultmann
re jec ts  “objectifying" knowledge of man in the sense that man is  
understood as i f  he were another natural e n tity , th a t is , a "thing."  
I t  is  in this context that Bultmann sees Heidegger as providing a 
"non-objectifying" in terpretation  of man. That is  why Bultmann con­
siders that Heidegger provides the “right" ontological approach to
man's being. Heidegger develops "a precise conceptuality in which 
the phenomena of human existence may be appropriately described in 
a nonmythological way" (Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 56). See also 
EF, pp. 92-110. Regarding the second sense fo r "ob jectiv ity" see 
n. 2 below.
2
Here the second sense in which “o b je c tiv ity "  is used by
Bultmann appears. "Objectivity" also means knowledge as such insofar 
as any knowledge has an object in space and tim e. In th is  context 
"object" is taken in its  broadest sense. Oaden exDlains that 
Bultmann allows the ex is ten tia l analysis to have "objective" charac­
te r ,  in the sense of being expressed in temporal "objective" proposi­
tions ( Christ without Myth, p. 45, n. 2, and p. 66 ) .  Jaspers in 
c r it ic iz in g  Bultmann points out his usage o f Heideggerian existen­
t i a l  ia  as objective s c ie n tific  tru th  ("Myth ano Relig ion," p. 139). 
To say that Heideggerian categories are found in the New Testament 
or that they are the resu lt of a phenomenological analysis is  not 
enough to ju s t ify  th e ir  application in an absolute, necessary way. 
Thomas Aquinas's categories also f i l l  those requirements. Yet 
Aquinas's categories are shaped w ithin a timeless dimensionality
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Bultmann departs the most from tra d itio n , although not so fa r  as to
follow  Heidegger in his "overcoming of metaphysics."^
Even though Bultmann accepts Heidegger's e x is ten tia l analysis
and uses i t  to provide his ontological categories he considers that
i t  is  not adequate to  express the theological understanding of man.
Heidegger's analysis does not recognize the coram deo which in
2
Bultmann's thought is  essential for theology. Thus, from Bultmann's
while Heidegger's are shaped within a temporal one. Bultmann takes 
Heidegger's temporal categories and applies them in the context of a 
timeless in terp retation  of being and knowledge. The Heideggerian 
e x is te n tia lia  become “timeless truths" (Ogden, Christ without Myth, 
p. 66; FU, p. 330). Thus, man as a temporal re a lity  is  interpreted  
not in TTie context of the flu x  of time but in the context of time­
lessness. I t  should be remembered that Bultmann works w ithin a 
Kantian framework fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  and that Kantian o b je c tiv ity  is  
developed on the basis of the A ris to te lic  categories o f matter and 
form. See p. 99, n. 1, p. 100, n. 1 above. I t  is  c lea r, then, that 
Bultmann does not fo llow  Heidegger's new temporal in terp retation  of 
knowledge and "o b jec tiv ity" according to which o b je c tiv ity  is to be 
found in the continuity both of the subject-object relationship (with  
no primordial or in i t i a l  gap assumed) and of the three extasis of the 
flu x  o f time (past, present, and fu tu re ). See pp. 130-40 above.
^Bultmann s t i l l  uses the tra d itio n a l in terp retation  of the 
ontological framework fo r  his understanding of the structure of rea­
son. His heavy re lian ce  on Heideggerian insights appears to be a 
device to replace the Aristotelic-Thom istic categories with  
Heideggerian e x is ten tia l ones which are more suitable fo r expressing 
the foundational doctrine of ju s tif ic a tio n  in its  Lutheran sense. 
A ris to te lic  categories are not suitable because they are grounded on 
the description of "th ings." E x is ten tia lia , as categories can reach 
man because they are grounded on the phenomenological description of 
man as e x is te n tie ll,  and thus they w il l  not "objectify" (reduce to 
the level of "thing1')  man's proper h istorica l being.
2
The coram deo originated in the New Testament and Lutheran 
theology. See KM, pp. 17-23; Ogden, Christ without Myth , p. 137; 
and Martin J. De~Nys, "Myth and In terpretation: Bultmann Revisited,"
International Journal fo r Philosophy of Religion 11 (1980):32.
Heidegger's ex is ten tia l analysis considers man as he is  in h istory  
and nature. Theology and Bultmann deal with man in his his re la tio n  
to transcendent God.
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theological viewpoint Heidegger’ s analysis is not “wrong" but rather
"incomplete,"^ inasmuch as i t  interprets man from the perspective
of an “external" phenomenon, namely, "death," and forgets the “inner"
2
phenomenon of "love." In short, the theological analysis of man
Bultmann e x p lic it ly  denies that the theological analysis 
of existence in fa ith  is  in any kind of "competition" with philo­
sophical ontology (EF, p. 108). He affirms the s c ie n tif ic  task of 
theology as he remarks emphatically that he cannot concede "that the 
theological explication o f existence in fa ith  may not f a l l  back on 
the philosophical analysis of man. On the contrary, I a ffirm  that 
th is  is  precisely what theology must do i f  i t  at a l l  wants to c la r ify  
the existence in fa ith  in  a conceptual way, i . e . ,  i f  i t  wants to be 
a science and not merely a sermon" (ET, p. 97). Yet, Heidegger's 
analysis is  considered as introductory- to  fa ith  as i t  reveals "from 
the outset an ontological poss ib ility  of human existence of which 
man dimly knows. Faith is  from the outset an ontological poss ib ility  
of man th a t appears in the resolve of despair. I t  is th is  that makes 
i t  possible for man to understand when he is encountered by the 
kerygma" (EF, p. 108).
Macquarrie (Exi s ten ti al i st Theology, pp. 67-76) searches for 
a point of contact between Heidegger’ s e x is te n tia lis t  analysis and 
Bultmann’ s analysis of the man in fa ith , and believes th a t i t  could 
be found in Heidegger's concept of Angst. Yet, an analysis of 
Heidegger's concept of Angst (Being and firne, 1 .6 .40) reveals that 
Angst belongs to being-in-the-world since ^being-in-the-world i ts e lf  
is  that in  the face o f which anxiety is  anxious" ( ib id . ) .  Conse­
quently, Angst cannot resu lt from confronting "something standing 
apart from the world" (Macquarrie, E x is ten tia lis t Theology, p. 70). 
Perhaps the best way of understanding EKe re la tio n  between 
Heidegger's analysis of natural man from the viewpoint of death and 
anxiety and Bultmann's complementary analysis of the man of fa ith , 
is to fo llow  Bultmann's own analogical approach (EF, p. 110). For 
fu rth e r commentary on the Heideggerian concept of Angst as belonging 
to and being determined by the world w ithin a temporal dimensionality 
see Being and Time, 1 .6 .41 ; I I . 1.53.
2
Love, according to Bultmann, belongs to the ontic level.
"Love is  not ( lik e  h is to r ic ity )  a characteristic  of man as such 
(what Heidegger speaks o f as 'e x is te n t ia l ') ,  but rather is  an ontic 
determination of resolve" (EF, p. 106). And the ontic phenomenon 
of love reveals the existence of fa ith  (p. 107) which constitutes 
the subject matter o f theology as a science. "Theology can have its  
basis only in the man o f fa ith . Only fa ith  can motivate applying 
oneself to a science th a t undertakes a conceptual in te rp re ta tion  of 
existence in fa ith , and so theology, can only be a movement of fa ith  
i ts e lf "  (p . 97). The subject matter of theology, then, is  not love.
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finds in the ontic realm a phenomenon which has been disregarded by 
philosophical analysis and which allows the theological "completion" 
o f ontologyJ
Bultmann's theological analysis of man's being sees man as 
2
determined by God, whose act of encounter requires o f man a “rad ical
openness for the power speaking to him from the sphere o f the trans- 
3
cendent." The theological dimension, the coram deo, determines 
man's being both as possib ility  and as exi stenti el 1. Since God's 
being is timeless, the occurrence o f a real ontological re la tio n  
requires either th a t God should become in some way temporal or th a t  
man should become in  some way tim eless. Bultmann's approach follows 
the la tte r .  Man's being as revealed by the act of fa ith  en ta ils  a
Love is  just the phenomenon which corresponds and reveals the act 
o f fa ith  (EF, pp. 95-97). Yet love may also re fe r  to the act of
fa i th  in fE se lf, end so i t  is not a phenomenon but an in v is ib le
r e a l i ty .  See KM, p. 200; Roberts, p. 167.
^"Completion" gives the idea that what is  "completed" remains 
untouched in its  meaning. That is not the case in Bultmann's comple­
t io n  of Heideggerian categories. What Bultmann introduces in theo­
logy is  not revealed, nor can i t  be revealed through the ex is ten tia l 
analysis because i t  does not belong to this world, but to the realm 
of timelessness. This is the point where the timeless primordial 
presupposition appears conditioning the meaning o f man's being, and 
through man, the meaning of theological propositions as a whole. 
In the context provided by the timeless primordial presupposition 
accepted by Bultmann, the existen tia l categories bear quite d iffe re n t  
meaning from the one they have in  the temporal context in which
Heidegger places them. Thus, i t  can be seen that Bultmann develops
his own dua lis tic  philosophy of man's being in which some Heidegger­
ian motifs are included.
"God is  the re a lity  that determines our existence" (FU, 
pp. 56, 57).
3
Essays, p. 322. See Roberts, p. 53.
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passive p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness as a constitutive and determin­
ative element of i t J  "What we never are here and now--precisely
2
that is our true being." Man's being as timeless is to be seen when
Bultmann categorically denies that i t  belongs to the Lebenswelt,
3
that is to say, the world o f Parmenidean doxa. Yet the discovery
"Man in his f in i t e  'h is to r ic ity *  transcends the whole sphere 
of the subject-object co rre la tion , so also does God as in f in i t e  Thou 
or 'E x is ten t' transcend a l l  that fa lls  w ith in  the raacrocosmic coun­
terpart of th is  same sphere" (Ogden, Foreword to Existence and F a ith , 
p. 16). "For one who has th is  be lie f . . . whatever one has i t  w ill  
be as i f  one did not in fa c t have i t  . . . longing loses i ts  to rtu re , 
for in the very longing, man frees himself from the illu s io n  that 
the here and now could ever bring fu lf ilm e n t, and longing is  seen 
to go beyond time and in to  eternity" ( Essays, p. 6 ) .  Man's "real 
nature is  to  be found in what he is not in  the sense of being in  the 
world—i t  is  in what he is  only witfTGod; his existence as existence 
is eschatological and transcendent" (Essays, p. 111). Consequently, 
the be liever keeps "the g i f t  of grace, of his ju s t if ic a tio n  and his 
real nature from again becoming a phenomenon of the world" ( ib id . ) .  
"For the s e lf  of man, his inner l i f e ,  his personal existence is  also 
beyond the v is ib le  world and beyond rational thinking" (JCM, p. 40). 
Our essential being is  d iffe re n t from "the working of the laws 
governing the world" (FU, p. 59). See also Gogarten, Demythologiz-  
ing, p. 51, and Roberts, p. 53.
^EF, p. 281. Cf. Roberts, p. 50.
3
"In the eyes of the Christian fa ith  the world is the extran­
eous element, which even the dominion of mind cannot turn in to  a 
home. . . . For—the Christian fa ith  fee ls  obliged to say th is — 
man's real l i f e  is not his mind, but an inner se lf which is  at an 
even profounder level. . . . Man does not simply become aware of 
God in s triv in g  for the tru e , the good and the beautifu l, but only 
when .he can- free himself from the world and soar up to the eternal 
as his home" ( Essays, p. 153). Regarding the world ( Lebenswelt) as 
not pertaining to the real authentic being of man, see also FU, pp. 
60, 257; KM, p. 18; GVIV, p. 128; EF, p. 107; Ogden, C hrist without 
Myth, p. 5TT and Roberts, p. 89. Roberts (pp. 29-59) and points out 
that what is  controllable, what is physical in nature, what is  in 
the "past," and what constitutes our personality is to be denied as 
belonging to  man's being. Ogden (Foreword to Existence and F a ith , 
pp. 15, 16) points out the qua lita tive  difference th a t ex ists ,
according to  Bultmann, between the world and the inner s e lf  o f man's 
being. Yet, according to Roberts' c r itic is m , such a g u lf or 
dichotomy not only does not pertain to New Testament conceptuality
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of man's timeless ontological dimensionality does not mean that man 
should be considered as a timeless substance or r e a l i ty .  On the con­
tra ry , the paradoxical nature of man consists in  th a t he is at the 
same time both temporal and tim eless. His timelessness is  in tim e, 
in the continuum of time, yet i t  is  not to be id e n tifie d  or confused 
with the temporal h istorica l continuum of the LebensweltJ
In order to understand Bultmann's epistemological framework 
i t  is  necessary to have a clear understanding of his perception of 
the paradoxical relationship in which the timeless and temporal 
dimension of man's being are to be seen. Bultmann approaches the
but i t  also entails  a "massive contradiction involving fundamental 
features of the New Testament and reaching into every corner of i t "  
(p. 79). Interestingly enough, such dichotomy is  not a feature of 
Heideggerian thought e ither. "Ontologically 'w orld '--says Heidegger— 
is not a way of characterizing those en tities  which Dasein essen­
t ia l l y  is not; i t  is  rather a characteris tic  of Dasein its e lf"  ( Being 
and Time, 1.3.14). Thus, i f  Bultmann's essential dichotomy comes 
from neither the Bible nor from Heidegger, from where does i t  come"? 
In my opinion i t  comes from the acceptance of the timeless dimension­
a l i ty  of Being and reason.
Bultmann explains the o rig in  of the timeless-temporal
dichotomy that his in terpretation  of the world and man's authentic 
being entails  in the following sentence: "Whereas to ancient man
the world had been home— in the Old Testament as God's creation, to 
classic Greece as the cosmos pervaded by the deity—the u tte r d i f f e r ­
ence of human existence from a l l  worldly existence was recognized
for the f i r s t  time in Gnosticism and C h ris tian ity , and thus the world 
became foreign soil to human se lf"  ( TNT 1:165). See Ogden, Christ 
without Myth, pp. 58-60; Miegge, p. 62; and Roberts, pp. 22~, 237 
50-55. Obviously Bultmann does not consider the p o s s ib ility  that
a d iffe re n t kind of conceptuality may be working in the New Testa­
ment. As he develops his exegesis, Bultmann "selects" the available  
conceptuality that should f i t  w ith in  his chosen framework fo r in te l ­
l ig ib i l i t y .
^Essays, p. 112. Burton H. Throckmorton (The New Testament
and Mythology [London: Darton, Longman and TodcTI 1960J, pi 29)
explains that Bultmann understands the paradoxical re la tio n  between 
temporality and timelessness in man's being in the context of 1 Cor 
7:29-31. Man has to liv e  in the world als ob n icht.
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interpretation of th is paradoxical re lationsh ip  from the side of 
man's temporal nature. Heidegger's analysis helps Bultmann to  reduce 
existence to the "act of decision" or "resoluteness.1*^  As an act 
that belongs to a temporal e n tity  (man), the act of decision is 
always to be found "in time" yet i t  can be e ith er temporal or time­
less depending on what is i ts  “source" or "cause." I f  the source
is man, then the act of decision is temporal and consequently sin- 
2
fu l.  I f  the source is  God, and the act has no human "c o -o rig in ,"
As Bultmann reduces man's ex is ten tia l analysis to the act 
of decision, he is applying trad itiona l abstraction to the resu lt 
of Heidegger's phenomenological analysis in  order to find the "core" 
of existence. "Only in the act are we ourselves" (FU, p. 62).
Roberts (p. 323) in his conclusion believes th a t "the e ffe c t o f his 
[Bultmann's] work is to reduce the content o f Christian theology to 
a single idea, that of the act of decision in  which man draws his 
self-understanding and thus his s e lf in to  conformity with his authen­
t ic  being as p o ten tia lity  to be" (p. 323). See also ib id . ,  p. 305. 
Additionally, i t  is to be noticed that Bultmann's reduction o f ex is t­
ence to the "act of decision," which disregards and even contradicts 
Heidegger’s analysis of the a ll- in c lu s iv e  dynamic center of existence 
as "the moment of vision" in which "nothing can occur" (Being and 
Time, I I . 4 .68. a ), follows the Protestant tra d it io n  that re jec ts  the 
primacy of the in te lle c t and favors the primacy of the w il l  and 
action. For Bultmann the center of existence is the "act of deci­
sion" in iso la tion  from everything else in experience, an act in 
which no knowledge is possible (FU, p. 63; Roberts, pp. 179, 181). 
For Heidegger, on the contrary, "the center of existence is  to be 
found in d irec t continuity with the whole o f man's being both in  its- 
ontic and ontological leve ls . Moreover, th is  "center of g rav ity” 
in existence is not, and cannot be, an "ac t."  I t  is rather an essen­
t ia l ly  cognitive event that Heidegger c a lls  "the moment of vision."  
Bultmann's reduction is necessary in order to provide the "point of 
contact" in time for timeless transcendence.
2
Bultmann does not speak much about the act of decision as 
temporally executed. This is  due to the fa c t that Bultmann is  con­
cerned with the in terpretation  of the act of fa ith  which denies the 
temporal happening of human resoluteness as a whole. The following  
statement gives a clear idea of Bultmann's understanding regarding 
the way in which the act of decision functions in tem porality: "The 
present is the moment of decision, and by the decision taken the 
yie ld  of the past is gathered in and the meaning of the fu tu re  is
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and man’ s part is  rather passive as that which is “acted upon1'^  by 
the transcendent "act of God," the act is  timeless. The la tte r  is
chosen. This is the character of every h istorica l s itu a tion ; in i t
the problem and the meaning of past and future are enclosed and are
w aiting, as i t  were, to be unveiled by human decisions" (PE, pp. 141, 
142). I t  should be noticed that Bultmann s t i l l  in terp re ts  the “act” 
of decision in a way that avoids the obvious d if f ic u lty  of explain­
ing why the act of decision should involve knowledge in  its  temporal 
le v e l, but should not include i t  in i t s  timeless one.
^’’Only in the act are we ourselves" (FU, p. 6 2 ). Yet, "the 
act can be free only i f  i t  is simultaneous wrlh the must" ( ib id . ) .
And “the must is a word spoken by God and is wholly outside our con­
t r o l .  Only the free  act is  ours" ( ib id . ) .  So i t  is  in  being "acted 
upon” by God as the timeless transcendent “must" that man's being 
reaches i ts  "authentic" dimension and meaning. This dimension, how­
ever, requires the denial of world and time in a l l  i ts  forms. This 
denial implies that "every objectively discernible piece of behavior, 
of speech, every confirmed c h a ra c te r-tra it or ro le -id e n tity  of the 
person doing the act, is inessential" (FU, p. 63 ). See also JCM, 
p. 41; Essays, p. 158; Ogden, C hrist without Myth, p. 63; and 
Roberts, p. 291.
Roberts explains that Bultmann "has lim ited existence to  
moments of pure ex is ten tia l decision, which can have no essential 
re lationsh ip  to anything worldly" (p . 181). As freedom happens in 
the act of decision, i t  does not require a timeless e n tity  to explain 
i t .  "The Christian view of freedom indicates that freedom, as free­
dom o f the individual, is not a q u a lity , but can only be an event 
at any given time” ( Essays, p. 310). As is seen la te r ,  what th is  
position requires is  only a timeless p o te n tia lity . That is  to say, 
in the divine-human encounter man is  only passive. An active role  
as the one, for instance, Thomas suggests the active in te lle c t is  
able to perform is  ruled out by Bultmann. Yet, in order for the 
encounter to actually "happen” onto log ically , man has to have a 
passiv ity  sensible to timelessness. Man must have a timeless passive 
p o te n tia lity  upon which God could act. Such passiv ity  does not 
exclude knowledge. Yet i t  is not "knowledge" because knowledge is 
an "act" performed by man in time, and the "act of fa ith ” as "act 
of God" is  performed in timelessness. For further commentary on the 
timeless "act of fa ith "  in time, see FU, p. 253; Essays, pp. 101, 
102, 104; TNT, 1:331; KM, pp. 26, 27,“ 31; Roberts, pp. 24, 58.
According to Bultmann, Jaspers’ temporality is  not authentic 
because he merely refers to time w ith in  the closed continuum of his­
tory and its  trad itions (KMII, p. 189). Yet, Jaspers does not essen­
t i a l l y  d if fe r  from Bultmann's position since he also recognizes that 
man’ s real "h is to ric ity"  is  to be found beyond the continuum of time 
as he talks of the re lation  between Existenz and transcendence 
(Philosophy of Existence, p. 27). Bultmann also c r it ic iz e s  Cullmam
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what in relig ion is  called grace, freedom, and salvation ( ju s t i f ic a ­
tion  by fa ith ) .
Obviously, theology is  concerned with the understanding of 
the act of fa ith  which results from the encounter between tem porality  
and timelessness. Yet as timelessness is unknowable and inexpress­
ib le ,^  our ta lk ing about i t  must use temporal language in an analog i- 
2
cal sense.
Bultmann refers to man's timeless, passive p o te n tia lity  of 
being in the language provided by the phenomenological analysis of 
man's being, analogically applied. At this point i t  should be remem­
bered that "analogy" implies the denial of the f i r s t  obvious temporal
meaning that is  revealed by the phenomenological analysis in  order
3
to  apply i t  to a non-temporal re a lity .
The encounter, in the “moment of decision," happens in  the 
timeless dimensionality. Yet, since man has only passive po ten tia l 
timelessness and, therefore, can only function temporally, the tim e­
less act of fa ith  can be cognitively considered only from the per­
spective of tem porality, in which the timeless act of fa ith  is  seen 
as happening in the "moment" o f decision and pertaining to  the
fo r  not distinguishing properly between " tru ly  h is torica l process" 
and "events of nature" (EF, p. 232; Roberts, p. 52).
O^n man's authentic being as belonging properly to the realm 
beyond knowledge, see FU, p. 253; GV, 4:128; Roberts, pp. 24, 25, 
179, and Ogden, Foreword" to Existence and F a ith , p. 16. "Thus we 
find  ourselves led to the conclusion that our own existence, since 
i t  depends on our act, can never be known by us" (RJ, p. 63 ).
2
"Thus the determination that the man o f love acquires from 
the thou is exactly analogous to the threefold determination o f man 
by death, which is made v is ib le  by ex isten tia l analysis" (EF, p. 110)-
3
See p. 232, nn. 1-3 above.
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“present" in isolation from past and fu tu re J  This is  what Bultmann
c a lls  the "eschatological event," namely, the timeless act of God
2
in  the temporal experience of man. The "moment," the "now"--as the
This is possible due to Bultmann’ s "punctilear" view of time 
(Heinrich Ott, "O bjectification  and Existentialism ," in  Kerygma and 
Myth I I ,  ed. Kans-Werner Bartsch [London: S.P.C.K., 1962J, p. 317) .  
The "punctilear" understanding of time belongs to the A ris to te lian  
t ra d it io n  that interprets time from the viewpoint of timelessness 
as the “now" or the "moment" (p. 91, n. 2 above). I t  is  clear that 
Bultmann does not fo llow  Heidegger in his in terpretation  of time in 
the " flux" of i t .  The "moment” as the “now" allows fo r the iso la tion  
of the "present" act from both past and future, that is ,  from time. 
This "isolation" in time provides the necessary room fo r  man’ s time­
less transcendence to act upon temporal man in a non-temporal, non- 
h is to r ic a l way. Thus in  the "moment" temporality, as act of fa ith  
(past, present, and fu tu re ), is denied. In the act of love, they are 
not denied but "suspended," as fo r transcendence to cause the
act o f fa ith . This is due to the fac t that "the ' decision of love, 
however, is  not a second decision alongside fa ith ; I t  is precisely
fa ith  its e lf^  iFu ,  p. 181).
Faith and love are the two faces of one and the same act. 
Faith  points to the timeless side, love points to i ts  temporal side. 
Yet the act is not caused in time but in timelessness. In th is  
"causing," temporal dimension as a whole is suspended, y e t, at the 
same time conserved and transformed. Thus Bultmann can speak of 
"continuity" and say th a t the act of fa ith  is not to be reduced or 
"confined to a single moment" (FU, pp. 181, 182). "Every instant 
has the possib ility  of being an eschatological instant and in Chris­
tia n  fa ith  this p o s s ib ility  is realised" (PE, p. 154). Thus the 
"continuity" is thought of regarding the rea"cR and effects that the 
encounter has in time, but not to the act i ts e lf  which is not man's 
possession (PE, p. 155), but has to be repeated over and over again.
Bultmann explains (PE, pp. 152-54) how the paradox of human 
being as being at the same time an eschatological and h is to rica l 
being is  to be understood by re ferring  to Christ in  whose case man's 
experience of transcendence reaches its  highest and exemplar point. 
The "eschatological" dimension in Christ is described by saying that 
"the advent of Christ is  an event in the realm of e tern ity  which is 
incommensurable with h is to rica l time" ( ib id . ,  p. 153). Applied to 
man, Bultmann describes the "eschatological" dimension by saying that 
“fo r  Christian existence, its  eschatological character is never a 
state  o f a ffa irs  prevailing w ithin the world, but a continual lim ita ­
tion  o f its  existence in  the world. I t  exists only in so fa r  as i t  
constantly presses beyond its  lim its" ( Essays, p. 88 ) . See addition­
a l ly  Essays, p. 112; FU, p. 193. Throckmorton (pp. 134, 135)
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passive p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness o f temporal man— is  the only 
point in which timeless God can "act" in  tim eJ God cannot act tem­
porally, that is , in the flu x  of tim e, in  the Lebenswelt. He can 
only act on the Lebenswelt in d ire c tly  through his timeless act upon 
man who, having a p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness can, as temporal
being, introduce God's action into time as he "translates" i t  into
2
his ongoing experience in time as the authentically "new" element 
that confers upon him the g if ts  of freedom.
In accepting God's "indirect" action in tim e, Bultmann is
explains how Bultmann reaches the in terp re ta tion  of the eschatologi­
cal dimension of man from the starting point of the isolated temporal 
present. The isolated temporal present is  already the product of 
a timeless interpretation o f the flu x  o f time. Julius Schniewind 
points out that Bultmann "tends to confuse eschatology w ith timeless­
ness" ("A Reply to Bultmann," in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological
Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch LNew York: Harper & Row, 1961J,
p. 7b). What Bultmann is  actually doing, though, is  not confusing 
but reducing the temporal eschatology of the Bible to the timeless 
dimension of the encounter. This reduction is demanded by both his 
ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure.
^Bultmann expressly rejects the idea of a “point of contact" 
between revelation and man (FU, p. 316). The study of the context 
of such a declaration shows fKat Bultmann is  concerned with the idea 
that such a "point of contact" implies, in trad itiona l theology, the 
positing of a "better s e lf ,"  a timeless substance, which therefore 
is to be distinguished from the "regular" temporal s e lf  (substance). 
For Bultmann such a d is tin c tio n  is not possible. Yet, having denied 
th is classical in terp retation  of the "point of contact," i t  is 
obvious that his idea of "now" w ithin time considers existence as 
a whole as "passive potency" fo r the encounter with the timeless God 
(coram deo) .
2
An actual "new occurrence" cannot be provided in time. Time 
only repeats i ts e lf .  Something re a lly  "new" is  bound to come from 
outside time, namely, from timeless transcendence (EF, p. 107). In 
th is context Bultmann speaks of authentic "h is to ric ity "  to  refer to 
that h is to rica l experience caused by the "new" timeless act of Gou 
who saves and delivers man from him self, that is , from his past. 
Thus, i t  is not tem porality and h is to r ic ity  as pertaining to the 
Lebenswelt but as pertaining to the eschatological timeless act.
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following Kant's pattern regarding the way in which timeless freedom 
in man can be considered to be a condition or cause in  the empirical 
(temporal) realm without breaking the closed temporal continuum of 
the phenomenal Of course, Bultmann applies to the divine-human
Kant provides a detailed  explanation regarding the way in 
which the timeless causality of man's pure reason should be under­
stood as i t  determines the empirical temporal realm of the phenomena 
without breaking the causal continuum of natural and h is to rica l 
causality ( Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 319-330). The cau sa lity  of 
reason fo r Kant is timeless (p. 326). By affecting  the tim eless side 
of human w i l l ,  timeless reason is  able to in d ire c tly  "act" upon tem­
poral phenomena as i t  a ffects the timeless side of what belongs to 
the temporal continuum. The w ill as i t  is  affected by timeless 
reason keeps being a temporal phenomenon conditioned by temporal 
causality , which is not broken by the "new" timeless c o n d itio n a lity .
B r ie f ly , Kant's in terpretation  allows the in troduction of 
a timeless cause, through an "indirect" kind of co n d itio n a lity , into  
the temporal dimension of nature and history without breaking the 
closed natural and h is to rica l continuum. Kant suggests th a t "pure 
reason as purely in te ll ig ib le  facu lty , is  not subject to  the condi­
tions of time. The causality of reason in i ts  in te l l ig ib le  character 
does not begin to be; i t  does not make i ts  appearance at a certain  
time, fo r the purpose of producing an e ffe c t. I f  th is  were not the 
case, the causality of reason would be subservient to  the natural 
law of phenomena, which determines them according to tim e, and as 
a series o f causes and e ffects  in time; i t  would consequently cease 
to be freedom, and become a part of nature. . . . But in other 
respects, the same cause belongs also to the series o f phenomena. 
Man is  himself a phenomenon. His w ill has an empirical character, 
which is  the empirical cause of a ll his actions. There is  no condi­
tion -determ in ing  man and his vo lition  in conformity w ith this  
character—which does not i t s e l f  form part of the series o f effects  
in nature, and is subject to  th e ir  law— the law according to which 
an em pirically  undetermined cause of an event in time cannot ex is t. 
For th is  reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous 
orig in , a l l  actions being phenomena and belonging to the world of 
experience. But i t  cannot be said of reason, that the s ta te  in which 
i t  determines the w ill is always preceded by some other s ta te  deter­
mining i t .  For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject 
to sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in re la tio n  to its  
causality , the sequence or conditions o f time do not influence 
reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the 
sequence o f time according to certain ru les, be applied to  i t .  . . . 
This freedom must not be described, in a merely negative manner, as 
independence of empirical conditions, fo r in  th is  case the faculty  
of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena; but i t  must be
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encounter what in Kant is  only an inner anthropological occurence J
Nonetheless the Kantian pattern that explains the p o s s ib ility  o f an
ind irect relationship between the timeless realm o f the noumenon and
the temporal realm of the phenomenon is at the core of Bultmann's
understanding of the divine-human encounter.
Bultmann's in terp re ta tion  of the past and the future as modes
of temporality is  to  be understood in the context of th is  " in d irec t"
kind of "causation." Since the religious Christian re a lity  of
redemption happens in timelessness, namely, in  the act of God and
its  correlate, the act of fa ith , the past as belonging to the tem-
2
poral dimensionality of the phenomena is understood as sin. Yet,
the past is sin only when i t  is  taken as the determinative cause
3
in man's moment o f decision, namely, of his being. When the
regarded, p o s itive ly , as a facu lty  which can spontaneously o rig ina te  
a series of events" (pp. 326, 327).
^Bultmann in his use of Kant's pattern sees God playing the 
ro le  of Kant's "pure reason” and man playing the ro le of w il l  with  
i ts  timeless and temporal levels.
^"To liv e  on the basis of the world, th a t is  of the past, is
what is called s in . To liv e  on the basis o f the future is  ca lled
liv in g  in dependence on God” ( Essays, p. 81). Thus, i t  is clear that 
temporality per se is not sin” Sin rather consists in disregarding  
the timeless determination of God's act and le tt in g  the world deter­
mine man's being by conditioning his moment of decision. I t  is also 
clear that the fu ture is  not considered as temporal mode, but rather' 
as the perspective w ithin the flu x  of time from which the timeless 
act of God can be expected to appear. See Essays, pp. 80, 81; KM, 
pp. 18, 19; FU, p. 258; and Gogarten, Demythologizing, pp. 53, 54.“ Ss 
usual Bultmann believes th a t his in terpretation  ot the past as the 
essence of sin is  the B ib lica l Pauline position. "Paul is convinced 
that man is able to be free  from his past, indeed, that he does not
wish to be free but prefers to remain as he is .  That is the essence
of sin” (PE, p. 44 ).
2
Sin happens when temporal man lets time become his master 
(FU, p. 258). In th is  context time as past event determines man’ s
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determinative cause of man's decision is  seen in the timeless act 
of God, the past, which is  not erased from man's re a lity  as phenom­
enon, is  to be understood analogically as providing general insights  
to be used in the expression o f man's self-understanding o f f a i th J
Bultmann's in te rp re ta tion  of the future as temporal modality
2
agrees in general with Bloch's “not-yet." However, departing rad i­
cally from Bloch, Bultmann sees the "not-yet" as providing in man
being, replacing God's timeless authentic determination. On the 
other hand, God's causation in  redemptive encounter does not do away 
with the temporal mode of man's being, but rather i t  explains and 
interprets i t  in re la tio n  to  "new” situations provided by the time­
less encounter. Thus, i t  can be seen that Bultmann is following the 
trad itional Thomistic pattern according to which temporality receives 
i ts  meaning from the timeless understanding of Being. For further 
commentary on redemption and forgiveness as freedom from the past, 
see Essays, p. 112; Schniewind, p. 51.
^Roberts (pp. 28, 29) explains how according to  Bultmann's 
analogical understanding o f the past we have to consider i t  in iso la­
tion from its  pastness ( i t s  a c tu a lity ). Bultmann suggests that the 
past must be considered not as things that happened, but as picturing  
ways of behaving and understanding ourselves in the present moment. 
This provides the background, the h is to rica l s ituation, in which the 
new understanding of ourselves could be expressed (FU, p. 257).
See p. 149, n. 3 above. "Future cannot be characterized  
otherwise than as nothing" (JCM, p. 77). Roberts remarks that 
“Bultmann's future is an idealized future o f which nothing can be 
known, and over which we have no control. I t  is a Future which is 
'darkness', a future which never comes" (p. 54). This future never 
"comes" because i t  is not temporal but analogical. In i ts  analogical 
sense i t  only points to man's p o ten tia lity  fo r timelessness. Hence 
the fu ture  is always present as openness and as such is  never accom­
plished because that fo r what i t  is openness and p o te n tia lity  does 
not pertain to time but to timelessness. Obviously, th is  in terp re ta ­
tion of the future as temporal openness fo r timelessness is not 
Heidegger's, who sees the fu tu re  in the context of the being-in -the- 
world structure of Dasein. According to Heidegger the temporal 
nature of the future is constitutional of both authentic'and inauthen­
t ic  existence, and not only of the inauthentic as Bultmann suggests 
(Being and Time, I I . 4 .68. a ) .
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the necessary "openness" for his rad ica l passive p o te n tia lity  fo r
timelessness, that is to say, fo r being acted upon by God's timeless
redemptive a c tJ
In short, Bultmann's in te rp re ta tion  of man's being follows
the classical trad itio n  that considers man's being as receiving its
2
meaning from the realm of the timeless dimensionality. As usually
held in trad itio n a l philosophy, the temporal mode o f man's being is
not denied but rather interpreted from the viewpoint provided by 
3
timelessness. At the same time Bultmann carefu lly  avoids the t r a ­
d itional understanding according to which timelessness was thought
"Faith includes free and complete openness to the future" 
(JCM, p. 77). “To live  on the basis o f the future is  called liv in g  
in dependence of God" ( Essays, p. 8 1 ). For further commentary, see 
Roberts, pp. 28, 290. Roberts comments that according to Bultmann 
"authentic man is only poss ib ility , and therefore only future" 
(p. 29). Bultmann himself says that “what we never are here and now, 
precisely that is our true being” (EF, p. 281). Hence, man's future  
is taken in precedence to the presenT“and past because in the phenom­
enological analysis of time i t  is  the future which provides the 
necessary ground fo r the idea of “openness," which may provide the 
basis fo r the application of analogy. Thus, the fu ture as openness, 
analogically understood is suitable fo r  expressing man's passive
p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness. Thus analogically God's act is  a 
"future" act since, from the perspective of temporal man, i t  can be 
only perceived as coming from the as ye t undecided fu ture . Thus, 
not only the present but also the fu tu re  are interpreted analogically  
by Bultmann. For further commentary on Bultmann's analogical in te r ­
pretation of the future as a mode of man’ s being, see KM, pp. 19, 32;
and Roberts, pp. 74, 75, 81, 86.
2
See, fo r instance, Dooyeweerd, 1:24, 31, and Macquarrie, 
" E x is te n tia lis t ,” pp. 106, 107.
3
Austin Farrer evaluates Bultmann's timeless emphasis,
declaring that “Dr. Bultmann seems to  have no d i f f ic u lty  with the 
b e lie f that personal existence can kick o ff the body and survive; 
his unbelieving ex is ten tia lis t teachers would hardly follow  him 
there" ("An English Appreciation," in  Kerygma and Myth: A Theologi-
cal Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch LNew York: Harper and Row,
T95TT, p. 22).
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to be a substance or e n t ity J  Timelessness in man is ju s t a passive 
po ten tia lity  of man's being or en tity  which can be grasped cogni­
tive ly  by analogy to the temporal mode o f the present, the “moment," 
the "now." But the present as temporal mode does not provide the 
meaning o f man but rather the “place" in which man as e x is te n tie ll
can reach his true meaning, freedom, and redemption in the timeless 
2
encounter with God.
Man's passive p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness which d iffe re n ­
tiates Bultmann's anthropological ontology from Existentia lism , is  
a consequence of his in terpretation  of God's being as tim eless. I f  
God is timeless and an actual encounter between man and God occurs, 
then man's being is required to be at least open (p o ten tia l) to time­
lessness. And, as th is  p o ten tia lity  fo r timelessness determines the 
meaning of man's being, Bultmann's system is  s t i l l  developed in the 
trad itional pattern fo r reason's structure, according to which mean­
ing is to spring from timelessness into tem porality.
Mow i t  is necessary to consider Bultmanrf's in te rp re ta tio n  
of the epistemological framework. The ontological framework provided
^Consequently, there is  not a kind of e n tity  which, lik e  
Thomas’ s idea of soul, could be thought of along the lines of 
entity or substance, even a divine substance. On the contrary, man's 
timelessness is conceived only as passive p o te n tia lity , and so i t  
allows fo r the paradoxical in terpretation  of man's being as eschato­
logical and h istorica l (£E, p. 154). Bultmann believes th a t " fa ith  
insists not on the d irec t iden tity  of God's action w ith worldly 
events, but, i f  I may be permitted to put i t  so, on the paradoxical 
identity which can be believed only here and now against the appear­
ance of non-identity" (JCM, p. 62 ). The Kantian pattern of 
Bultmann's ontology is apparent in his anthropology.
2See FU, p. 58.
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the necessary understanding of the nature of the "object" to be 
understood, namely, God's act on man's p o te n tia lity . The epistemo- 
log ical framework has to deal with the cognitive process which theo­
log ical reason is  supposed to fo llow  in order to provide a proper 
knowledge of its  particu lar "object" or subject m atter.
Epistemological Framework
As in the case of the ontological framework, Bultmann does 
not develop his epistemological framework in a systematic wayJ This 
fa c t explains why the analysis o f Bultmann's in terp re ta tion  of rea­
son's structure requires more space than the analysis of Aquinas's 
2
in te rp re ta tio n . As happened in the case of Aquinas, Bultmann’ s
3 4in terp re ta tion  of "natural reason" sets the stage fo r  the function-
5
ing and in terpretation  of “theological reason." Natural reason and
Roberts believes that Bultmann's epistemological approach 
"is such a tangle that one hardly knows where to s ta r t  sorting i t  out" 
(p. 172). Yet, the analysis of Bultmann's epistemological framework 
is neither impossible nor bound to be unclear. The problem with i t  
perhaps is that there has been no serious analysis of Bultmann's 
epistemological framework so fa r .
2
As fa r as I know there is  no in-depth study of Bultmann's 
epistemological framework.
3
“Natural reason” stands fo r  the in te rp re ta tion  of reason 
and i ts  functioning within the d iffe re n t s c ie n tif ic  enterprises. 
I t  corresponds to what Aquinas called  lumen ra t io n is .
4
While he speaks of presuppositions, Bultmann does so in  
re la tio n  to the particu lar task o f hermeneutics ( JCM, p. 48). He 
does not pay much attention to the fa c t that his hermeneutical system 
as a whole is  conditioned by his in terp re ta tion  o f the ontological 
and epistemological frameworks, ve rita b le  presuppositions which he 
accepts without due critic ism . C f. Thiselton, p. 232, and Bruce 
W ilsh ire , "James and Heideqqer on Truth and R e a lity ,"  Man and World 
10 (1977 ):92.
"Theological reason" is  Bultmann’ s in terpretation  of 
reason's structure in relation to the supernatural realm of theology.
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theological reason do not contradict each other; on the contrary, 
they complement each other. I t  is  precisely th is  “harmony" between 
the "supernatural" and natural realms that makes Bultmann's rational 
structure so appealing. Of course, as is  seen la te r ,  Bultmann under­
stands this "harmony" in a way that d iffers  substan tia lly  from 
Thomas' s understand!* ng.
The analysis of Bultmann's epistemological framework of 
reason's structure is  developed in two steps. F irs t  the functioning 
of natural reason is  analyzed. Second, the in te rp re ta tion  of the 
functioning of theological reason is  considered.
Natural Reason
In order that the broad and complex in te rp re ta tion  of scien­
t i f i c  natural reason in i ts  epistemological framework may be appre­
ciated as a whole, its  presentation is  divided in to  three major 
issues, namely, the cognitive realm, the metaphysical framework, and 
o b je c tiv ity .
The cognitive realm: the closed temporal continuum. At th is
point the determination of the epistemological framework by the onto­
log ical framework is  apparent in Bultmann's Kantian pattern. This 
determination is produced by what I ca ll Bultmann's f i r s t  founda­
tio n a l ontological dichotomy, namely, the Kantian dichotomy between 
the timeless noumena and the temporal phenomena.* In the context
Theological reason corresponds to what Aquinas ca lled  lumen prophe-  
t ia e  (Revelation, origin of theological knowledge) and lumen f id e i , 
the actual functioning of reason in the theological enterprise.
*The fact that cognition is  interpreted as belonging exclu­
s ive ly  to the phenomenal realm of the Lebenswelt is  expressed in a
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of his Kantian understanding of the timeless-temporal Partnenidean 
dichotomy, Bultmann accepts as "fact"^ the in te rp re ta tio n  which 
circumscribes cognition to  the temporal realm and declares that 
knowledge of the timeless realm of the Platonic th in g - in - its e lf  is 
impossible. Thus, knowledge belongs to the closed continuum of tem­
p o ra lity . This idea, namely, the idea of the closed continuum of
causality  as pertaining exclusively to the temporal realm , reminds
2
one o f Kant's epistemology. In short, the closed temporal continuum
summary way by Kant him self: “The conception of a noumenon is  there­
fore merely a lim ita tiv e  conception, and therefore only o f negative 
use. But i t  is not an arb itra ry  or f ic t it io u s  notion, but is  con­
nected with the lim ita tio n  of sen s ib ility , without, however, being 
capable of presenting us w ith any positive datum beyond th is  sphere" 
(C ritique  of Pure Reason, p. 188). For the re lation  of the noumenal 
realm to timelessness in  Kant's conception of God, see ib id .,  
pp. 371 , 372. The ens summum just cannot act in the phenomenal realm.
^Bultmann expresses clearly th a t "the conformity to law 
[closed continuum] which is  part of our conception o f nature does 
not require proof but is  presupposed as axiomatic" (FU, pp. 247, 
248). He further adds th a t "we cannot free  ourselves from th a t pre­
supposition” ( ib id .) .  Regarding the conformity to law or to the 
closed temporal continuunv that determines the cognitive realm, 
Bultmann explains that such "conception is  not 'an in te rp re ta tio n  
of the world,' 'a judgment about the w o rld ,’ 'a w orld-view '; i t  is 
not a conclusion about the world, e ith er subjective or based on a 
conscious decision. I t  is  given in our existence in  the world" 
( ib id . ) .  Even when Bultmann affirms that the closed continuum is 
taken fo r granted by modern man (JCM, p. 16), his dependence 
on Kantian philosophy can hardly be ignored. The closed- 
continuum presupposition is  accepted by most libera l Protestant theo­
logians today, for instance, T illic h  ( Systematic Theology, 1:116) 
and Dooyeweerd (1 :93 ). However, Bultmann is  the one who applies i t  
with more coherence and follows i t  to  i ts  fina l consequences for 
theology. What Bultmann considers a “fact" or "given to existence," 
however, Macquarrie considers to be a "pseudo-scientific view . . . 
that was popular h a lf a century ago" (An E x is te n tia lis t Theology, 
p. 168). For an introduction to available critic ism  of bultmann's 
closed-continuum presupposition, see Thiselton, pp. 260, 261 . Regard­
ing the cl osed-continuum as applied to God's transcendence, see GV 
4:132. —
2
The following statement from C ritique of Pure Reason shows 
how the closed-continuum presupposition which Bultmann sees as a
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which plays the role of basic determinative category in Bultmann’ s 
epistemological framework is  not " ju s t given" to u s j  as Bultmann
"given," has been philosophically expressed by Kant's in terp retation  
o f  r e a l ity  as divided in to  noumena and phenomena. "The p rinc ip le  of 
continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as 
changes (in  mundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of 
a l l  empirical in tu itions in  space, any break or hiatus between two 
phenomena (non datur h ia tu s )—for we can so express the p rinc ip le , 
that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a 
vacuum, or which even admits i t  as a part of an empirical synthesis. 
For, as regards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and 
beyond the f ie ld  of possible experience (the world), such a question 
cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides 
only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena 
fo r the construction of empirical cognition" (p. 174) Thus, the 
closed continuum is not “given to our experience," as Bultmann 
claims, but rather a complex epistemological construction that 
results from Kant’ s epistemological theory.
Even though the in te llec tu a l basis of the closed continuum 
idea is to be found in Kant i t  is introduced in the exegetical realm 
by Ernst Troeltsch who provided the c lass ica l expression o f the basic 
presuppositions of the h istorica l c r i t ic a l  method. For instance, 
Troeltsch says that exegesis must fo llow  the principle o f "analogy” 
according to which "the fundamental homogeneity of a ll h isto rica l 
events" must oe affirmed, and the p rin c ip le  of "correlation" (p. 732) 
must be affirmed, and the princip le  of "correlation" according to 
which "the reciprocity of a l l  manifestations of s p ir itu a l-h is to ric a l 
l i f e ” ( ib id .)  is to be posited as a basic rule. Thus Bultmann, 
through the influence of the s c ie n tific  approach to B ib lica l exegesis 
th a t finds its  roots in Troeltsch receives also ind irec tly  the in flu ­
ence of Kant who expressed philosophically the closed continuum prin­
c ip le  a fte r  which Troeltsch developed the basic principles fo r the 
historica l c r it ic a l method. For an introduction to the influence of 
Ernst Troeltsch in theology see Roland H. Bainton, “Ernst 
Troeltsch—Thirty Years L a te r,” Theology Today 8 (1951):70-96. For a 
discussion on the presuppositions of the h istorica l c r i t ic a l  method 
as expressed by Troeltsch see Gerhard Hasel, "Method in the 
In terpretation  of the B ib le .” (Paper w ritten  at Andrews University, 
January, 1983), pp. 26-59 [d u p lica ted ]).
Vu, p. 248. Regarding the way in which Kantian philosophy 
influences Bultmann’ s closed-continuum presupposition and i ts  in flu ­
ence on the overall Bultmannian theology, see Roberts, pp. 140, 144. 
Bultmann e x p lic itly  explains that the closed continuum is  to be 
regarded as theological presupposition insofar as theological think­
ing is  linked to the hermeneutical and exegetical tasks. "The his­
to ric a l method includes the presupposition that history is  a unity 
in the sense of a closed continuum o f effects in which individual
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u n c ritic a lly  affirm s, but i t  is rather the fin a l product of a long 
process of philosophical interpretation in which classical reason 
finds i ts  mature expression in Kant's epistemological framework.
This f i r s t  Bultmannian dichotomy circumscribes cognition to 
the temporal phenomenal realm but does not deny the timeless noumenal 
one. I t  ju s t denies cognition, the cap ab ility  of functioning in 
relation to the timeless noumenal realm which Bultmann's pattern 
accepts as the realm fo r  religious experiences.^
events are connected by the succession o f cause and e ffect" (EF, 
p. 291). The practical outcome of such presupposition is  "that THe 
continuum of h istorica l happenings cannot be rent by the interference  
of supernatural, transcendent powers and th a t therefore there is no 
'miracle* in this sense o f the word" ( ib id . ,  p. 292). Yet, in the 
same context, a place fo r an indirect contact with the supernatural, 
which would not in te rfe re  with the cl osed-continuum, is  claimed by 
Bultmann as he affirms th a t the closed continuum "does not mean that 
the process of history is  determined by the causal law and that there 
are no free  decisions o f men whose actions determine the course of 
h istorica l happenings. But even a free  decision does not happen 
without a cause, without a motive" ( ib id . ,  p. 291). Regarding the 
indirect causality of timelessness in  the realm of the closed- 
continuum, see p. 239, n. 1 above.
1
'The basic d ifference between Thomas's and Bultmann's episte- 
mologies is to be found here. Bultmann recognizes no "active 
in te lle c t"  fo r crossing the gap between timelessness and temporality 
as Thomas did. A dd itionally , for Thomas there is not a clear-cut 
gap between timelessness and time, as Bultmann claims, but rather 
a hierarchical interwoven merging of both o f them in the ontological 
constitution of re a lity  as a whole. Another basic d ifference is to 
be found in Bultmann's interpretation of God’ s timeless being as a 
nonentity. As a consequence of th is  in te rp re ta tio n , Bultmann's 
God cannot leave timelessness so as to re la te  to temporality 
d irec tly . Thus the closed-continuum presupposition is  not a require­
ment of science as such (Roberts, pp. 142, 143) but rather of 
Bultmann's particu lar in terpretation o f God's Being. Consequently, 
I suggest that a c ritic is m  of the closed-continuum presupposition 
should not focus on the temporal level of s c ie n tific  causality as 
Robert (pp. 140-44) and Thiselton (pp. 260, 261) do. On the contrary, 
i t  should focus on an analysis of the dimensionality o f Being in 
which God's nature is theologically understood.
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The in terpretation  th a t sees the closed continuum as deter­
mining the lim its  of the cognitive realm requires that theological 
reason, in its  s c ie n tific  m o d a lity j should explain how i t  can be 
possible for "knowledge” to  re la te  to its  re lig ious origin (timeless
realm) i f  knowledge is only possible w ithin the temporal context of
2
the closed continuum.
Metaphysical system. Now that the cognitive realm has been 
id en tifie d  as pertaining exclusively to tem porality, i t  is  necessary 
to  know the background of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  to  which each p a rtic u la r  
knowledge is  supposed to re la te  in  order to  have meaning and inner 
coherence.^ In Aquinas th is  background was provided by his h ie ra r­
chical interpretation of r e a l ity  as a whole. Bultmann replaces
"S cien tific  reason" is  to be seen as the modern re jection  
of both the transcendent and the timeless realms. S c ie n tific  reason 
works within the ontological dimension of tem porality. Science does 
not re late to timeless speculations. Bultmann accepts th is  Kantian 
pattern.
2
This points to the basic problem of theological reason as 
found in the Bultmannian system. The problem consists in how to 
explain the existence of theological knowledge when the subject 
matter that pertains to theology belongs to  the timeless realm and, 
at the same time, any possible knowledge can only belong to the tem­
poral realm of the closed continuum.
3The metaphysical framework fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  (in te rp re ta ­
tio n  of re a lity  as a whole), which in Aquinas corresponds to the 
hierarchical in terpretation  o f re a lity  w ith in  the A ris to te lian  tra d i­
t io n , in Bultmann is divided in two: the timeless framework o f the
noumena for theological in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  and the phenomenal framework 
fo r  objective s c ie n tific  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  Thus, in Bultmann's system 
the same proposition may have two d iffe re n t meanings depending on 
the framework fo r  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that is being applied a t the  time. 
The analysis o f the s c ie n tific  in te rp re ta tion  of the world (Weltan­
schauung) provides the metaphysical framework fo r  objective knowledge 
(natural reason). The timelessness of God's being provides the 
framework fo r theological knowledge (theological reason).
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Thomas's hierarchical explanation o f re a l ity  with a s c ie n tif ic  in te r ­
pretation of the world.^
The in terpretation of the world or world-view is  to be pro-
2 3vided by science through its  “permanent p rinc ip les ."  Yet, since
the background of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  provided by s c ie n t if ic  world-views 
refers to time, they are not "absolute," "necessary,” or "unchange­
able," predicates as the la te r pertain only to  timelessness. 
S c ie n tific  world-views do change.^ Nonetheless, they are to 
be preferred over against tra d itio n a l ontological re flec tions and
"Weltanschauung is  a theory about the world and l i f e ,  and 
about the unity of the world, its  o rig in , purpose or worth—or again, 
i ts  worthlessness—about the meaning o f i t  a l l—or again, about its  
meaninglessness," Essays, p. 8 ). Since God, and hence fa ith , stands 
in the realm of timelessness, "a Weltanschauung stands in sharpest 
contrast to belief in God" ( ibidTTT See also ib id . ,  p. 72, and 
Roberts, pp. 42, 43.
2
“For a ll our thinking today is  shaped irrevocably by modern 
science" (KM, p. 3 ). " I t  is science which determines that view of 
the world Tfirough the school, the press, the w ire less, the cinema, 
and a ll  the other f ru its  of technical progress" ( ib id . ,  p. 5, n. 1 ). 
Cf. Roberts, p. 10, and Hans-Werner Bartsch, "Bultmann and Jaspers," 
in Kerygma and Myth, A Theological Debate I I ,  ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch 
[London: S.P.C.K., 1962J, p. 199. Putnam explains th a t "reason had
to be coextensive with science because what else could i t  be?"
(p. 186).
J^CM, p. 38, c f .  K raft, p. 52.
4
According to Bultmann even though science provides the 
"accurate" world view, i t  does not provide a fina l closed in terpreta­
tion  o f the world. The very "true" s c ie n tific  in te rp re ta tio n  of the 
world, as i t  pertains to the temporal realm of the Parmenidean doxa, 
changes according to i ts  nature (KM, p. 3; PE, p. 7 0 ). The framework 
fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y  (world-viewT-  is  provided, b a s ic a lly , by the 
sciences of nature and not by h is to ry . That is , by a cosmological 
in terpretation  provided no longer by philosophy but ra th e r by natural 
sciences. As the framework fo r the in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  of the whole 
leaves out not only timelessness but also, within the temporal realm, 
h isto ry , a further reduction of what can be ca lled  "real" is  
achieved.
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mythology because they are developed according to the formal "perma­
nent principles” of science. 1
At th is  point, where the changeable temporal re a lity  is  con­
sidered to reach its  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  from the "permanent princip les"
of science, the tra d itio n a l timeless cognitive categories shaped by
2
trad ition  from P lato 's orig inal interpretation of the idea as "form" 
are incorporated as the basic meaning of s c ie n tif ic  objective cate­
gories through the Kantian pattern.^
Temporal re a lity  is  supposed to find  i ts  meaning from the 
background of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  provided by categories shaped in  and 
from the tra d itio n a l timeless interpretation o f Being's dimension­
a l i t y .4 I t  is  to be noted, then, that Bultmann's understanding of 
the nature of s c ie n tific  knowledge pertains to a p o s itiv is tic  model^
For Bultmann the main point regarding science "is  not the 
concrete results of s c ie n tific  research and the contents of a world­
view, but the method of thinking from which world-views follow" ( JCM, 
p. 37).
2
See p. 87, n. 3 above.
3
Regarding the Greek orig in  of modern s c ie n tific  categories, 
see Raschke, pp. 375-79; Putnam, p. 216; P e ro tti, pp. 96, 97; 
Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1966),
pp. 55, 56; and Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers , p. 116. Regarding 
how the classical ontological categories of P laton ic-A ris to te lian  
orig in  were preserved at the very core of Descartes' s c ie n tif ic  
rational system, see Savagnone, "La o g n o sc ib ilita ,” p. 381. For 
an analysis of the way in which the trad itiona l categories of reason, 
from th e ir Platonic orig in  to their Kantian formulation were 
developed, see chapter I above; c f. Raschke, p. 383.
4This pertains to the Kantian epistemological framework. 
See pp. 111-113 above.
^See Macquarrie, An E x is ten tia lis t Theology, p. 168. I t  
should be noted that even Heidegger's understanding of the nature 
of s c ie n tific  thought is also p o s itiv is tic , not showing awareness
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which has the tendency of taking physics as metaphysics.^
In short, Hermann's metaphysical framework fo r the back­
ground of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  is  developed as a s c ie n tif ic  world-view
which is  to be constructed w ithin the K antian-P ositiv is tic  tra d i-
2-
tio n . Thus, as is seen in  the next section, the s c ie n tif ic  positiv­
is t ic  understanding o f science appears as a determinative element
3
mainly as i t  shapes the meaning o f "o b jec tiv ity ."
O bjectiv ity . The analysis o f o b je c tiv ity  discloses 
Bultmann's second dichotomy, namely, the dichotomy between nature
4
and h istory. Since the permanent princip les of the in t e l l ig ib i l i t y
of the way in which recent discoveries and science's own critic ism  
affected the nature o f s c ie n tific  epistemology. See Raschke, p. 380; 
c f. Lauer, p. 172, and Peter Kampits, "The Myths o f Reason and C r i t i ­
cal Rationalism," Listening 15 (1980):112-16.
^See Putnam, p. 15, and Roberts, p. 143.
2
Jaspers remarks that modern science "is known to surpris­
ing ly  few: indeed, there are many scholars, and Bultmann, a serious
h is to rian , is apparently one of them, who are unfam iliar with its  
principles" ("Myth and Relig ion," p. 135). Be that as i t  may, 
Bultmann's concept of science appears to be more p o s itiv is tic  and 
s c ie n t if ic , replacing metaphysics with physics and cosmology.
^ It  is precisely at the level of o b je c tiv ity  that the 
K antian-positiv is tic  understanding of science shows up in  Bultmann’s 
system. I t  is also at th is  level th a t new s c ie n tific  discoveries 
suggest that a "new" temporal in te rp re ta tion  of o b je c tiv ity  and know­
ledge as a whole is necessary. For a c ritic ism  o f the p o s itiv is tic  
scientific ism  followed by Bultmann, see, fo r instance, Whitehead, 
The Function, p. 27; Trigg, p. 100; Kampits, p. 114; Putnam, p. 125; 
K ra ft, p. 53; Michael Kandmann, "Critiques of Reason from Weber to 
Bloch," Telos C19763:187-98; P e ro tti, p. 41.
4
"Our relationship to history (Geschichte) is  wholly d if fe r ­
ent from our relationship to nature. Man, i f  he r ig h tly  understands 
him self, d ifferen tia tes  himself from nature. When he observes nature 
he perceives there something ob jective, which is not him self. When 
he turns his attention to h istory, however, he must admit himself 
to be a part of history; he is considering a liv ing  complex of events
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of temporal r e a lity  find th e ir  basic meaning in Plato's "idea,"^ the 
concept of o b jec tiv ity  that they ground applies f i r s t  and more 
properly to nature, which seems to  have room fo r the generality , per­
manence, and exactness that such a tra d itio n a l in te rp re ta tion  of 
o b jectiv ity  requires. On the other hand, as history refers to  the
individual ( in  time, in the Lebenswelt) , form as a timeless category,
2
fa l ls  short of the dynamic r e a l i ty  o f the object.
in which he is  essentially involved. . . . Hence there cannot be 
impersonal observation of nature" ( Jesus, p. 11). See a d d itio n a lly , 
FU, pp. 190-92; Heinrich O tt, Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte in  der 
TFeologie Rudolf Bultmanns (Tubingen: Mohr, 1955), p. 10; FT 37
Young, History and Existential Theology: The Hole of History in  the
Thought of Rudolf Bultmann (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969),
pp. 18- 22; aria rhiselton, pp. 245-51. Michalson, following the 
Bultmannian pattern, suggests th a t "one ought no longer to juxtapose 
nature and supernature, but nature and history" (The R a tio n a lity  of 
F a ith , p. 23). See also ib id . ,  pp. 28, 36, 37, 73, 89.
 ^See p. 251, nn. 2 -4 , above. Bultmann himself explains  
how knowledge of nature derives i ts  epistemological structure from 
Greek ontology. "In a ll such factua l knowledge or knowledge of p rin ­
c ip les , the world is presumed to  have the character of something 
objective, passive, accessible to simple observation. That is , the 
world is conceived in conformity with the Greek understanding of 
being. Research into facts and princip les has not altered fundamen­
t a l ly  since i t  was developed by the Greeks" (FU, p. 187). He fu rth e r  
believes that the Greek epistemological framework is  both necessary 
and authoritative for knowledge as a whole. Science has been "devel­
oped in exemplary fashion in  the Greek world, and every fu tu re  age 
tha t does not wish to lapse in to  barbarism learns from the Greek 
world" ( Essays, p. 87). Cf. ib id . ,  pp. 86-89, 165; FU, p. 187; 
Roberts, pp. <z6, i f ,  172; T i l l ic h ,  Systematic Theology, 77178, 179; 
Thiselton, p. 441; Gogarten, Demythologizing, pp. 52-62 passim; 
Lorite , p. 292, and Heidegger, "A Non-Objectifying Thinking," p. 28.
2
I t  is  apparent, then, th a t Bultmann's second dichotomy is  
also grounded in the time-timelessness ontological dichotomy of 
classical thinking. Knowledge qua knowledge is produced when cate­
gories are applied to the sensory data. Yet categories, even in 
Kant, have been shaped on the basis of Greek timeless ontology. Con­
sequently, s c ie n tific  categories are not able to grasp h istory as 
they grasp nature. Yet, as Ogden makes p la in , there is no knowledge
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Even though s c ie n tific  o b jec tiv ity  as developed and applied 
in  the study of nature cannot provide categories fo r grasping and 
understanding the whole of temporal r e a lit ie s , notably man as h is to r­
ica l re a lity , i t  ce rta in ly  provides, in Bultmann's opinion, the 
framework for determining in the temporal realm what is  real and what 
is  not, what is a fa c t (even a h is to rica l fa c t) ,  and what is  no tJ
Here, the timeless epistemological framework appears as determinative
2
of temporal re a lity .  In other words, something can only be re a l,  
a fa c t or an event, i f  i t  f i t s  the s c ie n tific  epistemological frame­
work— that is , i f  i t  pertains to the closed continuum and can be 
grasped through the trad itio n a l categories of timeless o b je c tiv ity . 
H istory , then, is subordinated to both ontology and natural science.
Besides i t  should be noted that the same basic understanding 
of o b jec tiv ity  that is  used for the study of nature is  also used fo r
without ob jectiv ity  ( Christ without Myth, p. 25). Every knowledge 
as i t  relates to e n t it le s , is bound to be objective, even h is torica l 
knowledge.
^"Modern man acknowledges as re a lity  only such phenomena or 
events as are comprehensible w ithin the framework of the rational 
order of the universe. He does not acknowledge miracles because they 
do not f i t  into th is  lawful order. When a strange or marvelous acci­
dent occurs, he does not rest u n til he has found a rational cause" 
( JCM, pp. 37, 38). See additionally KM, pp. 5, 7; K ra ft, p. 52; and 
P iz z u ti, "Teologia," p. 575. As seen la te r , th is  determinative 
aspect of the ontological and epistemological frameworks is to be 
applied even upon theological knowledge (KM, p. 4 ).
2
. I t  is , then, apparent why Bultmann considers that the world­
view (cosmology) is  not that important regarding i ts  particu la r con­
ten t or in terpretation  of the world and sees its  importance rather 
as a "method of thinking" (JCM, p. 37). Nothing which is not 
"approved" before the tribunal of s c ie n tific  principles can be con­
sidered as "real" or have any meaning at a l l .
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the study o f h istorica l r e a l i t ie s J  As we approach the analysis of
the epistemological category o f ob jec tiv ity  as applied to temporal
h istorica l re a l it ie s ,  i t  is  necessary to remember that the f i r s t
ontological dichotomy has already determined that history is  the
2
realm of what is re la tiv e . The category of the absolute corresponds
to the timeless dimensionality of God's being.
At th is  juncture our analysis needs to turn to Bultmann's
3
th ird  dichotomy, which he sees between H istorie  and Geschichte.
I am aware that Bultmann e x p lic it ly  declares that ob jec tiv ­
i ty  in h is to rica l science is  to  be distinguished from o b je c tiv ity  
in nature (PE, p. 117). Yet a more careful study of Bultmann's sug­
gestions on- the meaning of h is to rica l o b je c tiv ity  shows that i t  is  
not o b je c tiv ity  as such th a t is  to be interpreted d iffe re n tly  but 
rather the way in which o b je c tiv ity  and man (the subject which has 
become the subject matter) are to be re lated . Moreover, h is to rica l 
research faces the fact th a t in its  realm o b jec tiv ity  must not be 
detached from the cognitive subject; on the contrary, i t  must include 
"the sub jec tiv ity  of the h istorian" which Bultmann considers, fo llow ­
ing Historicism , "a necessary factor of objective h istorical know­
ledge" (PE, p. 119). Cf. ib id . ,  pp. 121, 122, and J. Robert Toss,
"H istorical Knowledge as Basis fo r Faith ," Zygon 13 [1978]:220 ). 
In h is to rica l knowledge, o b je c tiv ity  “is not attainable in the sense 
of absolute ultimate knowledge" (PE, p. 121). Michalson provides 
a good description of the way tra d itio n a l o b je c tiv ity  is to be under­
stood when applied to the study of H istorie  (The R ationality  of 
Faith , p. 65 ).
^EF, p. 89; c f. PE, pp. 11, 124; Roberts, p. 115.
3
For an example of Bultmann's actual usage of these concepts 
in theological discourse, see KM, pp. 35-38. Schniewind explains 
the general meaning of these terms which, by the way, are not 
Bultmann’s creation, but perta in  to German theological conceptuality. 
"In German theology we are fa m ilia r  with the remarkable d is tin c tio n  
between H istorie  and Geschichte. The d is tin c tio n  would appear to 
go back to Martin Kahler (1892), though th is  is  not absolutely cer­
ta in . Von Dobschtitz p e rtin en tly  asked whether the d istinction  were 
possible in  other languages. Be that as i t  may, i t  is undoubtedly 
a real d is tin c tio n . Geschichte means the mutual encounter o f per­
sons, H is to rie  the causal nexus in the a ffa irs  of men. The la t te r  
is the subject matter of h is to ric a l science, which seeks to divest 
i t s e lf  of a l l  presuppositions and prejudices and to establish
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This dichotomy appears because the epistemological category of objec­
t iv i t y  even as i t  is  adapted fo r h is to rica l investigation^ is  s t i l l
timeless and therefore unable to reach the subject m atter of h istory ,
2
namely, the concrete ex is ten tie ll individual in  the Lebenswelt. 
What h istorica l s c ie n tific  objective categories are able to reach
3
is H is to rie . What fa lls  out of the reach of s c ie n tif ic  o b je c tiv ity  
(but is  nonetheless p a rtia lly  included in i t )  is  Geschichte. In  
Geschichte we have reached the realm of the e x is te n t ie l l . H istorie  
works with these aspects of the concrete individual th a t may be known 
when the categories of ob jectiv ity  are applied. Geschichte appears 
in that realm which lies  beyond Hi s to ri e without denying, however, 
any o f the objective data established in H is torie . Geschichte hap-
4
pens w ith in  the lim its  set up by H is to rie .
ob jective  facts. Geschichte, on the other hand, cannot achieve such 
im p a rtia lity , fo r the encounter which i t  implies v i t a l ly  affects our 
personal existence: i t  demands resolve and decision, yes or no, love
or hate" (p. 8 2 ). Cf. FU, p. 191; Lauer, p. 172, n. 20; and 
Michalson, The R a tio n a lity , p. 27.
^See p. 255, n. 1 above.
PE, p. 116; FU, p. 59. For further commentary see Roberts, 
pp. 26, 277 and K ra ft, p. 59.
^ " It is possible, for instance, to f ix  o b jec tive ly  a certa in  
part of the h is to rica l process, namely, events in so fa r  as they are 
nothing but occurrences" (PE, p. 116). See also Runzo, p. 408.
^The three dichotomies of Bultmann's thought are inclusive. 
That is ,  the ontological noumen-phenomenon dichotomy includes the 
epistemological nature-history dichotomy, which includes the d is c i­
p lin a ry  Historie-Geschichte dichotomy. In other words, fo r  
Geschichte to appear as a realm of r e a l ity ,  i t  is  necessary to apply 
the nature-hi story epistemological dichotomy w ith in  the mediate 
in te lle c tu a l context provided by the noumen-phenomenon ontological 
dichotomy.
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Since Christian theology as a cognitive enterprise finds its  
orig in  in  propositions th a t are handed down from the p a s t j  the 
Hi s to ri e- Geschichte dichotomy seems to provide the necessary frame­
work fo r developing a careful evaluation of both the cognitive 
material handed down from the past (H is to r ie , historiography) and 
the e x is te n tie ll act o f fa ith  (in  the realm of Geschichte) that con­
s titu tes  the origin o f theological reason. Historie is  reached 
through the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method, which tries  to determine the
o b je c tiv ity  and h is to r ic ity  o f the knowledge handed down by Christian  
2
tra d itio n . As i t  makes p la in  the real s c ie n tific  objective meaning
In its  broadest sense i t  is  possible to speak o f tra d itio n . 
In a more restricted sense, i t  can be applied to the B ib lic a l account 
about the origin of the Christian re lig io n  and its  theology which 
are the grounds of Christian tra d itio n .
2
I t  is not my purpose to investigate Bultmann's understanding 
of the historical c r i t ic a l  method or i t s  application in theological 
exegesis. The phenomenological analysis o f reason's structure needs 
only th a t the connection between the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method as 
rational procedure and Bultmann's general in terpretation o f reason's 
structure be seen c le a r ly . Bultmann f irm ly  believes th a t s c ie n tific  
reason d ire c tly  requires (and theological reason in d ire c tly  through 
via negativa) the correct, radical application of the h is to rica l 
c r i t ic a l  method to the orig inal documents of the C hristian Faith,
p a rtic u la rly  to the New Testament (TNT, 1:251).
The basic categories and procedures of th is  s c ie n tific  
method, Bultmann says, have been worked out "from the time of the
Enlightenment onward" ( ib id . ) .  " I t  is  in  accordance with such a
method as this that the science of h is to ry  goes to work on a l l  his­
to ric a l documents. And there cannot be any exceptions in the case 
of B ib lic a l texts i f  the la t te r  are at a l l  to be understood h is to r i­
c a lly . Nor can one object that the B ib lic a l writings do not intend 
to be h istorica l documents, but rather affirm ations of fa ith  and pro­
clamation. For however certain  th is  may be, i f  they are ever to be 
understood as such, they must f i r s t  o f a l l  be interpreted h is to ri­
c a lly , inasmuch as they speak in  a strange language in concepts of 
a faraway time, of a world-picture th a t is  alien to us. Put quite 
simply, they must be translated , and trans la tion  is the task of his­
to ric a l science" (EF, p. 282). See also Essays, pp. 234, 235. Cf. 
Gogarten, Demytholoqizing, p. 38; Jaspers, Philosophical Faith,
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of Christian tra d it io n , the h is to ric a l c r i t ic a l  method shows what
is  not the object o f theological reasonJ Yet, in  Bultmann's system,
the purpose o f the s c ie n tific  investigation o f h istory is not the
2
obvious immediate goal of the “reconstruction o f past history" but 
ra ther the in te rp re ta tion  and understanding of i t  by remembering that 
the s c ie n tific  results  are ju s t an objective expression of its
p. 235; Roberts, p. 97; Walter Vogels, "Les lim ites  de la methode 
h is to r ic o -c r itiq u e ,"  Laval Theologique et Philosophique 36 (1980): 
173-194.
I t  seems c lear that fo r  Bultmann the h is to ric a l c r i t ic a l  
method is a necessary preliminary step which is  to  be taken in  order 
th a t theological reason may be consequently applied. I t  is also clear 
th a t, as the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method works in the realm of objec­
t iv i t y ,  i t  applies as framework fo r  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  both the ontolo­
g ical and epistemological dichotomies (EF, pp. 290-95). In i ts  h is -  
fo r the hidden o b je c tiv ity  of the Christian documents, then, the is -  
to r ic a l c r it ic a l  method needs to u t i l iz e  not only the principles and 
method of thinking that a s c ie n tif ic  inquiry requires but also the 
concrete results of such inquiry in the d iffe re n t areas of knowledge 
th a t may be involved in  the Christian documents to be interpreted.
^Bultmann makes i t  very p lain  that since the h is to rica l 
c r it ic a l  method works out in the realm of tem porality, its  results  
are not absolute but always te n ta tiv e  (FU, pp. 15, 30, 31). As the 
h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method works with history, the past, i ts  objec­
t iv i t y  represents fo r theological reason what is  to be negated. 
Hence, any possible variation th a t h istorica l science may introduce 
in i ts  in terp re ta tion  of the Bible never affects the functioning and 
meaning of both theological reason and Christian fa ith .  Theological 
reason finds its  "subject matter" not in history but in the timeless 
acts of God in time; more precisely, in Geschichte, since Geschichte 
as happening is  never past but is  always a renewed resolve in the 
present, in the "now." This is  the reason why Bultmann is not a fra id  
of applying s c ie n tif ic  reason in the in te rp re ta tion  of B ib lica l 
tra d it io n . What is  consumed by sc ien tific  c r itic is m  “is only the  
fa n c ifu l p o rtra its  o f Life-of-Jesus theology, and th a t means nothing 
other than Christos kata sarka" (FU, p. 132). Bultmann's position  
"presupposes the f in a l divorce o f reason and fa ith  and history and 
fa ith .  . . . There is no such thing as an objective, h is to rica l 
basis fo r fa ith "  (Ross, p. 212). I t  is  in th is context that Bultmann 
sees nature and h istory leading men to grace ( Essays, p. 118).
2INJ, 2:251.
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e x is te n tie ll source, that is , of history as GeschichteJ
Geschichte points to that dimension, s t i l l  in  time, which
the cognitive categories cannot grasp. This is the realm of the
2
e x is te n t ie ll . I t  is w ithin this realm th a t the contact between the 
noumenal level of God's timeless Being and the phenomenal order of 
man's temporal being occurs.^
In order to grasp the meaning o f history as h istory i t  is 
necessary to  apply abstraction to the resu lts  provided by the h is to r­
ical c r i t ic a l  method. "Historical science, therefore, is  the in te r­
pretation o f such works. I t  has the task o f understanding the objec­
t if ic a tio n s  of l i fe  by reducing them, so to  speak, to the ground from 
which they grew, namely, the ground of the creative l i f e  of the soul 
which reveals i ts e lf  only in its  ob jec tifica tio n s" (PE, p. 124). In 
th is founding of the meaning of h istory  on its  ground, namely, 
Geschichte, the present, as temporal mode, takes precedence over the 
future (Michael E. Quigley, "Revelation and the Problem of H is to ri- 
cism," Heythrop Journal 17 [1976J:298). The result of such abstrac­
tion from past as a whole to past in terpreted from its  present (as 
the Geschichte which constituted i t  is  considered and interpreted  
from the “now'' of the orig inal "happening") is  that "we look on what 
is repeated, constant, and typical as something strik ing  a chord in 
us— something we can understand" ( Essays, p. 320). In th is  way, 
history loses its  uniqueness and temporal meaning.
2
The e x is ten tie l1 corresponds to the realm of the esse which 
cannot be reduced to knowledge in Aquinas's system e ith e r . Tn this  
sense the e x is te n tie ll (esse, Geschichte) provides the ontological 
foundation fo r essentia or H istorie as knowledge. See Roberts, 
pp. 180, 181; p. 235, n. 1 above.
3
At th is point Geschichte appears as what lie s  beyond the 
reach of knowledge. As soon as Geschichte is  expressed in cognitive 
forms, i t  is  no longer Geschichte but H is to rie  which can be analyzed 
and understood by natural sc ien tific  reason through i ts  usual pro­
cedures. Thus, Geschichte provides a realm in time and in history 
which cannot be reached by knowledge ye t is  the source o f knowledge. 
Bultmann sees in th is realm that which is  le f t  out by trad itiona l 
categories, the opportunity for placing ontologically the context 
between timelessness and temporality without disturbing the cognitive 
realm of the closed continuum of science. Thus, Geschichte is  not 
the realm o f the " irra tio n a l"; on the contrary, i t  is  the realm that 
provides the possib ility  of a deeper level of understanding and 
ra tio n a lity . Jaspers ( The Great Philosophers, p. 313) explains how
in the Kantian pattern the realm of the unfathomable is  not " ir ra ­
tio n a l,"  but that which "reason experiences as the l im it  of reason
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Geschichte does not provide the ground fo r an understanding
of history as a wholeJ I t  rather provides the place fo r  the happen-
2
ing of individual h is to rica l phenomena. Thus, the meaning o f 
Historie is  referred to Geschichte as to its  ground and therefore 
to the present as the "now" in which Geschichte is  possible.^ The
and draws into the lig h t of reason.” Bultmann's idea of encounter 
does not deny Jasper’ s view but goes beyond i t .  Man has a contact 
with the unfathomable (which is not irra tio n a l) beyond the lim its  
of reason. The problem is  that such a “grasp" is  not cognitive but
exp erien tia l, ex is ten tia l. See FU, p. 35; GV 3:132; and Roberts,
pp. 12, 37, 38. Jaspers, who worlcs w ith in  tRe” same general pattern 
fo r ra t io n a lity , explains that while the sacrificium  in te llectus "is  
unbearable to any rational being, an acceptance of s c ie n tific  cogni- 
tion is  by no means the end of the fa ith  in revelation; for th is  
fa ith  is  beyond s c ie n tific  cognition and untouched by i t .  I t  is  
neither cognoscible nor combatable i f  i t  gives up the aberrations 
i t  has kept fa llin g  into" (Philosophical Fa ith , p. 53).
^"Today we cannot claim to know the end and the goal of h is­
tory. Therefore the question of meaning in history has become mean­
ingless (PE, p. 120). Cf. JCM, p. 48; PE, pp. 110, 113, 119. This
is what Runzo calls the re lativ ism  of BuTlmann's philosophy of his­
tory which "becomes essentia lly  the re lativ ism  of his general episte- 
mology” (p . 404).
2
Even when the meaning of h istory as a whole, according to 
Bultmann, cannot be reached, "there s t i l l  remains the question of 
the meaning of single h is to rica l phenomena and single historical 
epochs" (PE, pp. 120, 121).
3
See p. 259, n. 1 above. Geschichte as circumscribed to the 
present is reduced to the act of resolve which from i ts  "punctual" 
experience in time provides the ontological room fo r the "self know­
ledge of the living mind" (PE, p. 122). The understanding which per­
tains to Geschichte is  described by Bultmann as "hearing.” "We ca ll 
understanding by such appropiate 'hearing' h istorica l understanding, 
because here the understanding is  i t s e l f  a h istorica l action in which 
I grasp my own possib ility" (FU, p. 190). Thus the meaning of h is­
to ric a l understanding as "seTT^understanding" does not consist "in  
what is  said, what can be understood as a 'tim eless' expression of 
meaning, as an 'eternal t ru th ',  but in the fact that is  said. Just 
because i t  is said, my situation becomes a new s ituation , and I 
myself—deciding this way or th a t—become a new person" (FU, p. 193). 
This interpretation of "self-understanding" referred to an actual 
momentaneous experience in  time, yet in disconnection from time (past
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
“now” of Geschichte as e x is te n tie ll act of decision provides the 
point of contact with timelessness; that is , i t  provides the h is to r i­
cal side of man's passive timelessnessJ When the Act o f God
happens, the “moment" becomes the "eschatological" moment in which
2
the meaning of h istory is realized. The "now" o f Geschichte as the 
moment of decision and resolve provides, w ithin the s c ie n tific  epis- 
temological framework, the level in which the contact between time­
less God and temporal man may happen without contradicting or upset­
ting the structure o f reason.
Theological Reason
I t  is time now to turn to Bultmann's in terp retation  o f the 
functioning of theological reason"* in  the context provided by natural 
reason. In order fo r theological reason to e x is t, some kind of con­
tac t between God and man is necessary. This contact is to be found
and future) i t  is  possible only on the basis and framework provided 
by Bultmann's dichotomies. This isolated way of interpreting meaning 
and history does not stem from the phenomenological analysis 
(Heidegger, Being and Time, I I . 5 .7 4 ).
^See p. 232, nn. 1, 2, and 3 above.
2
"The meaning in history lie s  always in  the present, and when 
the present is conceived as the eschatological present by Christian  
fa ith ,  the meaning in history is  realised" (PE, p. 155).
The use of the term "theological reason" applied to 
Bultmann's system does not mean that he recognizes a new kind of 
reason for theological purposes as, for instance, Aquinas’ s active  
in te lle c t . What is  d iffe ren t between natural and theological reason 
is  th e ir  objects to which they are related. Theological reason finds 
i ts  "object" in  God's timeless transcendence. "Theological reason," 
then, in Bultmann's system, points to the way in which natural 
reason deals with i ts  "new" subject matter.
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in Bultmann's idea of "encounter."^ I t  is  necessary, then, to con­
sider the "encounter" as the source o f theological knowledge 
(revelation) from the perspective of both involved p a rtie s , namely, 
God and man. And, second, to deal b r ie fly  with the form which theo­
logical reason is supposed to take as i t  is  applied to the cognitive 
m aterials that are found in  the original documents of the Christian 
Faith , namely, the B ib le .
Origin: Revelation. According to Bultmann, theological
2
knowledge has its  o rig in  in revelation understood as the act of God. 
In order to grasp what “act of God" and “revelation"3 mean, i t  is  
necessary to bear in mind the ontological and epistemological frame­
works so fa r  analyzed. Theological reason does not deny natural
I t  is important to  bear in mind th a t the “encounter" is not 
to be understood in analogy to substance (des substantiell Seienden) 
but rather in analogy to h istorica l personal relations as given when 
concrete ontic Daseins re la te  to each other ( Essays, p. 271). In 
short, the encounter is  to  be understood in terms of "ac t,"  as that 
which "happens" in the moment of decision and resolve.
^As in the case o f Jaspers (p. 114, n. 1 above), Bultmann's 
in te rp re ta tion  of theological reason is  developed on firm  ground 
(JCM, pp. 70-72). Hence Funk seems to be correct in remarking that 
Bultmann's position is  not sub jec tiv is tic , at least in the sense of 
not being groundless (Foreword to Faith and Understanding, p. 25). 
Cf. Roberts, p. 181; and Gogarten, Demythologizing, pp. bb, 56. I t  
should be noted that Bultmann d iffers  from Jaspers precisely in his 
in te rp re ta tion  of the man-transcendence relationship as possible only 
as a resu lt of God's act ( KMII, pp. 189-99).
^God's act implies "revelation .” "We cannot speak of what 
God is in Himself but only of what He is  doing to us and with us” 
(JCM, p. 73). Since Bultmann has not developed a detailed  ontology 
of God’ s being, i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to see what he means w ith his dis­
tin c tio n  between God in Himself and God in His act. I t  seems, how­
ever, th a t he wants to  s h if t  the question o f God from the cognitive 
realm (what the idea o f being in himself im plies), to the idea of 
personal existence which relates to w il l  and decision. See JCM, 
pp. 43, 73; TNT, 1:190, 191; and PE, p. 96. Yet, as the ontological
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reason but rather complements i t . *
F irs t , since the “act" pertains to God, revelation must
“happen" within the dimensionality of God's being, namely, tim eless-
2
ness. Yet, God’ s act must reach temporal man in  order to  be reve­
la tio n . Thus, revelation  requires that the act o f God should connect 
timelessness w ith tem porality. However, God's act cannot happen 
“within" tem porality because th is  would imply both some tem porality  
(even as p o te n tia lity  for tim e ), which would d isrupt the in te rp re ta ­
tion  of the Being of God as timeless and "wholly other," and the 
negation of the closed continuum th a t Bultmann's Kantian epistemolo- 
gical framework requires. Bultmann solves the problem by suggesting 
a passive p o te n tia lity  fo r timelessness in man's temporal being.
framework makes c le a r, both God's being and act pertain to tim eless­
ness. Hence, any speaking about God, whether about his being, his 
act, or his w i l l ,  is  to be understood analogically and not mythologi­
c a lly  or ob jective ly  (JCM, p. 62; and Ogden, Foreword to Existence 
and Fa ith , p. 19).
*Bultmann's position regarding the relationship between 
natural and theological reason agrees with Thomas's in th a t both 
theologians see i t  as a harmonic re lation  of complementation. Yet, 
Bultmann does not accept theological reason as a perfecting or a 
higher level o f functioning of the natural powers of reason. This 
and the closed-continuum epistemological presupposition are perhaps 
the two main differences to be found between Aquinas's and Bultmann's 
rational systems. "Exegesis presupposes the lumen naturale; other­
wise i t  is meaningless" (EF, p. 101).
See p. 215, nn. 1-3; and p. 216, n. 1 above. "The work of 
God cannot be seen as a universal process, as an a c tiv ity  which we 
can observe (as we observe the workings of the laws of nature) apart 
from our own existence" (FU, p. 59 ). See JCM, pp. 61, 62.
^Bultmann e x p lic it ly  denies that man has the p o te n tia lity  for 
an active contact with timelessness as in Aquinas's active in te lle c t  
(FU, p. 316). Yet, he also speaks e x p lic it ly  about man "being 
endowed" by the "dimension o f eternity" of God's l i f e  ( Essays, 
pp. 107, 108). Thus, a passive p o ten tia lity  fo r timelessness is  
ascribed to man. See p. 232, nn. 1, 2, and 3 above.
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Thus the act of God is  considered as happening "within" the causality  
of temporality and not “between" worldly events.^ The timeless act 
of God is to be found "within" temporality but not as being i t s e l f  
temporal.
Second, since God is conceived as acting (and not ta lk ing  ) ,
revelation is not a communication o f knowledge (propositions) but
only the experience that man has when he is encountered by God. The
B ib lical concept o f "Word of God," therefore, is  to be understood
3
and interpreted on the basis of God's timeless ac t. At th is  point,
"The thought of the action o f God as an unworldly and trans­
cendent action can be protected from misunderstanding only i f  i t  is  
not thought of as an action which happens between the worldly actions 
or events, but as happening w ithin them. The close connection 
between natural and h istorica l events remains in ta c t as i t  presents 
i t s e l f  to the observer" ( JCM, pp. 61, 62). The timeless act of God 
"within” time is what Bultmann c a lls  in theological language “the 
eschatological event" (FU, p. 202). For an introduction to the 
critic ism  of Bultmann's interpretation  of eschatology as tim eless, 
see Thiselton, pp. 265, 266.
2
"God's revelation is prim arily  an event, not a communication 
of knowledge" (FU, p. 210). Cf. Macquarrie, E x is te n tia lis t  Theology,
p. 241. Is it~ fh a t  God cannot speak? Not at a l l .  I t  is that man
has not categories fo r understanding or hearing whatever a timeless 
knowledge may be. On the otherhand, God cannot ta lk  human language 
because this implies fo r him to be "between" temporal causality  and 
hence not to be "wholly other" or timeless. Yet, the Kantian frame­
work of reason's structure accepted by Bultmann allows in man a cate­
gory for grasping a timeless act. I t  is , then, through the act of 
God that man gets in contact with (encounters) God and that the sub­
je c t matter of theology is given. Yet, what God's action is cannot 
be known. Regarding the meaning of God's action i t  is necessary to 
apply the rational procedure I am try ing to analyze here. As the pro­
cedure is applied, we learn, f i r s t ,  that we know what God's act is  
not ( via negativa) ,  namely, i t  is  not knowledge as propositions; and 
second, that what God’s act is can 0e in d irec tly  expressed by analogy 
to what man's act as e x is te n tie ll means (FU, p. 258). As is  c lear, 
the Thomistic tra d itio n a l procedure is at work, yet w ithin a d i f f e r ­
ent ontological and epistemological framework.
^"To be sure, what is meant by 'word of God' can be c la r if ie d
in a formal way: but precisely th is  formal c la r if ic a t io n  te l ls  us
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Bultmann sees c learly  the danger of reducing the act of God, his 
Word, and revelation to the realm of timelessness.^ In order to  
avoid that misunderstanding of his position, Bultmann applies the
Kantian structure fo r the in terp re ta tion  of the re la tion  between
2 3timelessness and time and finds in  the "act of preaching," which
4
is o n tica lly  produced by the church, the temporal counterpart of 
the timeless act of God. As God's timeless act has no cognitive con­
ten t, so i ts  temporal counterpart in  the preaching of the church has 
to be seen in the act as "speech event" and not in  its  cognitive con-
5
ten t. Bultmann's epistemological framework, however, finds in
that no 'content' of the word of God can be conclusively exhibited  
but rather can only be heard in the immediate moment" (EF, p. 91). 
See FU, pp. 149, 190, 301, 302, 306, 204, 213; Thiselton, p. 229; and 
TNT,- 2:50, 60-63, 66, 69.
^"Are we not in danger of relegating the divine dispensation, 
the history of salvation, to the dimension of timelessness?" ( JCM, 
p. 78).
2
See p. 239, n. 1, and p. 240, n. 1 above.
^"Revelation is  effected precisely in the proclamation" (FU, 
p. 211). "Proclamation is event, is i ts e lf  a part of the revelation"' 
( ib id . ) .  “God encounters us in preaching" (EF, p. 87 ).
^"The Word is  also constituted by the church" (FU, p. 213). 
The church, as an "otherworldly" community, which is grounded in the 
e x is te n tie ll partic ipa tion  of ontic "acts of fa ith ,"  is the f i t  
instrument fo r expressing the act of God. And, the expression in  
preaching is  the only one recognized by Bultmann.
^In th is  case, the im plication is not that we should find  a 
preaching without words, something which would be impossible since 
preaching happens in the world. The idea of "speech event" empha­
sizes the abstract act—the temporal counterpart of God's time­
less act. "Act" is  always "abstract" in  Bultmann in the sense that 
i t  refers to the "mere happening" in disconnection of any past, 
fu ture , or cognitive contents whatsoever. See FU, pp. 212, 209; EF, 
p. 87. Michalson gives a pertinent description of th is aspect of
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the “act o f fa ith" the correlate  fo r the "act of God," and through 
i t  the timelessness-time re la tion  is smoothly bridged through man's 
passive p o te n tia lity  fo r  timelessnessJ
Revelation finds i ts  ground in the timeless act of God but 
reaches the cognitive realm from the perspective of the “act of 
fa ith" which is the temporal human side of the divine-human
Bultmann's thought and how this m otif is  developed by post- 
Bultmannian theology, notably by Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling 
(The R a tio n a lity  of F a ith , pp. 91, 92).
^There has been c ritic ism  of the way Bultmann tie s  down God's 
timeless act to the temporal act of preaching, not because God's act 
cannot have a temporal counterpart w ith in  the Kantian pattern, but 
rather because the timeless act of God is  conditioned fo r its  happen­
ing to a particu lar temporal act and tra d it io n  as w e ll. This posi­
tion has been challenged, notably by Ogden (Foreword to Existence
and F a ith , pp. 20, 21); Jaspers ("Myth and Religion," pp. 148, 1491;
and Franz Buri (Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, pp. 129-
153). From an epistemological point of view the problem arises when 
the tim eless act of God cannot happen except in connection with tem­
poral h is to ric a l act, namely, the act o f preaching.
Bultmann puts i t  th is  way: "The kerygma, the summons, is
therefore teaching in so fa r  as i t  implies a specific understanding? 
I t  gives instruction concerning a fa c t— but a fac t which must not 
be regarded as an objective fac t of the world. Therefore the factual 
communication is not merely the imparting of information which is  
incidental and secondary; i t  is i t s e l f  a part, as the preaching 
authorized by the saving act is a p art, of the saving act i ts e lf .  
There is  no way of going behind the preaching to a saving fact separ­
able from the preaching—whether to a 'h is to ric a l Jesus' or to a cos­
mic drama" (FU, p. 212). See also ib id . ,  pp. 209, 310; c f. TNT, 
2:240; Essays, p. 12. The s a lv ific  revelatory act of God, thus, 
seems to be conditioned to temporality and to human in it ia t iv e .  The
problem is even more complex because even though the content is not 
the "principal" aspect o f preaching, i t  forms an important part of 
i t .  Thus, i t  is not only preaching as act but preaching regarding 
a p a rtic u la r content, the Christ event. See EF, pp. 89, 90; Essays, 
p. 114; FU, p. 308; and Hiegge, pp. 84-89. Christian preaching, 
then, ha's the monopoly on salvation. God cannot save outside the 
Christian tra d itio n . Jaspers c r it ic iz e s  th is  aspect of Bultmann's 
thought as representing a remnant of the Lutheran-Pauline myth of 
ju s tif ic a tio n  by fa ith  ("Myth and Relig ion," p. 149).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
267
encounterJ Yet, since knowledge pertains to  the temporal realm,
revelation can reach i t  only in d ire c tly , as suggested by the Kantian 
2
pattern. To put i t  b r ie fly , revelation  d ire c tly  reaches the subject
(o f the subject-object re lationsh ip ) and only then, in d ire c tly  
through the subject, reaches the object whose objective content is  
not modified. Let us see now how, according to  Bultmann‘ s explana­
tion , revelation reaches both the subject and the object.
God's act reaches the subject not at his cognitive level but 
rather at i ts  existentia l le v e l. Existence has been reduced to the
4
act of decision, and decision provides knowledge, not about objects
"The possib ility  of understanding is ,  of course, based on
the operation of the divine act" (FU, p. 210). "But 'reve la tion '
('unveiling ' apokalypsis) designates not the knowledge communicated 
but the event which puts the man in a new situation" ( ib id . ) .  Cf. 
EF, pp. 86, 89.
2
“The hiddenness of the wonder as wonder counterpoises its
v is ib il i ty  as a world event” (FU, p. 253). "This is the paradox of
fa ith , that fa ith  'neverthelesT1- understands as God's actions here 
and now an event which is completely in te ll ig ib le  in the natural or 
historical connection of events'* ( JCM, p. 6 5 ). For a fu ll  discussion 
of Bultmann's application of Kant's pattern, see the entire section, 
ib id ., pp. 62-65.
3
The ind irect re lation  between reve lation  and knowledge is  
explained in a very accurate way by Bartsch as he comments th a t "in  
the sh ift of self-understanding from unbelief to  fa ith , a s h ift which 
Bultmann's e x is te n tia lis t in te rp re ta tion  makes c le a r, we can discern 
the creative force behind the s h if t ,  which is  the eschatological 
action of God. Not that we can discern i t  d ire c t ly , in an objective  
kind of way: i t  is only manifested in d ire c tly  through the s h ift  
i ts e lf .  Bultmann helps us to see that i t  is  to th is action of God 
that the witnesses are re a lly  te s tify in g . They do this by speaking 
of i t  in objective language, making i t  v is ib le  by means of m iracles, 
etc. All that is  openly v is ib le  is the s h ift  of self-understanding, 
which points to the action of God. But that action cannot be per­
ceived or known: i t  can only be accepted or rejected in decision" 
("Bultmann and Jaspers," pp. 200, 201).
^This reduction has been required by the timelessness of God. 
I t  is not present either in Heidegger's or Sartre 's  philosophies, 
for instance.
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but prim arily  about the ex is ten tie ll who performs the act in indepen­
dence o f any objective element that may be involved in i t J  S e lf-
understanding is a level of knowledge th a t as such pertains to time
2
and more particu la rly  to human relationships and actions. S e lf- 
understanding is  "grasped," not through cognitive categories but
3
rather in the act of decision, in  e x is te n tie ll experience as the
“Self-understanding belongs to  human beings as such" (FU 
p. 210). Bultmann explains that th is  ex is ten tia l knowledge happens 
when " I am myself involved" (FU, p. 188 ). That is what e x is te n tia l­
is ts  c a ll knowledge in  the f i r s t  person. Bultmann fu rth e r says that 
"my self-understanding given in my experiences never has the charac­
te r  o f a knowledge of something present at hand, and therefore s e lf-  
understanding i ts e l f  does not have the character of being present at 
hand, but is seized only in resolve" ( ib id . ) .  "The historical
s itu a tio n  cannot possibly be 'seen* in  the Greek sense as an objec­
t iv e  fa c t;  i t  can only be heard as a summons. For the situation  
demands resolve and is  only understood when the resolve is taken" 
(p. 187). The experiential level o f knowledge pertains to any know­
ledge insofar as every knowledge is  produced by an e x is te n t ie ll . 
Thus Bultmann states th a t "all understanding of anything (tha t is , of 
anything in the world) is always u ltim ate ly  an understanding of 
myself" (p. 187). “I cannot simply accept what is said as informa­
tion : fo r  I understand i t  only by a ffirm in g  or denying . . . th is is
a m atter of the disclosure of my own p o s s ib ilit ie s  which I understand 
as mine only by grasping them or by re je c tin g  them as a perversion of 
myself. Understanding, therefore, is  always simultaneously resolve, 
decision" (p. 158). "Understanding presupposes a coherent l i f e -  
complex in which the one who understands and what is  understood
belong together" (p. 315). This is  not going beyond the subject- 
object relationship, as, for instance, Gogarten ( Demythologizino, 
pp. 48-52) and H. Ott ("O b jectification  and Existentialism ," pp. 312- 
314) suggest, but rather is the acceptance of the subject-object 
pattern and the philosophical tra d itio n  that determines its  Kantian 
in te rp re ta tio n . Once th is  pattern is  accepted, epistemological room 
fo r theology is found at the level of the individual ( e x is te n t ie ll) 
as h is to ric  (Geschichte) .
2EF, p. 59.
^The "cognitive" "perception," so to speak, th a t provides 
the ex is ten tia l non-objective knowledge which Bultmann c a lls  "se lf-  
understanding," is "actio n ,” "ac tiv ity"  i t s e l f .  Action qua action, 
independent from any “object," provides the only access to the 
cognitive realm of self-knowledge. "The event of the summons
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act of decision and not to  the involved object. Thus, s e lf -
understanding as knowledge re fers  to the existent jjua ex istent in
independence o f any information regarding the world.
In the world, s in fu l man cannot but develop his s e lf -
understanding from the viewpoint of and w ith in  the framework provided
by the closed temporal continuumJ Yet, when the divine-human
encounter happens, the act o f God encounters man as a whole; there-
2
fore revelation is its  re s u lt, the act of f a i th ,  involves meaning.
But since both the ontological dimensionality o f God (tim eless) and
the epistemological dimensionality of man (temporal) do not allow  
a cognitive relationship in the trad itio n a l mode of vision (th e o ria ,
discloses to the man a s itu a tio n  of ex is ten tia l self-understanding, 




As Husserl savs: “AH experiences are conscious experi­
ences" (Ideas, pp. 141, 142). Hence, since the act of God is  act only 
insofar us i t  reaches man conditioning his "act“ as the "act of 
fa ith ,"  which is the act of man as a whole, the act of fa ith  must 
involve meaning, knowledge, understanding. Yet, i t  cannot get into  
man's experience through the objective level of knowledge but only 
through the levels of action and self-understanding. "Faith is 
re a lly  an understanding" (FU, p. 302). “For Christian knowledge has 
a genuinely h istorical character. I t  is therefore an understanding 
which is consummated in resolve and is an understanding o f one's 
self" (p. 207). "God's reve lation  is p rim arily  an event, not a com­
munication of knowledge. But the event is  a basis for both a know­
ledge and a teaching, since i t  makes possible a new s e lf-  
understanding” (p. 210). See also FU, pp. 205, 209, 316, and EF, 
p. 86. "There is indeed a knowledge~that is  also given in revela­
tion , however l i t t l e  the la t te r  is a supernatural arrangement fo r  
communicating remarkable doctrines. I am given a knowledge, namely, 
of myself, o f my immediate now, in which and fo r which the word of 
proclamation is spoken to me. Thus, i t  is  not an observer's know­
ledge, not a world-view in which man is in terpreted as a phenomenon 
within the world on the basis of certa in  general princip les of 
explanation, but rather a knowledge that is  only opened up to  me in
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as contemplation), Bultmann proposes th a t the understanding of the 
way the re la tio n  is  accomplished must be reached by analogy to the 
level of e x is te n tie ll encounter, to which the cognitive level of 
self-understanding correspondsJ In other words, the encounter with 
a timeless God can only be grasped by man w ithin the mode of se lf- 
understanding which excludes any propositional content. Yet revela­
tion produces knowledge, but a nonpropositional kind o f knowledge.
The encounter through the act o f God places man in a tru ly  
"new" s ituation; fo r i t  places man in contact with timeless God.
laying hold of the p o s s ib ility  for understanding myself th a t is dis­
closed in  the proclamation; i t  is a knowledge that is  only real in 
the act o f fa ith  and love" (EF, p. 88) .  “The p o s s ib ility  of under­
standing the Word coincides with man's p o ss ib ility  o f understanding 
himself" (FU, p. 302). See also for fu rth e r commentary, FU, pp. 139, 
188, 316; IF ,  p. 106.
^Bultmann explains that when two persons meet in time "reve­
lation" happens. "One person 'reveals' himself to another through 
an act of friendship or love and also through an act o f hate or mean­
ness. And, indeed, i f  in  such cases the revelation is  given by a 
word, th is  word has the character of an occurrence and is  not merely 
a mediating and informing communication about some state  of a ffa irs . 
Rather the revealing word is  i ts e lf  the state of a ffa irs  or at least 
belongs indissolubly to i t "  (EF, p. 59). As the encounter with tem­
poral persons places man in a new situations, so does the encounter 
with God. Thus, the meaning of God’ s act is to be grasped by analogy 
to the knowledge we have o f man's encounter with man.
^This entails  that the "knowledge" we find  in se lf-  
understanding as a resu lt of God’ s action is not an objective know­
ledge belonging to the temporal realm ( Essays, pp. 67, 68; KMII, 
p. 183; FU, p. 301; JCM, pp. 36, 65). Knowledge is ra ther an exper­
ience o f^  the subject at the ontic e x is te n tie l1 le v e l. This 
experience, therefore, "happens" without words, propositions, or any 
kind of objective content even regarding the e x is te n tie ll himself. 
I f  any content were expressed regarding the ex is ten tie  11, i t  would 
not be an “experience" or "self-understanding," i t  would be somebody 
else’ s understanding applied to the subject.
3FU, p. 193; EF, p. 59.
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In the cognitive realm th is  encounter is experienced by man in  terms
of the self-understanding which is  fa ith . The self-understanding
of fa ith  constitutes the cognitive orig in  of theological meaning.
Yet, “revelation" in i ts e lf  is  not to be confused with the s e lf-
understanding o f fa ith . Revelation in i t s e l f  is  the act o f God that
happens in timelessness,  ^ and in  re lation  to  which man "reacts"
cognitively by developing the "new" self-understanding th a t fa ith
is . The self-understanding of fa ith  is , therefore, the temporal
counterpart o f a timeless act (the encounter i t s e l f ) .  However, i t
should be noted that the tem porality to which the self-understanding
2
of fa ith  belongs is  interpreted by denying the actual flux  o f tim e.
Even though the act of cognitive correlate of reve lation
^See p. 267, n. 1.
2
For Bultmann theoloqy is "a h is to rica l science in  th a t i t  
speaks of a specific occurrence in human existence" (EF, p. 94); 
see p. 236, nn. 1-3 and p. 237, n. 2. Bultmann himseTf explains 
this is  to be understood w ith in  the context of self-understanding 
of fa ith . " In  fa ith  I deny the closed connection of the worldly  
events, the chain of cause and e ffec t as i t  presents i t s e l f  to  the 
neutral observer. I deny the interconnection of the w orldly event 
not as mythology does, which by breaking the connection places super­
natural events into the chain o f natural events; I deny the worldly  
connection as a whole when I speak of God. I deny the w orld ly con­
nection when 1 speak of myself, for in th is  connection of worldly  
events, my s e lf ,  my personal experience, my own personal l i f e ,  is 
no more v is ib le  and capable of proof than is  God as acting" ( JCM, 
pp. 64, 65). I f  timelessness is  to be seen in  re lation  to  the tem- 
poral closed continuum, i t  should share in i ts  tem porality. Such 
a possib ility  is  to be completely rejected. Such is the re s u lt of 
a radical application of the timeless dimensionality fo r i n t e l l ig i ­
b i l i ty  to God's transcendence. Neither God nor man can be reached 
by objective knowledge. Their beings have to be reached beyond that; 
in man's case in  self-understanding, yet beyond that as the act of 
fa ith  suggests to the phenomenological analysis; in  God's case in 
self-understanding of fa ith , yet even beyond that as the "wholly 
Other” idea requires. This going beyond o b jec tiv ity , therefore , 
requires the temporal cognitive dimension of "self-understanding"
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e n ta ils  meaning and understanding, i t  is  not as yet theological know­
ledge J  In order fo r  theological knowledge to be constituted, the  
self-understanding o f fa ith  is to be expressed and consequently, i t  
has to  enter the realm of o b jec tiv ity  and propositions, that is , cog­
n itio n  as available in the flux  of time. The self-understanding of
2
fa ith  reaches o b je c tiv ity  both in the mode of myth and of ex isten-
3
t ia l  propositions. Only the la t te r ,  though, are, properly speaking,
and the classical procedure of analogy. For additional commentary 
see GV, 3:117; TNT, 2:86; and Roberts, pp. 42, 50, 51. Cf. KM II, 
p. 19IT; FU, p. 19ZT and Roberts, pp. 285-87.
^EF, p. 89. "Theological propositions— even those o f the 
New Testament—can never be the object of fa ith ; they can only be 
the explication of the understanding which is inherent in fa ith  
i t s e l f 11 (7RT7T7237, 238).
2
"Myths give worldly o b jec tiv ity  to that which is unworldly 
( Per Mythos o b je c tiv ie rt das Jenseitige zum D iesseitigen)" ( JCM, 
p. 19 ). De Nys comments that myth expresses ob jective ly  that which 
is not objective ("Myth and Interpretation ," pp. 28, 29). Ogden puts 
Bultmann’ s understanding of myth in an abridged way. "Myth or myth­
ological language is language through which man ( 1) attempts to artic­
u la te  his experience of that non-objective ground or horizon which
u ltim ate ly  determines his human existence (2 ) by ’o b je c tify in g ’ th is
horizon, speaking of i t  as embodied in o b jec t-like  a c tu a litie s , 
images of which are drawn from more fam iliar experienced objects
(3) which actualities are represented as having a history of th e ir  
own, in  which history they also act so as to c r i t ic a l ly  determine 
human historical events" ( Christ without Myth, pp. 25, 26).
3
Theological propositions have to be distinguished from
philosophical and mythical ones. "Propositions of philosophy, so 
fa r  as they contain tru th , are in themselves ’r ig h t teaching’ " ( TNT, 
2 :240 ). Yet, "the propositions of theology are not themselves 'r ig h t  
teaching' but, so fa r  as they contain tru th , teach what the 'r ig h t  
teaching' is --a  teaching which is  not found by investigation but is  
given in the kerygma" ( ib id . ) .  Philosophy expresses cognitively the 
realm of the encounter. Theology expresses what is  encountered in 
i t .  Theological propositions express what Bultmann c a lls  the 
"kerygma." The "kerygma" is teaching "in so fa r  as i t  implies a 
sp ec ific  understanding" (FU, p. 212). The "kerygma" as grounded in  
God’ s act essentially belongs to the timeless realm (TNT, 2 :240 ). 
"Kerygma” is mediated into knowledge through self-understanding and
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considered to be "theological."^ Mythical expressions are theologi­
cal only insofar as they have ex is ten tia l meaning.
The meaning o f theological propositions, however, is not 
objective but e x is te n tia l. But, since theological propositions use 
objective meanings to express th e ir  ex is ten tia l one, they are bound 
to have a double meaning. F irs t, they have the h is to rica l objective  
meaning that relates every proposition to its  natural or h istorical 
ground and background of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  Second, they have the 
theological or ex is ten tia l meaning th a t relates the same objective
constitutes the "ex is ten tia l core" to which theological propositions 
re fe r. "That the kerygma never appears without already having been 
given some theological in terp retation  rests upon the fact that i t  
can never be spoken except in human language and formed by human 
thought" ( ib id .) .  As Ogden suggests, th is  implies a d iffe ren tia tio n  
between the ob jec tiv ity  of myth (which demythologization denies), 
which corresponds to natural or h is to rica l knowledge, and the objec­
t iv i t y  of the ex is ten tia l statements which correspond to the s e lf-  
understanding (Christ without Myth, pp. 49, 50). Yet, since the 
e x is te n tie ll is the realm in which both o b je c tiv itie s  are grounded 
and both are expressed in objective terms, the d iffe re n tia tio n  seems 
not to have ontological basis.
Additionally, according to Bultmann, the "kerygma" is reached 
through the objective application of the e x is te n tia lia  (Jaspers, 
"Myth and Religion," pp. 138, 140). Thus the d is tinc tion  is grounded 
on Bultmann's in terp re ta tion  of the epistemological framework, 
according to which theological propositions are those that, s t i l l  
being on the objective side of knowledge, are aware that th e ir  
foundation is to be found in the e x is te n tie ll experience of 
self-understanding. As propositions they s t i l l  are objective, yet 
they are closer to the "true" meaning because they avoid as much as 
possible the reference to natural and h istorica l re a lit ie s . To 
properly reach a theological meaning, however, even theological 
e x is ten tia l propositions are not enough. They s t i l l  are on the 
temporal side. I f  the timeless dimension of the encounter is to be 
reached, an analogical procedure is to be applied from the starting  
point provided by the ex is ten tia l propositions which express the 
self-knowledge of fa ith .
^This is because they correspond to the "fact" provided by 
the encounter (FU, p. 212). See also Macquarrie, E x is ten tia lis t  
Theology, p. 6 .
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propositional expression to the self-understanding to which i t  is 
related as its  o r ig in j  Therefore, even when theological meaning 
as such, as originated in  the timelessness of God, is to  be consid­
ered as "objective" in  the sense of not being groundless, theological 
propositions are to be recognized as subjective since they have th e ir  
source in the subject in  independence of the temporal objects and 
s ig n ifica tio n s  to which they re fe r. Propositions in  th e ir  objective 
meanings are just "used" as the only available vehicle to express 
the meaning of what the subject alone has experienced. Consequently, 
the p a rtic u la r propositions that any cognitive subject may choose
to express his own fa ith  depend not on objective norms but rather
2
on the sheer spontaneity of the subject.
Abstraction: Demythologization. Bultmann does not discuss
any procedure that the subject should fo llow  in order th a t his s e lf-  
understanding of fa ith  may be properly expressed.^ However, he does
^See fo r instance, FU, p. 189, and De Nys, pp. 33-35.
p
Theological propositions are “determined by the believer's  
situation" (TNT, 2:238). They are, therefore, incomplete ( ib id .) .  
They "may be only re la tiv e ly  appropriate, some more so, others less 
so" ( ib id . ) .  The kerygma can appear “only in a form modeled by an 
in d iv id u a l's  understanding of his own existence or by his interpre­
ta tio n  o f his own existence or by his in terpretation  of that under­
standing" (pp. 240, 241). See also FU, p. 213, and Macquarrie,
E x is te n tia lis t  Theology, p. 242. This sub jectiv ity  is  more visib le  
in the realm of myth, because mythical authors were much less careful 
in th e ir  choice of objective expressions.
■*The divine encounter happens to every C hristian. The
encounter is the same fo r a ll  men whether prophets, apostles, or 
believers . Cf. TNT, 2:237, 238. Bultmann suggests no rule for the
cognitive expression of the encounter. I t  ju s t has to happen in the
realm of temporal o b je c tiv ity .
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suggest a procedure that reason is  supposed to follow in order to  
grasp the meaning th a t theological propositions seek to convey. This 
procedure is  widely known through i ts  popular name of "demythologiza­
tion" ( Entmythologisierung) .
As a cognitive procedure, demythologization can be applied  
to  any kind of theological propositionJ Yet, due to the relevance 
o f the Biblical tra d itio n  fo r the constitution of Christian theology,
demythologization has been developed by Bultmann mainly as a
2
hermeneutical procedure adapted to  the particu lar cognitive features
o f the Bible. Since this investigation is concerned with ra tion a l
procedures, demythologization w il l  be considered and analyzed as a
rational procedure. Demythologization is an abstractive procedure
which is required, in Bultmann's opinion, due to  the fact th a t the
Word is hidden in Scripture because its  propositional mode combines
3
"summons and information."
Biblical conceptuality is  mythological-, and myth, according 
to  Bultmann, has three basic modes or meanings. F irs t, myth refers  
to  the meaning of its  o b je c tiv ity  understood in the context o f a 
prim itive world-view.^ Second, myth finds its  proper "object" and
1 Ib id.
J^CM, pp. 18, 45. See Thiselton, p. 230.
3FU, p. 306; JCM, p. 71.
^Biblical mythology is , according to Bultmann, "not only 
irra tio n a l but u tte r ly  meaningless" (KM, p. 8 ) .  Bultmann believes  
th a t the objective acceptance of BibTTcal cosmology "would involve 
a sacrifice of the in te lle c t which could have only one re s u lt— a 
curious form of schizophrenia and ins incerity ' (KM, p. 4 ). Bultmann 
is only p a r t ia lly  r ig h t. The acceptance of B ib lica l cosmology would
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therefore its  “true" meaning as i t  is  understood as an expression 
of man's self-understanding of f a i t h J  Third, myth re fe rs  to objec­
t iv i t y  as such and knowledge in general as the temporal vehicle fo r
2
expressing what is tim eless.
indeed mean the sac rifice  of the in te lle c t .  Yet, what Bultmann is  
not aware of is that the in te lle c t which would be sacrificed  is only 
the particu lar in terpretation  of reason's structure that he has 
u n c rit ic a lly  accepted from Kantian tra d it io n . See add ition a lly  KM, 
pp. 2 -5 , 8 ; JCM, p. 43; PE, p. 12; Kampits, p. 113; Rousas~J. 
Rushdoony, By What Standard?: An Analysis of the Philosophy of
Cornelius Van h i  (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publish­
ing Co., 1959), pp. 12, 13; Thiselton, pp. 255, 256, 280, 289; and 
Roberts, pp. 131-40.
■”fhe real purpose of myth is  not to present an objective 
picture  of the world as i t  is , but to  express man's understanding 
of himself in the world in which he liv e s . Myth should be interpre­
ted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or b e tte r s t i l l ,  exis­
te n t ia l ly" (KM, p. 10 ). In order that such an in te rp re ta tion  may 
be carried oul, Bultmann explains th a t "the c r ite r io n  adopted must 
be taken not from modern thought, but from the understanding of human 
existence which the New Testament i t s e l f  enshrines" (KM, p. 12). 
Here two relevant aspects of Bultmann's in te rp re ta tio n  “of B ib lical 
conceptuality should be noticed. F irs t ,  even though i t  is possib.le 
to fin d  in the Bible a "concern fo r the e x is te n t ie ll , “ to  take such a 
concept as "criterion" fo r theological in t e l l ig ib i1i t y  is  determined 
not by the New Testament but rather by the Kantian pattern . Second, 
th is  c rite rio n  e n ta ils  Bultmann's acceptance of a t least some 
B ib lic a l propositions as "objectively meaningful" and "tru e ."  I t  is , 
then, according to Bultmann, an objective understanding of man, 
namely the self-understanding, as developed in the New Testament by 
Paul and John, that is  supposed to provide the pattern fo r  demythol- 
ogizing by replacing the content o f tra d itio n a l categories. For 
fu rth e r commentary see JCM, pp. 18, 55; Thiselton, pp. 2, 230; De
Nys, p. 29; and Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 27.
2
"Mythology is  the use of imagery to express the other­
worldly in terms of th is  world and the divine in terms o f human l i f e ,  
the other side in terms of th is  side. For instance, divine  
transcendence is expressed as spatial distance. I t  is  a mode of 
expression which makes i t  easy to understand the cultus as an action 
in which material means are used to convey immaterial power" (KM, 
p. 10, n. 2 ). See also KM, p. 103; and JCM, pp. 20, 83. This moHe
or level of myth is not onTy to be applied to the B ib lic a l world-view
but to any world-view insofar as every world-view is  temporal. I t  
applies, therefore also to the "true" ( in  the objective leve l) 
s c ie n tif ic  world-view. The c o n flic t between world-views, even
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I t  can be c learly  appreciated that Bultmann's idea of myth 
is only the result of a consistent application of his particu la r  
in terpretation  of the ontological and epistemological frameworks of 
reason's structure and of the orig in  of theological meaning as w ell. 
This application determines th a t other insights or in terpretations  
of what mythological conceptuality may be are simply ruled out with­
out fu rther investigation or explanation.^
When B iblical conceptuality is taken as propositions to be 
interpreted in search of th e ir  theological meaning, the abstractive  
procedure o f demythologization as understood by Bultmann follows and 
includes three major steps, namely, the s c ie n tif ic , the e x is te n tia l, 
and the analogical.
The f i r s t  step aims to discover the "true" objective meaning 
of B ib lica l conceptuality which is  to be achieved through the app li-
p
cation of s c ie n tific  categories (the epistemological framework).
including the sc ien tific  world-view, "shows that in our age fa ith  
has not yet become aware of the identity  of i ts  ground and object; 
that i t  has not yet genuinely understood the transcendence and 
hiddenness of God as acting" ( JCM, p. 83 ). For further commentary 
see Thiselton, pp. 252-54; Miegge, p. 120; Ogden, Foreword to  Exist­
ence and F a ith , p. 18; Schniewind, pp. 47, 52; Ogden. Christ without 
Myth, p. 25; and Runzo, p. 403.
bultmann declares th a t he does not consider myth "in that 
modern sense, according to which i t  is p rac tica lly  equivalent to 
ideology" (KM, p. 10, n. 2 ). Regarding the modern understanding of 
Myth as equivalent to ideology, see for instance, Heidegger, "Review 
of Ernst Cassirer's Mythological Thought," in The Piety of Thinking, 
ed. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
s ity  Press, 1976), p. 41; Jaspers, Philosophical F a ith , p. 122; 
Robert J. Schreiter, "The Role o f Myth in the Science of Theology," 
Listening 15 (1980):179-83-
2
"Exegesis presupposes the lumen naturale; otherwise i t  is 
meaningless" (EF, p. 101). And the lumen naturale presupposes Greek
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This step, which is  mainly developed in exegesis through the h is to r i­
cal c r i t ic a l  method, e n ta ils  the complete denial of the B ib lica l 
world-view, which is  replaced by a s c ie n tific  oneJ The "true" 
o b je c tiv ity  reached both in the realms of nature and history is  that 
which the application o f the timeless sc ien tific  categories allows. 
The tru e  ob jectiv ity  is  abstracted from the fa lse, mythological one. 
The practica l result fo r  theology of reaching the "true" objective
meaning o f Biblical propositions is the discovery that the realm of
?
fa ith  is  not reached by i t  at a l l .
conceptuality and i ts  timeless primordial presupposition. For 
Bultmann the B ib lical conceptuality is  only "apparent ob jec tiv ity"  
(KM, p. 16). I t  includes many "contradictions and roughness" ( ib id .)  
wfTTch require evaluation. Cf. Thomas, "The Epistemology," p. 384. 
This evaluation is to be accomplished by the application of sc ien ti­
f ic  categories (Thiselton, p. 262; Ian Henderson, Myth in the New 
Testament [London: SCM, 1952], p. 46). Thus theology becomes
anci 11 a s c ie n tifiae ; c f .  Kamphis, p. 108. Bultmann p la in ly  states 
that B ib lic a l conceptuality is  mythological "because i t  is  d iffe ren t 
from the conception o f the world which has been formed and developed 
by science since its  inception in ancient Greece and which has been 
accepted by a ll modern men. In th is  modern conception o f the world 
the cause-effect nexus is  fundamental" ( JCM, p. 15).
^ " It is , of course, true that demythologizing takes the
modern world-view as a c r ite r io n . To demythologize is  to re jec t not
Scripture or the C hristian  message as a whole, but the world-view 
of Scrip ture, which is  the world-view of a past epoch, which a ll too 
often is retained in Christian dogmatics and in the preaching of the 
Church. To de-mythologize is to deny that the message of Scripture 
and o f the Church is  bound to an ancient world-view which is 
obsolete" (JCM, pp. 35, 36). And, since “the mythical view of the 
world must be accepted or rejected in its  entirety" (KM, p. 9)
Bultmann rejects i t  as a whole, replacing i t  by the s c ie n tif ic  world­
view as "true" framework fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y  (S c ien tific is m ). Cf. 
KM, p. 9; Roberts, pp. 128, 129.
'2
Funk c learly  expresses the way in which the h is to rica l
c r i t ic a l  method contributes to the abstractive process of demytholo­
g iza tio n . "There can be no question of discarding h is to rica l c r i t i ­
cism. But we must understand its  true significance. I t  is  needed 
to t ra in  us for freedom and veracity—not only by freeing us from
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The second step aims a t the disclosure of the theo log ica l-  
ex is ten tia l meaning that the objective proposition is  expressing.^ 
To reach th is  theological level of meaning, propositions are con­
sidered only insofar as they are an expression o f a Dasein's s e lf -
understanding. This requires a previous understanding of o b je c tiv ity
2
as a whole, including s c ie n tific  o b je c tiv ity , in order th a t s e lf -
understanding as such may appear. I t  is , then, through the ex is ten -
3
t i a l i a  that the content or meaning of the self-understanding th a t  
myth enshrines is reached. And only through abstraction (v ia
a specific tra d itio n a l conception of h istory, but because i t  frees  
us from bondage to every h is to ric a l construction which is w ith in  the 
scope of h is to rica l science, and brings us to the rea liza tio n  th a t  
the world which fa ith  w ills  to  grasp is absolutely unattainable by 
means of s c ie n tific  research" (Foreword to Faith  and Understanding, 
p. 31). T ill ic h  also believes that "s c ie n tific  explanation and h is -  
to r ic a l critic ism  protect revelation; they cannot dissolve i t ,  fo r  
revelation belongs to a dimension of re a lity  fo r which s c ie n t if ic  
and h istorica l analysis are inadequate" (Systematic Theology, 1 :116). 
Cf. KM, p. 12.
^See p. 272, nn. 1-3 , and p. 273, n. 5 above.
2
"Faith i ts e lf  demands to be freed from any world-view pro­
duced by man's thought, whether mythological or sc ien tific "  ( JCM, 
p. 83 ). Roberts explains that th is  corresponds to what Bultmann sees 
as a radical application of ju s tif ic a tio n  by fa ith  in the realm of 
epistemology (p. 46). See also JCM, pp. 15, 16; Roberts, pp. 126, 
127; M. Sales, "Mythe et fo i aux colloques de Rome," Archives de 
Philosophie 31 (1968):293, 294.
3
Here the ontological framework as represented by the 
Heideggerian analysis of the structure of man’ s being provides the 
categories fo r the abstractive procedure of demythologization. Here 
is  where the difference between Bultmann's and Jasper's in te rp re ta ­
tio n  of demythologization should be seen. Jaspers does not believe  
th a t an adequate understanding of both myth and existence is  present 
in Bultmann's procedure. According to Jaspers the e x is te n tia lia  are 
not to be used as sc ien tific  categories for leading demythologization 
to i ts  ex is ten tia l results. See "Myth and Relig ion," pp. 145, 146. 
Regarding demythologization as understood by Barth, see H. O tt, 
"O b jec tifica tion ,"  pp. 334, 335.
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negativa) of o b jec tiv ity  can the e x is te n tia lia  be applied and render 
the proper theological meaningJ
Now the th ird  step in the cognitive abstractive process of 
demythologization may be taken. Since both the self-understanding, 
as pertaining to the ontic experience o f the e x is te n t ie ll , and the 
conceptual expression of i t  ( its  th eo lo g ica l-ex is ten tia l meaning) 
belong to the temporal realm, the timeless being of both God and 
man can be reached only when the tim eless ontological gap is  bridged 
through the tra d itio n a l application o f analogy. Analogy is to be 
applied, according to Bultmann's system, from the starting  point pro­
vided by the self-understanding of fa ith  and not from the trad itio n a l 
one provided by the in te lle c t (as, fo r  instance, in Aquinas). The 
analogical procedure as such, however, seems to be basica lly  under­
stood in the same way, as i t  provides the bridge to reach the time-
2
less being of both God and man.
De Nys remarks on this step in the process of demythologi­
zation by saying th a t "beneath and w ith in  the superstructure and 
vehicle of mythological expression resides the e x is te n tia l-  
theological meaning which those texts  express. The business of 
in te rp re ting  them, then, is the business of uncovering and stating  
in appropriate concepts this meaning. To do this in terp retation  must 
detach th is  meaning from its  mythological vehicle and superstructure. 
To demythologize is to perform th is  detachment" (p. 33).
2
Bultmann's treatment of analogy is  inadequate and fragment­
ary (Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 169). He rejects the trad itiona l 
approach of analogia entis insofar as i t  worked on the objective 
understanding of both God's and man's beings ( Essays, p. 107). Con­
sequently, the tra d itio n a l procedure which grounds theology on the 
proofs of God's existence is also rejected by Bultmann (FU, pp. 314, 
53, 320; Roberts, p. 259). We cannot reach either God^s or man's 
being due to th e ir  timelessness (FU, pp. 60-64). Bultmann explains 
that in his system i t  is not possible to "speak of God's action in 
general statements," i t  is  only possible to speak of “what He does 
here and now with me" (JCM, p. 66) .  I t  is , then, through man's
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Summary and Partia l Conclusion
The phenomenological analysis o f Bultmann's in terp re ta tion  
o f the epistemological and ontological frameworks of reason's struc­
tu re  shows that he has accepted as a fa c t the c lass ica l, timeless, 
prim ordial presupposition as contained and expressed in the Kantian 
pattern . I t  also has shown that even though Bultmann has incorpor­
ated w ith in  his system several Heideggerian motifs, notably the exis­
te n t ia l ia ,  he does not use Heidegger's insights regarding the primor­
d ia l presupposition fo r the constitution of meaning and fo r the 
in te rp re ta tio n  of the frameworks of reason's structure.
In the ontological framework, Bultmann considers man's being 
as an e n tity  to be basically  temporal. Yet, in the theological 
realm, man finds himself in  an e n tire ly  new situation, namely, coram 
deo, which opens man's being to a passive p o ten tia lity  fo r  timeless­
ness and, in consequence, to a new and true meaning o f h is being as 
a whole. God's being as "wholly other” is  conceived in tra d itio n a l 
tim eless terms. God's timelessness requires, in order that the 
divine-human encounter may on tica lly  happen, that even temporal man 
should be interpreted in his innermost being as tim eless, at least 
as having a passive potency fo r a timeless encounter. Thus, the real 
meaning of man's being is reached theo log ically  not from the perspec­
t iv e  of temporality but rather from the perspective of timelessness. 
The old A ris to te lian  procedure which understands and in terp re ts  time 
with timeless categories is followed.
action that analogia is  to be applied and "God himself reached" cog­
n it iv e ly  (JCM, pp. 68, 69 ). Cf. EF, p. 110; Macquarrie, The Scope, 
p. 134. ~
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Bultmann's in terpretation  of natural reason, which deals 
mainly with nature and h istory , follows the tra d itio n a l P laton ic- 
A ris to te lian  in terp re ta tion  of o b jec tiv ity  as timeless transcendental 
forms and categories in the Kantian pattern. Yet, the metaphysical 
background fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  is  no longer provided by the 
Aristotelian-Thom istic hierarchy of being but rather by a p o s it iv is -  
t ic ,  s c ie n tis tic  in terp retation  of the world.
Theological reason is  interpreted as functioning in the realm 
constituted by s c ie n tific  categories as that which they cannot reach 
(Geschichte, e x is te n t ie ll) .  Theological meanings, therefore, cannot 
pertain to the objective side o f knowledge but only to its  subjective  
side, as the re flec tio n  in temporal knowledge of the s e lf -  
understanding that the believer develops as a resu lt of the s a lv i f ic -  
revelatory act of God (encounter) that happens in  timelessness.
There are two consequences of th is  in terpretation  of theolog­
ica l reason in the context o f natural s c ie n tif ic  reason. F irs t ,  
o b je c tiv ity  applies only to the realm of science and, consequently, 
is to be denied in toto by theological reason. And second, demythol­
ogization, as an abstractive process, can reach only the subjective  
level of the self-understanding as act. Only from the epistemologi­
cal ground provided by the self-understanding as act can the t r a d i­
tional analogy be applied so as to bridge the gap between tim eless­
ness and time.
Conclusion
The phenomenological analysis of reason's behavior in  theo­
logy shows that Christian theology as a whole has been constituted
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on the ground provided by the timeless Parmenidean primordial presup­
position. Catholicism and conservative Protestantism have followed 
the Aristotelian-Thornistic in terp re tation  of reason's structure. 
Liberal Protestantism has departed from th is  pattern by replacing 
i t  with the Kantian one, which is  ju s t a variation worked out on the 
same tra d itio n a l in terp retation  of the primordial presupposition. 
I t  would seem, then, that theological c ritic ism  should decide between 
these two patterns. Yet p r io r  to th a t, theological c r itic ism  needs 
to address i ts e lf  to the ground of Being, that is , to  the c r it ic a l  
analysis o f the primordial presupposition of reason's structure.
Regarding the primordial presupposition, the phenomenological 
analysis of the theological context has revealed, f i r s t ,  that the 
issue has not as yet been addressed by theological re fle c tio n , and, 
second, that the timeless primordial presupposition has been adopted 
as a fa c t without fu rther c ritic is m . Yet, the phenomenological 
analysis of the philosophical context has revealed both the hypothet­
ical nature of reason's structure (showing that reason cannot be 
taken ju s t as a "fact," as a "given") and the foundational "choice" 
that lie s  at the ground of reason's hypothetical nature namely, that 
reason's structure can function and constitute meanings in  two dimen­
s io n a litie s : time and timelessness. Thus the philosophical context
points out the necessity fo r  theology to forsake its  naive epistemo­
logical dependence on one philosophical trad ition  and enter into 
a critic ism  of theological reason.
I t  seems clear th a t a c r itic ism  of theological reason must 
begin by addressing i t s e l f  to the understanding and in terpretation
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of the ground of Being as primordial presupposition. But, how could 
such foundational re fle c tio n  be developed theologically , in indepen­
dence of philosophical trad itions as a whole, so as to  provide a 
viewpoint which could decide whether reason's structure should 
function timelessly or temporally as i t  constitutes theological mean­
ing? The only p o s s ib ility  would be provided by a phenomenological 
analysis of a "fact" of theological reason which appears as not being 
the product of a philosophical in terp re ta tion  of the primordial pre­
supposition, whether timeless or temporal. Within the Christian  
tra d itio n  such a "theological fact" o f reason can be provided only 
by the B iblical conceptuality.
I t  is necessary, then, that a th ird  aspect of theological
reason be phenomenologically analyzed, namely the "fact" of B ib lica l 
conceptuality as working within a dimensionality. Consequently the 
analysis of the B ib lic a l context is  aimed (as was the analysis of
the "fact" of theological reason as found in the history of theology) 
at the discovery of the dimensionality or primordial presupposition 
of i ts  reason in order to provide the background fo r a decision 
regarding the dimensionality which theological reason should adopt 
as i t  constitutes theological meanings.
Let us focus, now, on the analysis of the way in which reason 
has been u tilize d  and interpreted in the constitution o f theological
meanings in the o rig ina l writings of the Christian tra d itio n , namely
in the Bible.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE THEO-ONTO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF 
REASON IN SACRED SCRIPTURE
In order that the possib ility^  of a c ritic ism  of theological 
reason may be affirmed, theology must address i t s e l f  to the in te rp re ­
tation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure by 
i ts e lf ,  th a t is ,  in  independence from the philosophical Parmenidean 
understanding.
So fa r ,  the analysis of the philosophical context has shown 
that Reason can constitute meanings following e ith e r of two opposite 
in terpretations of the primordial presupposition, namely, tim eless­
ness and tem porality. The analysis of the theological context has 
shown th a t Christian theology as a whole has constituted its  meanings 
following the Parmenidean timeless interpretation of Reason's struc­
ture. Theology as yet has neither considered nor actually taken the
P o s s ib ility  should not be confused with need. The need of 
a c ritic ism  of theological reason is  apparent when the many d iffe re n t  
and even contradictory theological systems are considered seriously  
(fo r instance Aquinas's and Bultmann's regarding the p o s s ib ility  of 
accepting a d irect knowledge about God [chapter 2 above]). Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason was motivated by a s im ilar situation in the 
philosophical realm 1pp. 257-93). Kant believed that i f  reason's 
a c tiv ity  produced two contradictory conclusions regarding the same 
subject m atter, something had to be wrong in the rational procedure 
i ts e lf .  Even though the necessity of a critic ism  of theological rea­
son is obvious, i ts  possib ility  is not. Thus, the p o s s ib ility  of 
a c ritic ism  of theological reason needs to be shown and established.
285
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primordial choice that Reason's structure requires. On the contrary, 
theology, as developed so fa r , has u n c r it ic a lly  adopted the philoso­
phical timeless interpretation of Reason that was available in its  
formative yearsJ
The very p o ss ib ility  of a c ritic is m  of theological reason 
depends on the actual existence o f a theological re flec tion  on 
Being's dimensionality. In order that a viewpoint fo r the critic ism  
of theological reason may be found, the actual theological re flec tion  
on Being's dimensionality should re la te  to the very roots of Chris- 
tian thinking and should be independent from the classical
"Formative years” refers to a very broad span of time which 
can go as early as the th ird  century B.C. and as la te  as the nine­
teenth and twentieth centuries A.D. Because of lack o f space I can­
not analyze the history of Greek influence in theology (often called  
"H ellen ization"). In general, the h istory of Greek influence on 
Christian theology can be clearly perceived in any serious history 
of Christian thought, as, for instance, Justo J. Gonzalez 
(A History of Christian Thought, 3 vols. [N ashville: Abingdon Press,
19 /0 -iy /b jJ ; Ado It  Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg.
2
Perotti remarks that, according to Heidegger, the ontologi­
cal re flec tio n  must return, in search of its  own foundations, to the 
origins of Western thinking, namely to early  pre-Socratic philosophy 
(p. 75). In my opinion a c r itic a l approach to theology also needs 
to return to its  origins in order to get to the foundation of its  
presuppositions, notably, its  primordial presupposition. In other 
words, the search fo r a viewpoint from whose perspective the possi­
b i l i t y  of a critic ism  of theological reason may be affirmed is to 
be directed at the theological re fle c tio n  on Being's dimensionality 
as early  as possible in the history of Christian re flec tio n . 
Heidegger, in the philosophical realm, goes back to discover the 
orig inal Greek in terpretation  of Being before Plato and A ris to tle . 
In th is  chapter I intend to do likewise in the theological realm, 
that is , to go back in  the history of Christian re fle c tio n  so as to 
find the theological reflection  on Being p rio r to theology's accept­
ance of the Parmenidean interpretation of i t .
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Parmenidean interpretation of i t . 1 As has been seen in chapter 2
above, the theological context does not provide such an o rig in a l
re fle c tio n . Thus i t  appears that in order tha t the c ritic is m  of
theological reason may be affirmed as possible, another context needs
to be considered, namely, the B ib lica l context.
In th e ir  independence from the Parmenidean tra d itio n , B ib li-
?
cal w ritin g s , as a "fact" of theological reason, provide the s ta r t ­
ing point fo r searching a fte r  the necessary viewpoint that a c r i t ic a l
The "independence" idea is already at the root of the sola 
Scriptura p rin c ip le . Heidegger, within a tra d itio n a l understanding 
of theology expresses, nonetheless, the necessity of "independence" 
as he considers that the task o f theology is  "to place in discussion, 
w ithin i ts  own realm of the Christian fa ith  and out of the proper 
nature o f that fa ith , what i t  is to think and how i t  is to  speak" 
("Non-Objectifying Thinking," p. 30).
2
That the Bible is a "fact of reason," and p a rtic u la rly  of 
theological reason, is apparent. As a "fact" i ts  p o s s ib ility  does
not need to be shown or proven. The " fa c t” ju s t appears when the
words and meanings of sacred Scripture are considered as what they 
are, th a t is  to say, as a product of Reason's a c tiv ity  in co n stitu t­
ing meaning. The approach to B ib lical w ritings as "fact" o f Reason 
is cogn itive ly  prior to any h is to ric a l, s c ie n t if ic , or metaphysical 
consideration of its  content. Moreover, i t  is  even p rio r to any 
theological in terpretation  of revelation and inspiration . Even i f
the reader considers B ib lica l conceptuality to be "mythological,"
he has, nonetheless, to recognize i t  as "fact" of theological reason 
which may be phenomenologically analyzed in search of the dimension­
a l i t y  in which they were constituted. In th is  regard i t  should be 
remembered that "scientists seem to be becoming more aware o f how 
th e ir  development of paradigms and theoretical frameworks, the power 
of root metaphors to give r is e  to images which organize th e ir  
research, may be derived from the same human capacities which create  
myths" (S ch re ite r, p. 1810). Claude Levi-Strauss says that myth has 
i t s  own logic as "science of the concrete" (The Savage Mind [Chicago: 
The U nivers ity  of Chicago Press, 1966], pp~ 11-14). “General myth
and f i r s t  philosophy are not contrasted in  content but in idiom"
(W illiam  E. Abraham, "The Origins of Myth and Philosophy," Man and 
World 11 [1978]:177). "Thought has scarcely touched upon the essence 
of the m ythical, especially w ith regard to the fac t that the mythos 
is the saying, while saying is the cal 1 ing-i nto-appearance" 
(Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 94).
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approach to the interpretation of reason's structure in  theology 
requires- The B iblical writings are to be considered as a rational 
fac t of theology insofar as they are the product of Reason's 
functioning in constituting the meanings they expressJ As a
rational fa c t, the B iblical writings imply a primordial presupposi-
2
t io n . I t  is the purpose of th is  chapter to discover and show the 
primordial presupposition in which B ib lical meanings have been con­
stitu ted  in order that theology may have a ground fo r choosing the 
dimensionality in which Reason is  to be used as d o c trin a l, e th ica l, 
exegetical, and h istorica l meanings are constituted.
In order that th is purpose may be accomplished within the 
lim its  of the present investigation, i t  is necessary to single out, 
from the broad scope of B ib lica l lite ra tu re , a p a rtic u la r passage 
in which the orig ina l re flection  of theological th inking on Being's 
dimensionality may be e x p lic itly  found. In order to  be representa­
t iv e  of B ib lica l ra tio n a lity  as a whole, such a passage should be 
f i r s t  ''ontological," in the sense of dealing expressly with Being, 
and second should be found as early as possible in  the history of 
theological thinking. I t  can be seen, then, that a working choice 
needs to be made in order to select a passage th a t, as representative  
of B ib lical ra t io n a lity , may provide the locus on which the phenomen­
ological investigation in search of the o rig in a l theological
Vhe same procedure was followed in both the f i r s t  and second 
chapters of th is  dissertation. Both philosophical and theological 
writings were approached and analyzed as "facts of reason."
2
See p. 67, nn. 1-3 and p. 68, nn. 1-3 above.
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interpretation of the primordial presupposition may be developed.^
Such a foundational and representative passage of B ib lica l ra tio n a l-
2
i ty  is found in Exod 3:14, 15. This passage is independent from
As in  the case of the phenomenological analysis o f the theo­
logical h is to rica l context, in the analysis of the B ib lica l context 
i t  is impossible to address ourselves to the whole scope of available  
materials of B ib lica l w ritings. Thus I have to make a choice, a 
selection of a passage, in  order that the analysis may be possible. 
The passage to be selected should represent a primordial re flec tion  
on Being's ground and Reason’s dimensionality so that the in terpre­
tation of the primordial presupposition in  which the B ib lic a l mean­
ings as a whole have been constituted may be discovered. See p. 75 , 
n. 3 above.
2
Besides, on the basis of the continuity  and harmonious re la ­
tionship th a t exists between the OT and NT (Jaspers, Philosophical 
Faith, p. 334; Gerhard Hasel, “The Unity of the B ib le ," paper pub­
lished as an insert in M inistry, May 1975, pp. 12, 13), and of the 
fact that Exod 3:14, 15 seems to be at the basis o f the " I AM” 
expressions of Jesus in the gospel according to Saint John (George E. 
Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1974], pp. 250, 251; and C. K. B arrett, The Gospel According to St. 
John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text,
2nd. ed. I  Phi l^delphia:  ^ Westminster Press, 1978], p. 342). and of 
the & wv cat o nv eat o cpxopevoc statement in Revelation 1:4 (R.
C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation o f St. John's Revelation 
[Columbus, Ohio: Wartburg Press, 1943], p. 39; Henry Barclay Swete,
The Apocalypse of St. John: The Greek Text with Introduction Notes
and Indices, 3rd ed. LGrand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1908J, p. 5; Friedrich
Dlisterdieck, C ritic a l and Exegetical Handbook to the Revelation of 
John [New York": Funk and Wagnalls Publishers, 1887], p. 100; George
R. Murray, The Book of Revelation, New Century Bible [London: Butler
and Tanr.er, 1974J, p. 54; Martin Rist and Lynn H. Hough, "The Revela­
tion of St. John the Divine, In terp re ter's  Bible [New York: Abingdon
Press, 1957], 12:369; Massyngberde J. Forde, Revelation: Introduc­
tion, Translation, and Commentary, Anchor Bible, v o l. 35 LGarden 
City, Flew York: Doubleday and Co., 1975], p. 376), the selected
passage (Exod 3:14, 15 and context) is  representative of B ib lical 
ra tio n a lity  as a whole. That is , since there is  not another primord­
ia l re flec tion  on the meaning and dimensionality of Being in Scrip­
tures, the Exod 3:14, 15 statement provides the in terp re ta tion  of the 
background of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  for the B ib lic a l constitution of mean­
ings as a whole.
I t  should be remembered that the Rev 1:4 statement has 
parallels in ancient lite ra tu re . For instance, the idea was fam ilia r  
for H e llen is tic  readers who were fa m ilia r  with a s im ilar expression 
regarding Zeus who is referred to in a song of doves in Dodona as
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the trad itional Parmenidean in terpretation  of the ground of Being^
and i t  also re fle c ts  on Being early  in the history of theological 
2thinking.
ecuc nv, Oc u c ^ o t i v , eeuc ’e o o e x o i  (James M offat, "The Revelation 
of St. John the Divine," The Expositor’ s Greek Testament [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979], 5 :337 ). Simon Magus is  also said to have
designated himself as o ea-tiSc , o o t o c , S arnaopevoc ( ib id . ) .  The 
shrine of Minerva (= Is is )  at Sais bore the inscription " I am a ll  
that hath been and is and shall be" ( ib id .)  Also in the I I ia d  there  
is  a passage that may be considered as para lle l to  Rev 1:4 especially  
regarding the ontological dimensionality (a t least Heidegger con­
siders i t  to have ontological meaning); “Kalchas, Thestor's son, fa r  
the best of the . . . in te rp re te rs , who knew a l l  that is , is  to  be, 
or once was" (Homer, The I l i a d , p. 61, as quoted and translated by 
Heidegger from the German tran s la tio n  by Voss [ Early Greek Thinking, 
p. 3 3 ]). These p a ra lle l statements are to be interpreted as to th e ir  
ontological meaning in th e ir  own particu lar context, as, fo r  
instance, Heidegger does ( ib id . ,  pp. 33-36). Moreover, as the in te l ­
lectual context fo r  the Rev 1:14 declaration is  provided by Exod 
3:14, 15, the p a ra lle l statement cannot be considered as providing 
the clue for its  in te rp re ta tio n .
^Since Parmenides wrote about the f i f t h  century B.C. ( /‘•n c illa  
to  Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 41; and p. 76 , n. 1 above) and the 
Exod 3:14, 15 passage was produced no la te r than the eighth century 
B.C., approximately, i t  seems that a Parmenidean influence on Exod 
3:14, 15 fragment is  the general, approximate, non-conclusive resu lt 
of the Documentary Hypothesis of the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method 
(Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A C r it ic a l,  Theological
Commentary [Philadelh ia: Westminster Press, 19/4J, pp. 52, 53; Ernst
Se11i n and Georg Fohrer, Introduction to the Old Testament 
[Nashville: Abigdon Press, 1968], pp. 146, 147; and Otto E iss fe ld t,
The Old Testament: An Introduction [New York: Harper and Row,
1965J, pp. 166, 169). Yet, even w ithin the Documentary Hypothesis, 
recent tendencies recognize th a t th is  date represents the moment when 
pre-existent trad itio n s  were put in  writing (E. Alan Cole, Exodus: 
An Introduction and Commentary [Downers Grove, I l l in o is :  In te r ­
vars ity  Press, 1973J, p~. 14). Consequently, the understanding of 
Being which is rendered by Exod 3:14, 15 would be much older than the 
eighth century B.C. I f  the conservative approach is considered, the 
actual date of Exod 3:14, 15 could be as early as the fifte e n th  cen­
tury B.C. (E iss fe ld t, p. 158; and William A. Shea, "Date o f the 
Edoxus," The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia [1979-1982], 
2:230-38):
2
The Bible as a whole does not present another re fle c tio n  
on the ground of Being. I t  should be remembered that the revelatory  
setting in which Moses’ s rendering is  expressed finds a p a ra lle l in
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The selection of the Exod 3:14, 15 passrge and its  context 
(Exod 3-6) for my epistemological investigation in search of the Bib­
l ic a l  interpretation of the primordial presupposition of Reason's 
structure is  due to three main considerations. F ir s t ,  th is  is the 
te x t in which the idea of Being is  e x p lic it ly  addressed and put in to  
words in Biblical w ritings . Moreover, the text introduces also a 
foundational in terpretation  of the epistemological framework. 
Second, i t  seems clear that th is  o rig in a l and foundational grasping
the revelatory setting in which Parmenides's re flec tio n  is produced. 
See Jaspers, The Philosophical F a ith , p. 53. As the NT seems to 
repeat and refer to Exod 3:14, lb foundational ontological statement 
(Childs, pp. 80, 84; and p. 134, n. 2 above) whatever the meaning of 
Exod 3:14, 15 may be, i t  should be understood as applying to both the 
OT and the NT. By the way, th is  has been the approach to classical 
theology so fa r. The problem with trad itio n a l theology is that i t  
interpreted the text in  a Parmenidean framework fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .
Classical theology has considered Exod 3:14, 15 as the place 
in which the id en tifica tio n  between speculative ontology and the Bib­
l ic a l  idea of God found its  ground and expression (Emil Brunner, The 
C hristian  Doctrine of God [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949J,
pp"I 128, 129). Consequently, th is  te x t was employed as the "proof 
tex t"  fo r Christian ontology (Dennis J. McCarthy, "Exod 3:14: 
History, Philology, and Theology," The Catholic B ib lic a l Quarterly 40 
[1978]: 318; Childs, p. 58). The phenomenological analysis of the 
te x t needs to be aware of such id e n tific a tio n  in order to avoid i t  
through the application of a methodological epoche.
As I suggest that Exod 3:14, 15 proviaes both a re flec tio n  
and its  expression on the ground of Being, I am re ferring  to the text 
as providing insights into the realm of foundational ontology. I am 
aware that Protestant theology is uncomfortable regarding a "mixing" 
of theology with philosophy. "In practice philosophia
Christiana has never yet taken shape; i f  i t  was philosophia, i t  was 
not Christiana, i f  i t  was Christiana, i t  was not philosophia (Karl 
BartfiT Church Dogmatics, 4 vols. LEdinburgh: T & T Clark, 1959],
1 :5 ). Obviously Barthks position is  not shared by Catholic theolo­
gians fo r whom the philosophy-theology relationship is a fa c t. Yet, 
what Barth is actually rejecting is  the classical in terpretation  of 
ontology in its  Thomistic d e ta ils , which he incorrectly  id e n tifie s  
with the whole of philosophia C hristiana. As the search fo r the 
primordial presupposition of theological reason in i ts  B ib lical con­
te x t is undertaken, the p o s s ib ility  of a philosophia b ib lica  w il l  be 
evaluated.
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of Being is not denied but rather recognized and adopted by B ib lical 
trad ition  both in the OT and NT. And th ird , theologians and philoso­
phers of a l l  times, notably in modern times, recognize Exod 3:14, B 
as the locus classicus fo r a discussion o f the B iblical understanding 
of BeingJ Due to lack of space i t  is  not possible now to provide 
further arguments or to show beyond any doubt the wisdom of my selec­
tion. Yet, as I proceed in analyzing the tex t and the history of 
ontological interpretations of i t ,  i ts  paramount position not only 
as the locus classicus fo r theological ontology but add itionally  as 
a foundational reflection  on the ground o f Being form ally sim ilar 
to that of Parmenides of Elea in the classical philosophical tra d i­
tion or to Heidegger's in contemporary philosophy, is going to be 
seen with increasing c la r ity .
In order that the phenomenological investigation o f Exod 3:14 
15 in search of the B iblical in terpretation  of the primordial presup­
position may be accomplished, the following steps are taken. F irs t,  
i t  is necessary to see i f  Exod 3:14, 15 actua lly  expresses a founda­
tional re fle c tio n  on the ground of Being—that is , i f  i t  is  indeed 
an ontological tex t. In other words, i t  is  necessary to determine 
from the te x t whether or not Exod 3:14, 15 puts Being in to  words 
already with a particular foundational in terpretation . This f i r s t  
step requires both an overview of the main interpretations Exod 3:14. 
15 received through the history of theology, and a phenomenological- 
exegetical analysis of its  content and context. Second, i f  the f i r s t
^See below, pp. 298-320.
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step does establish the ontological nature of the te x t, i t  w ill  be 
necessary to inquire about its  in terpretation  of the primordial pre­
supposition J
Exod 3:14, 15 is the object of an ongoing discussion regard- 
2
ing i t s  meaning from which no certa in  gain has been obtained in the
3
ontological realm since Thomas Aquinas’ s classical in terp retation ,
As I continue my investigation following the phenomenologi­
cal procedure I w il l  try  to “show" rather than "prove" the poss ib il­
i ty  of an ontological understanding of Exod 3:14, 15. Yet every
“showing” implies a "seeing." I can try  to c la r ify  my “showing" as
much as possible, yet I can do nothing regarding anybody’ s “seeing." 
The problem of the “seeing" that the phenomenological approach 
e n ta ils  is worsened by the fac t that Exod 3; 14, 15 focuses i ts
"showing" in the realm of the "unthought," which is the foundation 
and condition of what is being expressed and thought in its  words; 
c f. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 24. The realm of the 
"unthought" is  TRe realm of t f i i  primordial presupposition which 
conditions the whole of our in terpretation  of reason's structure and 
i ts  actual functioning as i t  constitutes meanings.
Hence, while I am trying to “show" what is  being thought in 
Exod 3:14, 15, those who read my “showing" are bound to understand i t  
from the background of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  provided by th e ir  own 
"unthought" primordial presupposition and even an "unthought"
(u n c r it ic a lly  assumed) epistemological framework. Yet, even though 
d i f f i c u l t ,  the “seeing" of the "unthought" primordial presupposition 
may be accomplished at least a fte r  a long and painful path. This 
path is  the one I  am about to take from the side of the "showing." 
The reader must be prepared to take its  counterpart from the side of 
the "seeing."
2
Through the h istorical survey of theological interpretations  
of Exod 3:14, 15 i t  w ill be seen that there is “no scholarly
consensus” regarding its  meaning (David Noel Freedman, "The Name of 
the God of Moses," Journal of B ib lica l L ite ra ture  79 [I96 0 ]:15 1 ), and 
th a t in  this passage, which includes "most of the major theological 
problems" (Childs, p. 88) ,  there is s t i l l  today "very much of a 
mystery” (E. Sh ild , "On Exodus i i i  14 — ’ I AM THAT I AM’ ," Vetus 
Testamentum 4 [1954]:296).
^This does not mean that Thomas's is the only in terpretation  
of the tex t. I t  rather means that the many d iffe re n t in terpretations  
of i t  do not e ith e r go beyond or basically  deny Thomas’ s ontological 
in te rp re ta tio n . The differences between extant in terpretations  
appear in re la tion  to the way in which the classical ontological 
meaning is supposed to be related to the actual meaning of the te x t.
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this fac t makes its  phenomenological analysis to be more complex and 
d if f ic u lt  than is the analysis of Parmenides' fragment, about whose 
ontological meaning and relevance there is  a wide and so lid  consen-
Even though my investigation focuses on the ontological and 
epistemological relevance and meaning of Exod 3:14, 15, an exegetical 
method needs to be used, otherwise no meaning could be derived from 
the te x t. Since I do not fo llow  the "sc ien tific"  h is to ric a l c r it ic a l  
method but instead have decided to follow  a more phenomenological
^See p. 84, nn. 1 -4 , and p. 85, n. 1 above.
2
The reason why the h istorica l c r it ic a l  method cannot be used 
in th is c r it ic a l research fo r the primordial presupposition of Exod 
3:14, 15 is  that the h is to rica l c r it ic a l  method already exists as 
such on the basis of a timeless in terpretation  of the subject matter 
which the enterprise of investigation is trying to discover, namely, 
the B ib lic a l in terpretation  of the primordial presupposition. In 
short, the h istorica l c r it ic a l  method presupposes what is  supposed 
to be investigated and reached at the end of the exegetical procedure 
(p. 116, n. 1 above). The same is true regarding the h is to r ic a l-  
grammatical (also known as gram matical-historical) method which 
assumes the basic guidelines of Greek ontology and epistemology.
Moreover, since the h istorica l c r it ic a l method is  not the 
"only possible view" (Michael Butterworth, "The Revelation of the 
Divine Name?" The Indian Journal of Theology 24 [1975 ]:52 ), I believe 
that the phenomenological procedure is  more appropriate fo r  th is  par­
t ic u la r epistemological search. The p o ss ib ility  that both the his­
torica l c r it ic a l and historical-grammatical methods may be used in 
Biblical exegesis can be addressed only a fte r  the B ib lic a l in terpre­
tation of the primordial presupposition has been reached.
Besides, i t  must be taken into account th a t regarding 
Exod 3:14, 15,the h is to rica l c r it ic a l method suggests many " c r it ic a l"  
theories about how the tex t should and should not have been o r ig i­
nally w ritten , causing, in that way, more confusion than c la r if ic a ­
tion (Childs, pp. 61, 62). In my p articu la r view th is  "s c ie n tific "  
methodology reveals the scholar's in a b ili ty  to re a lly  reach what is  
being thought and expressed in the te x t. The very claim that the 
actual redaction of the te x t needs to be rearranged fo r the text to 
have "meaning" shows that the presuppositions and primordial presup­
position on which the h is to rica l c r it ic a l  method has been con­
structed are not those of the tex t. What happens epistem ologically
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approach^ s im ilar to the one u tiliz e d  in the analysis of both the
o
philosophical and theological contexts, and, since such an approach
is  more fam ilia r  to philosophers than to theologians and exegetes
who are bound to follow either the h istorica l c r i t ic a l  method or the
trad itio n a l grammatical-historical method, i t  is  necessary to c la r ify
at least three main features of the phenomenological exegetical pro-
3
cedure to be followed as related to the B ib lica l te x t.
when the h is to rica l c r itic a l method is applied to the text is  that 
the cognitive subject, through his “s c ie n tific "  understanding o f the 
epistemological framework, changes the subject matter of investiga­
tion  (cognitive object) a fte r his own image. This "putting" sense 
in to  the text does violence to i t  at i ts  structural level as the 
te x t 's  meaning is  rearranged to f i t  ex tra -B ib lica l categories. Thus, 
i t  can be seen th a t the movement o f in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that the h is to r i­
cal c r it ic a l method follows comes not from the tex t but rather goes 
toward i t .  For further analysis and c ritic ism  of the h is to rica l 
c r it ic a l  method, see George Eldon Ladd, The New Testament and C r i t i ­
cism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1978); an3 Gerhard Maier,
The End of the H istorical C ritic a l Method (S t. Louis: Concordia Pub-
lishing House, 1977).
V o r  an introductory summary to the way in which phenomenology 
has been understood and used by theology, see Edward Farley,
Ecclesial Man, pp. 235-72. In general, theology has understood 
phenomenology as a "method of obtaining essences or meaning" ( ib id . ,  
p. 272) which was supplemented by ex is ten tia l philosophies. Yet the 
phenomenological method is applied by theology mainly to the study of 
fa ith  as an experiential religious phenomenon. Farley proposes, from 
a better in terpretation  of Husserl's phenomenology, an “in te r -
subjective matrix of Faith" ( ib id . ) .
2
I f  the phenomenological procedure was appropriate fo r the 
philosophical and theological investigations, i t  should also be
appropriate fo r the investigation of the B ib lica l context.
^Even though phenomenology is  widely used as a s c ie n tific
procedure in several disciplines, I am not aware of any consistent 
application o f i t  to the exegetical enterprise. Yet, the phenomeno­
logical procedure is used, at least in some degree, by several exe­
getes. See, fo r instance, Ignace de la P o tte rie , La ve rite  dans
Saint Jean, 2 vols. (Rome: B ib lica l In s titu te  Press, 1977).
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F irs t, phenomenological exegesis applies a s c ie n tific , 
philosophical, theological, and doctrinal epoche.^ In other words, 
as the text is analyzed in search of i ts  meaning, every p rio r e x is t­
ent theory is “suspended" or “bracketed out." Yet epochs is not
ignorance of those theories. Phenomenological epoche can be applied
2
in its  fullness only when a ll the involved theories are properly 
understood, otherwise they w ill not be suspended but rather ignored 
or, worse, applied unconsciously.^
Second, phenomenological exegesis, through epoche, works and 
is  grounded on the "things themselves," which in our p articu la r case 
are the meanings o f the text i t s e l f  as i t  is .^  Phenomenological 
exegesis does not go "beyond" the thing i ts e lf  as i t  appears (te x t)
Epoche means suspension of judgment. In th is  case suspen­
sion of judgment as represented in s c ie n tif ic , philosophical, theo­
lo g ic a l, and doctrinal theories. Bultmann him self, fo r  instance, 
knows about the necessity of applying a methodological epoche in  the 
exegetical enterprise. "Every exegesis that is guided by dogmatic 
prejudices does not hear what the tex t says, but only le ts  the la tte r  
say what i t  wants to hear" (EF, pp. 289, 190). The problem with 
Bultmann's approach is that epoche is  not applied to the rational 
ontological presuppositions.
2
I apply only theoretical methodological epoche. H istorical 
epoche, that is , the suspension of h istory as such, cannot be applied 
because a ll categories and presuppositions (whether timeless or tem­
poral) develop and are given in and through history (Valone, "Con­
f l i c t s  in the Later Husserl," p. 212). Cf. Taylor, "Lebenswelt and 
Lebensformen," pp. 188, 189.
^That is why my analysis of the text needs to provide at 
least a broad view of the way Exod 3:14, 15 has been understood 
throughout the history of theology.
4
Heidegger, Being and Time, In t ,  2 .7 .c .
^In order to have a text at a l l ,  Textual Criticism  is 
required.
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in order to find i ts  meaning in a kind of tra d itio n a l sensus
1 2 plenior, but i t  rather looks fo r meaning in  the tex t as i t  appears.
Third, phenomenological exegesis presents its  results not 
by "constructing," "building up,” or "proving" its  assertions and
statements, but rather by "describing" or "showing" what has been 
heard or seen while the exegete catches a t least some glimpses of 
what is being thought in the text."*
A fter these prelim inary considerations, i t  is  time to proceed
into the search for the primordial presupposition of B ib lic a l ration­
a lity  such as i t  is foundationally expressed in Exod 3:14, 15 within
4
the epistemological and constructive lim its  of th is  investigation .
Yet phenomenological exegesis recognizes the existence of 
a sensus p len ior, of a "hiddenness" of meaning, but such "hiddenness" 
pertains and is found w ith in  the text and not beyond or behind i t ,  
as, fo r instance, in the mind of God (R. Brown, The "Sensus Plenior" 
of Sacred Scripture, chap. 1 ). Whatever the nature and meaning of 
a particu la r hiddenness may be, the phenomenological procedure 
unveils i t  by making i t  v is ib le  in the te x t and never behind i t .  
See Heidegger, Being and Time, In t, 2 .c .
2
In th is  way the phenomenological procedure puts the exegete 
in touch with what is before every theory, namely, the thing i ts e lf  
which is  the source and ground of every possible theory. I t  can be 
seen that even in the exegetical realm " I'o b je c t de la phenomenologie 
nous transporte sur un plan d ifferen t, plus d iffic ile m e n t accessible 
mais plus proche aussi de reel originaire" (Waelhens, p. 391).
3 Indeed, the phenomenological procedure stands in very close 
relationship to the B ib lic a l principle expressed in Rev 2:7: "He that 
hath an ear, le t  him hear what the S p ir it  saith unto the churches."
4An additional c la r if ic a tio n  is  necessary regarding .the 
phenomenological procedure to be followed in the analysis of Ex 3:14, 
15. As I develop the method in search of the primordial presupposi­
tion that Ex 3:14, 15 e n ta ils , I w ill not dialogue with every single 
exegete who has addressed himself to the te x t , nor shall I argue with 
those whom I quote. I w il l  only use those m aterials which are useful 
to c la r ify  my phenomenological analysis already produced by exegeti­
cal scholarship on the subject.
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The B ib lical Expression o f Being:
----------------- Exodus T : 1 4 , TS---------------
As Exod 3:14, 15 is approached phenomenologically i t  is  neces­
sary to f i r s t  ask about i ts  subject m atter. In other words, does 
Exod 3:14, 15 th in k , ta lk , and express Being or not? Is  our text 
ontological? Can i t  point to  the ground o f Being and i ts  in terp re­
tation according to B iblical rationality?
In order to discover the ontological relevance o f Exod 3:14, 
15, f i r s t  the broad lines in  which i t  has been in terpreted so far  
must be brought into lig h t so that the phenomenological epoche may 
be applied to  them and the te x t i ts e lf  may be reached.^ And second,
the meaning o f the text must be reached in order to discover whether
2
its  subject matter speaks and expresses Being or not.
Theological Interpretation
I t  is  not possible to understand in depth Exod 3:14, 15 without
3
a general awareness of the most relevant ontological in terpretations
According to the philosophical analysis o f presuppositions 
that was developed in chapter 1, i t  is obvious that presuppositions 
cannot be denied so as to claim a presuppositionless re flec tio n .
Yet, the search fo r presuppositions, notably fo r the primordial pre­
supposition, may "suspend” them in order to  ask the tex t fo r its  own 
primordial presupposition, thus avoiding imposing upon the text the 
exegete’ s presupposition.
In order that this procedure may be successfully applied,
the exegete needs to know what is to be "suspended." Furthermore, 
i t  is obvious that the analysis i ts e lf  works on the presupposition 
that the B ible is the result of the functioning of Reason’ s struc­
ture. Yet th is  is  a fact th a t applies to every human in te llec tu a l 
production, which is not being investigated here.
2
At th is  point the phenomenological investigation of the text
may either confirm or deny any of the extant theories or even may
propose a new one. This is the tex t's  prerogative.
^In other words, neither an extensive nor an exhaustive over­
view is intended in this study due to i ts  epistemological lim its .
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of i t  that are available in the history of theology and exegesis. As
I attempt to provide a b r ie f  summary of such in te rp re ta tions , the
following question w ill lead the way. Is Exod 3:14, 15 an ontologi­
cal text according to Christian tradition? I f  i t  is ,  what kind of 
ontology is  i t  supposed to express? Is Exod 3:14, 15 supposed to
work in a timeless or, instead, a temporal in te rp re ta tion  o f Being's 
dimensionality?
This specialized h is torica l survey is  developed in the fo l­
lowing three steps: (1) the interpretation o f Exod 3:14, 15 before
Thomas Aquinas; (2) the in terpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 by Thomas 
Aquinas; and (3) the interpretation  of Exod 3:14, 15 a fte r  Thomas 
Aquinas.
Exod 3:14, 15 before 
Thomas Aquinas
Early Jewish exegesis. The way in which the LXX translated  
Exod 3:14 ( ego eimi ho on) is  generally understood as "metaphysical. " 1 
According to Henry Barns, Rabbinic w ritings had the same general
The survey to be presented is , therefore, necessarily specialized. 
For a b r ie f introduction to the history o f in terp re ta tion  of Exod 
3:14, 15, see Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther the Expositor: Introduction
to the Reformer's Exegetical Writings, companion volume to Luther1-? 
Works (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 23-26;
Childs, pp. 84-87; and Brunner, The C hristian Doctrine, pp. 128- 
32.
^en ry  Barns, "La revelation du nom d iv in  'Tetragrammaton.'" 
Revue Biblique 2 (1893) :337. I t  is fu rth e r considered to be an 
“Aussage iiber das Wesen Gottes" (Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann, 
Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alten Testament [Munich: Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, 19/1J, p. 484).
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metaphysical in terpretation of i t . *  I t  seems c lea r, however, that
when rabbinic thought renders the Divine Name on a present, past,
2
future temporal formulation i t  points to an in terpretation  of Being 
that is  somewhat d iffe ren t from tra d itio n a l Thomism. Thus, whatever 
ontological meaning the rabbinic renderings may involve, they cannot 
be understood as expressing the Thomistic in terpretation  of Being, 
but rather as expressing an understanding of the orig inal ontological 
meaning that is  found in Exod 3 :14 , 15 on which both the rabbinic and 
the New Testament renderings fin d  th e ir  ground and source.
n short, some rabbinical w ritings seem to reveal an ontolog­
ica l understanding of Exod 3:14 , 15 which d iffe rs  from Greek
Thomistic in terpretations. Yet, because they do not approach the 
tex t from a philosophical perspective, the ontological p o te n tia lity  
of the text is not further developed.
Augustine of Hippo. At the climax of P a tr is tic  theology a 
d iffe re n t theological approach can be easily perceived as Augustine's 
in terpretation  of Exod 3:14, 15 v ir tu a lly  contains the whole Thomistic 
doctrines of the Divine Name and analogy.^ Augustine allowed Greek
* Barns, p. 337. I cannot agree, however, with Barns's in te r ­
pretation which sees that the ancient versions "sont nettement pour 
le sens metaphysique" ( ib id . ) ,  at least in the c learly  Thomistic
sense in which Barns understands metaphysics.
2
M. Ford presents, fo r instance, the M elk ita 's  rendering of 
Exod 3:14 as "He who was in the past and he who w il l  be in the fu tu re . 
I t  is  he who is  in the world. . ." ;  and Rabbi Isaac's (ca. 300 
A.O.) as “I am he who was and I am he (Who is ) now, and I am he (Who
w ill  be) fo r ever" (p. 377). The rabbinic rendering is , then, very
sim ilar in its  general meaning to the o i)V icaT o Tiv c a t  o c o x o y c v o c  
(Rev 4:8) o f NT times.
^Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 192.
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ontology to be the constitutive element of his in te rp re ta tio n  of
God's nature J  Whatever God is , i t  must naturally be what Greek
2
Being was supposed to be, yet in its  highest level. According to  
Augustine, then, Greek ontology provides the material content fo r  
the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15. Thus the timeless primordial presup­
position is seen as pertaining to the subject matter o f the te x t. 
Although timelessness does not come out of the te x t, as the text 
speaks o f Being, i t  is  taken for granted that i t  must re fe r  to  time­
lessness since that is  the only availab le  in terpretation o f Being
3
provided by the ex tra -b ib lica l realm o f Greek philosophy.
Augustine provides a Platonic interpretation of God as 
essence, as immutability of what is (G ilson, Thomisme, pp. 126, 127). 
Thus, timelessness is assumed to be the deeper meaning o f the te x t.
2
"But God is  without doubt a substance, or perhaps essence 
would be a better term, which the Greeks call ousia. For ju s t as 
wisdom is  so called from being wise, and knowledge is  so called from
knowing, so essence is  so called from being [ esse] .  And who
possesses being in a higher degree than He, who said to his servant 
Moses: ' I  am who am,' and 'He who is ,  has sent me to you .' But a ll
other things that are called essences or substances are susceptible 
of accidents, by which a change, whether great or small, is  brought 
about in  them. But there can be no accidents of th is  kind in God. 
Therefore, only the essence of God, or the essence which God is , is 
unchangeable. Being is  in the highest and truest sense of the term 
proper to  Him from whom being derives i t s  name. For what undergoes 
a change does not re ta in  its  own being, and what is  subject to 
change, even though i t  may not actually  be changed, can s t i l l  lose
the being which i t  had. And, therefore, only that which is not only
not changed, but cannot undergo any change at a l l ,  can be called  
being in  the truest sense without any scruple" (Augustine, The 
T r in ity ,  trans. Stephen McKenna [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1962], 5 :2 ) .
3
Augustine not only id e n tifie s  "the summum esse and the 
summum bonum (Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 129), but he also 
id e n tif ie s , in my opinion, tEe understanding of Being with the 
Parmenidean Neo-Platonic in terpretation .
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In short, Augustine's theology assumes the id e n tific a tio n  
between the Neo-Platonic in terpretation  of Being and the B ib lic a l 
idea of the Name of God as expressed in Exod 3:14.
The Pseudo Dionysius. According to the Areopagite, the Name 
of God is connected with the philosophical approach of negative theo­
logy in an e x p lic it ,  d irect way.^ The movement of meaning from 
philosophy into the text (th a t is , into the idea o f the divine name) 
is  also present in  the Pseudo Dionysius. He emphasizes the idea of 
absolute transcendence. Since God is the philosophical absolute, 
the super-essence or existence, no name is an adequate pointer of 
his actual esse or Being. Thus, whatever Exod 3:14, 15 may mean 
regarding God's being, i t  w il l  not reach i ts  unspeakable essence.
The name rather w il l  be a kind of pointer toward the u tte r mystery
2 3o f God's Being. Yet, when the unspeakability o f God's Being is
The Divine Names (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), 1:6.
Brunner summarizes the position of the Pseudo Dionysius regarding 
the Being of God in the following way: "The Divine Nature is
unspeakable. C erta in ly , ju s t as the Divine Being is  'nameless', so 
also i t  can be described by a l l  kinds of names, ju s t as the One who 
transcends a ll existence is  also the A ll-e x is tin g . We can, there­
fo re , say everything about God as well as nothing" (The Christian  
Doctrine, p. 120).
2
A comparison between the Pseudo-Dionysius and the Jasperian 
structure could be revealing. Even though such a comparison cannot 
be developed here because of lack of space, i t  can be suggested that 
the Pseudo-Dionysius approach to the idea of God's Being may be con­
sidered in general as a pre-Kantian antecedent of Jasperian thought 
on God's Being.
3
"Thus, as for the Super-Essence of the Supreme Godhead ( i f  
we would define the Transcendence of its  Transcendent Goodness) i t  
is  not lawful to any lover o f that Truth which is  above a l l  tru th  
to celebrate I t  as Reason or Power or Mind or L ife  or Being, but 
rather as most u tte rly  surpassing a ll condition, movement, l i f e ,
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affirmed w ithin an equivocal approach to Being as a wholeJ a precise 
in te rp re ta tion  of the ground of Being is  being held, namely, time­
lessness.
In short, also for the Areopagite the Nameof Exod3:14, speaks
2
of Being, yet i t  must be negatively understood because of his rad i­
cal acceptance of the timeless Parmenidean presupposition which 
determines the meaning for both God's Being and God's absolute trans­
cendence.^
Exod 3:14, 15 according 
to  Thomas Aquinas
Early in his Summa Theologiae Aquinas introduces the concept
4
of the Name of God into the core of both his theological and philo­
sophical systems.^ Before considering Thomas's in terpretation  of
imagination, being, rest, dwelling, union, l im it ,  in f in ity ,  every­
thing that exists" (Dionysius, 1 :5 ).
^That is  to  say, Dionysius follows the Parmenidean via nega- 
t iv a  regarding the interpretation o f Being's dimensionality involving 
the equivocal re la tion  between transcendent and immanent beings and 
which rejects the P laton ic-A ris to te lian  analogical procedure which 
considers both transcendent and immanent beings as analogical.
2
Dionysius, 5 :1 , 3.
^There is no doubt that the Bible speaks about God's trans­
cendence. Vet, nowhere can we fin d  the idea of u tte r  unspeakability 
of God. On the contrary, the very purpose of God's revelation in the 
Bible is to le t  His name be known (Exod 6, 7 ). Therefore, whatever
one's in terpretation  of the idea of B ib lica l transcendence may be, 
the concept of absolute transcendence as found in the Areopagite must 
be considered as a v io lation of the B ib lic a l in te rp re ta tio n  of i t .
4See Armand Mauer, "Saint Thomas on the Sacred Name
'Tetragrammaton,'" Medieval Studies 34 (1972):275-86.
’’Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 130. According to E.
L. Mascall, the starting point of Thomas Aquinas’ s theology is
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Exod 3:14,15 three important facts need to be noted: (1) Aquinas con­
structed his system only after he considered and c r it ic iz e d  the 
already-ex isting  ones—thus he re jec ts  the equivocal understanding 
of being that the Pseudo Dionysius followed and follows the analogi­
cal way as c lass ica lly  understood by Greek philosophy, notably by 
Plato and A ris to tle ;^  (2) Thomas knew Exod 3:14 only through Jerome's
Latin translation which renders the ho on of the LXX by the Latin 
o
q u ie s t ,  and (3) Aquinas's main question as he dealt with the prob-
3
lem of God was, What re a lly  makes God God?
Let us take a b r ie f  look into the way in which Aquinas under-
4
stands Exod 3:14, 15 in the context o f his theological system. He
addresses himself to the issue of God's name only a fte r the
the 'metaphysics of Exodus' which expressing God as ipsum esse sub-  
sistens draws in to  unity a ll the other attributes and operations of 
God ( He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism [London: Lowe and
Brydonel 1962J, p. 131. I t  is possible to see how Aquinas concen­
tra tes in  the in te rp re ta tion  of Exod 3:14 the basic principles of his 
great synthesis o f Judeo-Christian revelation—which sees God as the 
Great Act— and Greek philosophical thought—which sees God as the 
Great Thought of the universe ( ib id . ,  pp. 5, 7 ). Let us note, how­
ever, the equivocity in which the “Act of God“ idea stands. In other 
words, the meaning of "act" is d iffe re n t in re lation  to the context 
fo r in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in which i t  is used. Thus i t  has d iffe ren t con­
notations whether i t  is related to the Thomistic or B ib lica l contexts.
^"Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, 
et non aequivoce pure neque pure uni voce. Non enim possemus nominare 
Deum n is i ex crea tu ris , d ic itu r secundum quod est a liqu is ordo 
creaturae ad Deum ut ad principium e t causam, in qua praeexistunt 
excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones" (ST, I .  13, 5 ).
2
See Barns, p. 338, n. 1. Thomas was not acquainted with the 
Hebrew o rig in a l.
Clascal1, p. 10.
4
His theological system as developed in his mature thought 
is found in the Summa Theologiae.
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discussion about both God's existence (esse) and nature ( essentia)
have been developed and established.^ As the text and its  idea of
2
God's name is  addressed, Thomas asks not fo r i ts  meaning but rather
3
fo r its  “appropriateness." In th is context Thomas considers that 
the name provided by Exod 3:14, “He who is ,"  is  the most appropriate 
fo r God because of three main reasons: (1) because the name means
ipsutn esse,^ i t  may re fer more properly to  God's nature;^ (2 ) "He
ST, I .  2-11. This already shows th a t Aquinas does not go 
to the text in order to develop his understanding of Being from i t ,
but, on the contrary, he goes to the te x t with a previous non-
B ib lical in terpretation  of i t .
2
Gilson explains th a t according to Aquinas God does not 
reveal the meaning of Being in Exod 3:14. The meaning is revealed from 
the philosophical extra -B ib lica l re flec tio n  on Being which was 
already grasped by Augustine (Thomisme, p. 137). Obviously, the name 
only reveals the idea of Being as the meaning of the "sound-name," 
but not the meaning of Being i ts e l f .
3
In other words, does the B ib lical idea of a name of God, 
and p artic u la rly  the name provided by Exod 3:14, 15 f i t  God? Yet, 
I wonder, how can one decide on the "appropriateness" of a name w ith­
out having already a clear idea about the meaning and nature o f the 
re a lity  the name is supposed to be naming? As fa r  as I can see, such 
a decision is  impossible without the assumption of an already 
accepted in terpretation  of the nature of the Being to be named. I t
seems, then, that Aquinas comes to the te x t with an already taken
ontological position to which the text is supposed to re la te .
4
"Primo quidem propter sui significationem . Non emm 
s ig n ifica t formam aliquam, sed ipsutn esse. Unde cum esse Dei s it  
ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc n u lli a l i i  conceniat, ut supra ostensum 
est, manifestum est quod in te r  a lia  nomina hoc maime proprie nocninat 
Deum; unumquodque enim denominatur sua forma" (ST, I .  13, 11). See 
also Savagnone, "La Cognoscibilita," p. 72.
"*At f i r s t  glance ipsum esse seems to  be an idea which may 
be found w ith in  the range of meaning intended by the "I am who I am" 
of Exod 3:14. Yet i t  must be remembered that fo r Aquinas ipsum esse 
has a very precise ontological meaning. For an introduction to 
Thomas's idea of ipsum esse, see pp. 168-74 above. B rie fly , however, 
le t  i t  be said that esse, fo r Thomas, is  the act o f existence, 
essentia is  what specifies the act of existence, and ens re fers  to
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who is" is to be considered the most appropriate name fo r God because 
of ejus universa!itatem;^ and (3) the present tense in  which "He who
anything that exists as a re a lity  or substance (ST, I .  3 , 4 n. a ). 
Yet, to say God's esse is  to refer to  God’s essentia because God's 
essentia est suum esse (ST, I .  3, 4 ) ,  which means th a t “est ig itu r  
Oeus suum esse et non soTum sua essentia" ( ib id .) .  Thus, the name 
of God as such is used by Aquinas to s ig n ify  naturam divinam and the 
Tetragrammaton to s ignify  "Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et (ut 
sic lic e a t loqui) singularem" (ST, I .  131, 1 ad 1 ). However, i t  is  
not possible rea lly  to distinguish between God's naturam and God's 
esse (ST, I .  3. 7), hence whatever may be said regarding God's nature 
in Thomas's theology forms part of the deeper meaning of Exod 3:14. 
In short, to say that the Exod 3:14 passage means God as ipsum esse 
enta ils  its  tota l id e n tific a tio n  with the ideas of esse and essentia 
as pertaining to the Being i ts e lf  of God.
^Universality is  required from God in Aquinas's system
because of the ontological context provided by his in terp re ta tion  
of Being. Such an understanding is  based upon A r is to tle 's  idea of 
the universal nature of metaphysics and theology understood as in te l­
lectual disciplines (Metaphysics, 6 .1 , 8 -1 2 ). In Aquinas's theology 
God's essence is interpreted from categories which have been devel­
oped fo r the understanding of things, namely, matter and form,
potency and act. Thus, God must not be composed of e ith e r matter 
or form, but He is to be id en tified  w ith His own essentia vel naturam
(ST, I .  3. 3). I t  is  apparent th a t th is  procedure reduces the
p o s s ib ility  of understanding God's essence to the level o f things.
According to th is  requirement o f Thomas's ontology, the less 
determinate or concrete a name is , the more " f i t t in g "  i t  w ill  
be to God's nature, which is  u tte r s im plic ity  (ST, I .  3 . 7 ). Thus, 
"quolibet enim alio  nomine determinatur a liqu is modus sustantiae re i;  
sed hoc nomen QUI EST, nullum modum essendi determinat, sed de habet 
indeterminate ad omnes, e t ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae 
in fin itum  (ST, I .  13. 11). Obviously, the ideas of God's sim plicity  
and universality  derive from Thomas's ontological A ris to te lian  frame­
work fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y .
The Tetragrammaton f i t s  God because i t  is  a universal name, 
that is to say, an abstract name, which lacks any concrete determina­
tion . Again, the abstract meaning o f A risto te lian  categories fo r  
being are imposed upon Exod 3:14 as i t  is  assumed both th a t i t  talks  
about Being and that i t  interprets i t  in the classical A ris to te lian  
way. The text is not asked for its  meaning. There is  no dialogue 
with the text. There is  no search fo r  the "hidden" meaning within  
the te x t. The text is  thought to have, behind i t ,  a deeper meaning 
which is provided by classical A ris to te lian  philosophy.
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is" is rendered^ is considered an additional argument fo r its
appropriateness as the name o f God “whose existence does not know
2
either past or fu ture , as Augustine says."
Consequently, according to Aquinas, Exod 3:14 e n ta ils  three 
main ontological ideas: ( 1) the idea of ipsum esse or "act o f ex ist­
ence"; (2 ) the twofold idea of universality  and s im p lic ity ; and 
(3) the ideas of timelessness and unchangeability.^ A ll these basic 
ideas find  th e ir  ontological ground in the context of Thomas’ s own 
philosophy and are not provided by the te x t i ts e lf .  Yet, at the 
same time, Thomas sees that these ideas pertain to the deeper sense
^At least according to  the Latin translation availab le  in 
Thomas's tim e. See above, p. 304, n. 2.
2
ST, I .  13. 11. Of course Thomas is  talking about the 
present tense in Latin. No discussion is  to be expected about the 
Hebrew imperfect tense or i ts  "notion of tim e." I t  is possible that, 
after a l l ,  the present tense may be the better way of understanding 
the Hebrew imperfect in th is  particular instance. Yet, i t  is not 
possible to deduce timelessness from the grammatical feature of a 
present verbal tense. T.cmas does not do that e ither. He ju s t sees 
i t  as " f it t in g "  the already developed timeless understanding o f God's 
Being that he brings to the te x t. For Thomas, "aeternitas non est 
aliud quam ipse Deus" (ST, I .  1. 2) and "ipsa aeternitas successione 
caret to ta  simul existen?' (ST, I .  10. 1 ). Hence God, as ipsum esse 
is timeless. Consequently “Kquinas considers that the Bible uses 
metaphorical terms to re fer to God and "e tern ity  in temporal and suc­
cessive terms although e te rn ity  exists instantaneously” (ST, I .  10, 
1 ad 4 ). Thomas explains the way in which God is supposed~to relate  
to His creatures by suggesting that “God is  said to be related to 
a creature because the creature is related to Him, just as, according 
to A ris to tle , the knowable is  said to be related to knowledge because 
knowledge is  related to i t"  (ST, I .  13, 7 ad 4 ).
3
See SCG, I .  22; and Mauer, "Tetragrammaton," p. 277.
4The only thing that the text provides is the word "Being." 
In other words, i t  speaks Being. Yet Thomas’ s in terp retation  of its  
ontological meaning is grounded on A ris to te lian  philosophy.
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of Exod 3:14 as such. Thus, for Aquinas the subject matter of Exod 3:14 
is  ontological, ye t i ts  meaning is  to be found behind the te x t  in  
the A risto te lian  tra d itio n  of philosophical in te rp re ta tion .
As I proceed with the h is to rica l analysis of ontological 
interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15, my main question is : Does the
h istory  of Christian theological in terpretation  a fte r  Aquinas re je c t  
or follow  his ontological interpretation? In short, has Thomas's 
in terpretation  actually  been denied and overcome as a whole? Or, 
on the contrary, should the en tire  scope of B ib lic a l and theological 
scholarship be seen and interpreted as s t i l l  working within the onto­
log ical trad ition  that finds in Thomas Aquinas i ts  greatest exposi­
tor?
Exod 3:14, 15 from Thomas 
Aquinas until today
I t  is under the direction of B ib lical exegesis, which appears
la te  in the history of theology,^that Exod 3:14, 15was f ir s t  analyzed
and considered fo r i ts e lf  and not from a predetermined systematic 
2
viewpoint. As a result of the exegetical approach some new
The exegetical enterprise of B ib lica l theology as an 
independent d isc ip lin e  is a rather recent phenomenon which can be 
traced back as early  as 1745 (Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: 
Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. [.Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1977J, p. 18). The process of liberation  from i ts  bondage to system­
a t ic  theology and philosophy has been slow and gradual.
2T rad itio n a lly , the text has been interpreted as expressing 
a basic ontological meaning which is  assumed to be the same c lassica l 
A ris to te lian  one. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
OT scholars in the process of liberation  from systematic theology 
and philosophy have turned th e ir attention toward Exod 3:14 w ith the  
e x p lic it  intention of rejecting the inherited abstract philosophical 
in terp re ta tion .
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interpretations of the tex t have been offered J  According to Ernst
2
Jenni, current interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15 may be divided into  
three major types. F irs t ,  there are those in terpreters who follow  
Thomas in  claiming that the text reveals God's essence. Second, 
there are those who understand i t  as a refusal to  answer Moses' 
question, thus pointing to the u tte r mystery of God's essence. And, 
th ird , there are those who understand i t  as a declaration regarding 
God's work in history. As I deal with current in terpretations of 
the te x t I w ill follow  Jenni's general categorization in order to 
sim plify a very complex s ituation . Yet, before doing th a t, as a gen­
eral context, I think i t  is  helpful to  also become acquainted with 
the Reformers' approach to Exod 3:14, 15.
0T scholars have been trying to find , in dialogue with the 
te x t, a d ifferent in terp re ta tion , an in terpretation  that should be 
as fa r  as possible from the tra d itio n a l one and, at the same time, 
that should be as near as possible to the "ideological m ilieu” of 
sacred Scripture (Walter Zimmer!i, Old Testament Theology in Outline 
[A tlan ta: John Knox Press, 1978J1 20). For instance, J. A.
Motyer presents a survey o f interpretations on the meaning of our 
tex t from a lingu is tic  viewpoint. He reports in terpretations such 
as, fo r  instance, ”C. E. Simon, 89: not 'to  be' but 'to  a c t';  Ryder
Smith, The Biblical Doctrine of Man, 44 'the active one'; B. W. 
Anderson, The Living World of tTie OT. ,  34: ‘A c tiv ity , not eternal 
Being"' (The Revelation of the Divine Name [London: Tyndale Press,
1959], n.~W T.
In the same lin e  o f thought the following statements are
relevant: "'Yahweh', in which both the idea of nearness, of being
present and the idea of mystery are found” (Th. C. Vriezen, An Out­
line  of Old Testament Theology [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958J, p.
147); and Ludwig kohler who points out that i t  should be considered 
as "the Existing One, the Living One" (Old Testament Theology
[Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953], p. 42).
In short, during the last two centuries the general tendency
of B ib lic a l exegesis has been the re jec tio n  of any possible re la tion ­
ship w ith trad itional interpretations o f  Exod 3:14; at least th is is 
th e ir  e x p lic it purpose (Childs, p. 8 7 ). Of course, the Thomistic 
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Reformation. In broad lines the Reformers'^ approach belongs
2
to the trad itiona l ontological in terp re ta tion . Yet, with th e ir
emphasis on the theologia crucis, they also stress the personal
3
dimension of the name. In short, the text is  s t i l l  understood as
4
ontological as in  the classical tra d itio n , but the en^hasis has 
shifted toward God's action in h istory , mainly as seen in  the person
5
and work of Christ.
Classical ontological in te rp re ta tion . This position is  s t i l l  
mainly held by Thomist and Neo-Thomist theologians.^ Yet, because 
of the current emphasis on h is to r ic ity  and God's a c t iv ity  in crea­
tio n , even th is school of in terpretation  stresses th is  aspect. Yet, 
in spite of such an emphasis, i t  is  clear that fo r th is  school the 
deeper sense of the text is not to be seen in i ts  "h istorica l"  
nuances but rather in its  deep ontological leve l.^  Exod 3: 14, 15 is
S o r a b r ie f  commentary on Luther's Calvin's andZw ingli's  
interpretations of Exod 3:14, see Childs, pp. 86, 87. See also John 
Calvin, Institu tes o f the Christian Religion, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: 




Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, pp. 130, 131.
4D. J. McCarthy, p. 318; John Calvin, Commentaries on the 
Four Last Books o f Moses, Arranged in the Form of a Harmony, 4 vols. 
TErand Rapids: EerdmanF, 19507, V. 1 7 7 W.------------------------------
Childs, pp. 86 , 87.
S ee , fo r  instance, Mascall's book He Who Is .
Sarns, p. 336.
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considered as expressing in  "germ" the actual Being of GodJ
B rie fly , then, Exod 3:14, 15, according to the classical
ontological in terpretation  reveais two modes of God's being, namely,
2 3the timeless "existing" Being of God in its  innermost nature, and 
*h is  inner Being as He manifests Himself w ithin the order o f and
4
relates to created things as l 'e t r e  h istorique.
The "refusal" in te rp re ta tio n . There is a theological trend 
th a t wants to get r id  of the philosophical in terp retation  of Exod 
3:14, 15 by asserting that the real meaning of God's answer "I am 
th a t I am" is actually the refusal to define God in any human terms.® 
Consequently, the name is  interpreted as pointing to  the u tte r  
mystery of God's nature.®
* Ib id . , p. 335
2Schild, pp. 297-301.
3
Edmond Jacob believes that the new element that God reveals 
to Moses in the rendering of the Name is  the ontological idea o f "he 
who is" in an abstract meaning which the Is ra e lite s —who had very 
l i t t l e  grasp of abstract ideas—could not develop in a too highly 
sophisticated metaphysic (Theology of the Old Testament [New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1958], pp. 51, 52). Kohler, on a philosophical
basis, decides that the meaning of the name points to Existence,
Being, and L ife (p. 43).
^Barns, p. 333.
“Le nom suggere V im poss ib ilite  de d e fin ir  Dieu" (Dubarle 
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 34, 1951, pp. I f f . ,  
quoted by Vriezen, p. 235, n. 4 ) . See also Edward W. H. Vick, Speak­
ing Well of God (Nashville: Southern Publishing Assn., 197TT, p.
3FT Consequently, th is  te x t has been interpreted by th is  school as 
re jecting  the tra d itio n a l ontological d e fin itio n  (Brunner, The Chris­
t ia n  Doctrine, p. 120) by pointing to the obvious fa c t that God's
nature surpasses every blasphemous in tent of d e fin itio n .
®Gottfried Quell, "Kurios," TDNT (1979), 3:1065. For addi­
tion a l information on those who support th is view, see Moshe
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Even though the "refusal" theory e x p lic itly  wants to get r id  
of the classical philosophical t ra d it io n , i t  actually  follows i t ;  
for the v ia  negativa which emphasizes th a t the absolute transcendence 
of God^  is  accepted as ground for the re fusa l. Thomas's in terpreta­
tion is rejected only insofar as i ts  analogical procedure is  not
accepted. Yet Thomas's in terpretation  is  s t i l l  working as the time-
2
less primordial presupposition of God's being is accepted.
In short, th is  kind of in te rp re ta tion  rejects the philosophi­
cal A ris to te lian  thought and works w ith  the Parmenidean timeless 
in terpretation  of the primordial presupposition o f Being which 
requires the absolute transcendence o f the divine Being as wholly 
other which, consequently, is conceived to  be unknowable.
Greenberg, Understanding Exodus (New York: Behrman House, 1969),
p. 83, n. T .  From a Biblical exegetical point of view, th is  
in terp retation  has been focused from the perspective provided by the 
analysis of the parallelism  that may be found between Genesis 32 and 
Judges 13 (Childs, p. 69). Yet, Childs properly argues that Exod 
3:14b appears as a positive answer to Moses's inquiry (p . 59). Childs 
further points out that the text does not use the 'an i 'asher 'ani 
construction which would f i t  better the idea of mystery and refusal 
( ib id . ) .  Thus, according to Child 's critic ism , the refusal theory 
does not find  a firm  foundation in the te x t.
Whe "refusal" theory places i t s e l f  within th a t tra d itio n  
which finds in the Pseudo-Dionysius a notable representative. See 
p. 302, nn. 1-3 and p. 303, nn. 1-3 above. Regarding the via nega-  
tiva  tra d itio n  on the interpretation of Exod 3:14 see, fo r  instance, 
Georges A. Barrois, The Face of C hrist in the Old Testament (New 
York: S t. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), p. 81.
2
The "refusal" theory is grounded in the p a rtic u la r timeless 
in terpretation  of Being which is at the basis of the in terp re ta tion  
of absolute transcendence as "wholly other." This v ia negativa 
tra d itio n  was originated by Parmenides (p . 79, n. 3 above! A ris to tle  
and Thomas, on the other hand, suggested the analogia en tis  procedure 
in order that the gap (Platonic chori smos) may be bridged. The 
"refusal" theory denies the bridge ( analogia) but accepts the gap 
(chorismos), which obviously is also at the very root of Thomas's 
classical thinking.
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"HistoricaT* in te rp re ta tio n J  I t  is  within th is school of 
in terp retation  that the most radical re jection  of the tra d it io n a l  
ontological in terpretation o f Exod 3:14, 15 is  to be found. This 
in terp retation  is  provided by OT exegesis and embraces many d iffe re n t  
approaches and nuances. Many of them stand only on the basis of 
philo logical speculations th a t rather avoid the ontological subject 
of Exod 3:14, 15, which a t times seems to surpass the philosophical 
cap ab ilities  o f some exegetes.^ There are, however, among the many 
exegetical interpretations three trends th a t, because of th e ir  re le ­
vance regarding our ontological inquiry, deserve to be singled out. 
They are the "Hiphi 1," the "Future," and the "Presence" theories.
Let us consider f i r s t  the “Hiphi 1" theory. As the name sug­
gests, th is  theory is based on the hi phi 1 form of the hypothetical 
verbal stem from which the tetragrammaton is  supposed to have been
I ca ll the wide range of interpretations provided by OT exe­
gesis "h is to rica l"  because in general they point to a realm other 
than the one posited by the trad itio n a l ontological approach. This 
realm other than the ontological is the h is to rica l. Thus, fo r  
instance, the idea of "creator" is  not a h is to rica l idea in the sense 
of being given in time and temporality but rather as i t  points to a 
dimension other than the one to which the trad itional timeless 
abstract being belongs. So, I ca ll these theories "h istorica l" inso­
far as they re la te  God to history and not because they make God h is ­
to rica l .
2
That is the reason why i t  is not possible for me to develop 
here a complete and exhaustive history of exegetical in te rp re ta tio n  
of Exod 3:14, 15.
^The philological approach has been widely used and from its  
results many d ifferen t meanings have been suggested fo r the Tetra ­
grammaton. For an introduction to the d iffe re n t results of the p h il­
ological approach to the in terp retation  of Exod 3:14, 15, see B. W. 
Anderson, "Names of God," In te rp re te r’ s Dictionary of the B ible  
(1962), 2:410, 411.
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derivedJ According to th is  theory, the main idea that would be con-
2
veyed by the tetragrammaton is that o f “creator."
3
Even though th is  theory may assume d iffe ren t forms, its
4
general hypothetical foundations which stand on the insecure ground 
of lin g u is tic a l analogies and the fact that so fa r there is  no known 
hi phi 1 of hawa in Hebrew, make i t  highly improbable. On the other 
hand, from the ontological viewpoint, the idea of "creator" which 
is suggested by th is theory is not denied but, on the contrary, is  
rather included in the trad itio n a l in terpretation of Being.^
This theory seems to have been suggested by W. F. Albright 
in “Contributions to B ib lica l Archeology and Philology," Journal of 
B iblical L ite ra tu re  43 (1924):363-78. See also Childs, pp. 63, 64. 
TRi theory stands on para lle ls  and analogies to extra -B ib lica l 
m aterials— Proto-Aramaic, pre-Islam ic, Babylonian, Egyptian, and 
Canaanite. I t  is argued that "the name Yahweh could be a h iphil from 
the verb hawah" (Jacob, p. 50). According to 0. N. Freedman, the qal 
rendering of the MT and LXX are to be interpreted as secondary 
developments ("The Name of the God of Hoses," Journal of B iblical 
L iterature 74 (1960): 152. Yet, no proof of this assertion is pro­
vided by Freedman.
^Childs, p. 79; D. N. Freedman, "The Name," p. 152.
3
See, fo r instance, Child ’ s commentary and critic ism  of 
F. M. Cross's version of i t  (pp. 63, 64); and J. P h ilip  Hyatt’ s 
rendering of i t  as meaning "Sustainer of X (ancestor of Moses)" 
("Yahweh as 'The God of my Father' Yetus Testamentum 5 [1955]: 
130-36).
4Jacob, p. 50. On the other hand, in my opinion, th is "iso­
lation" from the context of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  that is provided by the 
text i t s e l f  is  perhaps the main reason so as to re ject the likelihood  
of the h ip h il theory. For further critic ism  of th is  theory, see 
Childs, pp. 63, 64.
^To say that God is ipsum esse is  not the same as saying that 
God is  "creator" e x -n ih ilo . Yet, according to classical Thomistic 
in te rp re ta tio n , the active dynamic understanding of God as ipsum esse 
includes ( in  His re la tion  to the world) the idea of "c re a to r.” See 
p. 169, n. 1 above. Thus, from an ontological viewpoint, th is  theory 
seems to be able to reach God's Being only in its  re la tio n  to history
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Second, le t  us consider the "Future" theory. This theory 
stands on the fu ture interpretation of the temporal idea o f the 
imperfect tense in which 1 ehyeh is  rendered in  HebrewJ On the basis 
of this grammatical in terpretation , a wide range o f meanings have 
been suggested. For instance, the text is  understood as being only
an expression of God’ s promise to be with His people in a hopeless
2 3situation, or as related to God's promise o f redemption, or as
4
referring to God's “presence" with His people, or as pointing to 
God's inscrutable purposes,® or as suggesting th a t since God's nature 
is  “fu l l  of the future" His essence needs to be understood as i t  
relates to history—mainly regarding what God is  s t i l l  expected to 
do in the future.® This last nuance is  at the core of recent
and to the world. I t  does not contradict the ontological in te rp re ta ­
tion  of Thomas Aquinas but rather assumes i t  in order to see the idea 
of "creator" as re la tiv e  to God's ac tiv ity  in the world.
V o r instance, see Motyer, p. 23; Greenberg, pp. 82, 83; and 
Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1958) ,  p. b2.
2
Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1962), pp. 180,"TFT
^Motyer, p. 23; Buber, p. 52. "En sorte que, a travers le 
dynamisme exprime par le verbe Hayah, i l  est possible de retrouver 
le  sens de 're s u lta t de 1 'action' qu'exprime souvent ce verbe; 'Je 
deviendrai bien que Je deviendrai (avec les hommes)', 'Je 
subsisterai' ,  ou 'Mon action de devenir avec ( Is ra e l)  se maintiendra' 
(c f .  Exod 33:19)“ (Andre Lacoque, Le devenir de Dieu [Paris: Edi­
tions Uni vers ita ires , 1967], p. 105).
4
Motyer, p. 24.
5W. J. Peter Boyd, "The Mystery of God and Revelation," 
Scottish Journal of Theology 13 (1960):178-82.
®For fu rther representatives of th is  kind o f in te rp re ta tio n , 
see Gerald O’C o llins , "The Principle and Theology o f Hope," Scottish  
Journal of Theology 21 (1968):137.
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theological trends such as Theology of Hope  ^ and Theology of Libera­
tion .^
Even though constructed upon a debatable fu ture  in terp reta­
tion of the imperfect of haya,^ from an ontological perspective, at
^See Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and
the Im plications of a Christian Eschatology INew York: Harper & Row,
T957T---------------------  ---------------------------
2
" I t  has been said often, in  recent years, that the 
expression used in Exod 3:14 ( ' Ehyeh asher ' ehyeh) is  correctly
translated not as ' I  am who am', which can be interpreted w ithin our 
categories in  the sense of a vigorous but s ta tic  assertion of God's 
transcendence, but rather as ' I  w il l  be who w ill be.' A new kind 
of transcendence is emphasized: God reveals himself as a force in
our fu tu re  and not as an ahistorical being. Grammatically, both
translations are va lid . I t  would be better perhaps to use an 
expression which emphasizes the characteris tic  of permanence: ' I
am he who is  being.' But the use of s im ilar expressions (th irty -one  
times throughout the Bible) and the context of the Covenant in which
the above passage is found, lead us rather to stress the active sense
of the terminology employed" (G utierrez, pp. 164, 165). See also 
0’ Coll ins, p. 137. Of course, there are differences of emphasis 
between G utierrez's  and Moltmann's positions regarding the interpre­
ta tio n  o f Exod 3:14. See G utierrez's c ritic ism  of Moltmann's empha­
sis on the future dimension of God which forgets, according to 
G utierrez, the idea of action in the present (p. 217).
^A temporal future tense is not so obvious and necessary in 
Hebrew. In Hebrew the perfect tense refers mainly to  a finished 
action in  i t s e l f ,  while the imperfect denotes a n o t-y e t-f in i shed 
action (Mayer Lambert, T ra ite  de Grammaire Hebraique [Hildesheim: 
Verlag Dr. H. A. Gerstenberg, I972J, pi 239). The imperfect 
expresses, then, a durative action ( ib id . ,  p. 244) tha t can re fe r, 
according to the context, to past, present, or future actions 
( ib id . ) .  Hence, the kind of action which the verb refers to may be 
grasped w ith  some degree of certainty as referring  to an action "qui 
est representee comme commencee, incomplete, so it qu’ i l  s ’ agisse du 
passe, s o it  q u 'il  s'agisse du futur" (Barns, p. 344).
Yet, in my opinion, no ontological conclusion or meaning may 
be grounded or derived e ith e r on the basis of the kind of action con­
veyed by the Hebrew imperfect_ as verbal form, or by the s ta tive  or 
active ideas which the verb haya may be seen as conveying. No onto­
logical meaning about the "temporal" nature of God's being in i ts e lf  
can be deduced from these idea; otherwise we find ourselves in the 
same kind of in te llec tu a l movement in which Aquinas was when he saw 
God's timelessness grounded in the present tense of the Latin qui
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f i r s t  glance at th is  in terpretation  i t  appears th a t what th is  trend 
is  in fact doing is  not re jecting Thomas's ontological in te rp re ta tion
e s t. We would fin d  ourselves hanging our own preconceived ontologi­
c a l ideas on the idea of "incompleteness" allegedly provided by the 
Hebrew verb. Barns warns against the interpretation  of the imperfect 
as basis for the idea of God's development (p. 338). I t  is true that 
haya means "becoming'' (William L. Holladay, A Concise Hebrew and 
Aramaic Lexicon o f the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1G78J,
s .v . haya) ,  BCrE i t  is  also true th a t in depending on the context 
haya does' not always mean "becoming," but on the contrary, i t  may 
be used to express general statements (Barns, p. 336). Lacoque 
argues that haya is  not s ta tive  but active and th a t as a consequence 
the idea of God developing in time is  suggested by the tex t (p . 21). 
What about the “future" tense o f ' ehyeh? Is i t  to be translated  as 
future or as present? Of course the “future" theory needs a future  
translation in order to provide a rational fo r i ts  temporal h is to r i­
cal in terpretation over against the tra d itio n a l ontological one. 
Furthermore, to give some ground fo r th e ir  theory, some exegetes con­
nect the 'ehyeh in  verse 14 with the 'ehyeh in  verse 12 whose context 
requires a fu ture translation. Thus, i t  is  claimed that Moses's 
question in vs. 13 is  but an extension of his question in vs. 11. 
Thus, the argument goes on, the context in vs. 14 is  the same that 
is  in vs. 12, therefore also the second 'ehyeh is  to be translated  
in future tense (J . Gerald Janzen, “What1!  TrT a Name? 'Yahweh' in 
Exodus 3 and the Wider B ib lica l Context," In terpretation  33 [1973]: 
235). I think th a t such an "arrangement" of the context v io lates both 
the inner d ia logic dynamics of the broader passage (Exod 3:4-17) and 
the inner dynamics of meaning that springs from the structure of 
parallelism  in which the vss. 14 and 15 are constructed. I f  the 
meaning is supposed to be determined by the context, the exegete 
should pay atten tion  to its  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  as a whole and should 
not begin by rearranging i t  on account of some presuppositions that 
are imposed upon the text.
The fu tu re  in terpretation  of Exod 3:14 has been held also 
on the basis of i ts  alleged parallelism  with Exod 33:23 regarding 
God’s back--past—which Moses could see, and His face --fu tu re—which 
remained unknown to Moses. This theory was put forward in July 1952, 
in Cambridge, by the late Professor William Manson (Boyd, p. 178). 
Boyd has properly remarked that in Hebrew the temporal ideas conveyed 
by abor and panim are precisely the opposite ones to those claimed 
by Manson. J&bor, referring to time, means "a fte r"  ind icating , thus, 
a future tense, and panim, re ferring  to time, means "before" in d ic a t­
ing, hence, a past tense (pp. 178, 182; Holladay, s .c . *aj?6r  and 
panim). Consequently, th is  attempt to provide a ground fo r the 
"future" theory fa iled  as i t  did not recognize the proper temporal 
bearing of the words involved. F in a lly , i t  should be noted th a t even 
among those who stand for a h is to rica l in terp re ta tion  of the text 
there are some who translate ' ehyeh in present tense (Barns, p. 334; 
Buber, p. 52).
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but rather emphasizing by means of the future grammatical tense God's 
a c tiv ity  and re la tio n  to history. The tex t simply does not make 
e x p lic it  the supposed ontological dimension as claimed by Thomistic 
tra d it io n J
Third, le t  us consider the "Presence" theory. This theory 
also expresses God's a c t iv ity  in history yet without arguing its  
position from the basis o f the future tense of the verb involved, 
kind of verbal action , or philologies. On the contrary, i t  re lie s  
more on the inner h is to ric a l nature o f B ib lical thinking which is  
p artic u la rly  seen at work in  Exod 3:14. For th is  trend of in terpre­
ta tion  the p articu la r "nature” of B ib lica l thinking appears to be 
"self-ev ident." This theory claims th a t according to the B ib lical 
kind o f re flec tio n , Exod 3:14 thinks Being, but not as Being i t s e l f —
abstract Being—but ra ther as continuous "presence" of God with His
2
people through h is to ry .
As the investigation  goes on, i t  should be noted that the 
general idea presented by th is  theory which sees the te x t as pointing 
to God's ac tiv ity  in history stems from the text and its  B ib lical 
context. This theory, however, does not see any ontological re le ­
vance or meaning in the te x t. God's a c tiv ity  in history refers to 
God’ s revelation or manifestation to h is to rica l temporal beings. 
I t  refers  to reve lation  and not to God's Being in  i t s e l f .  Thus, the 
Thomistic ontological in terpretation  is neither replaced nor challen­
ged. On the contrary, i t  is assumed as necessary in te lle c tiv e  con­
text fo r the in te rp re ta tio n  of God's action as pertaining only to 
"revelation" and not to His Being.
2
For instance, Exod 3:14 is interpreted as meaning "The pres­
ent one," "He who is  there" (Greenberg, p. 82); "Active being," 
"manifested being" (G. Henton Davies, Exodus: Introduction and Com­
mentary [London: SCM Press, 1967], pp. 71, /Z ) .  Buber understands
Exod T:14 as expressing an absolute future meaning " I shall be 
present," "I w ill be always present" (pp. 52-54). Martin Noth in te r ­
prets i t  as "active Being" and considers possible a future transla­
tion ( Exodus: A Commentary [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962],
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Ontological ly , however, "presence" is  not Being, but assumes 
Being as i ts  ground fo r manifestation in h is to ry . Thus the te x t does 
not re fe r  to  Being but to  i ts  manifestation in  relation to h is to ry J  
Again, as in  the case o f the future and h ip h il theories, th is  posi­
tion necessarily presupposes the tra d itio n a l timeless Thomistic 
in te rp re ta tio n  of ontology. For only the dogmatic acceptance of 
tra d itio n a l ontology prevents B iblical "presence" from becoming Being 
in i t s e l f .
Summary and Partia l Conclusion
Even though th is  survey of interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15 
has been neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, i t  is c lear enough 
to suggest some general conclusions regarding its  ontological re le ­
vance and meaning.
p. 45). Von Rad in terprets i t  as "Being present," "Being there,"  
and therefore not in the sense of absolute but of re la tive  and e f f i ­
cacious being: "I w ill be there (fo r you)" (p . 180).
Whe ontological bearings of th is  theory are properly and 
c le a rly  explained by Vriezen. "In this name Yahweh reveals His Being 
only in i ts  'formal aspect' by speaking o f His actual presence. This 
is not a real q u a lifica tio n  of Yahweh’s Being, for Yahweh does not 
mention His name; but at the same time He does more than th is : Re
gives man the most solemn assurance of His presence. For him who 
understands th is  there is  no more need to  ask about His name. Taken 
in th is  way th is  word of God to Moses ty p if ie s  as shortly and essen­
t ia l l y  as possible a ll th a t Israel believes and knows concerning God. 
This name Yahweh, thus taken to mean "He who is" without any further 
q u a lific a tio n  of His Being, is  therefore o f fundamental importance. 
God can only be denoted as the Real One according to the functional 
character o f His Being, not in His Being i ts e lf "  (p. 236). In th is  
statement the articu la tio n  between "presence" and “Being in  its e lf"  
is spelled out e x p lic it ly .  Other authors do not express i t  
e x p lic it ly ,  yet their interpretations seem to work in the same 
general understanding th a t was expressed by Vriezen (Hans K. 
La Rondelle, Perfection and Perfectionism: A Dogmatic-Ethical Study
of B ib lic a l Perfection and Phenomenal Perfectionism [Berrien Springs, 
Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1975J, pp. 43, 44, and n. 36).
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Until the time of the Reformation the te x t was considered 
both to be on to log ical--that is ,  i t  expresses Being— and to agree 
with the classical A risto te lian  in terpretation o f Being and its  
primordial presupposition. A fter the Reformation, and as a resu lt  
of the investigations performed by OT exegesis, the subject matter 
o f the text is  no longer considered to be Being, but rather God's 
action in re la tion  to history. In a word, the te x t is seen as re fe r ­
ring  to God's presence but no longer to God's Being.
The Being-presence dichotomy at which B ib lic a l exegesis has 
arrived in re la tio n  to the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15 can stand only 
on the basis of an uncritical acceptance of the tra d itio n a l timeless 
in terpretation  o f Being in the Aristotelian-Thom istic tra d it io n .  
What the text presents cannot be Being because i ts  meaning d iffe rs  
from what must be accepted as the only possible meaning fo r  Being 
in  i ts e l f ,  namely, timelessness. Thus, modern OT scholarship eludes 
the ontological discussion by denying that Exod 3:14 expresses and 
in terprets Being in  i ts e lf .  Exegesis has shifted the focus of a tten ­
tio n  regarding Exod 3:14, 15 from the ontological realm to the re la ­
tion a l realm of h istorica l presence. In my opinion th is  is  an 
u n critica l surrender to inherited ontological presuppositions. I 
rather see the B ib lic a l idea of "presence" as a pointer that requires 
a new analysis o f ontology from the lines of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that 
stem from the te x t of the Bible i t s e l f J
^Yet OT scholarship fa l ls  short of an ontological conclusion 
regarding the idea of "presence" because of a dogmatic acceptance 
of a timeless in terpretation  of Being which OT scholarship cannot 
fin d  either in Exod 3:14, 15 or in the Bible as a whole. Thus OT
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Phenomenological Analysis
The main purpose for developing here a phenomenological 
analysis^ of the te x t is to discover whether i t  thinks and speaks
scholarship reaches the odd conclusion that the tex t names Being but 
does not think of or re fer to Being.
^The phenomenological method o f exegesis that I have chosen 
to follow  as a tool fo r developing the ontological analysis of Exod 
3:14, 15 agrees with the results reached by many OT scholars who, 
along with Vriezen, think that in  Exod 3:14, 15 the important thing  
is  to  discover what the passage meant theologically  fo r the Is ra e l­
ite s  (pp. 194, 195). See also Jacob, pp. 48-50; Zimmerli, p. 19; 
W alter C. Kaiser, J r . ,  Toward an Old Testament Theology (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1978), pp. 106, 107; von Rad, ppT 179-87; and
Robert Alan Cole, Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary (Downers
Grove: In ter-V ars ity  Press, 1977), p. 22. Fhus, philo logical specu­
la tions should be avoided since "philo logical theology is fa u lty  
theology” (Kohler, p. 40).
Besides, some OT exegetes consider that the h istorica l c r i t i ­
cal method does not a ffect the theology of Exod 3:14, 15 since i t  
“n 'a  abouti a aucun resu lta t essentiellement contraire aux donnees 
bibliques” (Barns, p. 347). See also Janzen, p. 230, and 0. J. 
McCarthy, who suggests that the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method should 
be put away in order that exegesis may work with the text as i t  is
because "no matter what the possible origins of the text or parts
of i t  may be, the emphasis on hyh is  there" (p. 318).
One of the main points developed by the h is torica l c r it ic a l  
method regarding Exod 3:14, 15 stems from a comparative study of Gen 
15:2, 7 and Exod 6 :2 -3 . This comparative analysis is approached with  
the presupposed idea that the Bible is  the product of a combination 
of pre-existent trad itio n s  which once arose from separated groups 
(Motyer, pp. 2 -4 ). However, th is  presupposition has been properly
analyzed and c r itic iz e d  by M. H. Segal ( The Pentateuch: Its  Composi­
tio n  and Its  Authorship and Other B ib lic a l Studies [.Jerusalem: Hebrew 
University, 1967J, pp. 4, 5 ). As the phenomenological approach aims 
to grasp what is being thought in the te x t, a basic knowledge of both 
the immediate and broader contexts appears to be necessary. I t  needs 
to be remembered th a t, due to the epistemological-constructive nature 
of th is  study, I be highly selective in  the use of available exegeti­
cal materials. Consequently, I w i l l  discuss only those aspects of 
the tex t and of the exegetical analysis of i t  that are especially  
relevant to the ontological purpose o f th is  study. For fu rth e r  
information of broader exegeteical issues related to the analysis 
of Exod 3:14, 15, see, fo r instance, A. M. Dubarle, "La revelation  
de Dieu a MoTse," La Vie S p ir itu e lle  119 (1968): 11 -23; J . P. Hayatt, 
"Was Yahweh O rig in a lly  a Creator Deity?" Journal o f B ib lical L ite ra ­
ture 86 (1967):369-77; N. Lohtink, "Die pri es terschrift 1i che
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Being as its  subject matter or n o tJ  The analysis addresses four 
main aspects: (1) the context (3 -4 :17 ); (2) Moses's question (vs.
13); (3 ) the ' ehyeh ' asher ' ehyeh statement (vs. 14); and (4) the 
p a ra lle l structure th a t makes vss. 14, 15 a lite ra ry  thematic unity .
The context
The main structure (3:1-4:17). From a thematic point of view
th is  passage can be divided in the following way: ( 1 ) the theophany,
from 3:1 to 3:9; (2) the divine-human dialogue, from 3 :10-4 :17 , which
2
in the f in a l analysis is  a continuation of the theophany. The tran ­
s itio n  between these two sections in  the text is  made in 3:10 where
3
God's commission is  uttered for the very f i r s t  time. Verse 10, so 
to speak, reveals another dramatic ontological transformation in  
Moses^ as he becomes God's chosen mediator.^ This change in  Moses
Abwertung der Tradition von der Offenbarung des Jahwenamens an Mose," 
B ib lica  49 (1968):1 - 8 ; H. H. Schmid, "Ich bin, der ich b in ,"  Theolo- 
gie und Glaube 60 (1970) :403-12; and E. Zum Brunn, "La 'philosophie  
chretienne' et 1'exegese d'Exode 3:14 selon M. E. G ilson," Revue de 
Theologie et de Philosophie 19 (1969):94-105. See also the studies 
quoted throughout th is  chapter.
^ h is  is necesasary p artic u la rly  due to the context of h is­
to r ic a l in terpretations. The classical approach thought that Exod 
3:14, 15 referred to Being i ts e lf .  Recent 0T scholarship thinks that 
i t  does not refer to God's Being but rather to His re lationship  and 
manifestation to h is to rica l beings.
2 3Janzen, pp. 4, 5. Childs, p. 77.
^In re lation  to a previous change in Moses' personality, see 
Exod 1 and 2. From Exod 1, 2 i t  is  possible to in fe r  th a t a deep 
change had happened in the l i f e  and personality of Moses by the time 
of the burning-bush. From a young liberation ism  as apparent from 
his early  experience in  Egypt (Exod 2:11-15), he was transformed, 
during his forty years in the wilderness of Midian (Acts 7 :3 0 ), in to  
a c a re fu l, re fle c tiv e , and mature person who knew what resp o n s ib ility  
is a l l  about. On the other hand, Moses seems to be well aware of 
Is ra e l's  sp iritual condition back in Egypt.
5
Jacob, p. 51. In th is regard I cannot accept the suggestion
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him self, in my opinion, affects the meaning o f the text as a wholeJ
2
The dialogue (3 :1 0 -4 :1 7 ). Obviously the dynamic structure
of divine-human dialogue o f the text is  a t the very root of the mean­
ing of that which is  being thought and expressed in and through the 
tex t.^  The dialogical dynamics of the te x t may be d iffe re n tly  in te r­
preted.^ Nonetheless the meaning of the te x t can be reached only 
as such dialogical structure is c a re fu lly  followed from the lines
of Traditional Criticism  according to  which Moses's ca ll was given
by Is ra e l. See D. J. McCarthy, p. 312.
^Moses should be considered as the f i r s t  shalTah ( “messenger,"
"representative"). As a matter of fa c t ,  Moses is the one from whom
the category of shaliah i t s e l f  finds i t s  B ib lic a l type. See E. von 
Eicken and H. Lindner, “Apostle," New International Dictionary of 
New Testament Theology (1980), 1:127—29.
2The context in which the theophany of Exod 3:2 appears is
addressed in the second part of th is  chapter as I deal with the onto­
logical significance of the passage. At th a t time the "theophany" 
proves to be of paramount importance.
^1 fu lly  agree with Childs when he remarks that the subtle 
d ia le c tic  of the chapter "is missed by those who subsume the divine 
element w ithin the category of the psychological" (pp. 72, 73).
^For instance, Childs considers th a t there is no logical con­
nection between Moses's questions and God's answers. "The pro­
gression of the dialogue is more v iscera l than ra tio n a l. Each time
in which the objection is  fu lly  met, a new one springs up, uncon­
nected with the la tte r .  No v is ib le  gain is  ever made. The picture 
emerges of one person try ing to reason w ith another who is throwing 
up arguments, but basically  whose w i l l ,  not mind, is resisting the 
c a ll .  Moses' in it ia l  objection points to his own in a b ility . Soon, 
however, his objection can f la t ly  con trad ict God and a ttribu te  the 
worst to the people. In the end he is  trapped and his real doubt 
emerges" (Childs, p. 71). Nonetheless, Childs recognizes within the 
in terp lay of elements a s k illfu l design working through. "In a real 
sense, each of the subsequent objections arises from the perspective 
of past experience (3 :11 , 13; 4 :1 , 10) and each of God's replies  
points him forward to the new re a lity  o f fa ith  which has been prom­
ised (3:12, 14; 4:5 , l l f f . ) "  (Childs, p. 72). I t  is not c lear, how­
ever, what Childs means by "log ical connection" and " s k illfu l 
design." These two ideas expressed by Childs seem to be somehow con- 
trad ic to ry .
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of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  that are brought into i t  as the dialogue
advances^ through the harmonious partic ipation o f both involved and
2concerned parties . In short, the tex t under consideration is  found
Due to lack of space i t  is not possible here to show the 
way in which the subtle d ia le c tic s  of the text progresses as i t  keeps 
on bringing new elements o f judgment and information, thus providing 
a foundation fo r further questions and answers. The way in which 
God answers Moses's question by providing more than what Moses
requested is  worth noticing. In His answers God does not l im it  Him­
s e lf to what has been asked by Moses, but rather Moses's questions 
are God's opportunities fo r giving additional revelation regarding 
the mission He is placing upon Moses and the deta ils  Moses must know 
in order to accomplish the mission successfully (Childs, p. 71 ).
I t  should be also borne in mind that the very content of 
God's revelation in this passage (God's plan fo r Is rae l's  lib e ra tio n )  
stems from the dialogical dynamics where Moses's so-called objections 
(which can also be understood as Moses' contribution in the develop­
ment of the expression of God's plan of salvation for Is ra e l)  are
part of the revelation i t s e l f .  Divine and human elements, working
together in dialogue, produce the fin a l expression of God's plan.
In other words, God does not appear in Exod 3:14, 15 as bringing a 
pre-determined, fin a l strategy. God rather works out His plan with  
Moses's active partic ipation . What is Moses's contribution to  God's 
plan? Obviously Moses does not provide e ither the foundation or the 
guidelines fo r the plan, but rather his deep and personal knowledge 
about the sp iritu a l condition o f Is rae l. God, of course, also knows 
the situation  (Exod 3 :7 -9 ). Yet God allows His messenger to id e n tify  
himself with the mission which is being considered for the f i r s t  
time.
2
The text shows God interested in the dialogue and in the 
plan. Is Moses also that interested? Or is Moses in fac t try ing  
to get rid  of the mission? Some exegetes understand Moses's p a r t ic ­
ipation in the dialogue as revealing precisely a negative a ttitu d e  
(Childs, pp. 74, 75). I do not deny that th is  is a possible in te r ­
pretation , yet the context also allows for a kinder view, according 
to which Moses, overwhelmed by the unexpected mission to which God 
is appointing him (with the humble character acquired through his 
previous experience in the w ilderness), questions God, motivated by 
a deep sense of inadequacy. On the other hand, Moses's questioning 
also reveals a real desire to  accomplish the mission and even, 
already, an actual involvement in the mission i ts e lf .  In th is  
regard, i t  should be noted, as Childs remarks, that the introductory  
hinneh in  vs. 3:13 gives not a hypothetical meaning to Moses’ s s ta te ­
ment and question ( f im) but, on the contrary, gives the idea of 
Moses's accepting God' s mission: "agreed, I come to the peo­
ple . . ." (p . 66) .
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embedded in the context of a d ia log ical dynamics o f in te l l ig ib i l i t y  
in which the mission o f liberation  and redemption o f Israel is being 
presented and explained.
Moses's question
Within the d ialogical structure of the te x t , the analysis 
of the question^ which evokes the answer in which the divine state­
ment about the Name of God and its  meaning is uttered appears, then,
The headline of this section may be somewhat misleading 
since in Exod 3 (vss. 11 and 13) Moses utters two questions. 
Obviously, I am concerned with the meaning of the second one. A word 
of c la r if ic a tio n  regarding the re lationsh ip  that exists  between both 
questions is , however, necessary. Are they two d iffe re n t questions 
or ra ther two aspects o f the same one? Janzen seems to agree with 
the la t te r  (pp. 234 , 235). He, however, does not provide solid ev i­
dence fo r such an in terpretation . What Janzen is  actually trying  
to do is to ground the idea of "presence" in the te x t . In order to 
do th a t he wants to  equate both * ehyeh (vss. 12, 14), giving more 
strength to the hypothesis that sees the questions as being the same.
I think this reasoning is  fau lty . The same answer does not neces­
s a r ily  entail the same question. On the other hand, the answers can­
not be equated. In vs. 12 the ‘ehyeh *im construction d iffe rs  from 
the ‘ ehyeh ‘asher ‘ ehyeh construction found in vs. 14. As a matter 
of fa c t ,  the ehyeh 'im construction gives the verb haya a particular 
meaning which d iffe rs  from the English “to  be." 'Ehyeh ‘ im has the 
connotation of presence which is not included in the simple form of 
haya (Holladay, s .v . haya). Thus the ‘ ehyeh *im construction should 
be understood as expressing a single concept in which "to be" takes 
over and includes the meaning of "presence" or "standing by." Conse­
quently, I am of the opinion that the tex t presents two d ifferen t 
answers for two d iffe re n t questions. Both questions and answers are 
dynamically connected w ithin the d ia le c t ic  structure of the passage. 
The answer to the f i r s t  question leads naturally  and log ically  to 
the formulation of the second.
In vs. 11 Moses questions about himself. He has been sent 
(vs. 10) to deliver the children of Is ra e l. So fa r  nothing more has 
been explained. In  a glimpse Moses can grasp the situation as i t  
is : the mission lie s  fa r  beyond his c a p a b ilitie s . Hence, his f i r s t
question is at the same time the sincere confession o f his in a b ility :  
"Who am I?" The e n tire  passage shows th a t Moses was already feeling  
the weight of the task upon him. Moses’ s f i r s t  question is also a 
subtle invitation  fo r God to fu rther reveal His plan for Is rae l's  
lib e ra tio n .
God's f i r s t  answer comes: “ I w il l  be with thee" (vs. 12).
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to be of paramount relevance. Consequently, many studies have been 
directed toward the analysis and determination o f its  meaning as pre­
cisely as possible. I t  is  necessary, then, to  ask fo r the meaning 
of Moses's question. What was Moses asking for? One group o f schol­
ars believes th a t Moses asked fo r the "meaning" o f the name,^ while 
another group thinks that Moses was asking God to id en tify  Himself 
by uttering His name. Such divergence has led scholars to a careful 
and time-consuming analysis of the meaning o f the in terrogative pro­
noun used by Moses, namely, ma in connection and comparison with the 
other availab le  in terrogative  pronoun, namely, mi.
The in terrogative  pronouns "ma" and "mi." The d ifference  
of meaning between these two interrogative pronouns as re la ted  to 
the idea o f name has been pointed out notably by Martin Buber, who 
basically sees ma (what) as asking fo r what finds expression or
This c la r if ie s  a l i t t l e  fu rth e r Moses's new nature (being) as shalTah 
" I t  appears th a t Moses's question is answered by way of God's 
im p lic it re d e fin itio n  of who Moses is" (Jantzen, p. 234). Moses's 
nature as messenger is  not to be defined from the viewpoint of the 
one who is  sent in iso la tio n  but rather in relationship to the 
presence of the sender (God) .
God goes on and gives noses a token of His presence. Childs 
has suggested that here zeh (th is ) connects th is  token way back to 
the theophany of the burning bush (vs. 2 ) and way ahead in to  the 
expected fu tu re  when the liberation  w il l  be accomplished (p. 74). 
God's presence as experienced when the dialogue took place is  not 
only promised to continue in  the future, but God is also involving  
Himself with His messenger (in  terms of His presence) in the mission 
of libera tion . He has already synthetically  described (vss. 7, 8 ). 
At this point in the dialogue, Moses's second question is uttered.
^Segal, p. 5. "Moses asks for a description of God's nature 
and character” (Schild, p. 297). According to Lacoque, Moses asked 
fo r "quid Deus cum hominibus" (p. 95). See also Motyer, p. 20.
2
Motyer, p. 7; Vriezen, p. 235; Davis, p. 71.
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l ie s  concealed behind the name (essence), while mi (who) is  seen
as asking fo r a person's name. 1
Yet, the actual meaning of both in terrogative pronouns is
not as c lear as Buber suggests, for i t  depends mostly on the context
2
in which the question is  asked and on its  antecedent. Thus, in order 
to understand the subject matter of Moses's question i t  is not pos­
s ib le  to rely on a pre-established abstract meaning o f the interroga­
t iv e  pronoun. The en tire  passage has to be examined in order that
3
i ts  in te n tio n a litie s , as a whole, may be grasped.
" I f  you wish to ask a person's name in B ib lic a l Hebrew, how­
ever, you never say, as is done here, 'What (m5h) is  his name?' or, 
'What is  your name?', but 'Who (mi) are you?', 'Who is  he?', 'Who 
(mi) is  your name?' 'T e ll me your name.' Where the word 'what' is 
associated with the word 'name', the question asked is  what finds 
expression in or lie s  concealed behind that name" (Buber, p. 48). 
Motyer accepts Buber's thesis and provides B ib lica l examples fo r i t  
(pp. 17, 19). See also Walter C. Kaiser, "ma," Theological Wordbook 
of the Old Testament (1980), 1:490.
o
Because o f lack of time and space I have been unable to do 
a complete study on the subject comparing each single B ib lica l occur­
rence of the ma and mi interrogative pronouns in th e ir  immediate con­
te x ts . Yet, from a partia l checking on the cases mentioned by 
Motyer, I am inclined to agree with Butterworth when he affirms that 
th is  d istinction  cannot be established from the Hebrew usage only 
(pp. 48 , 49), and th a t i t  is safer to conclude th a t i ts  meaning is 
"what is i t , "  with several possible shades of meaning ( ib id . ) .  For 
instance, Motyer affirm s that mi "expects an answer instancing in d i­
viduals or, as in the case of rKetorical questions, ca llin g  attention  
to some external feature i f  not the mere name, then, fo r  example the 
person’ s ancestry" (p. 19). However, mi sometimes seems to ask fo r  
more than mere superfic ia l infonnation“TExod 3:11; 2 Sam 7:18; 1 Sam 
18:18; Deut 5 :26). On the other hand, ma sometimes seems to be used 
to ask fo r  simple information (Exod 4 :2 ).
3
Yet Buber's suggestions can be taken in  the context that 
points to Being as an additional evidence which may reinforce the 
ontological relevance of the tex t. In my opinion, however, the mean­
ing and ontological relevance of th is  passage cannot be decided only 
on the basis of the meaning of the interrogative pronoun ma.
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The idea of "name." Moses asks fo r God’ s name. In Moses's
time there was a close connection between the meaning o f the true
name and the being o f a person.* In my opinion th is  connection is
2
present in the tex t as part of i ts  context fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y .  
Yet the name is only part of the general context to be considered. 
To answer the question about the meaning of Moses's question, i t  is  
necessary to return to the tex t and its  context.
Setting Moses's question in missionary context. Moses, the
3messenger, ponders the practical aspects of God's mission (v . 13) 
within the missionary context in which the dialogue develops. Moses 
foresees that the people are bound to be doubtful about the mission
“The 'tru e ' name of a person, lik e  that of any other object, 
is fa r  more than a mere denotative designation fo r men who think in 
categories of magic; i t  is the essence of the person, d is t i l le d  from 
his real being, so that he is present in i t  once again" (Buber, p. 
51). Von Rad expressed the particu lar way in which the idea of name 
was understood in Ancient Near Eastern cultures in the following 
statement: "Name was not ju s t 'noise and smoke': instead, there was
a close and essential relationship between i t  and its  subject. The 
subject is in the name, and on that account the name carries with 
i t  a statement about the nature of i ts  subject or at leas t about the 
power appertaining to i t "  (pp. 181, 182). Of course, the relation  
name-subject i ts e lf  may assume d iffe ren t ways and meanings in Scrip­
tures, but that which is  important fo r our investigation is the fact 
that the name was d ire c tly  related to the essence or nature of the 
named person.
2
This f i t s  the deeper sense that the in terrog ative  pronoun 
ma seems to suggest. I t  also f i ts  God's answer (vs. 14).
^After receiving God's assurance regarding the enterprise 
of lib e ra tio n  as being His and not Moses's resp o n s ib ility , Moses 
proceeds to describe the situation that is  lik e ly  to be expected upon 
his a rr iv a l at Egypt and his presentation of God’ s mission as so fa r  
explained in the te x t. In Moses's understanding, the people—perhaps 
Moses too?—would consider the information so fa r received as insuf- 
f i  c ien t.
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in both its  divine and human aspects. In vs. 13 Moses expresses his
b e lie f that doubt is to  be expected regarding the d iv ine  partner in
the dialogue. 1 As Moses expresses the people's doubt, the te x t turns
2
from being dialogical in to  being " tr ia lo g ic a l. “
In general terms i t  seems that Moses's evaluation of the 
reaction to be expected from the perspective of the th ird  party in 
the tria logue was accurate enough since God neither denies nor 
corrects i t ;  on the contrary, He rather proceeds to face i t .  God's 
answer reveals that Moses's question was relevant and that i t  
addressed a very important aspect of the nature of the mission which 
s t i l l  stood in need of fu rth er c la r if ic a tio n .
Israel and Moses's question. From what has been discussed 
so fa r ,  i t  is possible to conclude, agreeing with Childs, that the 
verific a tio n  of Moses's commission before the people is  linked to 
the revelation of the d iv ine name. 3 Since the text now runs in a 
tr ia lo g ic a l structure of meaning, i t  is  possible to  focus the
1Moses expresses his doubts regarding the human partner in 
Exod 3:11, and la te r, in  a positive statement in Exod 4 :1 .
2
As Moses expresses his second question as representative  
of the th ird  party in the dialogue—th at is , the people— who are the 
rec ip ien t of the mission, our text turns from a d ia logical to a t r ia ­
logical structure in  which three coordinated levels are connected 
with each other, namely, the sender (God), the one who is  sent, the 
messenger (Moses), and those to whom the en tire  movement of sending 
is addressed (the people, Is ra e l) . Consequently, i t  is  very d i f f i ­
cu lt to say that the question was only Moses's and not the people’s 
and vice versa. "This passage is often treated as i f  Moses is  seek­
ing information for him self, but in fac t he is  v isua liz ing  the Israe­
l i t e  in Egypt as seeking that information from him” (Motyer, pp. 20, 
21); c f .  Childs, p. 66 .
3 Ib id .
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significance of the question and the related verification^ of Moses's 
mission from the viewpoint of each party, namely, God, Moses, and 
the people. Yet, scholarship in general, following the emphasis
which flows from the tex t i t s e l f ,  approaches the issue from the 
people's perspective.
The question that naturally  arises regarding the idea of 
verifica tio n  is : In what sense may the people of Israel have seen
as necesary “Moses's knowledge of God's name fo r the v e r ific a tio n  
(p a r tia lly  a t least) of his divinely appointed mission? Due to 
Is rae l's  previous knowledge of the name^  as utterance (sound-name)
The idea that the "verification '' should take place through 
the simple uttering of God's name can be true only i f  the people's 
previous knowledge of i t  is assumed. I f  the people did not know 
God's name already, the "verificatio n" could happen only as a revela­
tion  of the nature of Moses's sender. The la tte r  would f i t  the ma 
pronoun as asking fo r the meaning of the name and not only fo r iTs 
simple utterance as a sound (Motyer, pp. 20, 21). I t  would also f i t  
the actual answer that is found in vss. 14 and 15. See also Butter- 
worth, pp. 47 , 48. Yet, i f  the f i r s t  p o s s ib ility  happens to be the 
intended one, the second p o ss ib ility  of the meaning of v e rific a tio n  
is s t i l l  possible, but not vice versa.
2
I have already suggested that the doubt-verification  level 
of Moses's inquiry on behalf of the people has two stages, one 
related to God, the other related to His messenger (Exod 4 :1 ) . Hence, 
i t  is  apparent that the "verification" that would have been provided 
through the revelation of God's name was not going to be enough 
either fo r the people or fo r Moses. The uttering of the name was 
rather the beginning of a process of verifica tio n  which was to con­
tinue throughout history on the ground provided by the sound-name 
i ts e lf  as utterance and its  particu lar meaning.
3
The actual knowledge of God’ s name by the Is ra e lite s  in the 
time before the Exodus has been challenged by h istorica l c ritic ism  
in re la tion  to the Documentary Hypothesis, mainly on the ground of 
the in terpretation  of Exod 6:2 , 3. According to the h is to rica l 
c r it ic a l method several previous mentions o f God's name in Genesis 
are anacronisms (Greenberg, p. 132). This in terp re ta tion , however, 
has been shown to be fau lty  (Segal, pp. 2 -8 ). Hence, mention of the 
name "Yahweh” in  pre-Mosaic times, for instance in Genesis 15:7, has
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which could be id e n tif ie d  in the midst of a s ituation  of re lig ious  
c o n flic t,^  and to the particular dynamic of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in
to be regarded as tes tify in g  to an ancient knowledge of God's name 
by the Is rae lites . Several theories have been put forward regarding 
the extent of th is  previous knowledge would have reached. Some 
believe that only the elders knew about i t ,  others th a t the meaning 
of the name was secretly  transmitted (Segal); and even others that 
the name was commonly known (Mowinckel; Greenberg, p. 79, n. 1 ).
*The idea of sp iritua l c o n flic t arises from the actual con­
te x t of the polytheism and sp iritua l darkness in  which the people 
were liv ing  at that moment (B. W. Anderson, p. 408; Paul F. 3ork,
The World of Moses [Nashville: Southern Publishing Association,
1978J, p. 22). I consider that Josh 24:14, 15 provides B iblical e v i­
dence of this s itu a tio n . Gottfried Quell suggests that Josh 24:14 
and 15 implies the polytheistic nature of the "Sod of the Fathers" 
("The Old Testament Name of God," TDNT [1965], 3:1073). In my opin­
ion, however, the context in Josh 24 does not support Quell's conclu­
sion because "God o f the Fathers" in th is  context need not be id e n ti­
fie d  with God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The context rather
points back to Egypt (vs. 14) and, because the gods referred to are 
id e n tifie d  as heathen gods (vs. 15), the text seems to refer not to  
the polytheistic nature of the "God of the Fathers" as standing fo r  
"God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," but rather to the pagan gods of 
Egyptian origin which the people of Israel were worshipping instead  
of Yahweh.
I t  is not possible to determine to what extent th is s ituation  
affected the people as a whole and th e ir  awareness regarding the 
already-revealed utterance of God's name. I do not think that from 
th is  situation of re lig ious darkness i t  is possible to infer th a t 
Is rae l as a whole was worshipping heathen gods, fo rg e ttin g , thus even 
the utterance of God's name. In my opinion i t  is  more lik e ly  th a t  
there was a situation  of spiritual c o n flic t among the people as some 
worshipped Yahweh while others worshipped heathen gods. A s ituation  
of s p iritu a l c o n flic t lik e  this implies that both parties were aware 
of the name of the involved d e ities , among them Yahweh. Another 
aspect to be considered in this respect is the singular form ’ abTka 
used in Exod 3:6.
Nonetheless, i t  is also possible to assume that some of the 
''Egyptian'' concepts about the nature and function of the names o f 
gods may have influenced Is rae l’ s own idea of the significance and 
importance of the name of their God (Buber, p. 51; Bork, p. 19). 
Yet, from this i t  is  not possible to conclude th a t the motivation 
of Moses's question has to be interpreted only in the context of the 
Egyptian usage of names, forgetting the whole context of in t e l l ig i ­
b i l i t y  in which Exod 3:14, 15 appears.
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which the question (vs. 13) is grafted and which i t  triggers,^ i t
can be seen that the question required at least the utterance of the
2
name which has not yet been mentioned.
As a matter o f fa c t, in a context of s p ir itu a l co n flic t lik e  
th is , the claim of being sent by a God  ^ who has not expressed His 
name makes no sense a t a l l ,  since even those who worshipped pagan 
gods related  to them by name. Moses would find  him self presenting 
a testimony that would not bear the minimal required evidence to be
4
considered as true by the people. Thus, i t  can be seen that the
Regarding the dynamic progress of meaning in  the passage 
under consideration, i t  should be remembered that so fa r  God has not 
id e n tifie d  Himself by name, rather He has introduced Himself in 
re la tio n  to His past h istorica l interventions in covenant history.
His proper name has been carefu lly  omitted from the dialogue. I t
seems as i f ,  after a l l ,  God is making room for Moses’ s question.
2
Since ancient times the name of the d iv in ity  played an 
important role both in worship (Gen 4:26) and in God's s e lf­
reve lation  (Gen 12, 15, 17). Hence, whatever the "sense" in which 
Israel may have considered the name of God and i t s  place in the
"v e rific a tio n ” of Moses's mission, i t  is  obvious th a t (in  this con­
te x t at least) the simple uttering of the name so fa r  not-mentioned 
is required. Yet, th is  does not hinder God from going beyond the 
minimum necessarium providing further ground and information regard- 
ing Moses's mission as the utterance of the name presents also the 
opportunity for the revelation of its  meaning.
3
The information Moses already has is enough fo r him to make 
a positive  iden tifica tio n  of the God who has appeared to him. Other­
wise, he would not have accepted the mission so re a d ily . I f  the sus­
picion that he was before a false God had arisen in  his mind, Moses 
would not have even discussed further his mission. Yet Moses fee ls , 
co rrec tly , that in the very special kind of re lationsh ip  that his 
new nature as shalTah involves (vs. 12) ,  a mere inference w ill not 
be enough either for him or for the people. This is  apparent when 
the question is analyzed from Moses's viewpoint.
4
"In the ancient world, where man's l i f e  was surrounded by
many divine powers, i t  was important to know what kind of god men 
were dealing with. For unless the god's name were known, i t  was 
impossible to enter in to  relationship with him and invoke him in
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"verifica tio n" and the “grounding" of Moses* mission before the 
people coincide and require at least the utterance of the already- 
known name o f God (YHWH) . At the same time th is  minimum requirement 
provides room fo r God's own in it ia t iv e  of furnishing fu rth e r revela­
tion about Himself.
The Meaning. From what has been presented so fa r ,  i t  is not 
possible to define in c le a r terms the precise and exact meaning of 
the question from Moses's viewpointJ The approach that reaches the 
closest to  the actual meaning of what is  being thought and expressed 
in the question is that which accepts an inclusive f le x ib i l i t y  that 
does not attempt to define beforehand what has to be the meaning of 
God's answer. In any case, the answer given to a question reveals 
what has been understood by the one who was o rig in a lly  addressed with 
the question, in th is passage, God. Thus, whatever the "precise
p
meaning' o f Moses’ s question may be, i t  should not be sought in iso-
3lation from God's answer; rather, i t  should be found in a
worship” (B. W. Anderson, p. 408). The u ttering  of the name seems 
to be necessary in this context of sp iritu a l co n flic t.
^In my opinion i t  is  not possible to determine Moses's actual 
understanding and motivation when he expressed his question. I think 
that such determination is  not indispensable for discovering the 
ontological meaning o.- the text since the question has meaning in 
a tr ia lo g ic  context. That is to say, the framework fo r in te l l ig i ­
b i l i t y  in which the question is expressed seems to emphasize more 
both the people's reaction demanding d iv ine  credentials and God's 
actual answer, than the precise determination of Moses's personal 
motivation and understanding as he uttered the question.
2
I doubt that a “precise" exclusive meaning could be reached
at a l l .
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dynamic d ia lectica l tension with God's answer.
Is the question rea lly  asking fo r  a revelation of the meaning 
of the name, namely, about God's nature? I see no objection fo r th is  
connotation to be included in what is  being asked fo r . As a matter 
of fa c t , a revelation of God's nature f i t s  well in the context 
so fa r  described. The other p o s s ib ility , namely, that the question 
should include only the uttering of the name, is  also possible.
Hence I agree with Childs as he remarks that the context points
toward both p o s s ib ilit ie s  included in the question.^ The fa c t, how­
ever, is  that in vs. 14, God, answering Moses's question in  order 
to provide a sure foundation and "verifica tio n " before the people
of Moses's mission, both utters His name and attaches to i t  the reve-
2
la tion  of its  new, unexpected ontological meaning regarding the
nature of the sender.
God's answer
Exod 3:14, 15, especially the f i r s t  words, has attracted the 
attention  and speculation of theologians throughout the centuries. 
That th is  situation is  understandable is  due to the fact that th is  
is the only passage ’’in  which an attempt is made to cast some lig h t  
on the meaning o f the name 'Yahweh'"^ which is  widely used in the
^Childs, p. 75. As I have already suggested, the very idea 
of name conveys the idea of "nature," as asked fo r .
O
Freedman, p. 151; D. J . McCarthy, p. 317. Yahweh is  the 
"sound-name" uttered fo r the f i r s t  time in the te x t. The name has 
appeared before in chap. 3 (vss. 4, 7) but not as uttered by God. 
The name Yahweh is  used in the narrative  i t s e l f  along with "Angel 
of the Lord" (vs. 2) and 'elohim (vss. 11, 13, 15) to re fer to God.
3
Zimmerli, p. 152.
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OT.^ Quell te l ls  us that exegetes find th is  name to be a "puzzling
2
word designed to explain." Even though th is  word has been under­
stood through the centuries to have an ontological meaning or to be
3
re lated  to ontology, by i t s e l f  i t  does not require an ontological
^According to Q uell, i t  is used 5,321 times in the OT (p.
1067).
ZIb id . ,  p. 1071.
3
I t  is  not necessary to review again the history of theologi­
cal in te rp re ta tion  on Exod 3:14. See above pp. 298 -320. Let i t  be 
remembered, however, that as a whole, h is to rica l in terpretations have 
been developed by considering the expression of the name i t s e l f  in 
iso la tio n  from its  context. So much emphasis has been placed la te ly  
on the philology of the name and on the proper translation  of the 
‘ ehyeh 'Ssher 'ehyeh statement that the real dynamic of in t e l l ig i -
b i l i t y  of the tex t as a whole has been neglected. Regarding the
overemphasized philo logical studies, see, fo r  instance, the Kenite 
and Egyptian theories (Q uell, p. 1066); the Assyrian hypothesis
(T. Rees, "God," The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia, 
(1939), 2:1254; and the “ litany" theory (Freedman, p. 152); c f. D. 
J. McCarthy, pp. 313-15. The philological approach has led to the 
conclusion th a t "the orig ina l meaning and derivation of the word are 
unknown. The variety  of modern theories shows th a t, etymologically, 
several derivations are possible but that the meanings attached to 
any one of them have to  be imported and imposed upon the word. They 
add nothing to our knowledge" (Rees, p. 1254; Kohler, p. 40; Barns, 
pp. 342-43; Q uell, pp. 1067, 1069).
Other theories, besides the classical Thomistic one, try  to 
q u a lify  the idea of Being present in the te x t from the assumption 
of the tra d itio n a l Thomistic interpretation as context fo r in t e l l ig i ­
b i l i t y  of what the text actually says. I part company with the 
"hiphi 1" theory because I see no real basis fo r  reducing the meaning 
of the en tire  passage to the probable meaning suggested by the hypo­
th e tic a l ph ilo log ical speculation that claims a hiphil sense fo r the 
word "Yahweh." I part company with the “future" theory because there 
is not s u ffic ie n t evidence that the context requires a future tem­
poral meaning. D. J. McCarthy suggests th a t i f  th is statement is 
considered as fu tu re , i t  would be an absolute use of the fu ture tense 
(w ith no predicate) usage which implies that the speaker is not
extant (pp. 315, 316). On the contrary, on the basis of the con­
te x t—God’ s a c tiv ity  in the past (vs. 6 ) and in  the future (vs. 10,
12)— I think th a t a present tense which re fers  to the God who draws 
near His people to bring them assurance in  the present time of
trouble f i t s  the text as a whole better. Otherwise God would be a 
"distant" God, a God who lives either in the past or in the future
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meaning; neither does i t  deny i t .
In order to  be able to see what is  thought in Exod 3:14,
15, i t  is necessary to bear in mind four basic points: (1) that the
statement ' ehyeh 1 gsher 1 ehyeh is not actually the name of God but
o
the explanation o f i ts  meaning; (2 ) that the context leans in favor 
of a present tense fo r ‘e h y e h (3) that the meaning of the name 
involves a double dimension, namely, that word as sound or sign
("sound-name")— as, fo r instance, Baal means “possessor" or Adon
4
means "Lord," "master,"— and the actual significance that the
but who does not liv e  in the present with His people. Furthermore,
I do not agree with the "future" theory because i t  basically  reduces 
the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15 to the meaning of Exod 3:12 (the pro­
gression of the te x t goes unnoticed, God is ju s t repeating Him self). 
For sim ilar reasons I also part company with the "presence" theory. 
Nonetheless, the "presence" theory is , in my opinion, the one which 
harmonizes the most with the B ib lical context as a whole. Yet, i t  
s t i l l  t r ie s  to "define" or "qualify" the meaning of God's name 
(Being), assuming Greek ontological categories which are brought into  
the text as framework fo r the interpretation of the very idea of 
"presence" as not re ferring  to Being i ts e lf .  Such an in terpretation  
is warranted neither by the text nor by its  context.
^As a matter of fa c t, the meaning-of-the-name level toward 
which the question is open may receive an ontological answer or any 
other answer as the one who utters i t  may wish.
2
Schild, p. 296. The name is uttered by God fo r the f i r s t  
time in th is  passage in vs. 15.
3
See p. 316, n. 3 above.
4
Kohler, p. 41. Let us re c a ll, fo r instance, the case of 
Abram whose name was changed by God to "Abraham” which means "Father 
of nations" (Gen 17:5). Obviously the sound "Abraham" had the 
already-mentioned meaning of ’ Father of nations" attached to its  
sound. However, i t  is  also clear that the actual meaning of the 
"Father of nations" idea receives further and wider connotations as 
i t  relates to the re a lity  i t  refers to , that is , in connection with  
what had already happened, was happening, and was going to happen 
in the future to Abraham's descendants. Indeed, the real meaning 
of "Father of nations" was greatly enriched at the cross and w il l
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meaning of the "sound-name" has from r e a l i ty  i ts e l f — as, fo r  
instance, the s ig n ifica tio n  of "possessor," “lord," or "master," 
depends on the actual re a lit ie s  of which they are signs; and (4 ) that 
God's explanation of His "sound-name" is  expressed with the Hebrew 
verb fo r "to be" (haya) . ^
With these considerations in mind i t  is  now possible to  see 
that Exod 3:14, 15 reveals not only the name (which actually appears 
in vs. 15) but also its  meaning (as "sound-name") as "Being." The 
emphatic Hebrew construction can be neither missed nor ignored. No 
matter what tense may be chosen for its  trans la tion , one th ing is 
clear: 1 ehyeh ' asher ' ehyeh spells out Being. Yet, i t  is  also
clear that no qua lifica tio n  or defin ition  whatsoever is made in  such
receive s t i l l  further meaning at the consummation when the complete 
re a lity  of God's redemption allows the appearance of the nation whose 
s ta rt was foreseen and enlightened by the meaning of the "sound" of 
the name "Abraham."
The same dynamics between meaning and re a lity  is to  be seen 
in the case of the name Yahweh (as sound), of which, un til the time 
of Moses, no meaning was known (Exod 6:2, 3 ) .  Here, in Exod 3:14 
God Himself chooses the meaning of His "sound-name." With the God 
of heaven who changes the names of men i t  could not have been other­
wise. No man, no tra d itio n , no philology, no philosophy ac tua lly  
could have given even a h int regarding the meaning of God's sound 
name. This d iffe rs  from the Canannite-Phoenician way of thinking  
about the Being of God from the viewpoint of natural forces (Vriezen,
pp. 181, 182).
^This is obviously not used as copula (D. J. McCarthy, p. 
316; and Vriezen, p. 235). The verb appears in gal imperfect, f i r s t  
person singular, in an idem per idem construction in which "the 
second verb serves as predicate, and th is , as a cognate accusative, 
emphasizes the verbal action" (Freedman, p. 153). The 'asher p a rti -  
cle functions as a re la tiv e  pronoun connecting the f i r s t  and second 
'ehyeh (Shield, pp. 297-301).
2
See, for instance, D. J. McCarthy, pp. 316, 317, and Vick, 
p. 34. God chooses Being rather than non-Being fo r his name (Langdon
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a statement regarding the meaning in  which the d ivine Being should 
be understood. The text opens a dimension, namely, the ontological
dimension J  which is  linked as i t  appears with the very same r e a l ity
2
of God. The God-Being connection is  established in  the u tte ring
3
of the name. There is , then, an e x p lic it  B ib lica l basis fo r in te r ­
preting God ontologically .
G ilkey, "The Mystery of Being and Nonbeing: An Experimental Pro ject,"  
The Journal of Religion 58 £19783:3).
^God is drawing near to His people who may be prone to regard 
God as not existent or in analogy to material things, as pagan 
nations did. God presents Himself, then, as Being, as R eality . Yet 
he does not present "qualifications" regarding how such re a lity , such 
Being, should be in terpreted . The parallelism  between vs. 12 and 
vss. 14, 15 shows that God w il l  be known through His own presence 
and revelation.
The ontological dimension appears as soon as Being is  
expressed in words, that is , as i t  becomes "logos." "The primary 
occurrence which makes theology metaphysical, which makes i t  a logic  
of the theos, is  the way of responding to revelation . As soon as 
th is  encounter with God becomes ob jectified  by i ts  being verbalized  
in accordance with the rules of logic (categorical proposition) theo­
logy becomes metaphysics" (P e ro tti, p. 64). Yet, theos may be con­
sidered to "appear" in two d iffe re n t interpretations of re a lity  as 
a whole, namely, timelessness and temporality. P e ro tti, commenting 
on Heidegger, speaks in the context of timeless logic and metaphysics. 
On the other hand, as is shown in the second part of th is chapter, 
Exod 3:14, 15 expresses logos and Being (onto-log ia) in a temporal 
in terp retation  of the primordial presupposition of reason's struc­
tu re .
2
According to P e ro tti, Heidegger suggests that the naming 
happens in Being. "Naming is ,  f i r s t  of a l l ,  a bringing into lang­
uage, that is to say, one names a being in Being" (p. 99). In Exod 
3:14, 15 Being i t s e l f  comes in to  the open, is named. Naming " is  a 
saying ( Sagen) ,  and saying is  a showing (Zeigen) , bringing fo rth  in to  
the openness of Being" (P e ro tti, pp. 99, l()0). Thus Exod 3:14, 15, 
in naming Being, deals with the ground of Being as i t  brings Being 
in to  openness. Being is  named, and thus its  dimensionality as ground 
of Being co-appears along with God (theos), providing the basis fo r  
the coherence and unity that reason's structure requires.
3
The Being-theos connection has been made, thus grounding 
the ontological nature of theological re flec tion . The ontological
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I t  is  necessary now to see, through the parallelism  in  which 
Exod 3:14, 15 is  constructed, how the revealed meaning of the "sound- 
name“ YHWH becomes a "center of ligh t" which points beyond i ts e l f  
to the way and dimension in which God's Being and, consequently, 
Being's dimensionality, is understood in B ib lica l ra t io n a lity .
An open ontological structure
The parallelism  in which vss. 14, 15 are constructed "has
long been observed."^ "Verse 14a appears as a paralle l to  v. 15,
2
with 15b providing a l ite ra ry  bridge to v. 13." Consequently, th is  
text is considered to be a "very complex unit both in substance and
reflec tion  must be connected to the analysis of the doctrine o f God. 
God is the supreme Being. Yet, since th is  ontological connection 
between God and Being is  made at the level of God's "sound-name," 
i ts  ontological relevance and significance is only in d ica tive . In 
other words, the meaning o f the Being expressed in the te x t is  not 
revealed by i t .  The text rather points to i ts  meaning as to be found 
outside of i t .  In th is respect Thomas Aquinas and the whole o f theo­
logical tra d itio n  were r ig h t: the ontological meaning o f the text
is  to be found beyond the te x t in philosophy. Yet, Aquinas and the 
trad ition  as a whole have always chosen an extra-B iblical philosophy 
to provide the meaning, the ontological meaning of the te x t. At this  
point i t  is necessary not to leave the text but to keep asking i t  
and its  context for fu rther ontological "clues" regarding the way 
in which the in terpretation of such foundational dimension is  expec­
ted to be carried on. I t  is  fo r that reason that i t  is necessary 
not to pass from the analysis of the meaning of the "sound-name" to 
the investigation of the essential meaning that flows from the 
re a lity  pointed out by the te x t , namely, Being.
According to Heidegger, not only Being but also the holy 
can be thought and put in to  words provided that God appears (What 
Is Metaphysics?, p. 360; c f . P e ro tti, pp. 98, 99). See also 
Heidegger, Remembrance of the Poet, p. 265; idem, “Holderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry," Tn Exi stence and Bei ng, ed. Werner Brock 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), p. 284.
1 Chi Ids, p. 69.
2 Ib id . ,  p. 70.
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style. Because of the t r ip le  introduction some scholars consider
2
the text as being "overloaded." In i ts  threefold construction Noth 
sees lite ra ry  grounds fo r explaining the parallelism  away by suggest­
ing the presence of secondary m ateria ls in vs. 14. The real answer 
would be provided by vs. 15.^ This in terpretation  is  developed, how­
ever, prior to and in independence of the ontological implications 
expressed through th is  p ara lle l construction.
I t  is necessary, then, to  analyze th is  particu lar paralle lism  
in order to discover its  ontological relevance and significance. 
Before analyzing i t ,  i t  is necessary, however, to visualize the 
parallelism  i ts e l f .
The Parallelism
al) and bl) said cl) Elohia dl) to Noses el) fl) I AH MHO I AN gl)
a2) and bZ) said c2) He d2) you e2) say this to f2) I AH g2) has
the people sent
of Israel ae
a3) and b3) said c3) Elohia d3) to Noses e3) say this f3) YAHHEH the g3) has
also to the God of your sent
people of fathers, the ae
Israel God of Abrahaa,
the God of Isaac, 
and the God of 
Jacob
THIS is NY MANE forever and THIS is ay aeaorial throughout all generations.
V^on Rad, p. 180.
^D. J. McCarthy, p. 316.
^Noth, pp. 43, 44. Consequently the re la tion  between 'ehyeh 
and YHWH is understood only on the basis of phonetic grounds.
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Ontological significance. The three statements that consti- 
tude the parallelism are constructed following the same pattern in 
which the subject is the same, namely, God ( ^elohim) (c l ,  c2, c3); 
the principal verb is the same, namely to say ( *amar) (b l,  b2, b3), 
and the in d ire c t object is  the same, namely Moses (d l, d2, d3). The 
connection between these three statements is  made by the simple usage
of a consecutive waw (a l,  a2, a3 ), with the only addition in  b3 of
the adverb cod.
The progression of meaning w ithin the parallelism , which dis­
tinguishes i t  from a simple tautology or senseless re p e titio n , is  
to be found in the direct object ( f l ,  f2 , f3 ) .  The simple statement 
in f l  is developed and integrated in to  a phrase of its  own in the 
second (e2, f2 ,  g2), and th ird  (e3, f3 , g3) para lle l sentences. What 
is added is  the exp lic it connection o f the meaning of God's name with 
Moses's mission (e2, g2, g3). The addition of the e x p lic it  command 
in which the mission is expressed is  also rendered in a p ara lle l 
structure.
What is  developed at length w ithin th is  paralle l construc­
tion , namely, that which does not appear in the same way any of the 
three times, is  the declaration regarding the name of God ( f l ,  f2 , 
f3 ). As the mission has been already presented (vss. 10, 12), the 
only real progression of meaning in th is  parallelism  is centered in 
the way the meaning of the name of God is  presented. I f  there were 
no progression regarding the name of God, th is would surely be a 
senseless re p e titiv e  passage. The te x t , however, not only is  to be
seen progressing as i t  grounds Moses's mission, but i t  should be
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understood also as a l ite ra ry  device to id e n tify  or connect the 
revealed meaning ( f l )  with the mission ( f 2 , g2 ) ,  with the already 
known “sound-name“ YHWH ( f3 ) ,  and with the already-mentioned descrip­
tion  o f the God of the Fathers ( f 3 ).
The sentence is so care fu lly  constructed there is no room 
fo r confusion regarding th is important matter: YHWH is identica l
with the God of the ancestors, the covenant GodJ Also, Being and 
mission are so essentia lly  linked that there is , so to speak, a 
missionary dimension o f Being and an ontological dimension of 
mission. Being is  the very foundation of Moses's mission ( f2 , g2).
Moreover, Being, which is  uttered and identified  with the God o f the
2 3Fathers, is the very meaning of the name Moses was wondering about.
The Being-mission-Yahweh idea is , therefore, stated c learly  through
th is  para lle l construction. Furthermore, i t  is  necessary to notice
that th is  idea opens i ts e lf  up (w ith in the paralle lism  i t s e l f ) ,
beyond the realm properly embraced by the paralle lism , in two main
ways. F irs t, the already-mentioned id en tific a tio n  between YHWH and
the God of the Fathers connects the Being-mission-Yahweh idea with
Exod 3 :6 , 13, 16^—with God's past a c tiv ity , with a God who has
already been, as i t  were, "in mission” in the past; a God who
entered into a covenant relationship with the fathers, and a God who
^Von Rad, p. 180.
2 Ibid.
^The second " I am" is  the bridge between “I am who I am" and 
YHWH (Greenberg, p. 83 ).
^D. J. McCarthy, p. 316.
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is fa ith fu l to His covenant in the present d i f f ic u lt  s itu a tio n  (Exod 
3:7-9 ) . 1
Second, the Being-mission-Yahweh id e a -re a lity  opens i ts e lf  
up through the demonstrative pronoun zeh (th is ) which connects 
e x p lic it ly  the dynamic progression of f  1, f2 ,  and f3  with the con­
clusion to the action expressed by the main verb 'amar (b l,  b2, b3). 
'Elohim rather culminates the progression of thought in which He has 
expressed and grounded together mission, His name, the newly-revealed 
ontological meaning of His “sound-name," and His past redemptive- 
missionary a c tiv itie s  by opening a ll th is  up through the c lea r fin a l 
statement: "This is my name forever and th is  is  my memorial through
a ll generations" (Exod 3:15c).
I t  is interesting to note that in  His conclusion God does 
not re fe r  to a "defin ition" of the meaning of His name even though 
the meaning of His name is  the basis fo r His answer to Moses's ques­
tion . Through the meaning of the "sound-name" as a pointer beyond 
i ts e lf  to the re a lity  to  which i t  is open, the name introduces the 
in terpretation  and understanding of both God and His Being. The name 
is a memorial. The Hebrew word for "memorial" is a noun constructed 
on the verbal stem zkr, "remember, 1 "think (about)," "declare," "pro­
claim," which over against shem, "name" (which refers to the name
2
that has been spoken) denotes the act of utterance. A memorial is ,
^1 cannot agree w ith the in terpretation  that sees in the text 
the expression of a magical formula. See Martin R is t, "The God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: A Liturg ical and Magical Formula," Journal 
of B ib lic a l L iterature (1938):289-303. To see in the te x t a magical 
formula does not follow e ith er from the tex t or its  context. The 
"magical formula" idea is  a r t i f ic ia l ly  imposed upon the te x t.
^ChiIds, p. 80.
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then, an act of remembrance, and remembrance en ta ils  temporal exten­
sion. The "through a ll generations" ( l edor dor) idea opens up the 
meaning of the passage to the fu tu re , connecting i t  with every possi­
ble future utterance of the name o f God and, more p a r t ic u la r ly , with  
every future se lf-reve la tion  of YHWH Himself. Hence, the add itional 
meanings that fu ture revelations may bring regarding God are to  be 
understood on the background fo r  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that is  provided 
by the ontological lig h t that shines from Exod 3:14, 15 toward both 
past and fu tu re J
I t  must be also noted th a t through the paralle lism  o f th is  
central tex t, the Being-mission-name id ea -rea lity  is  placed in  tem­
poral h istorical extension which embraces the three temporal
2
ec-stasies, namely past, present, and future. In th is context, the 
God, Being, and mission ideas stand together in unbreakable inner
See Childs, p. 335. On Exod 33:19, see, fo r instance,
Zimmerli, p. 20. In the Exod 3-4 passage i t  is  possible to f in d  an
example of th is  distension-tension idea in 4:11 where the reve la tio n  
of God's name, 'anoki YHWH, appears connected with the idea o f c re ­
a to r Thus, the idea of "creator" properly adds a new connotation 
of meaning to the meaning of the “sound-name,” that is to say, to 
the idea of Being. In short, the text makes a real connection with  
r e a l i ty  as i t  is given, and so Being is not reduced to the idea of 
Creator (as i t  happens, for instance, in the “h ip h il"  theory ). On 
the contrary, Being receives fu rth e r meaning as i t  includes w ith in  
i t s  own connotation a new shadow of the meaning of Being, namely, 
creator.
2
The opening into the past is achieved through the "God of
the fathers" idea. The opening in to  the present comes through the "I
AM WHO I AM" expression which draws God’s presence near to  the 
r e a l i t y  of His oppressed people. And the opening to the fu tu re  is 
c le a r ly  through the "memorial fo r a l l  generations" idea. "Extension" 
points to the fac t that Being as i t  is grounded in a tenqioral 
dimensionality cannot be frozen and reduced to a s ta tic  r e a l i t y  or 
concept. Thus "extension" points to Being's mar.'.cold "ontic  
appearances" which constitute the ontological basis fo r the cognitive
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re lationsh ip . The meaning of the d iv ine name (as “sound-name“ ) is  
c lea rly  given in the te x t i ts e lf  along w ith the name. The text pro­
vides the meaning of Sod’ s "sound-name," but i t  also points to its  
essential meaning and in terpretation as an additional and permanent 
task fo r which basic directions are given in the te x t i t s e l f  through 
i ts  temporal openness.
From what has been said above, i t  should not be concluded 
that the idea of Being, as presented in  Exod 3:14, 15 was "empty" 
of meaning for both Moses and the people. To assume that would 
amount to suggesting that the text c la r if ie s  an unknown X by means 
of another unknown X. The idea of Being had a basic elemental mean­
ing already for Moses and the people of his tim e. That mean­
ing was concentrated in the re a lity  o f God’ s presence; otherwise i t  
would not have been revelation at a l l .  Hence, Being is to be under­
stood from the seminal dimension o f "presence.”  ^ Yet the meaning 
of "Presence” is immediately f i l le d  up through the lines of inten­
tional i t y  that come to i t  from its  past and future extensions. These 
ontological extensions are the basis fo r  the epistemological tensions 
of meaning in which the ideas of Being, God, and mission are
a c t iv ity .  In order to grasp the meaning of its  "extended" subject- 
matter reason must gather in "tension" the lines of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  
that flow from the "extension" in which i ts  object is  found.
H hat is why I consider the "presence" theory to be closer 
to the B ib lical meaning. Furthermore, i t  can be seen that revelation  
and Being “co-appear" in  presence. Revelation points to the ontic 
appearance as source (o rig in ) of theological knowledge. Foundational 
ontology considers the ontic appearance as Being. Neither Being nor 
logos, however, may stand in iso la tion  from each other. Being and 
logos (revelation) belong together. Yet, the dimensionality in which 
both co-appear seems to be interpreted in  a non-traditional way.
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B ib lic a lly  constituted and understoodJ
Summary and P a rtia l Conclusion
From the b r ie f phenomenological analysis of the tex t that 
has been so fa r  developed, i t  is  possible to conclude that Exod 3:14, 
15 speaks and thinks Being, providing, therefore, the ground fo r a 
Biblical ontology and a B ib lica l analysis of the in terpretation  that 
the primordial presupposition of reason's structure has assumed in 
Biblical ra t io n a lity . The tex t not only expresses and thinks Being 
as i t  utters the name of God along with its  meaning as "sound-name," 
but i t  also shows that the "essential" or ontological meaning of i t  
cannot be “defined" from inside the te x t. Yet, i t  is not to be 
"defined" or interpreted from an extra-B ib lical philosophical re fle c ­
tion  e ither. The ground fo r a Biblical in terp retation  of both God 
and Being is  centered along the lines of meaning and in te n tio n a lity  
th a t flow from the re a lity  of God's ontic presence which appears in
This is  why I part company with the “presence" theory. More­
over, i t  is c lear that the B ib lical idea of "presence" does not 
accept any external category to be used as background for in t e l l ig i ­
b i l i t y  from which its  meaning should be in terpreted . On the con­
tra ry , the B ib lic a l idea of "presence" as ontic re a lity  stands by 
i t s e lf  in i ts  own context. Furthermore, i t  is  the lig h t in which
the very categories to be used in the understanding of God, Being, 
and mission are to be constituted.
I agree, then, with James Barr when he suggests that i t  is 
not possible to say that Greek static thought on Being is not 
present in the Bible on the basis of semantic considerations taken 
from isolated features o f the Hebrew language. I f  the Hebrews did 
not have an idea regarding s ta tic  Being, i t  was not because they did 
not have lin g u is tic  means to express i t  (The Semantics of B ib lica l 
Language [Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1961 J, pp. 58-/J?). This
contradicts in terpretations such as Rees's, who sees that the idea 
of God as absolute (meaning “self-existence") "would be a metaphysi­
cal abstraction, not only impossible to the time at which the name
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the distension-tension of the three temporal ec-stasies, namely, 
past, present, and fu tu re . Consequently, according to B ib lica l 
thinking ontology cannot precede the study of God (doctrine o f God). 
There cannot be a re fle c tio n  on Being prio r to its  “ontic" appear­
ance or presence. On the contrary, God’ s “ontic presence” is  the 
ground fo r the re flec tio n  on i t —onto-log ia . Thus, the structure  
of B ib lica l reason does not follow the trad itiona l onto-theo-logical 
order but rather functions in a p articu la r theo-onto-logical order. 
This order expresses^ the independence of B iblical ontology and
ra tio n a lity  from any extra -B ib lica l re fle c tio n , theory, or in te rp re - 
2ta tion .
originated, but alien to the Hebrew mind at any time" (Rees, 
p. 1254).
The problem with these two kinds of interpretations of B ib li­
cal ontology is that they are not sensitive to what is  being thought 
and expressed in the tex t ontologically , due to dogmatic acceptance 
of the Greek timeless in terpretation  of Being and reason.
^ If  th is expression of independence is followed to i ts  fin a l 
consequences in the discovery of the B ib lic a l in terpretation  of the 
ontological and epistemological frameworks, the sola Scriptura prin­
ciple could be applied and implemented in toto~ So fa r ,  the sola 
Scriptura principle has been applied only p a rtia lly  because i t  uses 
reason as a tool in i ts  classical or s c ie n tific  in te rp re ta tio n , thus 
always introducing extra -B ib lica l categories in the constitution of 
exegetical or dogmatic meanings.
2
There are not many approaches that address themselves to 
the analysis of B ib lical philosophy; among those who do, see notably 
A. J. Heschel’ s and Claude Tresmontant's. Yet they follow  the 
classical approach according to which Being is thought of and in te r ­
preted in extra-B ib lical timeless categories. According to 
M. Friedman, Heschel holds that "God does not reveal Himself, nor 
does the prophet speak o f God as He is  in  Himself, as ultim ate Being" 
("Abraham Heschel among Contemporary Philosophers: from Divine Pathos 
to Prophetic Action," Philosophy Today C1947]:297). Claude 
Tresmontant has w ritten  extensively on the subject. See, fo r  
instance, A Study of Hebrew Thought; Christian Metaphysics (Dublin 
and Melbourne: G ill and Son, 1965); Etudes de metaphysique biblique
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Yet the B ib lica l understanding o f the primordial presupposi­
tion  that stands a t the foundation of both ontology and reason has
(Paris: J. Gabalda et C ie ., Editeurs, 1955); and The Origins of
Christian Philosophy (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963). Sometimes
Tresmontant seems to  be heading toward working in  a temporal dimen­
s io n a lity  as, fo r instance, when he says that the “sensible is not 
deprived of meaning" ( Hebrew Thought, p. 51) or th a t the question 
indeed "is to decide whether the forms of Greek reason are those of 
human reason" ( ib id . ,  p. 114). Yet when his approach is  seen as a 
whole, his thought appears to be, as Brian J. Cudahy suggests, that 
of an e x is ten tia l, personalistic, a n ti-d u a lis tic  process-oriented 
philosopher ("Claude Trestroontant and B ib lica l Metaphysics," Proceed­
ings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 41 Ll96'/J: 
228). Yet his anti-dualism  is  rather an anti-P latonism  which does 
not deny the timeless Parmenidean in terp re ta tion  o f the primordial 
presupposition. In teresting ly enough Cudahy's evaluation of 
Tresmontant's approach to B ib lica l metaphysics concludes by remarking 
th a t "the most s ign ifican t unresolved problem, though, is  whether the 
ontological categories Tresmontant claims he has found in the Old 
Testament have actual ly  been drawn out of the Hebrew experience or 
projected into i t "  (p. 228). In my opinion, i t  seems to be clear 
that Tresmontant, working w ithin a tra d itio n a l approach to reason 
imposes on B ib lica l in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  tra d itio n a l timeless epistemo- 
logical and ontological categories.
The same dependence upon tra d itio n a l categories and ordo can 
be seen in E. Farley 's  application o f his in te rp re ta tion  of Husserl's 
epistemology to theology ( Ecclesial Man, pp. 232-234). Within the 
same general approach to B ib lical metaphysics or B ib lic a l philosophy 
may be seen, fo r instance, Leander Keyser's (The Philosophy of Chris- 
t ia n ity  [Burlington, Iowa: The Lutheran L ite ra ry  Board, 1928J, pp. 
751 55}; Walter A. Kaufmann's ( C ritique of Religion and Philosophy 
[Garden C ity , New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961J, pp. 303-305); Arthur
F. Holmes's (A ll Truth Is God's Truth, pp. 4 -5 , 125-28), Stewart
McDowall's (Evolution, Knowledge and Revelation, pp. 15, 16), and 
Sydnor Stealey's TfT 126) approaches to B ib lica l philosophy. Cf. 
Lovejoy, p. 5; and M. O tt, “O b jectifica tion  and Existentialism ,"  
p. 322.
Yet, on the other hand, there is also present in current 
theology a trend that is sensitive to the B ib lica l theo-onto-logical 
order and its  temporal dimensionality even though only pointing 
toward such a d irection  without drawing further re fle c tio n  or conclu­
sions from i t .  See, fo r instance, the "future" and "presence" theo­
ries  of interpretation  on Exod 3:14 (pp. 315-19 above). Oscar
Cullmann also points in the same d irection  when he remarks, in his
Christ and Time: The Prim itive Christian Conception o f Time and
Hi story (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, i960 ), that “fo r Greek
thinking in its  Platonic formulation there exists between time and
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not as yet been discovered. I t  is  necessary, then, on the ground 
and context provided by the ontological relevance o f  Exod 3:14, 15, 
to focus on the in terpretation  o f the dimensionality fo r  Being and 
reason in which B ib lic a l ra tio n a lity  has been constitu ted .
The B iblical In terpretation  
of being: Temporality
To know that Exod 3:14, 15 thinks and expresses Being is  not 
enough for grounding the viewpoint tha t a c ritic is m  of theological 
reason requires. Thus, i t  is necessary to go beyond the in i t ia l  d is ­
covery of the ontological status o f Exod 3:14, 15 in to  a search fo r  
the in terpretation o f the primordial presupposition in which both 
Being and logos are understood in B ib lica l ra t io n a lity .
Since neither Exod 3:14, 15 nor the Bible as a whole develops 
systematically an in terpretation  of either the epistemological or
e te rn ity  a q u a lita tiv e  difference, which is not completely expressed 
by speaking of a d istinc tion  between lim ited and unlim ited duration
of time. For P la to , etern ity  is  not endlessly extended time, but
something quite d iffe re n t; i t  is timelessness. Time in Plato 's view 
is  only the copy of e te rn ity  thus understood.
"How much the thinking of our days roots in  Hellenism, and 
how l i t t l e  in B ib lic a l C h ris tian ity , becomes clear to  us when we con­
firm  the fact tha t fa r  and wide the Christian Church and Christian  
theology distinguish time and e te rn ity  in Platonic-Greek manner" 
(P. 61 ). Cullmann goes on to say that for p rim itive  C h ris tian ity  
there was no q u a lita tiv e  difference between time and e te rn ity . "Thus 
time and e tern ity  share this time q ua lity . P rim itive  C h ris tian ity  
knows nothing of a timeless God. The 'e te rn a l' God is  he who was
in the beginning, is  now, and w il l  be in a ll the fu tu re , 'who is ,  
who was and who w il l  be' (Rev 1:4)" (p. 63). "The New Testament 
knows only the lin e a r time concept of Today, Yesterday, and Tomorrow; 
a l l  philosophical re in terpreta tion  and dissolution into  timeless 
metaphysics is foreign to  i t .  I t  is  precisely upon the basis of th is  
re c t il in e a r  conception of time that time in P rim itiv e  C h ris tian ity  
can y ie ld  the framework for the divine process in  his omnipotence 
f ix e s , for those ages into which he divides the whole process" 
(p . 53). The same could be said of Moltmann's general approach to
eschatology, see fo r  instance Theology of Hope, pp. 15-58.
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the ontological frameworks of reason's structure,^ no p articu lar
theory can be found as a guide to  our search for the B ib lica l in te r -
2
pretation  of the primordial presupposition. Nonetheless, since Exod 
3:14, 15 utters Being precisely in  a way which is  p r io r  both to any 
ontological or epistemological theory, the level o f the ground of 
Being appears with greater force. Yet in order to discover the Bib­
l ic a l in terpretation  o f the primordial presupposition, i t  is neces­
sary to go back to the te x t and question i t  from both the ontological
In theology as a whole th is  is  a fact which is accepted 
without further re fle c tio n . T i l l ic h ,  fo r instance, expresses the 
s itu a tio n  in a negative way when he p la in ly  affirm s that “theology 
as such cannot produce an epistemology of its  own" ( Systematic Theol-  
ogy, 1 :94). Some consider that B ib lica l thought is  not capable of 
abstract thinking (Stealey, p. 131), yet others consider that to  
derive ontological and epistemological theories from the Bible is 
possible (p. 15).
Both approaches, however, agree in the fa c t that the Bible  
by i t s e l f  does not o ffe r  any elaborated re flec tio n  e ith er on the 
ontological or epistemological frameworks. This has been generally  
misunderstood as en ta iling  the incom patibility between Bible and 
philosophy.
2
Even those who, lik e  Stealey, see th a t the B ib lica l 
narrative  contains a theory of knowledge suggest th a t such a theory 
is to  be “derived” from the te x t, since i t  is  not e x p lic it ly  
developed in i t  (Stealey, p. 15). Thus, the search fo r the 
in terp re ta tion  of the primordial presupposition of B ib lica l reason 
cannot begin from an evaluation of its  epistemological or ontological 
theories, as was necessary in the analysis of both the philosophical 
and theological contexts. In the analysis of the B ib lica l context, 
then, i t  is necessary to go d ire c tly  into the consideration of the 
dimensionality of Being i ts e lf .
■^Regarding the nature of the pre-ontological le v e l, the level 
of the “no-thing" (Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, p. 23; and 
p. 67, nn. 1, 2 above). Being and God have been connected in an 
unbreakable bond in Exod 3:14. Yet, they have not been id en tified  as 
one. They rather stand together. Neither is p rio r to the other. 
Yet, God as “ontic presence" reveals both what God and Being are and 
mean; c f . Stealey, p. 123.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
351
and epistemological viewpoints.^ The result of such a questioning
should provide at least a b rie f introduction to the understanding
of the B ib lica l in terpretation  of reason’ s dim ensionality and, at
the same time, a basis fo r the subsequent development of both a Bib-
2
l ic a l ontology and epistemology.
I t  is time now to analyze the way in which the ground of
The Bible as a whole, and Exod 3:14, 15 in  particu lar, are 
to be considered as “fa c t“ of theological reason, that is , as 
constituted by human minds. As reason is involved as the constitu­
tiv e  tool of meaning, both ontological and epistemological frameworks 
must be involved in such a constitution. "This “fa c t"  of theological 
reason cannot be denied even by those who, due to  th e ir  own in te r ­
pretation of the primordial presupposition and of reason's struc­
ture as a whole, consider the B iblical w ritings as a product 
of p rim itive , mythological, non-scientific  minds. "Levi Strauss has 
pointed repeatedly to  the fact th a t, like  magical thinking and savage 
mind, myth cannot be qualified  as prelogical or reduced to practical 
need, but that i t  has to be taken as a self-presentation of the 
human mind" (Kampits, p. 113). And, as a product of human mind, Bib­
l ic a l thought shares in and works with the structure of reason. 
Francis Strickland sees religious thinking sharing the systematic 
nature of reason's structure as he declares th a t "a world-view of 
some sort is not only an a ffa ir  of philosophy but inevitab ly  under­
lie s  re lig ious thinking as w ell. This does not mean that religious  
believers consciously adopt a philosophy. Very few indeed ever do 
th is . I t  simply means that when implications o f our fundamental
re lig ious beliefs are thought out in a philosophical way, i t  is found 
that they imply a certa in  way of looking at the world. Indeed, phi- 
losophyof some kind underlies a l l  re lig ion , fo r some conception of 
the Divine is the foundation of re lig io n , and th is  necessarily means 
a view of ultimate re a lity  and some thought of the way th is ultim ate  
re a lity  is related to or manifests i ts e lf  in human l ife "  (p. 47).
I do not deny that B ib lica l thought implies both an ontology (world­
view) and an epistemology (theory of knowledge). Yet in the tex t  
under investigation B ib lica l thought directs i t s e l f  toward expressing 
the dimensionality in which re a lity  as a whole is  interpreted as i t  
re lates to YHWH' s ontic  appearance.
2The c ritic ism  of theological reason must begin with a 
re fle c tio n  on the ground of Being and reason. The discovery of the 
B ib lica l in te rp re ta tion  of the primordial presupposition is the foun­
dation fo r  developing the critic ism  of theological reason and the 
technical philosophical expression of the B ib lic a l in terpretation  
of the ontological and epistemological frameworks.
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Being is  interpreted by B ib lica l ra t io n a lity . The analysis w il l  be 
developed in two steps: ( 1 ) from the viewpoint of the ontological
framework, the being-appearance relationship is  discussed; ( 2 ) from 




Exod 3:14 speaks and thinks Being in the present tim e. This 
is , however, not enough fo r  grasping the B ib lica l understanding of 
the primordial presupposition. The tex t connects God and Being essen­
t ia l ly .  Both of them "co-appear" as the "ontic presence" of God is  
given. Yet, the order of meaning comes from God into Being (theo- 
onto-logical ordo) and not as in classical thought from Being into  
God (onto-theo-logical ordo) J  Consequently, the in terpretation  of 
the ground of Being can be done only as God "appears" or is
"present." Thus God and Being are to be interpreted from the s ta r t-
2
ing point provided by God's "ontic presence."
*See above, p. 347.
2
I t  should be noted that due to the theo-onto-logical order, 
our text suggests the meaning of "appearance" referring to God cannot 
be derived from either the philosophical or the theological contexts. 
As i t  has been shown in chapters 1 and 2 above, both philosophy and 
theology accept the Parmenidean timeless in terpretation  of the p r i­
mordial presupposition in whose context the idea o ft "appearance" 
receives its  trad itio n a l meaning over against the idea of Being. 
Yet, in B ib lical ra t io n a lity  "appearance" is  the given from which 
the meaning of the primordial presupposition is to be reached.
For those fa m ilia r  with Heidegger's thought and his starting  
point in Being and Time from Dasein's appearance, the procedure I 
am following should not be d i f f ic u lt  to grasp. The main difference  
between my approach and Heidegger's, obviously, is to be seen in the 
starting point. Heidegger starts  from Dasein as appearance; from
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The “ontic" presence" of God, its  appearance, cannot be in te r­
preted, then, from the viewpoint of any already-established theory
Dasein he goes to the in terp retation  of the ground of Being; and from 
the ground of Being he in terprets God. In B ib lica l ra t io n a lity ,  
however, the movement of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  is d iffe re n t. The starting  
point is not the appearance of Oasein but the appearance o f God. 
From God ( theos) B ib lica l ra tio n a lity  goes to the ground o f Being 
( ontos) and from the ground of Being, i t  goes on to in te rp re t man 
and re a lity  as a whole.
I t  is necessary, then, in the search fo r  the B ib lica l in te r ­
pretation of the ground of Being that the classical in te rp re ta tion  
of “appearance" be placed under methodological epoche. Heidegger 
provides a summary statement regarding the tra d itio n a l meaning of 
"appearance." "At f i r s t  sight the d istinction  seems c lear. Being 
and appearance means: the real in contradistinction to the unreal;
the authentic over against the inauthentic" ( Introduction to  Meta­
physics, p. 98 ). He fu rther adds that " i t  was in the Sophists and 
in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere appearance and thus
degraded. At the same time, being, as idea, was exalted to a supra-
sensory realm. A chasm, chorismos, was created between the merely 
apparent essence, here below, and the real being, somewhere on high. 
In that chasm C h ris tia n ity  settled down, at the same time re in te r ­
preting the lower as the created and the higher as the creator 
( ib id . ,  p. 106). This d is tinc tion , according to Heidegger, has 
"remained dominant not only in Western philosophy," but i t  permeates 
" a ll  knowledge, action, and discourse" even where i t  is "not s p e c ifi­
c a lly  mentioned or not in  these words" ( ib id . ,  p. 94). This dis­
tin c tio n  also reaches the heart of modern science ( ib id . ,  p. 107). 
See also Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 25; and Sartre , Being 
and Nothingness, p. x l v i i . As Heidegger suggests, th is  in te rp re ta - 
tio n  of "appearance" is  adopted by theology as a whole and is  applied 
in  the constitution of theological meaning not only at the dogmatic 
but also at the exegetical leve l.
In order to  get acquainted with the dual is t ic  way of in te r ­
preting the "being-appearance" relationship in both dogmatics and 
exegesis, see, fo r instance, Anselm, Proslogion, trans. M. J. 
Charlesworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 8 . The d u a lis tic
in terp retation  of being and appearance is also present in Barth when 
he holds that the encounter "represents God in so fa r as i t  is  deter­
mined, made and used by God as clothing, temple or sign; in so fa r  
as i t  is pecu liarly  a work of God, which above and beyond i ts  own 
existence may and must serve to attest the o b jec tiv ity  of God and
therefore to make the knowledge of God possible and necessary"
(Church Dogmatics, 1 .1 .1 7 ), c f .  0 . Cullmann, Christ and Time, pp. 62, 
63, and in J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. 51-58, when he affirm s  
th a t "where Yahweh ‘ appears' ,  vE is manifestly not in the f i r s t  
instance a question of cu ltiva tin g  the place and time of his appear­
ance. The point o f the appearances to p articu la r men in p a rtic u la r
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whether philosophical or ph ilo log ica l. Rather, God's "ontic  
presence" is to be considered as the basis and s ta rtin g  point fo r  
the revealing of His Being and thus of its  ontological understand­
ing.^ The idea of “presence," therefore, involves both the "ontic" 
and the “ontological" levels regarding God as r e a l i ty .  Consequently, 
the in terpretation  of God's Being should follow  the lines of i n t e l l i ­
g ib i l i ty  that flows from God's “ontic presence" i t s e l f ,  p artic u la rly
as grasped by the early  ontological re flec tions o f Exod 3:14, 15 and 
2context.
In Exod 3:14, 15, the idea o f "presence" is  presented in the 
context of temporal openness that re la tes  the God-being-mission
situations lies  in the promise. The promise, however, points away 
from the appearances in  which i t  is  uttered, in to  the as yet 
unrealized future which i t  announces. The point o f the appearance 
then lie s  not in i t s e l f ,  but in the promise which becomes audible 
in i t ,  and in the fu tu re  to which i t  points" (Theology of Hope, 
pp. 99, 100); in Von Rad as he says th a t "the whole narrative LExod 
3] context leads rig h t away to the expectation th a t Yahweh intends 
to impart something— but this is not what he is , but what he w ill  
show himself to be to Israel" (p. 180); and in Motyer as he explains 
that "as regards the meaning of the verb, care must be exercised to 
exclude the sense 'to  be essentially* because the verb properly means 
'to  be phenomenally', corresponding to the Greek ginesthai and not 
to e in a i. Metaphysics are not involved" (p. 22). See also Vriezen, 
pp. 236, 249; and D. J. McCarthy, p. 317.
^ It  should be recalled that the "ontic" and "ontological" 
levels stand and belong together. Neither is  given without the 
other. The ontological level points to man's understanding of the 
Being who appears. Yet, the grounding level of ontology is the 
"o n tic ."
2
For the purpose of a c ritic is m  of theological reason i t  
should be realized that th is  passage is  irrep laceab le . I t  thinks 
Being at the level of i ts  ground, at the very beginning o f Christian  
re fle c tio n . Any other reflection  on the ground of Being would not 
embrace and influence Christian tra d itio n  as a whole. Furthermore, 
as fa r  as I am aware, there is no other primordial re fle c tio n  on the 
ground of Being besides the Exod 3:14, 15 passage.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
355
re a lity - id e a  to the three temporal ec-stasies which point, beyond 
the ontological statement of Exod 3:14, 15, toward the re a lity  from 
which the B iblical meaning of Being must be searched and found. 
"Presence," according to  the te x t, opens i t s e l f  up from the temporal 
present in which the I AM WHO I AM statement is rendered and which 
is shared and understood by Moses.
In other words, "presence" as an "ontic" realm springs from 
what actua lly  happens. In Exod 3:14, 15 what actually happens is  
properly described in 3 :2 , where the "theophany" of the burning bush 
is recorded. I t  is from the re a lity  expressed by th is  theophany that 
the idea of "presence" finds its  meaning and can be uttered in  Exod 
3:14, 15. Consequently, a proper understanding of the meaning
revealed by this particu la r theophany is foundational fo r the 
enlightening, from the tex t i ts e lf ,  of the basic meaning and realm 
of "presence" in its  inner connection and relation  to both God and 
Bei ng.
B ib lica l theophanies have been interpreted in various ways. 1 
However, as I approach the tex t following the phenomenological method 
of exegesis, a ll in terpretation must be placed under epoche, in order 
that the meaning of what is being thought and expressed in the text 
may be reached.
1 Again, due to lack of space, i t  is  not possible to develop 
here a detailed history of the theological in terpretation  of the 
"theophany" idea. As a general evaluation, however, i t  can be said 
that some scholars consider the very idea o f "theophany" in  a pejora­
tiv e  sense, as being simply "naive" (Jacob, p. 74). Other scholars 
understand i t  plainly as a "sign" which must be explained in natural 
terms and along the lines of the history of trad itions (Noth, pp. 39, 
40). And, there are even other scholars who suggest that B ib lical
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The subject in  txod 3:2 is thre “Angel o f the Lord" (mal ‘ ak 
YHWH) J  At f i r s t  glance i t  would seem as i f  the subject in Exod 3:2  
is  other than the subject in Exod 3:14 ( 'elohim) . The flow of mean­
ing in the tex t, however, points to the id e n tific a tio n  of both "Angel
2
of the Lord" and "Yahweh" in th is particu lar n arra tive . The verb 
in  Exod 3:2 is y e r5 ‘ , a niphal imperfect of the basic verbal form 
r a ‘ a, which in i ts  niphal form means "to be seen," "to le t  oneself
3
be seen," "to appear." The LXX translates i t  as ophthe, keeping,
4
however, the o rig ina l re flex ive  Hebrew sense.
theophanies must be explained as mythical in para lle lism  to extra- 
B ib lica l occurrences (Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. 98, 100).
V o r an introduction to the Biblical usage and meaning of 
the mal'ak YHWH construction, see Andrew Bowling, "Cover," Theologi- 
cal Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 1:464, 465.
2
See Lacoque, p. 75; and E. C. Kaiser, Toward an Old Testa­
ment Theology, p. 85.
^Holladay, s . v . ,  r a ‘a; and W illiam Gesenius, A Hebrew English 
Lexicon of the Old Testament including the B ib lic a l Chaldee, 23rd 
edition  (Boston: Riverside Press, 1882), p. 951, s . v . , ra cfr.
^Gesenius, p. 138. The LXX translates ’u$9n fie ouxu ayycXoc 
cupiou . This tra n s la tio n  could be understood a t f i r s t  glance as 
a passive (Wen ) w ith  auxw as agent. However, the passive voice 
is  very rarely used w ith dative. Additionally, &pdw in the LXX is  
used in re flex ive  sense, as, for instance, in 1 Kgs 18:1 (o *0nxi » 
"show th yse lf), where a passive voice is  used in re fle x iv e  sense fo r  
the translation o f a hi phi 1 of ra* a . Thus otenooiiai ooi would mean 
”1 w ill appear to thee" (A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New 
Testament in the L ight of Historical Research LNashville: Broadman
Press, I934j, pp. 819, and Wi 111 am h. Arndt and Wilbur F.
Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other 
Early Christian L ite ra tu re  LChicago: University of Chicago Press,
1952J, s .v .,  horao). Moreover, Exod 6:3 translates the same Hebrew 
niphal (th is  time in  f i r s t  person singular) as follow s: cat Wonv
irpo< A S paay e o i Io a a ic  c a t  la icu S , 9coC u v  au xu v Here »9oc is
c le a rly  not an agent (Robertson, pp. 623-625, 8 2 0 ), so i t  must be 
understood as being used with accusative, keeping the orig ina l 
re fle x iv e  niphal sense as i t  does, for instance, in the
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The re flex ive  idea conveyed by the verb yera1, which is 
properly t rn s la te d  into English as “appeared," expresses c learly  
the idea of "presence." What does "presence" ("appearance") mean?
Who or What is  present? From the context i t  is  clear th a t the one 
Who is present is  YHWH.
I t  is necessary now to formulate the following question: 
According to the te x t, is appearance to be iden tified  with Being or 
is  Being rather to be found behind and beyond its  appearance? Does 
the text reveal a gap between Being and appearance or not?
The English verb "to appear" has an im p lic it re fle x iv e  sense 
which the Hebrew niphal makes exp lic it.^  The re flex ive  sense of 
God's "appearing" is  e x p lic it ly  thought and expressed in Exod 3:2. 
When the tex t is asked, who is  the subject of the "appearing," the 
answer, obviously, is  YHWH. And, due to the re flex ive  sense in which 
the action is expressed, the answer to the question about what or 
who is the object of the action of God's appearing is  the same, 
namely, YHWH. In His appearing, YHWH is  both the subject who causes 
the action and the object on which the action is accomplished. Thus 
the "appearance," the "presence" of YHWH is  YHWH Himself, is  Being
n0oc to v  c u p i ov construction of 2 Cor 5:8 which conveys the "face to 
face" idea in a conversation situation  (Robertson, p. 625). In Exod 
3:2 the Hebrew preposition ' e l , which appears also in Exod 6:3, 
requires the re flex ive  sense of niphal.
^Gesenius, pp. 137, 138; Motyer, pp. 12, 13. I t  is  possible, 
then, to see here a correct translation  of the Hebrew preposition 'el 
by the Greek wpoc (Gesenius, p. 51). Hence, ’<S*en must be re flex ive  
in order to match both the general preposition and the Hebrew niphal 
sense.
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i ts e lf .^  The “appearance" of YHWH and YHWH as Being in i t s e l f  (on
the "ontic" leve l) are the same, they are the one and same "ontic"
2
re a lity .  Between them there is no “gap," "chasm," or "chdrismos."
The ontological meaning of Exod 3:2, 14, as a unity, points, 
therefore, to  the “ontic presence" o f  God's Being as correlated to 
the "ontic presence" of Moses's human being (Dasein). The way in
Heidegger suggests that the naming of God "causes the High 
One Himself to appear in  words, not merely to te l l  of his dwelling- 
place, the Serene, the holy, not merely to name him with reference 
to his dwelling-place" ("Remembrance o f the Poet," in  Existence and 
Being, ed. W. Brock [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949J, p. 263).
In a sense, then, the tex t "makes God appear" as i t  connects God's 
ontic presence with an e x p lic it expression of the ground of Being 
providing in  that way theological (independent from philosophy) 
access to the re fle c tio n  on the primordial presupposition.
2
On the contrary, current theology understands God's appear­
ance by stressing the subject or source of such an appearance. God 
in Himself is  the "source" or "ground" of His appearance. But the 
"appearance" is  not God in Himself, but rather "as he appears." Thus 
the Platonic chorismos is  to be found a t the very heart of theologi­
cal in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in open contradiction to B ib lical in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  
which knows no gap or chasm whatsoever.
I t  should be noted, however, th a t there are some theologians, 
mostly OT scholars, who, conscious o f the niphal re flex ive  sense of 
the tex t, are able to grasp its  meaning as self-presentation. For 
instance, see Zimmerli, pp. 70-81; Q uell, p. 1064; Childs, pp. 88 , 
89; Kohler, p. 99; Noth, p. 257; Raoul Dederen, "Revelation, Insp ira­
tio n , and Hermeneutics," in A Symposium on B iblical Hermeneutics, 
ed. Gordon M. Hyde (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald Pub. Ass.,
1974), p. 6 ; and notably Buber, pp. 41, 116, 127. By the way, in 
the OT, the same verb in the same verbal form is used fo r referring  
to the "appearance" of man (1 Kgs 18:2) and things, fo r instance, 
dry land (Gen 1:19) and stones (1 Kgs 6 :18 ).
Even in Buber's statement th a t in the theophany we find  the 
"imageless presence o f the inv is ib le  Who permits Himself to be seen" 
(p. 127), no ontological conclusion is  reached, and, consequently, 
the old timeless primordial presupposition automatically f i l l s  the 
meaning fo r the dimensionality of reason's structure. Nonetheless, 
I  consider th a t OT scholarship c le a rty  points to the id e n tific a tio n  
of Being and appearance in B ib lica l ra tio n a lity . OT scholarship 
merely fa l ls  short o f reaching the obvious ontological meaning 
that Exod 3 :2 , 14, 15 expresses because of its  uncritica l acceptance 
of tra d itio n a l Greek epistemological and ontological categories.
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which Exod 3:2-15 expresses what happens as i t  thinks the happening 
and puts i t  into words reveals a basic ontological meaning which 
e n ta ils , or better requires, the authentic and to ta l re jection  of 
the classical analogia en tis  by elim inating its  ground, namely, the 
Platonic chOrismos. This B iblical in terp re ta tion  of the ground of 
Being as i t  co-appears with the supreme Being provides a c lear tem­
poral interpretation o f the primordial presupposition of reason's 
structure.
At this point care must be taken not to draw hasty conclu­
sions about the meaning o f God's being as given in the temporal 
dimension so as to a ffirm  without fu rth e r c la r if ic a tio n  the idea of 
God's temporality, which would be misleading. So fa r , time and tem­
p o ra lity  in general have been interpreted from the framework provided 
by trad itiona l timeless categories a fte r  the A ris to te lian  model 
which makes time the realm o f what is  not Being, of what is  not re a l, 
of what develops. The en tire  idea o f time and development is  con­
sidered as "imperfect" and as a lower expression o f Being and 
r e a l ity .
The Bible shows a d iffe ren t in terp retation  of the primordial 
presupposition. I t  denies that that which appears is "mere” appear­
ance which needs to be denied so that Being in its  real meaning,
A sim ilar situation can be seen in the area of systematic theology 
where some theologians are also conscious of the being-appearance 
id e n tific a tio n  at least im p lic it ly . Carsten Johnsen c le a rly  denies 
the Platonic chorismos a t i ts  epistemological level when he under­
lines that " i t  is again our unfortunate trad itio n a l trend of dichoto­
mizing almost any re a lity  that passes through our disrupted minds. 
In th is  present case i t  is  nothing less than God Himself who is  'cut 
to pieces’ by our foolish dualist mania" ( The Maligned God [Mezien, 
France: The Untold Story Publishers, 1980], p. 243).
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significance, and in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  may be reached. For B iblical 
ra tio n a lity  the revelatory appearance is  Being, r e a l ity  i ts e lf ,  
God as He is in Himself. This im plies, in the language I have 
chosen to express the B ib lica l in terpretation  of reason's dimension­
a l ity ,  that God is temporal.
Yet the meaning of whatever God's temporality may mean is 
to be derived from His appearance as a whole (as extended in time) 
and not to be deduced from the classical in terp retation  of temporal- 
ity --n o t even the Heideggerian in terpretation  of time. Such a deduc­
tion considers and applies time as a category of His Being. On the 
other hand, the B ib lical te x t as so fa r  analyzed introduces time as 
ground of Being and dimensionality o f reason but not as category. 
Thus there is no cognitive basis to in te rp re t temporality in re lation  
to the Being of God. What God's tem porality means is  to be dis­
covered as God's Being and God’ s temporality co-appear in the "ontic- 
presence" of God. To get a glimpse of what God's tem porality may 
mean implies to have at the same time a glimpse of what God's Boing 
may mean. And to have such a glimpse does entail a modification 
of our own idea of what both Being and Time may mean.
Being its e lf  is not to be understood by denying that that 
which appears in time is  what the classical Parmenidean timeless pre­
supposition requires, but rather by affirm ing that what appears in 
time is  Being and God Himself. The te x t not only points to the 
id en tifica tio n  of Being-appearance with the exegetical idea of 
Presence as the ontic ground for both the B ib lica l understanding of 
God and Being but also shows that God’ s "ontic presence" is  not to
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be identified with the m aterial place of His appearance,^ but with
His words. Hence, the meaning o f God’ s Being does not have to  be
related  to the material place in  which His presence appears but, as
in Exod 3:2, 14, 15, basically to God's words. The Being of God is
2
"present" and at the same time "revealed" through and in His words.
I t  must be noted that the being-appearance " id en tific a tio n "  
is  a dynamic one which must not be understood as related or lim ited  
to the particular material nature of the element involved in i t ,  in 
th is  case, f i r e .  God is Himself in the f i r e  but He is not f i r e .  To 
express this fact new epistemological categories need to  be 
created. Our trad itiona l categories are of no use to express th is  
re a l ity  because a ll  of them have been shaped w ithin the timeless 
in terpretation of the primordial presupposition.
That Moses did not understand God to be f i r e  is made c le a r in 
the text by its  use of the beth essentiae (Buber, p. 117) which 
indicates that the f ir e  was the place of the "presence" but not the 
presence i ts e lf  of YHWH (Motyer, p. 14). Moreover, the te x t makes 
c lear that even when Moses saw the unusual scene of a f i r e  which was 
not consuming the bush, he did not grasp the presence of the Lord 
ju s t because of th is extraordinary event. The actual presence of 
YHWH was rather perceived by Moses when God spoke.
2
Noth, p. 40; Dederen, p. 6 . I t  is to be discussed fu rth e r, 
perhaps in some other place, how those theophanies in which God 
appears in the form of an angel, a w arrior, or even the highest theo- 
phany ever, Christ, should be understood in re la tio n  to God’ s Being. 
As a general approach I suggest that those theophanies would be 
be tte r understood i f  approached on the basis of a temporal under­
standing of the ground of Being. The coherent and complete analysis  
of Biblical theophanies add positive insight in the study of God’ s 
Being and its  dimensionality. The case of Christ is perhaps the 
deepest and most complex. No previously-defined ontological cate­
gories can be applied to C hrist. Categories must appear as the 
ephapax of Christ's  re a lity  is studied. This approach, that follows  
the theo-onto-logical ordo revealed in Exod 3:14, 15, e n ta ils  an 
ontological revolution.
Moltmann perceives th is  change from afar o ff when he says 
th a t "with the Christian message of the cross of Christ, something 
new and strange has entered the metaphysical world. For th is  fa ith  
must understand deity of God from the event of the suffering and 
death of the Son of God and thus bring about a fundamental change in 
the orders of being of metaphysical thought and the value tables of 
re lig ious fee ling” (The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the
Foundation and Criticism  of Christian Theology LNew York: Harper 5
Row, I9/4J, p. 215). Moltmann, fo I lowing B ib lic a l insights, is  able
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A dditionally, in the Exod 3:14, 15 parallelism , God's Being appears 
in temporal "extension" in  the three modes of time (p ast, present, 
and fu tu re ) .
Thus, i t  can be seen that Exod 3:14 points to  a temporal 
in terpretation  of the primordial presupposition of B ib lic a l ration­
a lity .  Yet, in providing a temporal interpretation o f Being's dimen­
s io n a lity , Exod 3:2, 14, 15 does not deny the c lass ica l analogia 
entis, because in order to  deny i t ,  i t  would be necessary to accept 
its  r e a l ity .  Analogia en tis  is rather le f t  groundless by B iblical 
ra tio n a lity  as there is  not even the s lightest suggestion o f anything 
like  the Platonic chbrismos. Yet, the analogical procedure as such 
is not to be dismissed but rather to stand in need o f being re in te r­
preted w ith in  the context provided by the temporal prim ordial presup­
position o f B ib lica l ra tio n a lity .^
to have th is  “in tu itio n "  which he, nonetheless, does not develop. 
As he goes on in his Christological investigation, he soon finds him­
se lf using the old tim eless categories o f Greek metaphysical origin  
and forgetting  the ontological implications of his own in tu itio n .
The emphasis on the ontological relevance o f God's words as 
essentia lly  integrated to His "presence," "appearance," or "being" 
is pointed out in John 9:37 regarding Christ. Jesus speaks what he 
has seen (he knows) (Francis J. Moloney, The Johannine Son of Man 
[Rome: t ib re r ia  Ateneo Salesiano, 1976], ppT 154, Ib b ). Bultmann
affirms th a t Christ, as the Word ( Logos) , “is  not an event recurring
within the temporal world, but is eternal being" ( The Gospel of John: 
A Commentary [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971J, p. 21). I t  is
to Be remembered that Bultmann follows the tra d it io n a l, timeless
in terpretation  regarding the "eternal” being of God, y e t  his identi­
fica tio n  between Logos and being comes from the te x t in  which Logos 
refers to God’s - BeTng including the nuance of communication arvJ
expression included in the correlated “revelation" idea. Thus, i t  
is not possible to is o la te  God’ s Being from His words. Both God's 
presence and His words are essential elements of His Being. God’ s 
Being cannot be grasped as presence apart from His words.
^Analogia en tis  is  denied as a procedure which assumes for its  
existence and m eaningthe timeless primordial presupposition. Yet
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In short, Exod 3:14, 15 and its  context express both the 
dimensionality—namely, tem porality*— and the structural ordo—
an analogical procedure can be thought and applied within the tem­
poral interpretation of the primordial presupposition. The basic 
difference between both analogical procedures is  that the analogia 
entis requires discontinuity w ith the in te l l ig ib i l i t y  of what is  
given in the realm of "appearances" or temporality. The temporal 
analogical procedure, on the other hand, requires the continuity of 
the meaning and in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  of what is given in the realm of 
"appearances" with that re a lity  which is  beyond the d irect reach of 
reason's capabilities.
^Here B ib lica l ra t io n a lity  parts ways with trad itional ph ilo ­
sophical ra tio n a lity  and w ith every single possible philosophical 
interpretation of ra t io n a lity , such as Heidegger's, S artre 's , and 
Merleau-Ponty's, that accepts the temporal interpretation of the p r i­
mordial presupposition. At f i r s t  glance such a radical departure, 
a complete departure from even those philosophies which share the 
same understanding of Being's dimensionality that the Bible holds, 
seems to be extreme and u n ju s tified . I f  the Bible and Heidegger's 
philosophy, fo r instance, work w ithin the same basic in terpretation  
of Being's dimensionality, why is  i t  not possible to use the already- 
developed Heideggerian ontology and i ts  categories for an accurate, 
rational interpretation of the B ib lica l message and for the constitu­
tion  of theological meanings?
To attempt such an enterprise, however, would imply that 
neither the B ib lical idea o f "ontic presence" as theophany nor the 
real revolutionary in te lle c tu a l movement of Heidegger's overcoming 
of metaphysical thought have been correctly understood. The B ib lica l 
interpretation of the primordial presupposition requires reason to 
think from appearance and in continuity with i t .  Both B iblical w riters  
and Heidegger do so. Yet between them, so to speak, there is  an 
absolute chorismos, namely, the chorismos o f fa ith . In other words, 
fo r Heidegger, fo r phenomenology as a whole, and for much of current 
theology (fo r instance Bultmann's) God ju s t does not appear. 
Heidegger accepts no manifestation of God in the present. Past mani­
festations are not relevant today, thus our time is understood as 
a godless time (Patricca, pp. 68 , 69). Heidegger's problem as he 
approaches the in terp retation  o f God is his trad itional onto-theo- 
logical order. His in te rp re ta tion  of the ontos, surely enough, 
d iffe rs  from the trad itio n a l one, yet he s t i l l  applies i t  to theology 
in the same old onto-theo-logical way that hinders the text from 
revealing its  ontological content.
For B ib lical ra t io n a lity , however, God does appear. Thus, 
should the Heideggerian categories be used as ontological and ep iste- 
mological frameworks of the structure of reason, the classical onto- 
theo-logical order, which is  grounded in the timeless Parmenidean 
interpretation of Being dim ensionality, would be applied instead of
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namely, theo-onto -log ica l--in  which the Biblical in te rp re ta tion  of 
reason appears and functions J  Thus the necessary basis fo r suggest­
ing the poss ib ility  of a c ritic ism  of theological reason has been 
reached. Yet, in order that the complete picture may be at least 
introduced i t  is necessary to have at least an introductory glance 
of the way in which the primordial presupposition of reason's struc­
ture of B ib lica l ra t io n a lity  is  seen from the viewpoint of the epis- 
temological framework.
Epistemological Frame­
work: Being and Logos
Since the phenomenological analysis of Exod 3:14, 15 grounds
the temporal in terpretation of the primordial presupposition of the
the theo-onto- lo g ic a l o rd e r of B ib lica l ra tio n a lity . In using 
Heideggerian categories, reason would be working with an incomplete 
framework both ontological and epistemological which would, in the 
f in a l analysis, d is to rt theological meaning as i t  constitutes i t .  
More than tha t, reason would be working with inadequate categories 
since Heidegger's ontological categories are bu ilt from the analysis 
of only part of the ontic re a l ity  that is  available, namely, things 
and man. In order to have a complete picture of the ontological 
framework to be used by theological reason, theologians working with 
Heideggerian categories are forced to apply to God via analogy the 
categories that properly belong e ith er to man or to things. Yet a 
being can be understood only with those categories th a t belong to 
i t  essen tia lly . Thus, theological reason needs, in order to be able 
to function properly, coherently, and systematically, to  have com­
plete understanding of the ontological framework which needs to 
include in f i r s t  place the discovery of those categories that pertain  
to God's Being. To accomplish th a t, the only way is  to le t  God 
appear in the theo-onto-logical order o f B iblical ra t io n a lity .
^Beyond that, no ontological re flec tio n  is developed. There 
is no technical expression of the ontological framework to be found 
either in Exodus or in the Bible as a whole. The development and 
technical ontological expression of the B iblical understanding of 
the ontological framework o f reason's structure is a task that s t i l l  
needs to be done.
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theo-onto-logical structure of theological reason from the viewpoint 
of the ontos,the analysis regarding how the primordial presupposition 
is  seen from the cognitive epistemological viewpoint requires the  
selection, from Scriptures, of a passage which would address Being 
(YHWH) from the perspective of the epistemological framework, th a t  
is , of the categories and cognitive processes that the subject is  
supposed to have and follow in order to  grasp and constitute meanings 
regarding both theos and Being according to B ib lica l ra tio n a lity .
Even when in this regard many texts could be chosen, the  
Exodus 6:2-7 passage, which is found within the same narrative that 
accounts fo r the development of Moses's mission of liberation which 
was grounded in Exod 3:14, 15 and i ts  ontological meaning, seems to  
be particu larly  enlighteningJ Yet, the phenomenological analysis
Additionally, this passage is chosen as representative of 
the B ib lical approach to the epistemological framework and its  dimen­
s iona lity  because even when i t  does not pertain to the same lite ra ry  
context to which Exod 3:14, 15 belongs, Exod 6:2-7 is  closely re lated  
to i t  appearing in the same n arra tiv e . The Exod 6:2-7 passage 
appears as having Exod 3:14, 15 as i t s  antecedent and ground. Exod 
6:2-7 appears in a d ifferen t h is to rica l and l ite ra ry  context than 
Exod 3:14, 15. Yet, as my b r ie f phenomenological approach suggests 
th is  text is connected to its  antecedent in Exod 3:14, 15 as YHWH 
appears again w ithin the general thematic context of the mission of 
deliverance that was co-grounded w ith the expression and in terp re ta ­
tion  of theos-Being (Exod 3:14, 15). Consequently, Exod 6:2-7 is  
also relevant fo r our analysis due to the fact that i t  pertains to the 
same early original theological re fle c tio n  to which Exod 3:14, 15 
belongs.
As the inner thematic and h is to rica l relationship that exists  
between Exod 3:14, 15 and Exod 6:2-7  has been expressed in d iffe re n t  
ways by d iffe ren t scholars, I take no time to show i t .  See fo r  
instance, Motyer, pp. 17, 24; and Quell, p. 1071. Furthermore, Exod 
6:2-7 does not appear as a mere repetition  of Exod 3:14, 15,
but rather as its  dynamic progression. Moreover, i t  should be remem­
bered that the philosophical context already showed the foundational 
ro le  that the interpretation of the ontological framework and i ts  
dimensionality play in the in terp re ta tion  of reason. In other words.
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of th is  te x t as i t  is going to be developed in  the following pages 
has not the purpose of discovering whether B ib lica l ra t io n a lity  is  
b u ilt  upon a timeless or temporal in terpretation  of reason's and 
Being's dimensionality. The purpose o f the b r ie f  ensuing phenomeno­
logical glance at Exod 6:2-7^ is  rather to see i f  B ib lical ra t io n a l­
i ty ,  as i t  is  focused and expressed from the concern and viewpoint 
cf the epistemological framework, recognizes and is  constructed on 
the recognition of the temporal in terpretation  o f Being's dimension­
a l ity  as grounded and expressed in the foundational Exod 3:14, 15 
passage.^
i t  is  seen that the basic nature, in te rp re ta tion , and categories of 
reason are grounded in the in terpretation  of the ontological side 
of reason's structure and not from the in terpretation  of its  ep is te ­
mological side.
^"And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord: 
and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob,- By the name 
of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to  them. 
And I have also established my covenant with them, to give them the 
land of Canaan, the land o f th e ir  pilgrimage, wherein they were 
strangers. And I have also heard the groaning of the children of 
Is rae l, whom the Egyptians keep in bondage and I have remembered my 
covenant. Wherefore say unto the children o f Is ra e l, I am the Lord, 
and I w il l  bring you out from under the burdens of the Eygptians, 
and I w il l  r id  you out of th e ir  bondage, and I w il l  redeem you with  
a stretched-out arm, and w ith  great judgments: and I w il l  take you 
to me fo r a people, and I w i l l  be to you a God: and ye shall know 
that I am the Lord your God, which bringeth you out from under the 
burdens "of the Egyptians" (Exod 6 :2 -7 ). (Emphasis supplied.)
^The brevity of my approach to the phenomenological analysis 
of Exod 6:2-7 is due not only to the fact that within the context 
and purposes o f th is d issertation  i t  appears as a corollary to the 
phenomenological analysis o f Exod 3:14, 15 and its  conclusions but 
also to the fac t that the scholarly discussion that has been con­
nected with i t  is not related to my epistemological concerns. Schol­
arly  discussions on Exod 6:2-7  have been mainly related to issues 
pertaining to the h istorica l c r it ic a l  method. In this context Exod 
6:2-7 appears as a key te x t in the discussion of Source C ritic ism  
in which two sources of the Pentateuch (J and E) have been found
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Within th is  context, and due to  the complementary role th a t 
the viewpoint expressed by Exod 6:2-7  plays regarding the main pur­
pose o f th is investigation, the phenomenological analysis of th is  
passage to be developed here w ill be res tric ted  to pinpointing only 
those aspects of i t  that may provide an introductory view to the 
basic understanding o f the primordial presupposition on which B ib l i ­
cal cognitive procedures are constituted. Consequently a complete 
phenomenological study of this passage is  not intended here.
The question fo r the meaning o f Being necessarily involves 
a cognitive process, namely, reason or logos. Since knowledge is  
essentia lly  involved in  any ontological re flec tio n ,^  the meaning of 
Being stems not only from God’ s appearance but also from the way in  
which such "appearance" is  known. Appearance, "presence," implies 
the knowledge of i t ,  otherwise there would be no "appearance" at a l l .
At th is point the problem appears to be more complex than
the one presented by the analysis o f the Being-appearance re la tio n ­
ship because knowledge, as the "tool" fo r understanding, has been
consistently used in  i ts  trad itiona l in te rp re ta tion  which is dogmati-
2
c a lly  applied fo r the constitution o f theological meaning.
(Mo ty e r ,  p. 3); Butterworth, p. 45). However, due to the epistemolog­
ica l purpose of my analysis, I shall omit the discussion of the many 
implications and possible theories th a t th is  te x t suggests in the
context and from the viewpoint of the h is to rica l c r i t ic a l  method.
^See p. 35, n. 4 above.
2
See chapter 2 above. Therefore to speak o f reason in theo­
logical c ircles means to speak of “pure" or "abstract," “s c ie n tif ic ,"  
timeless reason. There is no "concrete" or "h is to rica l"  reason work­
ing on the assumption of a temporal primordial presupposition. What
is called "concrete" and "h isto rica l" reason is  understood on the
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Knowing “Being its e lf"
Obviously, Exod 6:2 is  a kind of introduction to the 6:3-7
passage th a t follows. I t  is  also apparent th a t vs. 2 stands in  close
parallelism  to Exod 3:14, 15. I t  can even be said that vs. 2 is  
expanding the 3:14, 15 paralle lism . The connection to both what 
follows (vss. 3-7) and what preceeds i t  (3:14, 15) is made by pro­
nouncing the same name whose sound-meaning has ju s t been revealed J
Moses's and the people's concern is now centered in the prob- 
2
lem of knowing God. Consequently, God proceeds to explain the way
assumption of a timeless primordial presupposition. By the way, i t  
should be remembered, as was pointed out in chapter 1 above, that 
contemporary philosophical critic ism  of reason is beginning to 
develop a temporal in terpretation  of reason and its  primordial pre­
supposition. However, such an interpretation has not as ye t been 
considered by theological epistemology.
^The 'Sni YHWH expression certa in ly  is  d iffe ren t from the 
'ehyeh 'Ssher 'ehyeh construction or even from the ' ehyeh in  3:14. 
Yet, 1 Sni YHflff is  to be considered in Exod 6:2 as bearing and 
expressing the ontological meaning revealed in Exod 3:14, 15.
Obviously the idea of oath is  not d irectly  linked to the name Yahweh
in Exod 3:14, 15 as i t  appears to be in Exod 6 :8 . However, as the
idea of oath is that of personal commitment, i t  seems th a t i t  was
already im p lic it ly  present at the very foundation of the ontological
statement o f Exod 3:14, 15. Anyway, 'ani YHWH cannot be reduced to 
the simple idea of oath. On the contrary, the idea of oath—personal 
commitment— must be included in the essence of the broad meaning of 
God's Being. See Manuel O liva, "Revelacion del nombre de Yahweh en 
la 'H is to ria  Sacerdotal' Ex 6 , 2-8," B iblica 52 (1971): 17. In Exod 
6:2, then, i t  is assumed th a t Yahweh has a particu lar ontological 
meaning and even a revelatory function.
2
Moses has the same kind of re a lis t ic  attitude that he mani­
fested in receiving his mission now that he sees the mission pro­
gressing in  a d ifferen t d irection  than expected, namely, as he sees 
the mission fa ilin g  instead of succeeding (Exod 5:22, 23). Again, 
on th is  occasion Moses's remarks regarding the progress of his 
mission were accurate and r ig h t to the point. A divine answer was 
necessary. Consequently, God provided an answer following the same 
pattern th a t was set up in Exod 3:14, 15, yet expanding them a l i t t l e  
further and stressing th is  time the way in which the knowledge of
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cognition is to be handled in order that God as Being may be reached.
Verse 3, referring to two moments in the history o f salva­
tion  J  speaks about both God's Being and the knowledge of God. The
2
f i r s t  clause speaks about God's appearance—that is ,  God's Being. 
The second clause speaks about the knowledge of God. Obviously, both 
clauses are essentia lly  part of the same ontological dimension we 
are interested in , yet each one approaches the same revelatory dynam­
ics from a d iffe re n t viewpoint.
Both clauses are connected through the use of what exegetes
God should be approached, an issue which was neither presented nor 
developed in Exod 3:14, 15.
^One moment refers to the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob 
when God "appeared'' as (beth essentiae) 'e l Shadday. A second moment 
refers to the Exodus event when God revealed the meaning o f His 
"sound-name" YHWH as expressing Being. Because of lack o f space i t  
is not possible to analyze here the way in  which the recently- 
revealed meaning of God's name re lates to Yahweh's previous appear­
ances; c f. Motyer, pp. 30, 31. For an introduction to the study of 
the meaning and B iblical occurrences of '51 Shadday, see Motyer, 
pp. 29-31, especially p. 28, n. 73.
2
The meaning of God's Being springs from the whole o f His 
extended appearances. Thus i t  springs also from His appearances to 
Abraham as 'e l Shadday. Yet Abraham already knew the utterance of 
God’ s "sound-name I Gen 12:7). 'e l Shadday was a name ( t i t l e )  used 
by God in order to illuminate human knowledge of His Being at that 
particu lar time even though its  ontological relevance would not be 
understood except a fte r the revelation of the meaning of His name. 
Thus the ontological dimension was, of course, present in Abraham's 
time, but only im p lic itly . The name Yahweh was also present as 
"sound-name" whose meaning was unknown at the time, but which was 
already im p lic it ly  expressing the ontological dimension th a t under­
girds the whole of God's a c t iv it ie s . What was not yet given was the 
ontological in terpretation of the meaning of the name of God as the 
"sound-name." Exod 6:3 in re ferring  to "appearance" is  pointing, 
im p lic itly , to the ontological leve l, even though the ontological 
status of such "appearance" can be e x p lic it ly  grasped only a fte r  the 
Exod 3:14, 15 ontological revelation.
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call beth essentiae.  ^ In the f i r s t  clause, which speaks about God's 
appearance, beth obviously has an essential meaning since God's 
appearance expresses His essence and provides the ground fo r men's 
knowledge of Him. The second clause, however, speaks about the know­
ledge of God. In th is  context the name appears as a means that is  
designed to lead theological re fle c tio n  to the knowledge of the 
essence of God's Being. The name ("sound-name" and its  revealed 
meaning) is  the means which enlightens the way the knowledge of God 
is supposed to be approached. Yet, the name is not YHWH. The “ontic 
appearance" is YHWH. Thus, in the f i r s t  clause beth points not to 
the means or that in  which knowledge is  supposed to be approached 
but rather to the essential id e n tif ic a tio n  between YHWH and His
The connection between 'e l Shadda and YHWH in  Exod 6:3 is 
established by means of a Hebrew construction with beth which is  
e x p lic it ly  used in the f i r s t  part of the comparison and only e l l i p t i -  
ca lly  understood in the second (Motyer, p. 14). As the meaning of 
th is  special construction is investigated, i t  must be borne in mind 
that Exod 6:3 expresses an an tith e tica l comparison th a t involves the 
ontological ("appearance") and epistemological ("knowledge") frame­
works of reason's structure. Hence, the precise meaning to which 
beth points cannot be the same in each part of the a n tith e tica l com­
parison because i t  depends on the content to which beth re fers , which 
in each case is d iffe re n t.
Butttrworth explains that beth may have three possiole mean­
ings in th is  kind of context; namely, i t  can be interpreted as beth 
essentiae, meaning "in the manner o f ,"  “in the capacity of;" i t  can 
be interpreted as casus pendens, meaning “as to my name Yahweh;" and 
i t  can be also interpreted in an instrumental sense such as, fo r  
instance, "by," or "through" my name (p. 50). Exod 6:3 has been 
understood as an example of the use o f beth essentiae meaning "in 
the character of" (Kaiser, Toward an Old Testament theology, p. 106; 
Buber, p. 49; Motyer, p. 14), so th a t the name is seen as revealing 
the character, a ttrib u tes , q u a litie s , and essence of the person 
designated (Kaiser, Toward an Old Testament Theology, p. 106). Yet, 
as the name in i ts e l f  does not revea 1 God's essence, but rather 
points to i t ,  i t  seems that both the e x p lic it  and im p lic it use of 
beth in Exod 6:3 should be understood in  an instrumental sense.
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appearance. In the second clause, the e l l ip t ic a l ly  understood beth 
points to the knowledge o f God's Being (His ontic appearance) which 
is  to be reached through the revelatory means provided by the onto­
logical meaning of His “sound-name." Yet, as the name is not YHWH 
Him selfJ i t  only points to the cognitive approach to be followed 
as the meaning of God's Being is  searched fo r.
YHWH appears here in the context of the epistemological
framework; that is to say, in a context in which the knowledge of
2
God as cognitive process is  being thought about. In th is  cognitive  
context the name is a center o f lig h t . What kind of knowledge does 
the name, and th is  text as a whole, point to  or reveal? In order 
to answer th is question i t  is necessary to take at least a quick look 
at the niphal perfect form in which the verb yadac is used in vs. 
3, namely, nodact i .
I t  is interesting to note that Exod 6:3b, which sees the 
ontological dimension from the viewpoint of i ts  involved logos, uses 
the same re flex ive  idea th a t is  found in Exod 3:2, when the onto­
logical dimension is approached from the perspective of i ts  grounding 
appearance. 3 Since yada* in i ts  niphal form is  a revelational term
^ee Rafael Criado, "Valor hipostatico del nombre divino en 
el Antiguo Testamento,1’ Estudios Biblicos 12 (1953) :272-16, 345-76.
7
Thus the name provides the necessary link  between the onto­
logical and epistemological frameworks as i t  expresses th e ir  inner 
unity grounded in the temporal dimensionality of Being and reason. 
This link is necessary to provide the foundation fo r reason’ s 
coherence and .system.
3 eIn th is  case the preposition 1 may require the passive
sense of niphal (Gesenius, pp. 381, 50TT7 However, the re fle x iv e
idea is also possible (Holladay, p. 129). In Exod 6:3, J_ is  to be
translated as i f  used with a dative of advantage (Holladay, p. 168)
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which refers to the knowledge o f  the essence of God H im self,' the 
text speaks about le tt in g  God Himself be known.
As in the case when Being is  considered from the viewpoint 
of i ts  "ontic appearance,” here, when Being is considered from the 
viewpoint of its  knowledge, the fa c t that no “gap," "chasm," or 
“chorismos" is suggested by the te x t as the ground fo r knowledge 
implies that the Bible develops i ts  epistemological framework on a
which is  precisely the LXX rendering (o u t o i c ), which en ta ils  a 
re flex ive  sense. The re fle x iv e  idea is also suggested, w ithin the 
immediate context, by the wa'era' which in its  f i r s t  person singular 
points to the cause, o r ig in , or source of what is  to  be known, 
namely, YHWH, placing the object to be known ( YHWH) beyond any 
possible chorismos. This ontological idea of "appearance" which was 
already present in Exod 3:2 , 14, 15 finds its  epistemological coun­
te rp a rt in the noda* t i  which also in a niphal form presents God as 
the one who causes the cognitive a c tiv ity  [by His "appearance" 
w a'era ') and at the same time who is the object of the cognitive 
action of man.
In a more d is tan t context, the reflex ive sense is  also sug­
gested regarding the epistemological framework in Num 12:5, which 
also deals with God's revelatory process. Num 12:6 uses the hithpael 
form ' etwadd? which has a clear re flex ive  sense. I f  God le t  Him self 
be known in lesser revelatory occurrence (through dreams "bahalom), 
He would not do less in the case o f a "higher" or "closer" revelatory  
experience as in the case of Moses (face to face, mouth to mouth, 
“peh ' e lp e h " ).
Furthermore, the LXX transla tion  of n5dact i  by SsnXuoa 
c le a rly  stresses the ac tive  side of the reflexive niphal in Exod 
6:3b. Even i f  the passive sense of yadac in niphal is  t r ie d , God 
would s t i l l  appear as the object of the verb, namely, that what is 
known is  God as He appears (w a 'e ra ') .  Such passive meaning would 
suggest that man is able to know God by his own in it ia t iv e  and. cogni­
t iv e  powers. Yet the te x t as a whole points to a d iffe re n t kind of 
knowledge as i t  shows th a t God is known as He acts and “appears" in 
His “ontic-presence." Then, a passive rendering which would suggest 
a kind of cognitive contemplatio originated in man is absent from the 
in terpretation  that the te x t expresses. In short, the re flex ive  
sense should be preferred over against the passive sense of the 
Hebrew niphal.
'According to Jenni, yada* in  its  niphal form means 
"selbstkundgabe," "sich zu erkennen geben," "sich-kundgeben," which 
le t  God’ s essence to be known (pp. 693, 694).
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temporal understanding of the primordial presupposition of reason's 
structure.
In vs. 3 the verb in niphal ( nodae t i ) presents God as the 
one who causes the cognitive a c t iv ity  (the revealing, the appearing, 
the disclosure of His Being) and, at the same time, the one who is 
the object of such action, namely, the one who is supposed to be 
known through the cognitive a c t iv ity  caused by His revealing Himself.
Moreover, the same God who from the perspective of the onto­
logical framework is seen as appearing as He is  in Himself is  also 
seen from the perspective of the epistemological framework as the 
one who is  to be known as He is  in Himself. Thus, according to  the 
B iblical in terpretation  of knowledge, God Himself appears as He is 
as the subject matter to be known by theological reason. 1
Consequently, in B ib lic a l ra t io n a lity , Being and revelation
2
belong together. The knowledge of God is  d ire c tly  grounded on His 
Being since, according to the meaning o f God's "sound-name" provided 
by Exod 3:14, 15, i t  is  God's Being in i t s e l f  in His mystery that 
is  opened up fo r human knowledge. In th is  context the theos-Being 
idea is to be seen as playing the theos ro le  fo r reason's system in
^ t  seems also apparent that the personal dimension of Being 
and knowledge which is suggested by the use of the f i r s t  person 
singular is  a pattern that cannot be ignored in the texts we are 
considering. See Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 113; Cole, p. 20; 
and Butterworth, p. 49.
2
Being points to the "ontic” realm of onto-logy, while reve­
la tion  points to its  cognitive realm (on to -logy) . Being provides 
the ground and realm fo r revelation; revelation  happens in Being. 
On the other hand, revelation provides access to Being; without reve­
la tion  and i ts  cognitive access to Being there would be no Being. 
Being is "appearance" and "appearance" en ta ils  a cognitive subject
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theology,^ that is , as playing the ro le  o f the philosophical ONE, 
yet in  a temporal dimensionality.
The temporal dimension­
a l i t y  of B ib lical logos
I t  is  necessary, now, to inquire about the kind of knowledge 
that the Exod 6:2-7 passage suggests. Is i t  an in te lle c tu a l or prac­
t ic a l  kind of knowledge? Most theologians see the Bible as a
2
whole working with a "personal," "practica l" kind of knowledge. In
to whom Being ("appears"). Furthermore, Being is reve lation , since 
i t  is  what is known in its  “appearance."
*0n the basis that Christ is one of those appearances of the 
theos-Being, he is the ONE which provides the unity and coherence 
or meaning of the whole (metaphysics) from within i t s e l f  as i t  devel­
ops. In th is  sense statements such as &vaKc$aXaiuoaoeai to iovto  
tv  iu  Xpioxu ( Eph 1:10), and Yva n$ o 9eoc uavxo cv irSaiv 
(1 Cor 15:28) should be studied as a development of the ontological 
idea o f One and as providing at the same time further insights into  
the system of B iblical ra tio n a lity .
From the perspective of OT theology, Gerhard Hasel sees that 
"God is  the dynamic, unifying center of the OT" (Old Testament Theol-  
ogy: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. LGrand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 19/b, p. 100). Discussing the unifying center of OT theo­
logy, Hasel further remarks that "an OT theology which recognizes 
God as the dynamic unifying center is not forced into making the cen­
te r  a s ta tic  organizing p rinc ip le . With God as the dynamic, unify­
ing center, the OT allows the B ib lica l w ritings or blocks of writings  
to speak fo r themselves in that th e ir  individual theologies are 
allowed to emerge" (p. 102). And "in affirm ing God as the dynamic 
unifying center of the OT we also a ffirm  that th is center cannot be 
forced into a static organizing p rinc ip le  on the basis of which an 
OT theology can be structured" ( ib id .)  And: "This affirm ation means 
that we have anticipated what we la te r  describe as the emergence of 
the 'hidden inner un ity '"  ( ib id . ) .  This makes clear th a t the B ib li­
cal ordo is an ordo ad Deum as in Thomas and Bultmann, which, none­
theless, as i t  works in a temporal dimensionality, is  also at the 
same time an ordo ad Christum Cf. ib id . ,  pp. 99, 100.
2
Jenni provides a sample of the trad itio n a l in terpretation  
of the nature of B ib lica l knowledge. According to Jenni, the kind
of knowledge in which the Bible as a whole is expressed is not an 
" in te lle c tu a l"  kind of knowledge but rather a "personal," "practical"
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th is respect i t  can be seen that the passage under consideration does 
not lead to  an “in te lle c tu a l” in terpretation  o f knowledge, i f  " in te l­
lectual" is  interpreted exclusively as pertaining to the abstract 
in terp retation  of i t  provided by classical philosophical trad ition .^  
Yet, as the in terpretation  of “in te lle c tu a l"  knowledge may be under­
stood otherwise, i t  is  necessary to ask the text about i ts  own 
in terp re tation  of knowledge and its  in te lle c tu a lity  without tying 
dogmatically the idea o f " in te llec tu a l"  to its  Greek timeless 
in te rp re ta tio n .
Yadac appears in the Exod 6:2-7 passage again in  vs. 7, this
?
time in a clear future sense. The future idea appears as the climax
one related  mainly to the behavior realm and including, at the same 
time, an ind irect reference to the deity as in "be acquainted w ith,"  
"to be concerned about," "to care," "acknowledge," and "recognize" 
(p. 694). Zimmerli goes a l i t t l e  fa rth e r and recognizes that yadac
has not a “purely in te lle c tu a l meaning" as i t  includes the f u l l  force 
of "recognize" and "accept" (p. 44).
H o  conclude that the Bible follows a "personal" kind of 
knowledge over against an " in te llec tu a l"  one entails the dogmatic 
acceptance of the Greek timeless in terp re ta tion  of reason and its  
in te lle c tu a lity . This is  to impose upon the text and the Bible, in 
general, an extra -B ib lica l cognitive structure which does violence 
to i t  at the very foundation of its  in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .  The in terpreta­
tion of the "kind" of knowledge our te x t and the Bible as a whole 
represents cannot be decided on an ex tra -B ib lica l in terpretation  of 
the theory of knowledge; on the contrary, i t  rather must be dis­
covered from a phenomenological analysis of B iblical ra tio n a lity . 
The Philosophy of Science reveals that a tru ly  sc ien tific  enterprise 
follows a method of investigation whose main lines and procedures 
stem from the nature of the given re a lity  which is to be investigated 
(Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978], pp. 203, 204). Hence, the idea of B ib lical “in te lle c ­
tu a lity "  depends on the in terp retation  of the nature of the subject- 
matter to  which reason re fe rs , namely, God and re a lity  as a whole.
2
The future sense and its  relevance for the theological 
enterprise has been properly grasped and expressed by Moltmann 
(Theology of Hope, pp. 100, 118). Yet Moltmann's understanding is
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is reached in  a construction in  which the flow of meaning progresses 
(in  parallelism  to Exod 3:14, 15) from past in to  present and fu tu re . 
In vss. 3 and 4 the past ec-stasis of knowing God appears, in  c lear 
parallelism  to  Exod 3:15a, as the tex t proceeds to give fu rth e r  
information regarding YHWH as the God of the Fathers, a mighty God 
who entered in to  a covenant re lationship  with His people. Verses 
5 and 6 open the text and its  thought to the present ec-stasis  in 
knowing God as God's present evaluation of the current s itu a tio n  in 
which Israel finds i ts e lf  is  repeated and connected to the name YHWH, 
whose meaning is  to be understood from His presence in the present. 1 
Yet, th is present meaning, in order to be, must be related and con­
nected to the past from which i t  comes: " I have remembered my cove­
nant" (Exod 6 :5b ), and to the fu tu re  toward which i t  goes as pointed
out by the promise (Exod 6 :6 , 7 ) .  Thus the progression of meaning
2
in the tex t flows from the past in to  the present, and toward the
sadly unbalanced as the future aspect of the promise is overempha­
sized and the a ll-in c lu s ive  progression of meaning in the te x t (Exod 
6:3-7) is forgotten along with the extension-tension re lationship  
among past, present, and future from which B ib lic a l meanings spring.
Hhe present tense in Exod 6 ( as a historical moment) is  d i f ­
ferent from the present in Exod 3. The schema and basic in te rp re ta ­
tion of what a knowledge of God en ta ils  is , however, the same in both 
passages.
2
I t  is  possible to appreciate here the d ifferent dimension 
in which B ib lic a l reason moves. Plato has also an anamnesis that 
is supposed to provide the “true" ontological meaning of the thing  
i ts e lf  hidden behind the appearances. In P lato , anamnesis has the 
cognitive function of bridging the previously posited ontological 
chdrismos between the two worlds or levels of re a l ity .  In Exod 3:15b, 
however, anamnesis ( zkr) (even when i t  also has an ontological sense) 
works in a temporal cognitive dimension in which i t  gathers the 
"extension" through which God's Being "appears" so as to make possi­
ble the "tension" in which the knowledge about God as Being in i t s e l f  
stands.
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future on the basis of the remembrance of God's acts, of God’ s 
presence, and of God's promise.
In the context o f the progression of meaning that is found 
in Exod 6 :2 -7 , knowledge appears, then, as the climax in which these 
three ec-stasies are centered and connected in an extension-tension 
re la tio n s h ip J  Exod 6 :2 -7 , through i ts  inner progression of meaning,
c le a rly  suggests, then, th a t the knowledge of God w ill  happen in the
2 3future as a direct resu lt of God's temporal h istorica l fu lfillm e n t
In the text under investigation  there is also to be found 
the climax of a progression of meaning that starts ^from "hearing" 
(weshamecu, Exod 3 :18 ), goes into "believing" (ya'aminu, Exod 4 :8 ), 
an3 reaches f in a lly  i ts  climax in  "knowing" (wTdac tern, Exod 6 :7 ). 
Due to lack of space i t  is  not possible a t  th is  point to analyze th is  
enlightening progression o f meaning which would provide further and 
deeper insights for the development o f a B ib lical theory of know­
ledge.
2
That the text suggests a fu tu re  tense for "knowing" God does 
not mean th a t knowledge pertains to the fu ture alone, to the not-yet. 
That would imply that knowledge of God is not available since the 
fu ture as such is never reached. The te x t ,  however, speaks of future  
knowledge in the sense of a future th a t  is to be- actually reached 
as i t  becomes actual present (Exod 6 :5 -7 ) .  Exod 3, 4, and 6 speak 
of a present in which there is knowledge of God in an "extension- 
tension" structure. The fu ture ec-stasis points to a present-to-come 
in which further, deeper knowledge about God's Being w ill be a v a il­
able. Yet, at the same time, the fu tu re  is already "present" and 
acting in Moses's own time as "promise" as future “extension” or 
in te n tio n a lity  is integrated in Moses's actual knowledge through the 
cognitive "tension" (the in te n tio n a lity  of the "extension" is "back" 
into the cognitive subject) which God conditions and makes possible 
through the revelation of His Being as "promise" (prophecy). Thus, 
knowledge always "happens," that is , is  constituted in the present, 
but i t  springs from the ontological "extension" of God's temporal 
h is to ric a l ac tiv ity  and from the cognitive "tension" that is sug­
gested as the only way to reach cognitive ly  God's revelation.
3
Thus, the phenomenological analysis points to God acting 
"between" history and not "within" i t  as Bultmann's theory suggests 
(JCM, pp. 61, 62); see also p. 264 above. And yet, in an indirect 
way Bultmann agrees with the conclusion o f my phenomenological analy­
s is . He also sees that in the B ib le , God acts "within" history.
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of His present promise (vss. 6 , 7 ), which is rooted in His concern 
of remembering (past) His covenant (vs. 5 ) . Thus, the present, past, 
and future ontological ly  ,,extend“ the Being i ts e lf  of God as 
He appears. Consequently, the cognitive process as i t  approaches 
the temporally “extended" subject matter has to proceed, in order 
to discover its  meaning, through a “tension" ( “gathering") process 
which could harmoniously connect what has been "extended" in its  
ontological subject matter.
As the B ib lical knowledge about God's Being should follow  
His temporal ontological disclosure, i t  is  apparent that the cogni­
t iv e  framework of reason's structure functions in the temporal dimen­
s io n a lity , gathering, in cognitive tension, what has been presented
in temporal ontological extension. 1 Thus, knowledge about God in
2
Himself and knowledge about His acts coincide. Time and history
Yet, due to his "sc ien tific "  in te rp re ta tion  of reason, he considers 
that to be "mythical," and consequently he cannot accept i t .  See 
chapter 2 above, second part. Yet, when the tex t is considered as 
a " fa c t of reason” and its  temporal dimensionality is  discovered, 
i t  can be ra tion a lly  understood and accepted that God acts, in 
Bultmann's words, "between" history and its  phenomena.
Verses 4-7 of chapter 6 explain how God gives Himself to 
be known. The giving of God to be known is tied  up with the name 
Yahweh (vs. 3); that is , i t  is q u a lified  as an ontological disclo­
sure. What God gives to be known is His Being its e lf .  In vss. 4-7 
God explains how th is  ontological giving is  provided through the past 
and future "extensions" (ec-stasies) which are grounded and centered 
in the present of His presence to Moses (vs. 2 ). Thus the knowledge 
of God's Being in i ts e lf  is ontologically grounded in the “extension" 
which is  made available to human knowledge. But knowledge appears 
as the movement of "gathering" ("tension") of that which is given 
in temporal h istorica l "extension." Yet, the cognitive “tension" 
does not destroy the ontological "extension" but rather requires i t  
as i ts  ground. In th is  context, knowing God's Being in i ts e lf  and 
knowing His acts between history is the same thing.
2That, according to the OT scholarship, God is  understood 
to be known through His acts is a fac t widely known. See, for
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appear as dimensionalities th a t are at the very root of the B ib lica l 
in terp retation  of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure 
as seen from the perspective o f the epistemological frameworkJ
The temporal in terp re ta tion  of the epistemological structure 
that Exod 3-6 suggests stands in d irec t opposition to classical time­
less theories o f theological knowledge which understand the constitu­
tion  of theological meaning as an abstractive process which moves 
away from the level of time (sensory perception), which is  denied 
as the level where there is  no theological "truth" into the level 
of "eternal," "timeless" concepts where God Himself and "truth" 
abide.
Exod 6 , in its  ontological and epistemological relevance, 
turns upside down the classical in te rp re ta tion  of the way knowledge 
is supposed to  be constituted theo log ica lly . For the text under con­
sideration, God's words of promise are "abstract" concepts insofar 
as they are not yet "true." The words of the promise, coming from 
the future ontological extension of God, c e rta in ly  render knowledge 
about God. Yet, this is a kind of "abstract" knowledge. When 
uttered by God in the present as pertaining to the not-yet, future
instance, Motyer, p. 6; E. D. Schmidtz, "Knowledge," New* Interna­
tional D ictionary of New Testament Theology (1969), 2:396; Greenberg,
p. 83; Lacoque, pp. 345, 350.
^See Schmidtz, 2:396; Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 113; 
Q uell, p. 1062; von Rad, p. 185; Zimmerli, p. 21. I t  would seem that 
in His temporal extension-tension, ontological-epistemological struc­
tu re , God puts Himself on t r i a l .  His mission, which is shared with 
Moses, appears to be an ontological t r ia l  in which the Being i ts e lf  
of God is at r is k . Buber puts i t  in the follow ing sentence: "What
is now only existent in words w il l  then take on real existence. Then 
Moses w ill experience the mission of th is  God as an expression of
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realm, the promise is not actually “t ru e .“ I t  is  not "false" e ith e r .  
I t  is  just “abstract;" i t  is  a hypothesis which w ill come “true"  
only when such a hypothesis is  h is to r ic a lly  confirmed by an "ontic” 
act o f God. Thus, according to the B ib lica l in terpretation  of know­
ledge, truth "becomes” when that which has been promised (prophe­
sied) by God happens in actual time and hi s to ryJ
As theological reason is  interpreted and u t iliz e d  in B ib lic a l
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in a temporal dimensionality, the constitution of
2
meaning is to follow  a temporal approach to both o b jec tiv ity  and
His Being; not as a sp iritual mission, as now, but as a re a l ity  
apparent to the senses" (p. 47).
^When God acts truth becomes. That is , tru th  finds its  onto­
log ical ground in the temporal act o f God as i t  happens. The tem­
poral ontological dimensionality revealed by Exod 3-6 requires that 
the epistemological framework (logos) should be both constituted and 
expressed within a temporal in terp re ta tion  of the primordial presup­
position . The analysis of John 1 : 1 7  n aX ne c io  6 \ a  Inoo? X p io to c  
ctcvcto would bring additional l ig h t  upon the relationship that 
exists  between the temporal ontological grounding and the temporal 
epistemological grounded levels of theological reason as understood 
by Sacred Scripture.
In Exod 6 the people are not expected to pierce by fa ith  into  
the abstract tru th  that is supposed to be hidden behind the “h is to r i­
cal" promise of God. Not even Moses is  supposed to do so. Cogni­
t iv e ly ,  the promise is clear and meaningful. Yet the promise finds  
i t s  ontological ground in God's future act in h istory. U ntil the 
fu lf illm e n t time, the promise is  abstract knowledge in the sense of 
not having an ontological ground. Yet the "abstract" meaning of 
God's utterance ( in  th is case the promise) is the plain meaning of 
the tex t as i t  is  and not a meaning hidden behind i t .  However, th is  
p la in , clear, abstract meaning is  a p a rt ia l, "incomplete" meaning. 
I ts  "completion" (fu llness) is to  be reached as its  ontological 
ground happens. On the other hand, the “abstract" meaning o f the 
te x t has a provisional ontological ground in God's past and present 
a c tiv it ie s . From th is , perspective and context, I would suggest, 
the sensus plenior as hermeneutical princip le should be re in te r ­
pretes^
2
Because of the lim its and purpose of th is  study, i t  is  not 
possible here to develop any fu rth e r the way in which o b je c tiv ity
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reasoning.^ Extension-tension as ontological-epistemological struc­
ture that grounds i t s e l f  in the temporal dimensionality of Being and
should be interpreted within a temporal understanding of Being's 
dimensionality. A complete investigation should develop in d e ta il 
the idea of B ib lica l temporal o b je c tiv ity  as part of a B ib lica l 
theory of knowledge. I would lik e  to  suggest, however, that when 
B iblical o b jec tiv ity  refers to e n tit ie s  which are commonly available  
to man (as for instance, man, h is to ry , nature, and sciences), i t  
should be interpreted in a way s im ila r to the one pointed out in  
chapter 1 above (pp. 130-40). Yet, when the constitution of meaning 
in its  ob jec tiv ity  is  referred to , e n tit ie s  which are not commonly 
available to human knowledge, as, fo r  instance, God's appearances and 
acts, o b jec tiv ity  should be in terpreted following the theo-onto- 
logical order from the starting point provided by the record of such 
appearances as found in the Bible. In order that such an in terpreta­
tion could be accomplished, the Bible as a whole should not be con­
sidered prim ordially as a book of h is to ry  (as, fo r instance, Bultmann 
does), but rather as a book o f ontology, epistemology, and 
metaphysics. History is , no doubt about i t ,  present in  the B ib le. 
Yet the in terpretation  and understanding of the B ib lica l contribution  
to h istorica l knowledge should be made after reason has been 
interpreted and sharpened as a tool fo r  the constitution of meaning 
in the temporal dimensionality in which the Bible as a whole, 
including its  h istorica l content, is  constituted.
A^s in the case of B ib lical o b je c tiv ity , B ib lic a l reasoning 
(which connects B ib lica l concepts w ith in  the temporal dimensionality 
of Being) needs to be phenomenologically discussed and analyzed. 
Exod 3-6 does not get into the d e ta ils  of B iblical reasoning which 
should be found elsewhere throughout Scripture. Regarding the study 
of B ib lical reasoning I would like  to suggest that an epistemological 
analysis of B ib lical typology as so fa r  studied in B ib lic a l hermeneu­
tics  would prove to be greatly enlightening. Yet typology should not 
be interpreted from the trad itio n a l in terpretation  of a timeless 
primordial presupposition, as Raymond Brown does (The 'Sensus 
Plenior' of Sacred Scripture, pp. 10-22 ), but rather i t  should be 
interpreted from a phenomenological analysis of the B ib lica l use of 
typological structures, as, for instance, can be found in Richard M. 
Davidson's doctoral thesis (Typology in  Scripture: A Study of
Hermeneutical Structures [Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews
University Press, 1981J ). In th is  context typology appears as "an 
h istorica l approach to the understanding of the saving acts of God" 
(R. T. France, Jesus and the Old Testament: His Application of Old
Testament Passages to Himself and His Mission [Downers Grove, 
111inois: In te r-V ars ity  Press, 197IJ, p. 76).
B ib lical exegesis has already produced a great deal of 
re flec tion  on typology which can provide a starting point for epis­
temological ly  expressing the B ib lic a l movement of reasoning that
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logos should, then, be followed by both exegetes and systematic theo­
logians as they work together. Exegesis should place i ts e lf  in  the 
extension-tension situation as presented and represented in the te x t  
to be analyzed in order to discover through and in i t  what was 
thought and expressed in the te x t .  Systematic theology should place 
i t s e l f  in the actual present o f history as i t  develops. In such a 
context i t  has to constitute theological meaning in the extension- 
tension which Sacred Scriptures present as both past and future lines  
of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  are discovered in  the Bible as a wholeJ
typology represents. Once the B ib lica l movement of reasoning is  
grasped from the typological structures of the Bible, i t  should be 
followed as theological meaning is  constituted both in exegesis and 
in systematic theology. For an introduction to the contemporary d is ­
cussion on typology, see, fo r instance, Bernard Ramm, Protestant Bib-  
l ic a l In terp re ta tion , 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1970), pp. 215-40; Robert C. Dentan, "Typology— Its  Use and Abuse,” 
Anglican Theological Review 24 (1952):211 -17; Charles T. F ritsch , 
"B ib Iica l typology: Principles of B ib lical Typology," Bibliotheca
Sacra 104 (1946):214-22; idem, "Biblical Typology: Typological
In terp retation  in the New Testament," Bibliotheca Sacra 104 (1946): 
87-100; Leonard Goppelt, “ tGitoc, <x\>t i t u* oc , xowiiedc , uttotGwooic , "  
TDNT (1972), 8:246-59; Donald A. Hagner, "The Old Testament in  the 
New Testament," in  Interpreting  the Word of God, ed. Samuel J. 
Schultz and Morris A. inch I Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), pp. 78-104;
Horace D. Hummel, "The Old Testament Basis of Typological In terp re ta ­
tio n ,"  B ib lica l Research 9 (1964 ):38-50; G. W. H. Lampe, “Hermeneu­
tic s  and Typology," London Q uarterly and Hoi born Review 190 (1965): 
17-25; J. van der PIoeg, "L'exSg&se de I'Ancient testament dans 
1 'e p itre  aux Hebreux,” Revue Biblique 59 (1947):187-228.
^ It is not possible here to develop the way in which exegesis 
and systematic theology should re la te  and depend upon each other as 
they work together in the constitu tion  of theological meaning w ith in  
a cocmnon in terpretation  of both the dimensionality and the frameworks 
of reason's structure. Yet i t  can be in i t ia l l y  pointed out that the 
extension-tension ontological-epistemological situation applies to  
both. Exegesis would constitute its  meanings w ithin the extension- 
tension as seen from the past present in which i t  was o r ig in a lly  
uttered. Exegesis would re -constitu te  the meaning as, fo r instance, 
understood by Moses and the people at th e ir  times. The extension- 
tension in which the knowledge of God’s Being was given to them is
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Conclusion
The phenomenological analysis o f the B ib lic a l context for 
the critic ism  of theological reason as expressed in Exod 3:14, 15 
and Exod 6:2-7 reveals that a c ritic is m  of theological reason is  
possible.
to be re-constituted in order that i t s  theological and ontological 
meanings might be grasped. The meaning produced by exegesis would 
constitute the basis fo r the ac tiv ity  o f systematic theology. Syste­
matic theology would consider the resu lt of exegesis as a whole as 
coming from the past, i f  the meaning is  grounded in h is to ry , or from 
the fu tu re , i f  the meaning is expressed as an abstract promise of 
God's future action. Then, systematic theology must constitute, 
within a temporal understanding of o b je c tiv ity , meanings fo r the 
present understanding, action, and mission of the Church as Moses 
had to do back in his time for accomplishing the mission God 
appointed to him.
In th is  context, systematic theology appears as a rational 
enterprise, not as a contemplative one, but rather as a reflection  
in action, in mission. In order th a t systematic theology may be 
possible as an in te lle c tu a l enterprise, the development of a Biblical 
ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics is  necessary. See pp. 41-51 
above.
Moreover, systematic theology cannot get r id  of the 
extension-tension in which the promise was o r ig in a lly  uttered even 
after its  fu lf illm e n t. The promise remains as o rig ina l ontological 
extension that grounds meaning and provides fu rther insights into 
the understanding of both God and His Being. As an example of this  
continuous approach to the understanding of God from the basis pro­
vided by the revelation of Exod 3:14, 15 in the extension-tension 
situation, Exod 33:12-23; 34:14; and 20:1-17 can be considered. In 
Exod 20:1-17 the ontological ground of B ib lica l ethics can be found. 
Once Yahweh is known by the people in His "truth" as He appeared in 
the past and as He promised to act in the fu ture , God puts forward 
the "abstract" outline  of ethical princip les as expressed in the Ten 
Commandments. Thus the Ten Commandments as “abstract" eth ical know­
ledge, that is to find  its  ground in man's ontological acts, is pre­
viously to find its  orig inal partia l ground in God’ s Being. The Ten 
Commandments, then, in th e ir  grounding in  God's Being, provide fu r­
ther ontological insights into the understanding of God's Being which 
would receive even fu rther ligh t when those "abstract" eth ical prin­
ciples are ontologically grounded in  man's own fre e  actions. 
Obviously, the highest revelation of God's Being is  to be found in 
Christ who Himself declared that His work can be interpreted as 
revealing further insights regarding the meaning of God's name 
(Being). Christ said that eYvupioa aiitoTc to ovopa aov  >caT -rvupiow
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The phenomenological analysis shows that Exod 3:14, 15 thinks  
and expresses Being i ts e lf .  Thus Exod 3:14, 15 is  an ontological 
te x t , which, a t the very dawn of Judeo-Christian thinking addresses 
i t s e l f  to the in terpretation  o f the ground o f Being. As the idea 
of Being is expressed, i t  is tied  to the idea o f theos as appearance 
or presence.^ Consequently, the B ib lical in te rp re ta tion  of reason's 
ordo replaces the classical onto-theo-logical ordo by a theo-onto- 
logical one. I t  is  in th is "order" that the ontological subject 
matter of Exod 3:14, 15 opens i ts e lf  up in  the three temporal
ec-stasies (past, present, and fu tu re ).
From the revelation of the ontological meaning of the "sound- 
name" YHWH and through its  temporal openness, Exod 3:14, 15 in  its  
p a ra lle l structure provides an introduction to the B ib lical in te rp re ­
ta tio n  of the primordial presupposition from the viewpoint of the 
ontological framework. Being is  thought as appearing in the "ontic  
presence" (Exod 3:2 ) which "extends" i ts e lf  in  the three temporal 
ec-stasies. Thus, from both the id en tifica tio n  o f Being and appear­
ance and the openness of Being in the ontological temporal d isten ­
sion, i t  appears th a t the primordial presupposition of the ground
(John 17:26). Regarding the "I am" declarations by Christ as re lated  
to the "I am who I am" of Exod 3:14, see Ladd, A Theology of the New 
Testament, p. 250; and C. K. Barret, p. 342.
A^s Being's dimensionality co-appears w ith  theos as the ONE 
that grounds the un ity , coherence, and system of reason's system, 
B ib lica l ra t io n a lity  finds at i ts  very origin what Heidegger saw as 
a necessity for his own temporal understanding o f re a lity  as a whole. 
According to Heidegger our times are needy because they are lacking 
a God who would "assemble on himself man and the things and in th is  
assemblage would arrange the history of the world and man's sojourn 
in i t "  (Holzwege, p. 248, as quoted and translated  by Vicynias,
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of Being has been understood temporally^ by B iblical ra t io n a lity .
Moreover, in Exod 6:2-7 , the temporal ontological extension 
is completed as the ground of Being, as expressed through the name 
VHWH (already ontologically q u a lified ), is  approached from the epis- 
temological viewpoint involved in the Being-1ogos re lationsh ip . The 
phenomenological analysis o f the Exod 6:2-7 passage shows that B ib li­
cal logos is  supposed to follow the ontological grounding temporal 
extension with an epistemological temporal tension (gathering) of 
the lines of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that come from the extended subject 
matter. Additionally, according to  the B ib lical in te rp re ta tion  of
logos dimensionality, knowledge is  considered as reaching the very
2
Being of God who reveals Himself as He acts ,,o n t ic a lly . ,,
pp. 316, 317). What Heidegger's system lacks is the foundation of 
the B ib lic a l system.
^Michalson (R ationality  of Fa ith , p. 15) points out that thus 
fa r , no theologian has put history as center o f his sytem. As 
Being's temporal dimensionality is  thought and expressed in the 
Bible, the possib ility  of both a B ib lica l ontology and critic ism  of 
reason is  established.
2
This implies tha t the common in terpretation  th a t sees extra- 
B ib lica l philosophy as a must fo r developing Christian theology is  
only p a r t ia lly  true. T i l l ic h  is representative of th is  posture when 
he affirm s that "the attempt of biblicism  to avoid nonbiblical, onto­
logical terms is doomed to fa ilu re  as surely as are the correspond­
ing philosophical attempts. The Bible i ts e lf  always uses the cate­
gories and concepts which describe the structure of experience. On 
every page of every relig ious or theological te x t these concepts 
appear: time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, fre e ­
dom, necessity, l i f e ,  value, knowledge, experience, being and not- 
being. Biblicism may try  to preserve th e ir  popular meaning, but then 
i t  ceases to be theology. I t  must neglect the fa c t  th a t a philoso­
phical understanding of these categories has influenced ordinary lan­
guage fo r  many centuries. . . . The theologian must take seriously 
the meaning of the terms he uses. They must be known to him in the 
whole depth and breadth of th e ir meaning. Therefore, the systematic 
theologian must be a philosopher in c r it ic a l understanding even i f
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As neither in the ontological nor in the epistemological 
frameworks can the suggestion of an o rig ina l “gap," “chasm," or 
“chorismos" be found, i t  appears that the dimensionality in  which 
both Being and Logos (ontological and epistemological frameworks) 
in B ib lical ra tio n a lity  have to be understood is  temporal.
As an original re flec tion  on the ground of Being has been 
found w ithin the Biblical context, the p o s s ib ility  fo r the develop­
ment of a c ritic ism  of theological reason has been established.
Now the actual c ritic ism  of theological reason can begin. 
As the c ritic ism  of theological reason is  pursued, i t  should follow  
the basic guidelines laid down by the phenomenological analysis of the 
only availab le  theological re flec tion  on the ground of Being and its  
dimensionality, namely, Exod 3:14, 15 and context—the two main
guidelines that Exod 3:14, 15 and context ground (which should be 
followed in a criticism  of theological reason) are the temporal 
interpretation of the primordial presupposition of the dimensionality  
of reason's structure and the theo-onto-logical ordo. On the basis 
of these two main guidelines both the ontological and epistemological 
frameworxs should be investigated in re la tio n  to th e ir  B iblical 
interpretation.^ Such an in terpretation  should be discovered from
not in creative power" (Systematic Theology, 1:21). T il l ic h 's  
approach is  true , but only p a rt ia lly  so, because the philosophy that 
the theologian needs (in  tha t, T ill ic h  is  quite r ig h t)  must be 
derived from the Scripture i ts e lf  and must be constructed in a tem­
poral dimensionality.
^As the Biblical epistemology is  developed, i t  is  possible 
to find valuable insights in ex tra -B ib lica l epistemological 
approaches that describe h istorica l reason within a tim eless dimen­
sionality  as, fo r instance, Michalson does (R atio nality  of Faith,
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the Bible as a fa c t o f theological reason and then expressed techn i­
ca lly  in ontological and epistemological language.
p. 87). In th is  sense Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Merleau-Ponty's 
epistemology could also prove helpful in providing insights. Yet, 
no help can be found fo r the development of the ontological framework 
of reason's structure because o f i ts  theo-onto-logical order. Thus, 
the epistemological insights that may help to sharpen the epistemo- 
logical framework o f reason's structure should be selected only a f te r  
the Biblical in terpretation  of the ontological framework has been 
reached.
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CONCLUSION
At the beginning o f this study the question regarding the 
p o s s ib ility  of a c ritic ism  of theological reason was formulated. 
The search fo r an answer to th is  foundational question has required 
the carefu l analysis of three major contexts in which reason has been 
both u t il iz e d  and interpreted in re la tio n  to the constitution of 
theological meanings, namely, the philosophical, theological, and 
B ib lica l contexts. Now th a t the analysis of these three contexts 
has been completed, i t  is  possible to answer a ffirm ative ly  the ques­
tion of the possib ility  of a critic ism  of theological reason by theo­
logy i t s e l f .  The evidence provided by the analysis o f these three 
major contexts allows me to conclude that a critic ism  of theological 
reason is  indeed possible.
The analysis of the philosophical context, fo r  instance, 
reveals the nature and structure of reason as i t  functions as a tool 
for the constitution of meaning. Reason's hypothetical nature was 
also uncovered. Reason constitutes meaning as i t  functions always 
in a subject-object re lationship which requires an in terpretation  
of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The basic 
meaning o f these frameworks is determined by the in terp retation  of 
the dimensionality of Being and reason (the primordial presupposi­
tion) on which both of them stand. The analysis of the philosophical 
context also revealed tha t philosophy so fa r  has developed two main
388
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interpretations of the dimensionality and function of reason, namely, 
timelessness and tem porality. As a matter of fac t the philosophical 
interpretation of Being (as no-thing) which determines the basic 
in terpretation of reason accepted in  Western c iv iliz a t io n  and science 
was born as Parmenides provided, at the very beginning of Western 
philosophy, a timeless in te rp re ta tion  of the primordial presupposi­
tio n . On the other hand i t  was only rather recently that philosophy 
explored and expressed a temporal interpretation of reason's dimen­
sionality .^  Both in terpretations ground d iffe re n t understandings 
of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks—th a t is ,  of 
reason functioning in  the constitution of meaning, yet following the 
onto-theo-logical structural order which is  essential to  the very 
nature of philosophy.
Consequently, as pointed out in chapter 1 above, reason's 
functioning has been id en tifie d  and confused with its  timeless in te r ­
pretation . Since the temporal approach to the in terpretation  of both 
Being and reason's structure is  a rather recent happening in the his­
tory of philosophy (nineteenth and twentieth centuries), i ts  actual 
development is  only in its  in i t ia l  stages. On the other hand, the 
fa c t that philosophy has developed two d iffe ren t interpretations of 
reason's dimensionality points to its  hypothetical nature and is  not 
to  be confused w ith tra d itio n a l approaches that re la te  reason to 
e ith e r relativism  or subjectivism. Relativism and subjectivism as 
philosophical options stand only over against something which is con­
sidered absolute or necessary in the context of a timeless in te rp re ­
ta tio n  of reason's dimensionality. I f  a temporal in terp retation  is  
followed, re lativ ism  and subjectivism as usually addressed and under­
stood in philosophy stand in need of fundamental re in te rp re ta tio n . 
In other words, what may be philosophically understood by re lativ ism  
and subjectivism in a temporal dimensionality of reason depends on 
the rein terpreta tion  that th is  dimensionality requires of such basic 
epistemological concepts as absoluteness, necessity, and tru th . Thus 
the temporality-timelessness disjunction revealed by the analysis 
o f the philosophical context does not point to re lativ ism  or subjec­
tiv ism , but rather goes beyond them to the expression of the funda­
mental hypothetical nature of reason on which these and any other 
epistemological concepts are constituted.
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I t  would seem, a t f i r s t  glance, that the philosophical 
approach to the c ritic ism  of reason does not leave epistemological 
room fo r a theological approach to i t .  Yet the very fa c t that theos 
as the center of coherence and meaning, is  included in  philosophy's 
in terpretation  of the structure of reason (following an onto-theo- 
logical order) reveals th a t the philosophical c ritic is m  of reason 
does not deny the p o s s ib ility  of a theological approach to i t ,  but 
rather seems to leave such an epistemological p o s s ib ility  open fo r  
theology, which must decide about i t .
The investigation o f the theological context as represented 
in the systems of Aquinas and Bultmann c learly  shows that theology 
has so fa r  dogmatically adopted the classical timeless in terp re ta tion  
of both reason's dimensionality and its  frameworks w ith in  the ph ilo ­
sophical onto-theo-logical structural order. The two systems share 
the same interpretation of reason's dimensionality, even though they 
follow d iffe ren t major philosophical trad itio n s  of reason's in terpre­
ta tio n . Thomas, representing conservative theology (both Catholic 
and Protestant), follows a Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian pattern 
for the interpretation of reason's structure and functioning, while 
Bultmann, representing lib e ra l theology (P ro testan t), follows a 
Parmenidean-Kantian pattern .
Thus, the analysis of the theological context reveals that 
the cognitive categories (epistemological framework) u tiliz e d  fo r 
the constitution of theological meanings have been interpreted and 
shaped following the basic P laton ic-A ris to telian  model. Extra- 
theological categories are thus brought into theological discourse
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from the subject’ s side as the theologian needs to employ categories 
fo r the constitution of meaning. As there are no theological in te r ­
pretations of rational categories available, theologians are bound 
to use those interpretations which are available—that is  to say, 
the philosophical interpretations of reason's categories. Because 
the philosophical interpretations of reason's categories are shaped 
from the starting point of the ontos, th e ir application to the theo­
logical realm—and p articu la rly  to i ts  B ib lica l ground—en ta ils  a 
process of selection according to which only those ideas which match 
reason's timeless categories are considered as true; and consequently 
those which do not match them are considered as "myth," "educational 
examples," and the lik e . In short, the analysis of the theological 
context not only shows that theology u n c ritic a lly  follows the time­
less in terpretation  of reason's primordial presupposition (thus 
ignoring the possible temporal in terpretation  of i t  suggested by con­
temporary philosophy, notably Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty); i t  also 
shows that because i t  follows the timeless in terpretation  of reason, 
theology is unable to grasp the in te l l ig ib i l i t y  of the orig inal 
reflections on which Christian theology is founded.
The question arises regarding the foundation on which theo­
logy's choice of a timeless in terpretation  of reason's primordial 
presupposition has been made. At th is  point i t  is not surprising 
to discover th a t, since theology has accepted the onto-theo-logical 
order of reason's structure, which places the critic ism  of reason 
in philosophy's realm, no actual re flec tion  on the dimensionality 
of reason ( i t s  primordial presupposition) has been developed by
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Christian theology. The classical Greek timeless in terp re ta tion  has 
simply been assumed without any fu rth er c r it ic a l consideration. Yet, 
since philosophy has advanced a d iffe re n t temporal in te rp re ta tio n  
that revealed both the hypothetical nature of reason's structure and 
the uncritical epistemological stand of Christian theology as a 
whole, the question fo r theology's in te llec tu a l grounds and i t s  own 
in terpretation  of reason's dimensionality cannot be ignored any 
longer.
In order for Christian theology to approach the in te rp re ta ­
tion  of reason's dimensionality and make a decision regarding i ts  
meaning, i t  is necessary that a theological re flec tion  on the ground 
of Being be found at the orig in  of Christian ra tio n a lity , or, i f  none 
is  found, that an approach to i t  be provided. Since the analysis  
of the theological context revealed that th re flec tion  has not been 
produced nor attempted, the analysis of theological ra t io n a lity  as 
expressed in the B ib lica l context stands in need of phenomenological 
examination in order to determine whether or not such re fle c tio n  
already exists at the in te llec tu a l foundations of Christian re f le c ­
tio n .
Since Exod 3:14 has been tra d itio n a lly  considered as the locus 
classicus of an ongoing discussion regarding the meaning of Being 
w ithin Scriptures, the analysis of the B ib lical context was focused 
on i t  and its  context in order to discover its  ontological relevance. 
The phenomenological analysis reveals that Exod 3:14 and its  context 
express an original re flec tio n  on the ground of Being. As such, th is  
foundational passage of Christian ra tio n a lity  (which can be
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considered as the theological parallel to  Parmenides's philosophical 
in te rp re ta tion ) provides not only the necessary ground fo r  a c r i t i ­
cism of theological reason, as reason's structure is interpreted as 
functioning in  a theo-onto-logical order (grounded on God's "ontic 
presence” ) ,  but also the necessary viewpoint that an actual develop­
ment of a c ritic ism  of theological reason requires, namely, the tem­
poral in terp retation  of reason's dimensionality ( its  primordial pre­
supposition) .
The analysis of the Biblical context, as represented in the 
original re flec tio n  on the Ground o f Being that Exodus 3:14 
expresses, shows that B ib lica l ra t io n a lity  does address i t s e l f  to 
foundational ontology as i t  e x p lic itly  puts Being into words. Thus, 
Exod 3:14 seems to provide the necessary ground, even the in te lle c ­
tual ju s t if ic a tio n , fo r a B ib lical philosophy that can stand indepen­
dent from the Greek trad itio n s  of philosophy. In other words, i t  
seems that we could speak o f two d iffe re n t philosophical tra d itio n s— 
namely, the Parmenidean and the Mosaic-Biblical trad itions .
Since within B ib lic a l ra tio n a lity  Being co-appears with theos 
(in His "ontic-presence” ) ,  Exod 3:14 and its  context provide the 
necessary basis for a theological approach to the in terp re ta tion  of 
reason's structure, namely, for a c r itic is m  of theological reason. 
Moreover, the context of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  in  which both the expression 
of God's Being and its  ontological understanding are expressed sug­
gests a temporal in terpretation  of the primordial presupposition of 
reason's structure at the level of i ts  ontological framework ( ontos) . 
The analysis of Exod 6:2-7 complements the picture by suggesting that
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also from the perspective o f the epistemological framework ( logos) 
B ib lica l ra tio n a lity  is developed according to a temporal understand­
ing of the primordial presupposition. No chorismos, gap, or discon­
t in u ity  whatsoever is e ith er expressed or implied. On the contrary, 
reason is found e x p lic itly  functioning on the assumption o f a tem­
poral h istorical continuity. In short, i t  seems that theology, in 
following the Parmenidean philosophical in terp retation  of reason's 
structure was not only disregarding its  own rational structures but 
was following an in terp re ta tion  of reason which is  incompatible with  
the one used as its  original re flec tio n  and concepts were constituted  
and communicated in the B ib le .
Once the possib ility  o f both a c ritic ism  of theological rea­
son, as expressed in the theo-onto-logical in terpretation  of reason's 
structured order, and also the theological in terpretation  o f reason's  
primordial presupposition, namely, tem porality, have been established, 
the problem arises regarding the way in which theology should decide 
between the classical timeless in terpretation  of reason adopted in 
the constitution of Christian theological systems and the temporal 
in terpretation  that appears a t the origin and foundation of Christian  
ra tio n a lity  as expressed in the B ib lical context.
F irs t of a l l ,  i t  must be noted that the same problem is  faced 
by philosophy which should provide an answer o f its  own. Here, how­
ever, I am concerned only w ith a theological answer; the philosophi­
cal one fa lls  outside the lim its  and purpose o f this d isserta tio n . 
Philosophy has to provide an answer within its  own realm, follow ing  
i ts  own interpretation of reason's structure order (that is ,  w ith in
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an onto-theo-logical order). In my opinion, philosophy needs to 
affirm  both of them as i t  stands on reason's hypothetical nature as 
i ts  ground fo r decision; yet th is  raises questions regarding the very 
foundations of philosophy as in te lle c tu a l enterprise as so fa r  under­
stood; and these require urgent, careful philosophical treatment. 1
Within the Christian theological realm, which is  the concern 
of the present investigation, the decision regarding the adoption of 
a timeless or a temporal in terpretation  of reason should be made on 
grounds other than the onto-theo-logical philosophical ones, namely 
other than on the ground and authority of reason's functioning alone, 
which, as has been shown, stands in a foundational hypothetical 
nature that cannot be avoided. Furthermore, because of theology's 
p artic u la r in te lle c tu a l dependence on the B ib lica l tra d itio n  as
The hypothetical nature of reason challenges i ts  tra d itio n a l 
ro le  as the c rite r io n  and ground fo r truth not only in theology but 
also in philosophy. This s ituation  requires, perhaps, that philoso­
phy both reassess its  foundational interpretation of tru th , and adapt 
i t  to  the hypothetical nature o f reason on which philosophical tru th  
is supposed to stand. The major problem to be faced by such a ph ilo ­
sophical reassessment would be re lated  to the in terpretation  and ro le  
of the theos (fundamental unity) in reason's structure. I f  reason's 
hypothetical nature makes possible at least two basic in terpretations  
of i ts  own dimensionality, i t  seems d if f ic u lt  to see how the unity  
that i ts  own system requires (theos) could be attained.
At th is  point we may remember Heidegger's own approach to the 
problem. In his "overcoming" of metaphysics he actually rejected  
both the tra d itio n a l timeless in terpretation  of the theos and the 
theos i t s e l f  as part of reason's structure. Thus he understood 
reason to function in an "onto-logical" order from which the theos 
was ju s t absent— not only the Christian theos but also the theos as 
ground fo r the systematic unity and coherence of reason. Perhaps the 
only available conclusion, which I obviously cannot establish here, 
is that the onto-theo-logical in terpretation  of reason's structure is 
doomed to fa ilu re  and tha t, consequently, i t  should be replaced by 
the Christian theo-onto-logical in terp retation . Since th is  would 
imply philosophy's surrendering of its  in te llec tu a l foundations to 
theological re flec tio n s , i t  is  very lik e ly  that philosophy w ill  
develop another solution for th is  problem.
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con stitu tive  of its  own essence, i t  seems that the in te rp re ta tion  
that co-appears with the original re fle c tio n  on the theos should 
determine the theological in terp re ta tion  of Being's and reason's 
( lo g ia ) dimensionality. In the philosophical realm, the choice is 
linked to  a purely rational option as i t  naturally appears from the 
perspective of the ontos. As the in terpretation  of the ontos is  
sought on the basis of reason, reason's hypothetical nature presents 
two p o s s ib ilit ie s --th e  way of timelessness and the way o f temporal­
i ty .  On the other hand, when the dimensionality of reason is  seen 
from the perspective of not only the theos but p a rtic u la rly  of the 
C hristian theos, i t  seems that the appearance of the C hristian  theos 
as "ontic presence" brings along as " b u ilt - in ,"  a temporal in terp re­
ta tio n  o f Being's and reason’ s dimensionality which is both constitu­
tiv e  of and expressed through the ground provided by i ts  appearance 
which essentia lly  includes the Word ( lo g ia ) . That is  to  say, the 
"ontic appearance," on which not only a critic ism  of theological 
reason but also Christian theology as a whole stands, does not appear 
as a “brute fact" from which no lin e  of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  whatsoever 
flows to the cognitive subject, who is  expected to provide by his 
own rational hypothetical powers the in terpretation of the "brute 
fa c t."  I f  th is  were the case, the onto-theo-logical order would need 
to be applied and theology would stand in in te llectua l dependence 
on philosophy and share in its  essential hypothetical nature. On 
the contrary, however, God's "ontic presence" can be in te lle c tu a lly  
grasped when i t  appears not as a "brute fact" but rather (as i t  is  
understood by b ib lica l w riters) as the most fundamental and
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meaningful happening of a l l ,  which certain ly includes as i ts  source 
of meaning many lines of in te l l ig ib i l i t y ,  among them notably
those which essentia lly  provide the ground fo r temporal in te rp re ta ­
tion  of reason's dimensionality. In th is way the theo-onto-logical 
order of theology as in te lle c tu a l enterprise can be seen at work. 
I t  is no longer the re flec tio n  on the ontos (philosophical re f le c ­
tion ) which provides the ground fo r the in terpretation  of the theos 
of theology. On the contrary, i t  is  the theos and the lines  of
in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that flow from i t  that determine the in te rp re ta tion  
of the ontos w ith in  which the original re flec tio n  of Christian theo­
logy has been constituted as a whole.
Furthermore, were i t  possible for Christian theology to  con­
s titu te  its  system and meanings in absolute disconnection from the 
lines of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that flow from the Christian theos as pre­
sented in the B ible, i t  would have to accept the re flec tion  o f rea­
son's dimensionality from the philosophical perspective. Yet, i t  
is apparent that Christian theology not only cannot detach i t s e l f
from its  o rig ina l B ib lical re flec tio n  on the ground of Being from
the perspective of the theos but that i t  essentia lly  depends and is  
based on i t .  Otherwise there would be no authentic Christian theo­
logy, but only theology as such and in general, as for instance, is  
the case in early  Greek theology. Thus the affirm ation of the possi­
b i l i t y  of a c ritic ism  of theological reason co-appears with the theo­
logical decision for a temporal in terpretation of Being's and rea­
son's dimensionality. Consequently, a c r it ic a l approach to actua lly  
developing a critic ism  of theological reason should re je c t the
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t ra d it io n a l, timeless interpretation on which Christian theological 
systems have been so fa r  constituted and should adopt, on the con­
tra ry , both the theo-onto-logical in terp retation  of reason's struc­
ture and its  Christian temporal in terp re ta tion  of the primordial pre­
supposition.
This study reaches as its  conclusion only the affirm ation  
of the poss ib ility  of a critic ism  of theological reason. An actual 
development of i t  has not even been intended. Consequently, an eval­
uation and critic ism  of reason's tra d itio n a l in terp retation  and 
behavior in the constitution of theological meanings (as represented 
in Thomas's and Bultmann's systems) cannot be developed here e ith er. 
Only on the basis, not of the affirm ation of the p o s s ib ility  of a 
c ritic is m  of theological reason, but rather of i ts  actual development 
could the evaluation and critic ism  of reason's tra d itio n a l behavior 
and systems in theological enterprise be attempted.
Nonetheless, on the basis of the rad ica lly  d iffe re n t in te r­
p retation  of both reason's structural order (theo-onto-logical) and 
dimensionality (tem porality) i t  is  possible to suggest at th is  point 
that the actual development of a c ritic ism  of theological reason 
implies an "overcoming" of reason's tra d it io n a l, timeless in terpreta­
tio n , and consequently, of its  systematic and dogmatic resu lts . Yet, 
regarding both the conservative and the libera l in terpretations and 
uses o f reason's structure in the constitution of theological mean­
ing, the "overcoming" does not enta il a complete re jection  of Chris­
tian  theology as so fa r  constituted.
Moreover, because both the tra d itio n a l approach to theology
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in  its  systematic and dogmatic results  and the c r i t ic a l  approach to  
theology in its  yet-to-be-seen dogmatic and systematic results work 
with the same subject matter, i t  is  possible to  foresee that the  
"overcoming" that a critic ism  of theological reason entails  does 
not mean the absolute denial of every single Christian truth as i t  
is  so fa r understood and believed in the conservative and lib era l t r a ­
ditions of Christian theology. I t  means rather that on the basis 
of the constitution of theological meanings with the help, fo r the 
f i r s t  time, of frameworks and categories of reason, theologically  
developed and grounded, reason would be f in a lly  completely "prepared" 
and “fitte d "  fo r  i ts  theological task, which in  i ts  results would 
"overcome" tra d itio n a l systematic and dogmatic formulations in the 
sense of "going beyond" both libera lism  and conservatism.
In other words, as reason is  interpreted from a theological 
basis, its  categories and procedures fo r the constitution of meaning 
change. Consequently, the resu lt of constituted meanings (dogmatics 
and exegesis) w il l  change as w e ll. Indeed, not only w ill the theo­
logical answers be d iffe re n t, but even the theological questions w il l  
change. A new theological system w il l  arise, which, for the f i r s t  
time, w ill be fre e  from extra-theological philosophical conditioning. 
Furthermore, th is  "overcoming" w il l  not spring from or pertain to  
any particular tra d itio n  of Christian theology (Catholic or Protes­
tan t, conservative or l ib e ra l) .  Thus, the actual development o f a 
critic ism  of theological reason and i ts  ensuing systematic and exege- 
t ic a l results could provide a new starting point for Christian  
rapprochement. Since the tra d itio n a l timeless in terpretation of
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reason's structure is at the basis of the many disagreements that 
divide Christian theology, the "overcoming" o f th is in te rp re ta tion  
through an authentically theological temporal in terp re ta tion  of rea­
son's structure and its  frameworks as present in the B ib le  could 
prove to  be greatly b e n e fic ia l. for furthering  Christian dialogue, 
as theological truth is fo r  the f i r s t  time systematically explored 
with an in te llectua l tool (reason) especially shaped and f i t te d  for 
the specific  purpose of constituting Christian theological meanings.
In order that a c ritic is m  of theological reason may be 
actually  developed, as a basis fo r the theological dogmatic and sys­
tematic “overcoming" of the libera l and conservative approaches, 
further study needs to be done. Such a c r i t ic a l  enterprise is going 
to be time-consuming, d i f f i c u l t ,  and complex, but at the same time 
very rewarding both in te lle c tu a lly  and s p ir itu a lly .  I t  w i l l  require 
a team e ffo r t  in which many d iffe re n t specia lties  w ill be called to 
p artic ip a te , fo r its  development w ill embrace the en tire  spectrum 
of Christian theology. The path that a c ritic is m  of theological rea­
son w il l  u ltim ately follow, however, w ill be discovered as i t s  actual 
development takes place. Yet at this in i t ia l  stage I would lik e  to 
suggest at least some broad guidelines th a t could be helpful as the 
actual development of the critic ism  of theological reason gets 
started. To begin with, i t  should be taken in to  consideration that a 
c ritic ism  of theological reason should be constructed on the basis 
of a careful phenomenological analysis o f the foundational fact of 
theological reason that is found in the B ible as a whole. The c r i t i ­
cism of theological reason needs to be approached and developed on
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the ground provided by B ib lica l ra tio n a lity  and in t e l l ig ib i l i t y ;  
otherwise i t  would be neither Christian nor theological.
In other words, the c ritic is m  of theological reason is  not 
supposed to create a new theory of knowledge (reason). Such an 
approach would follow  the tra d itio n a l onto-theo-logical path, and 
consequently would not be a theological c ritic ism . A theological 
critic ism  of reason, on the contrary, should begin from the phenom­
enological discovery of reason's frameworks that appear flowing from 
the "ontic presence” of God ( theos). From th is  starting point the 
cognitive analysis should aim to discover the ways and categories in 
which reason's structure has already functioned in the constitution  
of Biblical ra t io n a lity . Within this general context, the 
enterprise should follow the theo-onto-logical structural order, 
according to which God's "ontic appearance" conditions the under­
standing and in terp retation  of Being, and through the in terp re ta tion  
of Being also condition the in terpretation of reason's cognitive  
categories ( logia or epistemological framework).
The c ritic ism  of theological reason needs to work phenomeno­
logical ly in order to grasp, describe, and epistemologically express 
the structure, categories, frameworks, and procedures of reason as 
they co-appear when B ib lica l conceptuality is actually expressed and 
developed throughout Holy Scriptures. The results of such an ep iste­
mological descriptive enterprise would enable Christian theologians 
both to properly understand th e ir  in te llectua l and theological roots 
and to develop th e ir  own theological reflections u t il iz in g  the same 
rational procedures that were used in the constitution of the
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foundational concepts of Christian thinking as recorded in the B ib le .
Within the general context special consideration should be 
given to the discovery and expression of the B ib lica l in terp re ta tion  
and usage of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks of 
reason's structure. The ontological framework should be approached 
f i r s t .  Since i t  is  at this point that both the lib e ra l and conserva­
tiv e  systems find th e ir  in te llec tu a l ground in the tra d itio n a l ex tra - 
theological timeless in terpretation  of reason s dimensionality, the 
c r it ic a l  approach should develop the theological understanding of 
Being and its  dimensionality through a careful study of the ways the 
Christian theos appears and is  interpreted w ithin B ib lic a l ra tio n a l­
i ty .  Thus the Christian doctrine of God and the Christian doctrine  
of Being w ill co-appear. This foundational study of B ib lic a l 
ontology could be summarized under the broad t i t l e  of God and tim eJ
This understanding of God's Being should be investigated  
w ithin the general framework of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  provided by the tem­
poral in terpretation  of both Being's and reason's dimensionality as 
expressed in Exod 3:14 and 6:2-7. I t  should begin by questioning the 
timeless in terpretation  of God's transcendence. Furthermore, an
This does not mean the denial of philosophy as a realm of
inquiry. I t  only means the denial of an extra-theo log ical, extra-
B ib lica l philosophy as constitutive of theology and its  in te rp re ta ­
tion  of reason's structure. This denial is based on the existence 
of a B ib lical philosophy which only the theo-onto-logical, temporal 
approach can discover and express. In other words, at th is  point 
theology takes over the philosophical task, which has been so fa r  
developed in an extra-theological realm and procedure, and develops 
i t  w ithin its  own realm and according to its  own procedure. The
resu lt of th is philosophical re flec tio n  w ithin the realm of theology
w ill  replace any extra-theological, extra -B ib lica l re fle c tio n  that 
the in terpretation of theological reason or the development of Chris­
tian  theology may need.
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investigation in search of the B ib lica l understanding of God's trans­
cendence should care fu lly  apply a methodological epochi to every 
extant theory regarding God's Being and His transcendence. Only 
through the consistent application of a methodological epoche could 
the meaning of God's transcendence, as i t  appears in the framework 
of a temporal in terpretation  of Being's dimensionality, be d is­
covered. In other words, an investigation of the way B ib lical 
ra tio n a lity  interprets God's Being should begin by asking how trans­
cendence is understood in the background of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  that is  
provided by the temporal in terpretation  of Being's dimensionality 
expressed in Exod 3:14. Moreover, an in terp re ta tion  o f God's Being 
should focus on the actual ontological “extension'' through which and 
in which His Being is  given. At the same time theologians should 
recognize the cognitive ''tension” which is supposed to gather the 
flow of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  that proceeds from God's ontological "exten­
sion," so that the ontological structure revealed by th is  flow of 
in te l l ig ib i l i t y  may be grasped and described. By thus p a tien tly  fo l ­
lowing God’s ontic "extension" as i t  appears in the B ib lic a l in te r­
pretation "stretched out” in the three ec-stasies of tem porality, 
and by gathering in cognitive "tension" the flow of in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  
revealed by God's ontic "extension," the theologian should be able 
gradually to discover both the B ib lica l idea of God and the B ib lical 
understanding of Being as they co-appear and are grounded in the 
theos.^
*As a new approach to the understanding of the theos is  con­
sidered, one discovers that some contemporary theologians have
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The in terpretation  of reason's ontological framework should 
be completed by the analysis of man's being as i t  appears and is 
interpreted in B ib lical ra t io n a lity . Then the in terp retation  of Bib­
lic a l metaphysics is to be developed and expressed in order to pro­
vide the basis of reason's unity and systematic coherence. Obviously 
the in terpretation  of B ib lic a l metaphysics would have to be developed 
within a temporal in te rp re ta tio n  of Being's dimensionality in the 
context provided by the B ib lic a l ontological in terpretation  of both 
God's and man's being.
already expressed seminal reflections which should not be ignored. 
For instance, Jurgen Moltmann affirms that "God who reveals himself 
in Jesus must be thought o f as the God of the Old Testament, as the 
God of the exodus and the promise, as the God with 'fu tu re  as his 
essential nature', and therefore must not be id en tified  with the 
Greek view of God, with Parmenides' 'eternal present' o f Being, with 
Plato's highest Idea and w ith  the Unmoved Mover of A r is to tle , not 
even in his a ttribu tes . Who he is , is not declared by the world as a 
whole, but is declared by Is ra e l’ s history of promise. His a t t r i ­
butes cannot be expressed by negation of the sphere of the earth ly , 
human, mortal and trans ien t, but only in reca lling  and recounting the 
history of his promise. In  Jesus Christ, however, the God of Israel 
has revealed himself as the God of a ll mankind. Thus the path 
leads from the concretum to  the concretum universale, not the other 
way round. Christian theology has to think along this l in e . I t  is  
not that a general truth became concrete in Jesus, but the concrete, 
unique, h istoric  event of the crucifying and raising of Jesus by 
Yahweh, the God of promise who creates being out of nothing, becomes 
general through the universal eschatological horizon i t  anticipates" 
(Theology of Hope, pp. 141, 142).
Yet even Moltmann, who is here following an insight provided 
by 0T scholarship (God’ s action and the "promise" m otif) is unable to 
draw the ontological and cognitive consequences fo r the under­
standing of Being's dim ensionality and his theo-onto-logical struc­
ture that are entailed by the approach to the knowledge of God he is  
suggesting. Moltmann, l ik e  most theologians, s t i l l  works with an 
onto-theo-logical understanding of reason’ s structure which does not 
allow him to "overcome" the trad itio n a l in terpretation  of reason as 
used in theology so fa r .  Moltmann's tra d itio n a l timeless under­
standing of reason is apparent when he follows the trad itio n a l theo­
logical idea that plays law and promise against each other (pp. 143- 
45).
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Within the framework of in te l l ig ib i l i t y  provided by a tempo­
ra l understanding of both Being and reason, B ib lic a l metaphysics is  
supposed to draw a picture, as c le a r as possible, of re a lity  as a 
whole, that is of ta  panta. Yet, w ithin a temporal dimensionality, 
ta  panta moves. I t  does not stand s t i l l ;  i t  is  not s ta tic , as in 
tra d itio n a l metaphysics. Consequently, as both the whole (ta  panta) 
and the thinker who is  trying to grasp and express its  meaning are 
supposed to move, i t  follows that ta  panta as such cannot be reached 
nor expressed, as i t  were, from the outside by try ing  to embrace i t  
through a single v is io  or contemplatio. On the contrary, i f  ta panta 
moves, its  meaning should be approached, grasped, and expressed as 
i t  were from the inside, from w ithin i ts  own movement. At this point 
the en tire  Bible provides the basis for an authentically  temporal 
h is to ric a l metaphysics that grasp the meaning of the ta  panta from 
i ts  inside as i t  moves, extends, and embraces i ts e lf  in the
"extension-tension" movement of B ib lica l in t e l l ig ib i l i t y .
Even though B iblical m otifs , such as, fo r instance, the
sanctuary and the struggle between good and e v i l ,  can provide
enlightening insights that should be kept in mind as the B ib lica l 
in terp re ta tion  of ta  panta is  investigated, the center of the whole
is to be seen in the ontological framework as both God's being and
man's being develop together in inner and essential relationship.
At th is point, consequently, the Bible as a whole appears
to provide the only metaphysical in terpretation  o f the meaning of
ta  panta from inside its  temporal f lu x J  Such an in terp re tation ,
^od , as the "center" o f ta  panta (as He appears in the OT 
through and in His "ontic presence which in the NT reaches i ts
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when developed in its  main guidelines, should provide the general 
background fo r in te l l ig ib i l i t y  that is to  be the ground fo r  coherence 
of both theological reason and its  system.
Secondly, the epistemological framework should be approached 
and investigated. The B ib lic a l logi a should be studied at the level 
of the o rig in  of concepts, the constitution of categories (o b jec tiv ­
i ty ) ,  and the relation of meanings once constituted, among themselves 
(reasoning).
At th is  point a word of c la r if ic a t io n  is  necessary. The sug­
gestion th a t the theological in te rp re ta tion  of reason "overcomes" 
the tra d itio n a l timeless understanding o f i t  does not mean that a ll 
rational procedures as known so fa r must be rejected by a temporal 
in te rp re ta tio n . As a m atter of fac t, there are many rational proce­
dures th a t have been developed in close contact with temporal 
re a lity ,  notably those of the modern empirical sciences. (An evalua­
tion of these procedures and th e ir re la tio n  to a temporal in te rp re ta ­
tion of reason's structure is not possible here; but i t  should be 
undertaken as the c ritic is m  of theological reason actually  devel­
oped). Thus, for instance, mathematical, physical, or h is to rica l 
procedures which could be involved and required in the determination
climax in the person and work of C h ris t), grounds an authentically  
Christian interpretation of the whole ( ta  panta) which is developed, 
from i ts  very foundations, along the lin e s  of temporal functioning 
of reason's structure. Contemporary metaphysical approaches, such 
as process theology, evolutionary theory, and Marxism, do recognize 
that the whole moves. Yet, a l l  of them approach the in terp re ta tion  
of the meaning of ta panta from both an extra-theological ontological 
framework and a timeless in terpretation  of reason's epistemological 
framework. See chapter 1 above.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
407
of information and dates (which obviously play a paramount part in 
a temporal in terpretation  of r e a l ity  as a whole) are not b as ica lly  
to be modified. Yet, as the meaning of any part of data stands in  
d ire c t relation to the whole to which they belong, the data and dates 
which such “tra d itio n a l"  procedures provide w il l  assume quite d i f ­
fe ren t connotations and nuances as they appear embedded w ithin the 
B ib lica l metaphysical framework o f in te l l ig ib i l i t y .
As the investigation of the in terpretation  of the epistemolo­
gical framework is  pursued through a phenomenological analysis of 
B ib lica l ra tio n a lity , i t  w ill be useful to discover how many categor­
ies and patterns of reasoning already have been approached in d ire c tly  
by B iblical scholarship; fo r instance, the epistemological study of 
B ib lica l patterns of reasoning, exegetical and hermeneutical studies 
on the meaning and structure o f B ib lical typology may provide deep 
and decisive insights.
I t  is only when these basic aspects o f reason's critic ism s  
have been discovered and adequately expressed that related epistemo­
logical issues can be properly analyzed from a theological perspec­
t iv e , notably the problem of the origin of theological meanings 
(reve la tion -insp ira tion ) and methodological hermeneutical patterns  
and procedures. A fter these issues are properly c la r if ie d , a l l  of 
the exegetical and doctrinal propositions and meanings that co n sti­
tu te  the whole of Christian theology can be properly addressed.^
Because the in te rp re ta tio n  of theological and exegetical
^Regarding related issues that should be approached once the 
critic ism  of reason has reached its  in i t ia l  development, see the 
Introduction above, p. 13-15.
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methodology has been developed on the basis of an extra-theo log ical, 
timeless understanding of reason's functioning which stands in need 
of being overcome, methodological procedures (in  exegesis, fo r exam­
ple) stand in need of radical re in te rp re ta tion . Consequently, w ithin  
the exegetical realm both the grammatical-historical and h is to ric a l-  
c r it ic a l  methods stand in need of being "overcome" through the 
developing of a new exegetical method which should replace them in 
the search fo r B ib lical meanings. Yet, due to the fac t that a com­
plete c ritic is m  of reason in a ll  i ts  complexities and details  may 
require a long time to develop and mature, i t  seems advisable that a 
c ritic is m  of the whole of Christian theology should be approached as 
a team e ffo r t  involving a ll i ts  related areas of concern and 
s p e c ia ltie s . Yet the general understanding should prevail that such 
an enterprise is to develop along the B ib lical lines of in t e l l ig ib i l ­
i ty  and that each area and d isc ip line  should take in to  account the 
discoveries that a c ritic ism  of reason may be gradually presenting to 
the theological community. This, moreover, implies th a t theological 
re fle c tio n  in a ll its  areas should be fle x ib le  enough to adjust its  
own conclusions in an ever-progressing discovering of tru th .
The analysis of time and timelessness as primordial presuppo­
s itions  has pointed to the p o s s ib ility  that a critic ism  of theologi­
cal reason can be developed. Some of the tasks and consequences of 
such a p o s s ib ility  have been b r ie f ly  suggested. The actual task of 
developing a critic ism  of theological reason remains before us. I t  
involves both an opportunity and a r is k : opportunity, because theo­
logy, a f te r  centuries of in te llec tu a l dependence, contemplates the
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p o s s ib ility  of being f in a lly  independent and thus au then tica lly  
Christian; and r is k , because i ts  in te llec tu a l independence, i ts  
“coining of age" en ta ils  the insecurity involved in  the “overcoming” 
of its  own trad itions  and dogmatic exegetical formulations. W ill 
theology accept the risk? W ill i t  s trive  fo r  i t s  in te llec tu a l fre e ­
dom? Or, on the contrary, w ill i t  rather choose to stay in comfort­
able in te llectual dependence, avoiding both the task and the risk?  
Only the future of Christian theology is able to answer th is  ques­
tio n .
Perhaps the passion fo r tru th  that burns in the soul of every 
theologian and the sad situation of theological disagreement and lack 
of unity that theology’ s in te llec tu a l dependence has so fa r  produced 
could provide the necessary motivation for both facing the task and 
accepting the r is k . I f  that is the case, the f i r s t  step to be taken 
on the path of in te llec tu a l independence seems to be clear: the
actual development of a critic ism  of theological reason.
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